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The prospect of nuclear terrorism, terrorist acts with nuclear fission explosives, is 
analysed by means of rational choice theory, a methodology borrowed from 
economics which has hitherto not been systematically applied to nuclear terrorism. 
The methodology allows the formalisation and modelling of key choices faced by 
both the aspiring nuclear terrorist and a potential target government in order to 
work out best strategies under the assumptions that the players are rational and 
intelligent. 
Four relevant decision situations are studied: The terrorist's choice of whether to 
embark on an ambitious and expensive nuclear project or to stay with tried and 
trusted conventional methods; The choice of fissile material for a terrorist bent on 
building a nuclear weapon: highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium as 
fissile material; The government's choice of prioritising between branches of fissile 
materials safeguards (HEU versus plutonium); and the strategic interplay between 
terrorist and government in the case where the terrorist has acquired a nuclear 
weapon and must decide whether to use it to attack, for extortion (blackmail) or to 
deter an attack upon his own interests. 
Several key conclusions reached are of direct policy applicability. A simple 
decision theoretical analysis shows that heavy emphasis on HEU over plutonium in 
safeguards measures is justified. It is demonstrated that relative deterrence (by 
denial) of nuclear terrorism in favour of conventional means is possible, and the 
conditions for which are found. It is found, moreover, that to use an acquired 
nuclear weapon for blackmail or deterrence purposes is almost never preferable for 
a terrorist, and the best response of a government to an explicit nuclear terrorist 
threat is almost always forceful response. 
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- 1 - Introduction, Literature review and methodology 
Although the freezing international climate of the Cold War seems to have 
thawed considerably, the nuclear threat is according to many analysts, as prevalent 
as ever. Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed EI Baradei, for one, concluded in 
2005 that 'the threat of nuclear war has never been greater'l. Much as the calculi of 
deterrence and massive nuclear retaliation may have become less prevalent, nuclear 
arms could be gaining newfound strategic importance for smaller actors: against a 
technologically advanced adversary it is a weapon that, even in small numbers, can 
immediately compensate for inferior conventional capacities. Nuclear weapons 'no 
longer represent the frontier of technology' Betts sums up; 'Increasingly, they will 
become the weapons of the weak,2. Non-state actors count among those who could 
see such potential. 
Recent events have shown with terrifying clarity that the new breed of terrorists 
is not averse to killing civilians in the hundreds and thousands for what they see as 
the ultimate cause, and the notion by Jenkins that 'terrorism is theatre' and 'terrorists 
want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead,3 has been called into 
question by many analysts4. 
Yet the successful detonation of an atomic bomb by a terrorist group could dwarf 
even the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 20015. Scholars, 
journalists6 and politicians alike have seen the possibility of terrorists acquiring and 
1 E. Follath & G.M. Mascolo 'AI Qaida also wants the Bomb' Der Spiegel (February 8 2005)* 
2 Richard K. Betts 'The New Threat of Mass Destruction' Foreign Affairs 77:1 (1998) p.27 
3 Brian Michael Jenkins 'Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?' RAND paper (November 1975)* p.4 
4 Including Jenkins himself: Brian Michael Jenkins 'The New Age of Terrorism' Chapter 8 of 
Kamien (ed.) The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook (New York McGraw Hill, 2006)* p.1l8. 
5 The total energy released in the terrorist attacks on Lower Manhattan - the kinetic energy of the 
two planes, the exploding aircraft fuel and the potential energy released as the two buildings 
collapsed - has been calculated to add up to approximately the equivalent of 0.2 kilotonnes (kT) of 
TNT. While some perspective is offered by this, such numbers are not directly comparable due to 
the very different way in which the energy is released. While the yield of the Hiroshima bomb 
was 65 times the energy release of September 11, relative difference in damage could be 
considerably larger than this. BBC 'The Destructive Forces Unleashed' (September 18 2001)* 
6 E.g. the op.ed. in New York Times the very morning this thesis was sent for printing: Jeffrey 
Goldberg 'On Nov. 4, Remember 9/11' The New York Times op.ed. (September 9,2008)* 
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detonating a real nuclear weapon, painting perhaps the grimmest picture of a 
terrorist attack imaginable. A coarse calculation by Bunn and co-workers7 estimates 
the consequences of a terrorist nuclear weapon of yield 10kT if detonated at the 
Grand Central train station, New York, on a normal day of the week. Such a bomb 
would reduce around one square kilometer of a city to burning rubble8. The number 
of dead is conservatively put at 500,000 and the direct economic cost to more than Sl 
trillion. The indirect and long-term costs, both in money and life, will likely be much 
higher, and, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has predicted, the economic 
plummet following the incident will cast millions of people worldwide into 
hardship and poverty9. 
The imminence of the above described threat, and how to deal with it, has been 
the source of debate for several decades. The aim of this thesis is to move the debate 
further by analysing different relevant scenarios and possible countermeasures by 
means of formal models and rational choice methodology. 
1.1 Chapter overview 
I review the existing literature on nuclear terrorism and show that although a 
number of important contributions have been made and progress has been 
significant over the last decade or so, the discussion has tended to focus on 
terrorists' nuclear intent and capability. I argue that a fruitful avenue for further 
research progress is to step beyond these questions and analyse scenarios and 
consequences given assumptions about the nature and stature of the terrorist. 
Rational choice methodology is proposed as a means to achieve this end. 
1.2 Definitions and terms 
I define 'terrorism' as 
7 Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier and John P. Holdren Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials 
report of the Project Managing the Atom (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 
Harvard University, 2003)* 
8 See figure 4.4. The area would stretch from the southern end of Central Park to Madison Square 
Park, and Times Square, the UN building, the Theatre District and Madison Square Garden would 
all be in ruins. 
9 Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, 'A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism' 
Keynote Address to the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism 
and Security (Madrid, 10 March 2005)* 
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Acts or threats of strong violence targeting civilians usually including 
destruction of civilian property, including planning of such acts or 
threats, by non-state actors with the purpose of creating a condition 
of fear, drawing attention, creating instability, and affecting an 
audience beyond the victims directly targeted. 
The definition is adapted from that used by MaerlilO. I define Inuclear terrorism I as 
Terrorism whose primary means is explosion by nuclear fission or 
fusion, or reasonably educated attempts at such. 
A 'terrorist' is a person guilty of terrorism, a Inuclear terrorist I one guilty of nuclear 
terrorism. 
A few notes to the definitions chosen are called for. There exists no real consensus 
amongst analysts as to how 'terrorism' should be defined, and there are a number of 
alternatives to choose fromll. The most important problem pointed out is that the 
notion of terrorism is often in the eye of the beholder: 'one man's terrorist is another 
man's freedom fighter ,12• The definition chosen herein emphasises the violence and 
the dread terrorism deliberately inspires, while placing no restrictions as to what 
might be the overarching political motive behind the attack. Also, destruction of 
property alone is not defined as terrorism if it may not be perceived as a threat of 
violence. No particular effort has been made to delve into the deep waters of 
philosophy in this respect, and like other authors before13 I interpret 'terrorism' in an 
operational sense, reserving the right to use the term somewhat pragmatically, 
recognising that I will inescapably - despite my best efforts to avoid bias - take 'the 
view from the west'. 
The restriction of terrorism to non-state actors excludes e.g. 'terror balance I 
10 Morten Bremer Maerli Crude Nukes on the Loose?: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism by Means of 
Optimum Nuclear Husbandry, Transparency, and Non-Intrusive Fissile Material Verification PhD 
dissertation (University of Oslo, 2004) p.13 
11 Mark Burgess 'Terrorism: The Problems of Definition' Center for Defense Information (August 
2002)*. See also Thomas J. Badey 'Defining international Terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach' 
Terrorism and Political Violence 10:1 (Spring 1998) pp.90-107. 
12 Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A Componellt in 
the War 011 al Qaeda (RAND, 2002)* p.67. 
13 Robin Frost 'Nuclear Terrorism Post-9/11: Assessing the Risks' Global Security 18:4 (2004) p.398. 
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between states. Many protesters of recent wars have dubbed state actions 'terrorism' 
- I merely note that this disaccords with the definition employed herein. 
Furthermore, the definition of nuclear terror is narrow and will only include true 
nuclear explosions. Other authors include such actions as nuclear sabotage 
(destruction of nuclear instalments for radiological contamination) and radiological 
dispersion weapons14• These means are disregarded here, for manageability, but also 
because the scale of the threat and the set of feasible countermeasures pertaining to 
each of these branches differ greatly, making a distinction natural. Much as for 
example a failed nuclear explosive (a 'fizzle') might have similar destructive effect as 
a large radiological dispersion device15, the former is included in the definition for 
its attempted nuclear explosion, the latter is not. 
I will include only 'reasonably educated attempts' at nuclear explosives, to 
exclude hypothetical cases where terrorists employ, for example, non-fissile 
materials in the misguided belief that it will somehow cause a nuclear yield16. 
Furthermore I will demand for threats of nuclear explosions to be plausible before 
counting them as 'nuclear terrorism', to exclude obvious hoaxes, a number of which 
17 have surfaced over the years . 
The definition of nuclear terrorism includes nuclear fusion for completeness. A 
home-made device utilising nuclear fusion is a scenario so far-fetched it is nowhere 
discussed, yet were terrorists to acquire a boosted fission or fusion weapon, then its 
use or threatened use would be defined as nuclear terrorism. 
Finally I bypass the intricacies of jurisdiction by defining a terrorist by being 
'guilty of' terrorism by simply assuming that every person in the world either is or is 
not guilty of the acts mentioned, independently of whether this has been or can be 
tried in a court of law. The fact that there exists a grey area will be disregarded as it 
is of little consequence to the discussion presented herein. 
14 e.g. Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector and Fred L. 
Wehling The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (New YorkRoutledge, 2005)* 
15 Richard L. Garwin 'The technology of megaterror' Technology Review 105:7 (2002) p.66 
16 For example, a 'nuclear bomb recipe' was discovered on an al Qaida friendly web page 
prescribing the use of the non-fissile material radium for a nuclear weapon. This would not .b~ a 
'reasonably educated' attempt. Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell 'Does Intent Equal CapabIlIty?: 
AI-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction' The Nonproliferation Review 12:3 (2005) p.636. 
17 Michael Levi On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007) p. 120 
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1.2.1 Research questions and research approach 
The overarching research question to be treated is 
In the face of a nuclear terrorist threat, what are the optimal policy 
countermeasures for a government seeing itself as a potential target? 
The research question itself is not new. What sets the present thesis apart from 
previous work is the research approach which rests upon two key features: (1) 
explicitly assuming there exists a terrorist adversary with the intent and some 
capability to mount a nuclear attack, and (2) employing rational choice theory to 
answer the above by analysing decision processes as seen by both actors in this 
scenario. The former of these assumptions is not in itself novel; it has been (at least 
implicitly) made by authors in the past in order to make policy recommendations 
for nuclear terrorism. The latter point has never previously been employed to the 
specific threat of nuclear terrorism to the author's knowledge. Point (2) implies 
assuming both terrorist and government to conform to some definition of 
rationality, as will be discussed towards the end of the chapter. 
The working hypothesis that the utilisation of formal methodology may offer a 
new perspective is tested indirectly by application to a number of sub-questions to 
that above, one per chapter through chapters 3 through 718, and its success is briefly 
assessed in chapter 8. 
1.2.2 The thesis 
The thesis is organised so that each chapter has an individual research question 
and short literature review. Each of the chapter research questions are subsets of the 
more general research question in the introduction. This choice follows naturally 
from the chosen research approach, in which the novelty of the work presented rests 
primarily with the methodology rather than the research questions themselves. It 
was deemed that readability could be much improved if the many and varied 
aspects of anti nuclear terrorism policy serving as background knowledge for our 
analysis were presented as they became of relevance, dispersed throughout the 
18 Chapters 3 and 4 have the same research question. 
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thesis chapters. This gives each of the gaming chapters 3 to 7 a certain degree of 
independence. 
1.2.3 Limitations and Scope 
While each chapter has its individual research question and scope a few general 
limitations may be noted. In addition to restricting myself to 'true' nuclear terrorism 
according to my definition, I will primarily concentrate on projects in which the 
terrorist, given fissile material, attempts to construct a crude device. 
The option of stealing a finished device is an important worry which is not a 
matter of focus in this thesis for reasons of restrictions of space and time. The issue 
has been treated expertly before19 yet it seems probable in the light of the analysis 
herein that a formal methodology could be fruitfully applied to aspects of nuclear 
terrorism with finished military weapons as well. 
Likewise, the prospect of a state deliberately sponsoring a terrorist nuclear project 
in some way, while a very serious concern, is not a matter of focus herein. A state 
which inadvertently transfers nuclear material to terrorists via lax safeguards, 
however, is of course included. A brief discussion of this issue is provided in 
chapter 6 as background to the question of deterrence of nuclear terrorism, but is 
otherwise not treated. 
I will implicitly assume throughout that unless explicitly stating otherwise, a 
terrorist-made nuclear weapon using highly enriched uranium will be of a gun-type 
design while a plutonium weapon will be an implosion device of some sort (see 
chapter 3 for details about these terms). 
This thesis, like the vast majority of the literature20 on nuclear terrorism, IS 
somewhat US-biased despite the fact that the United States is far from the only 
possible target of such an attack; some would argue not even the most likely21. 
19 e.g. Bunn, Wier and Holdren Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials and Ferguson and Potter 
The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism. 
20 A notable and most commendable exception where US and Russia are treated as equally 
important targets is Graham Allison and Andrei Kokoshin 'The New Containment' in Kayyem 
and Pangi (eds.) First to Arrive: State and Local Responses to Terrorism (Cambridge, MAMIT Press, 
2004) pp.9-20. 
21 Besides US and Russia, Israel comes to mind. It has been named a potential target for nuclear 
strike by Bin Laden's second-in-command al-Zarqawi in 2004; Salama and Hansell 'Does Intent 
Equal Capability?' p.628. Dunlop and Smith make the case that a target on the Eurasian continent, 
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Importantly, however, the issue is in every way a global one. The 'antiterrorist 
player' in the games of chapters 3 through 7 in no way needs to be interpreted as the 
US government, but using the US as illustration and example is convenient since 
such an abundance of data exists on US anti-nuclear terrorism efforts. Furthermore, 
the US has taken upon itself a leading role in the matter and has expressed its belief 
that it is the likely target of future attacks22, which makes it the natural example for 
gaming purposes. Likewise, al Qaida is sometimes used as example although the 
terrorist players in the gaming chapters are generic and do not need to represent a 
single existing group. 
1.2.4 Notes on terminology and references 
The term 'weapons of mass destruction' and its abbreviation, WMD, will not be 
used in this thesis excepting quotations. The term is commonly used 23 to collectively 
denote nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons24 • In the author's 
opinion, only nuclear amongst these can be said to cause 'mass destruction'; 
biological, chemical and radiological devices could potentially cause many 
casualtiel5, but at a typical level of destruction less than that of a conventional car 
bomb. Indeed, such devices might be in form of food contamination, an aerosol or 
dispersal of fine powder, causing no direct destruction whatsoever26• By the 
standard understanding, the anthrax spiked letters killing 5 in late 2001 would be a 
'WMD' while the September 11 attacks killing some 3000 would not. The author 
Moscow in particular, is far more likely since it would much simplify the required smuggling 
operation. William Dunlop and Harold Smith 'Who Did It? Using International Forensics to 
Detect and Deter Nuclear Terrorism' Arms Control Today (October 2006) pp.6-l0 
22 See Introduction in President George W. Bush The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America (Washington DC, 2002)* p.15 
23 Although a precise definition of this term has yet to be agreed upon by its users. See discussion 
adn references below. 
24 Often bundled as CBRN or another constellation of these letters. Occasionally as ABC weapons 
such as in Morten Bremer Maerli 'Relearning the ABCs: Terrorists and «Weapons of Mass 
Destruction»' The Nonproliferation Review (Summer 2000), pp.l08-119. There is no agreed upon 
definition of WMD, however - see discussion in Gavin Cameron 'WMD Terrorism in the United 
States: The Threat and Possible Countermeasures' The Nonproliferation Review (Spring 2000) p.163. 
25 Note that contagious biological agents can potentially produce many more casualties than either 
chemical or radiological weapons. 
26 Notably, cleaning up a contaminated area after radiological dispersal can cause much indirect 
destruction. 
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believes, as others have argued before him27, that the term can indeed be misguiding 
for policy uses; lumping threats of very different scale and nature together can 
conceal the necessity for a prioritised and nuanced response. 
I follow a convention from game theory of thinking of player 1 as male and 
player 2 as female28. The fact that this causes the terrorist player in all gaming 
chapters except 7 to be female should not be interpreted as a comment on the ever 
ongoing battle of the sexes. 
Much of the literature referred to in footnotes is available online without 
subscription. These are marked with an asterisk (*); internet addresses are given in 
the bibliography. 
1.3 The nuclear terrorism dispute: Would they? And could they? 
The debate over the prospect of terrorists wielding nuclear weapons goes back at 
least to the 1970s29 and has been ongoing in ebb and flow since. A revival of the 
discourse took place from the mid 1990s, following terrorist bombings of the World 
Trade Centre in 1993, the Oklahoma City federal building in 1995 and the sarin gas 
attack on the Tokyo underground the same year30. 
A certain refinement of the discourse is notable from the 1970s to the 1990s. The 
early warnings typically came from physicists involved with the development of the 
highly advanced nuclear arsenal of the United States and who regarded the bombs 
of the 1940s and 150s as somewhat primitive31. Since the 1990s an understanding has 
27 Most outspoken of all on this matter is perhaps the famous Amitai Etzioni Pre-empting Nuclear 
Terrorism in a New Global Order (The Foreign Policy Center, 2004)* pp.8-9. See also George 
Perkovich 'Deconflating"WMD", Paper #17, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (October 
2004)* 
28 e.g. Martin J. Osborne An Introduction to Game Theory (New YorkOxford University Press, 2004) 
p.xv 
29 Two of the earliest whistleblowers were Willrich and Krieger. Their reports seem simplistic in the 
light of the current debate with their heavy emphasis on vulnerability and little attention given to 
intent. Mason Willrich 'Terrorists Keep Out!' The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 31 (May 1975) and 
David Krieger 'Terrorists and Nuclear Technology' The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 31 (June 
1975). Both authors refer extensively to Theodore Taylor's work. 
30 See e.g. preface to Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley Thayer America's 
Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge Mass.:MIT 
Press, 1998) 
31 Notable examples include Theodore Taylor in John McPhee's The Curve of Binding Energy (New 
York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1974), Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William 
Maraman, and Jacob Wechsler 'Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?' in Leventhal and 
Alexander (eds) Preventing Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987) pp. 55-65 and 
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emerged in almost all literature that constructing even the simplest device is not an 
altogether trivial affair. Also, analysis of aspects beyond technicalities, 
vulnerabilities and consequences progressed significantly, including terrorist 
motivations and policy implications. Since the attacks on September II, 2001 the 
quantity of published material on nuclear terrorism, often in a bundle with other 
non-conventional forms of attack, has grown even further, partly reflecting a 
manifest policy change in the western world towards taking the threat seriously. 
Much progress has been made in developing more nuanced policy responses, yet 
novel contributions to the understanding of terrorist intent and capabilities have 
been somewhat slower in coming. As I will argue below, a certain circularity of the 
scholarly debate in this respect has been detectable over the last decade or so, a 
trend broken by a number of innovative approaches during the last few years. 
The 'risk' of an event is quite often defined as its probability of occurring 
multiplied by its consequence32. The probability in turn, when speaking of an attack 
by a hostile actor, is roughly equivalent with the term 'threat,33, typically defined as 
the product of intent and capability34. As one would expect, the debate over the 
importance of nuclear terrorism has focussed on evaluating these three quantities -
intent, capability and consequence35. While there is all but consensus of recent date 
that the consequences of a true nuclear attack would be enormous36, two questions 
have remained the core of the debate: 'Would they?' and 'Could they?'. 
Beyond superficial differences (such as references to the September 11 attacks in 
more recent papers) the disputes between experts in the late nineties are similar to 
Luis Alvarez The Adventures of a Physicist (New York: Basic Books 1988) 
32 Stanley Kaplan and B. John Garrick 'On the Qualitative Definition of Risk' Risk Analysis 1:1 (1981) 
p.12 
33 Henry H. Willis 'Guiding Resource Allocations Based on Terrorism Risk' Risk Analysis 27:3 (2007) 
p.598 
34 Or a somewhat more complicated function of these two. ibid. p. 599 
35 Those who agree the threat is real have furthermore quarrelled about what policy response is best 
suited, a debate I shall save for later. 
36 Mueller and Mueller are amongst relatively few to argue that too much attention has been given 
to the prospect of a Hiroshima-sized nuclear attack against a US city, which would be 'horrible 
though not apocalyptic' and which the the US 'can, however grimly, readily absorb'. Respecti\'eiy, 
John Mueller and Karl Mueller 'Sanctions of Mass Destruction' Foreign Affairs 78:3 (1999) p. 45 and 
John Mueller 'Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration' 
International Studies Perspectives 6:2 (2005) p. 208. 
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those seen in the academic press in recent years37. Let me quote but a couple of 
examples for illustration. In one of the primary papers of the 90s wave, Falkenrath 
warns of nuclear terrorism38. He admits it is not highly probable, but that the 
consequences still makes the risk a high one. He faces stark disagreement from 
Kamp39, another early voicer of opinions on the matter40 • Kamp argues, quoting 
Jenkins41, that terrorists do not want nuclear weapons, since they generally seek 
attention, not bloodshed. Furthermore, he argues, obtaining a weapon would be 
extremely difficult. He cites the troubles Iraq faced in their search for the bomb 
saying lit is difficult to imagine that a small terrorist group ... would find bomb 
building easier ,42. The fact that the necessary amount of fissile material needed far 
exceeds the seized content of any actual smuggling case43 shows, says Kamp, that 
obtaining this material is nearly impossible44 . 'Nuclear' does not deserve a place in 
the triad of serious threats with 'chemical ' and 'biological ', Kamp concludes. Two 
years later, Maerli argued the exact opposite: nuclear weapons are much more in 
line with terrorists I preference for big bangs and spectacular violence than the 
sneaking death of chemicals or bacteria45• 
A good decade has passed since Kamp's article, and the same arguments are still 
being exchanged. The partial standstill is underscored by Bunn and Wier - two of 
the foremost advocates for the urgency of the nuclear terrorist threat - quoting and 
37 This tendency of repetition has also been recognised by Gary Ackerman ('WMD Terrorism 
Research: Whereto from Here?' International Studies Review 7 (2005) pp.140-143), whose 
suggestions for future directions coincide very well with the research presented herein. Daniel 
Gressang wrote already in 2001 that 'proponents of different visions of the terrorist WMD 
potential appear to have reached something of a stalemate in the ongoing dialogue' (,Audience 
and Message: Assessing Terrorist WMD Potential' Terrorism and Political Violence 13:3 (2001) p.84); 
his paper reviews the debate on terrorist motivations. 
38 Richard A. Falkenrath 'Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism' Survival 40:3 
(1998) pp.43-65. As the title indicates, the threats treated are not exclusively nuclear. 
39 Karl-Heinz Kamp, Joseph F. Pilat, Jessica Stern and Richard A. Falkenrath 'WMD Terrorism: An 
Exchange' Survival 40:4 (1998) pp.168-183 
40 Karl-Heinz Kamp 'An Overrated Nightmare' The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 52:4 (1996) pp.30-
34. 
41 Brian Michael Jenkins 'Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?' Orbis 29:3 (1985) pp.507-515. 
42 Kamp 'An Overrated Nightmare' p.33. 
43 This still holds true today. 
44 These are but some of Kamp's points, notably. 
45 Maerli 'Relearning the ABCs' 
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re b tf K ' .. 46 . h f 47 U mg amp s oplruon elg t years a ter its publication . The intent of the 
terrorists to seek nuclear weapons is argued for by quoting Osama bin Laden 
naming such actions a 'religious duty', by pointing to the fatwa issued by a leading 
Islamic cleric in 2003 declaring the killing of millions of Americans to be 
permissible, and reported attempts by Al Qaida to obtain highly emiched uranium 
(HEU). The example of Iraq used by Kamp is irrelevant say Bunn and Wier, since 
Iraq's technical struggles were primarily related to the attempted emichment of 
uranium, a step a terror organisation would certainly sidestep. Furthermore 
requirements of weapon reliability and safety will be much stricter in a military 
. 48 
settmg . 
Bunn and Wier like most of the debaters present sound arguments and thorough 
analysis. Their attacks on Kamp demonstrate, however, that the debate had not 
moved on; Kamp's relevance has not diminished. There are several more recent 
counter arguments downplaying the nuclear terrorist threat as well, notably by 
Frost49• Frost iterates Kamp: nuclear materials are difficult to acquire, building the 
device requires enormous effort and facilities, and no terrorist group wishes to even 
try. Pluta and Zimmerman dissent utterly, attacking Frost point for point. Nuclear 
materials are surely available at the right price, they argue, Frost's prescriptions for 
necessary equipment to build a deviceso are 'ludicrous,sl, and al Qaida's intention to 
seek nuclear capacity is beyond doubt for much the same reasons as quoted by 
Bunn and Wier. Although some novel points are made, not very much is new since 
ten years previous: for a good decade the debate has tended to focus on pros and 
cons, mostly recognised by both sides but weighted differently according to the 
authors' convictions. 
46 Kamp 'An Overrated Nightmare' 
47 Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier 'The Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism' Current History (April 
2005) p.153 
48 A more relevant example, technically different but often cited, is the failure of Aum Shinrikyo's 
attempts to obtain biological weapons despite enormous wealth, skilled personnel, well-equipped 
laboratories and calm working conditions. d. William Roseau 'Aum Shinrikyo's Biological 
Weapons Program: Why Did it Fail?' Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24 (2001) pp.289-301. 
49 Robin M. Frost 'Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11' Adelphi Paper 45:378 (2005). 
50 Here Frost is in tum quoting Friedrich Steinhausler 'What It Takes to Become a Nuclear Terrorist' 
American Behavioral Scientist 46:6 (2003) pp.782-795 
51 Anna M. Pluta and Peter D. Zimmerman 'Nuclear Terrorism: A Disheartening Dissent' Survival 
48:2 (2006) p.62 
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In recent years, however, a number of publications have offered new approaches, 
indicating that the debate is now moving on. I discuss examples below. 
I have located the stance of a selection of authors52, primarily of journal articles, 
along the axes of 'would' and 'could' in figure 1.1. Most notably, the figure shm'\'s 
that most authors either believe terrorists both would and could build nuclear 
weapons, or they doubt both intent and capacity. Only May and Parachini seem to 
take the view that they probably would if only they could; these papers are not very 
explicit in this respect. 
It is fair at this point to note already that while the academic debate over nuclear 
terrorism may have exhibited a certain circularity, policy with respect to nuclear 
terrorism has certainly moved on since the mid nineties. In 1991 the United States 
launched the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) project53 . Since then some $13 
52 References include (note: positions are approximate; some authors give their position only 
implicitly): 
David Albright, Kathryn Buehler & Holly Higgins 'Bin Laden and the bomb' The Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists 58:1 (2002) pp. 23-24. 
Graham Allison 'How to Stop Nuclear Terror' Foreign Affairs 83:1 (2004) pp.64-74, 
George Bunn, Fritz Steinhausler and Lyudmilla Zaitseva 'Strengthening Nuclear Security Against 
Terrorists and Thieves Through Better Training' The Nonproliferation Review (Fall-Winter 
2001) pp.l-13. 
Bunn and Wier 'Seven Myths' op.cit. 
Gavin Cameron 'WMD Terrorism in the United States: The Threat and Possible Countermeasures' 
The Nonproliferation Review 7:1 (Spring 2000) pp. 162-179 
Richard A. Falkenrath 'Confronting Nuclear ... ' op.cit. 
Frost 'Nuclear Terrorism Post 9/11' op.cit., 
Frost 'Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11' op.cit., 
Sigfried Hecker 'Toward a Comprehensive Safeguards System: Keeping Fissile Materials Out of 
Terrorists' Hands' The Annals (of the AAPSS) 607 (2006) pp.121-132, 
Kamp 'An Overrated Nightmare' op.cit. 
Maerli 'Relearning the ABCs' op.cit. 
Michael May 'September 11 and the Need for International Nuclear Agreements', in Nuclear 
Issues in the Post-September 11 Era; Recherches & Documents No 30 (Foundation pour la 
Recherche Strategique, 2003)* pp. 113-124 
John Parachini 'Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective' The Washington Quarterly 26:4 (2003) 
pp.37-50 
Pluta and Zimmerman 'Nuclear Terrorism' op.cit., 
Leonard S. Spector 'The New Landscape of Nuclear Terrorism' in Barletta (ed) After 9/11: 
Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation Occasional Paper #8, 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2002)* 
Steinhausler 'What It Takes to Become a Nuclear Terrorist' op. cit. 
53 Often referred to as the Nunn-Lugar programme after the two US senators Samuel Nunn and 
Richard Lugar who proposed it. 
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billion have been spent through that and a number of other initiatives on prevention 
of nuclear terrorism54, mainly to improve the severe vulnerabilities in the wake of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union leaving an enormous nuclear complex at risk of 
theft and bribery, made worse by Russia 's economic plummet in the late nineties. 
While some will argue that politicians are still not doing enough55 and that the 
measures taken should be prioritised differently56, indications are that politicians 
and the press, particularly in the United States, are taking the threat of nuclear 
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Matthew Bunn Securing the Bomb 2007 Project Managing the Atom (Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, Harvard University, 2007)* p. 161 
S Bunn Wier and Holdren Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials and Bunn Securing the ee e.g. , 
Bomb 2007 
See discussions in chapter 3 and 4. 
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A survey of the literature on nuclear terrorism reveals that relatively few 
attempts have been made to approach the dispute differently. Most authors have 
gone at the task with a view to answering the 'would' and the 'could', and since the 
number of arguments for or against a given conclusion is not infinite, a certain 
repetition is perhaps unavoidable. It seems reasonable to speculate that a partial 
reason could be that many experts who see the threat as real have very reasonably 
aimed primarily to alert the reader to the urgency of the matter, and making novel 
contributions to an academic discourse might have been a secondary concern. This 
is examplified by Allison's summary of what he believes the task of the nuclear 
terrorism researcher should be: 'Since there is no established methodology, the 
soundest way to proceed is to ask and answer the core questions: who, what, where, 
when, and how?,57 
Indeed, if all of Allison's questions could be answered with certainty a 
government would have much of the knowledge it needs. Research on the 
potentialities of terrorism will, however, unfortunately always be limited by the 
fundamental obstacle that it is impossible to know with certainty what the terrorists 
intend and how capable they are. Because of the fundamental obstacles to 
knowledge, thus, the 'would/could' debate might never be concluded 58. Such 
limitations should not be taken to imply that trying to infer something about nuclear 
terrorism by studying related phenomena is futile, and the importance of the 
contributions of the 'standard' literature on nuclear terrorism has clearly been 
paramount. It does indicate, however, that approaches which can sidestep some of 
the uncertainties are worth exploring. 
This observation alone thus seems enough motivation to try to step beyond the 
debate over 'would' and 'could'. Instead of getting caught in the web of uncertainties 
stemming from the clandestine nature of the terrorist threat, I will ask 'assuming 
they were to try and get a nuclear bomb, then what?'. It is equivalent, one might say, 
to assuming intent and some capability in order to see where it leads us. Such an 
assumption is not in principle different from what previous authors have made 
57 Graham Allison 'The ongoing failure of imagination' Bulletill of the Atomic Scientists 62:5 (2006) 
p.37 
58 Except, of course, were a nuclear terrorist attack to occur. 
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when recommending what they see as the best policy response to a potential threat. 
Explicitly tossing aside uncertainties leaves more room for policy analysis, however, 
and I will show in the following how at least a handful of recent publications do this 





Illustration 1.2.: A cartoon representation of the research approach (author's sketch). 
The thesis aspires to introduce a rational standard by which the pros and cons of 
different policy measures can be compared quantitatively. The current literature 
largely provides all the most important arguments for and against different policy 
options and priorities, and yet different analysts come to different conclusions based 
on different weighing of similar qualitative arguments. I seek herein to find a 
methodology by which to compare pros and cons more rigorously, for which I use 
rational choice theory, a tool borrowed from formal social science. While some will 
disagree (as discussed in the next chapter) that rationality, suitably defined 59, is the 
best scale by which to measure policy actions and strategies, it proves to be a 
powerful tool in producing results and conclusions for policy application or further 
59 I use the oldest and arguably simplest framework of maximisation of utility. See next chapter. 
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discussions. The analysis presented forms but a small start, but points to possibly 
fruitful future directions. The research approach is illustrated in cartoon form in 
figure 1.2. 
This thesis does not profess to show that terrorists have a definite capability or 
intent to produce and detonate nuclear weapons. Nor does it need to. However, if 
the author shared the view of Frost and Kamp, the study herein would hardly be 
worthwhile. A brief clarification of the author's views is thus called for. 
There are persuasive arguments, this author finds, that at least al Qaida wants to 
possess a nuclear weapon60. The fact that they have proclaimed this is a weak 
indication - talk is cheap, after all, and a glimpse into the western press would tell 
bin Laden that the simplest way of spreading fear is using words like 'nuclear'. 
Stronger indications are al Qaida's meetings with leading Pakistani nuclear 
scientists61 and reported failed attempts to purchase HEU62 and acquire knowledge 
about nuclear weapon design63. While such incidents do prove that al Qaida have at 
least made serious investigations into the feasibility of the nuclear option, they do 
not imply beyond doubt an intent to go through with such a costly and ambitious 
project. Possibly al Qaida has merely been charting terrain, yet this alone signifies at 
least some intent, without going so far as does Zimmerman and Lewis, indicating 
that 'price per murder' might form the basis for parts of al Qaida's calculus64 . It is 
important to note, however that the analysis in the gaming chapters of the thesis 
involves a generic terrorist organisation and applies equally well to other groups 
60 One should bear in mind that al Qaida is today a loosely affiliated network whose extent is 
difficult to define and separate from a more general extremist Islamic movement. A useful 
overview of the recent developments of AI Qaida is provided by Bruce Riedel 'The Return of the 
Knights: al-Qaeda and the Fruits of Middle-East Disorder' Survival 49:3 (September 2007) pp.l07-
120 
61 David Albright and Holly Higgins 'A Bomb for the Ummah' The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 59:2 
(2003) pp.49-55. 
62 Albright, Buehler & Higgins 'Bin Laden and the bomb' 
63 David Albright 'AI Qaeda's Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents' Policy 
Forum Online The Nautilus Institute, Special Forum 47 (November 2002)*. See also The Commission 
on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Report to the President of the United States (Washington D.C., 2005)* and the 9/11 report concludes 
that al Qaida 'has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass destruction for at least 10 years'. The 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States The 9/11 Report Paperback ed. 
(New York: St. Martins, 2004) p. 545 
64 Peter D. Zimmerman and Jeffrey G. Lewis 'The Bomb in the Backyard' Foreigll Policy 
(November/December 2006) p.34 
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with nuclear intent, both present and future, whether they exist today or not. 
The consequences to the attacked party being so devastating, even a small 
probability will give a great risk. The magnitude of the effects certainly justifies 
efforts to try to quantify the risk, thus, which depends crucially on the probability of 
various scenarios. Only when some way is found by which to arrive at quantitative 
estimates for the threat can direct comparison be made with other risks so that 
responses may be prioritised and optimised. 
The construction of a gun-type HEU weapon may not be such a daunting task as 
commonly believed (see discussion in the following chapter), and I believe a capable 
group would have a modest but certainly non-zero probability of success. Bunn 
tentatively puts the probability of a nuclear terrorist attack over the next decade at 
29% and the expected cost for the target country at $100 billion yearly, while 
arguing 'even a risk dramatically smaller than that estimated ... would justify a 
broad range of actions to reduce the threat,65. Given an estimate of 500,000 people 
perished in such an attack66, maybe a million will be seriously injured and a similar 
number be homeless. In addition it is reasonable to assume that at least five times 
the number of casualties, 2.5 million, will be deprived of close friends or relatives. 
While it is dubious to quantify death, grief and strain in this manner, some 
perspective is offered by noting that the relatively high 29% estimate gives roughly 
an expected 1.7 million people dead, injured, homeless or deprived of close family 
members and loved ones in this manner by 2018, a figure well over a hundred times 
that of the September 11 attacks, estimated similarly. The possibility of such carnage 
must be extremely remote to justify negligence, I conclude. 
1.4 Notable recent contributions to nuclear terrorism research 
As mentioned some notable examples of relatively recent date deserve mention, 
where authors have approached the problem differently and moved beyond some 
of the uncertainties involved in all research on terrorism. 
First it is fair to note at this point the number of articles and think-tank reports 
which have dealt with more specific policy issues in connection with nuclear 
65 Bunn 'A Mathematical ModeL' p. 103. 
66 Bunn, Wier, and Holdren Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials p.16. 
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erronsm . T ese analysts, one might say, are making the same assumption I am 
herein
68 
that the threat from nuclear terrorism is real and must be dealt with in one 
way or another. These have made very important contributions of direct 
applicability to policy-making without delving too far into the 'would' and 'could'. 
Some papers, furthermore, deal only with terrorist motivations without considering 
capabilities in any detail69, while others again pay particular attention to specific 
related topics such as the role of fissile materials security in Russia 70 or elsewhere71, 
or HEU-fuelled research reactors72. While not necessarily 'scholarly' in nature, the 
importance of this literature should not be downplayed. 
Perhaps the definitive proof that academia has now started to stride beyond the 
'would' and 'could' is the recent book by Michael Levi73• He wastes no time debating 
terrorists' wish to acquire nuclear weapons, knowing that this has been treated by 
numerous authors before, but skips straight to an analysis of best policy responses 
in the face of such a threat. Levi offers a whole new way of thinking about defences 
against nuclear terrorism, in particular so-called second layers of defence, i.e. 
defences beyond the securing of stocks of nuclear materials. By not reiterating all 
the many arguments why nuclear terrorism is a possible threat (other than as is 
called for for policy analysis) the novelty of Levi's book is striking and represents a 
forward leap of the academic debate on responses to nuclear terrorism in this 
67 Perhaps foremost among these is the series of reports from Managing the Atom, primarily the 
Securing the Bomb series. A few other examples of good policy oriented reports of direct interest to 
us are Etzioni Pre-empting Nuclear Terrorism ... (op.cit.) *, Brian Finlay and Andrew Grotto The Race 
to Secure Russia's Loose Nukes: Progress since 9/11 (The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2005)*; Brian D. 
Finlay and Elizabeth Turpen 25 Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terror: A Guide for Policymakers (The Henry 
L. Stimson Center, 2007)* 
68 'Assumption' may not be entirely accurate in the case of these reports in that most often the 
imminence of the terrorism threat is argued for. 
69 E.g. the very thorough if somewhat dated analysis of terrorist motivation to employ 
unconventional weapons by Bruce Hoffman 'Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An 
Analysis of Trends and Motivations' Rand paper #8039-1 (1999)* 
70 e.g. Jon B. Wolfsthal and Tom Z. Collina 'Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead Control in Russia' 
Survival 44:2 (2002) pp. 71-82 
71 e.g. Rose Gottemoeller with Rebecca Longsworth 'Enhancing Nuclear Security in the Counter-
Terrorism Struggle: India and Pakistan as a New Region for Cooperation' Carnegie Endowment 
Working Paper #29 (August 2002)* 
72 e.g. William C. Potter 'Nuclear Terrorism and the Global Politics of Civilian HEU Elimination' The 
Nonproliferation Review 15:2 (2008) pp. 135-158 
73 Levi On Nuclear Terrorism 
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author's opinion74. His sidestepping the entire 'would/could' debate may be the 
feature which allows his analysis to reach as far as it does. While the novelty of the 
book lies primarily in its treatment of 'second layers', not a matter of focus in this 
thesis75, Levi's book will be referred to throughout the present work. 
Franck and Melese remain (to the author's knowledge) the only ones to have 
applied formal methodology to the terrorists' choice of opting for non-conventional 
weapons76. Their paper, reviewed in chapter 5, provides interesting analysis 
somewhat different from what is attempted herein. In his doctoral thesis77 Bunn 
attempted to quantify the risk of nuclear terrorism, suggesting numerical estimates 
of great utility for the research presented herein, and providing very conCIse 
numbers which will doubtlessly spur new and interesting debate78. 
Zimmerman and Lewis avoided the uncertainties by posing the question: if 
terrorists were to attack the US with a nuclear weapon, how would it be most 
practical to do it and what would it cost?79 They too assume intent and a basic 
capability in order take a step further. Their paper is among the clearest example of 
the benefits of not having to deal with motivations and capabilities: by asking new 
questions, new answers are found. Among the conclusions of the paper are that a 
terrorist project to build a nuclear weapon from highly enriched uranium is 
probably most easily done inside the target country (assumed to be the United 
States). In this case requirements of infrastructure such as availability of electricity 
are easily met, and since export control laws are inapplicable almost all the 
necessary equipment (except the uranium) may be bought from the online second-
hand marketplace Ebay for a modest sum. 
The reports from Project Managing the Atom should be mentioned at this point. 
74 See also Simen A. Ellingsen 'Strengthening the Second Line of Defense' (book review) The 
Nonproliferation Review 15:2 (2008) pp. 399-402. 
75 but reviewed in appendix D. 
76 Raymond E. Franck and Francois Melese 'Exploring the Structure of Terrorists' WMD Decisions: 
A Game Theory Approach' Defense & Security Analysis 20:4 (2004) pp.355-372. I perform a similar 
exploration in chapter 6. 
77 Matthew Bunn Guardians at the Gates of Hell: Estimating the Risk of Nuclear Theft and Terrorism - and 
Identifying the Highest-Priority Risks of Nuclear Theft PhD dissertation (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology,2007)* 
78 d. also Matthew Bunn 'A Mathematical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism' The Annals of the 
AAPSS 607 pp.103-120 (2006) 
79 Zimmerman and Lewis 'The Bomb in the Backyard' pp.32-39. 
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Since the early 2000s this project, a part of the more far-reaching Nuclear Threat 
Initiative, has produced yearly reports on the security of nuclear materials, penned 
by Matthew Bunn and colleagues8o• The reports focus on policy options to deal with 
possible nuclear terrorism, as well as surveying progress on US threat reduction 
programmes, and are valuable sources for their data collection and analysis, and 
policy recommendations inferred from it. In the same vain may be mentioned a few 
reports from war-game type research where participants have played out scenarios 
following a nuclear terrorist attack as a means to analyse its results and best 
81 
responses . 
Finally, although of a strictly qualitative nature, Dunn's analysis of whether al 
Qaida can be deterred from use post acquisition of nuclear weapons is another good 
example of how interesting contributions may stem from making assumptions to 
bypass the uncertain82. His paper is examined more closely in following chapters. 
1.5 Previous applications of game theory to terrorism 
Given the enormous abundance of literature on the subject of terrorism, even its 
nuclear variant, surprisingly little has been done in the nexus of terrorism and game 
theory or other rational choice methodology. The majority of work done is due to 
Professor Todd Sandler and various co-workers83, who have published widely. 
Their work has been drawn upon indirectly as inspiration for the models used in 
later chapters, yet none of Sandler's formal methodology papers deals specifically 
with nuclear or non-conventional terrorism84. Among the themes treated by Sandler 
80 The latest one is Bunn Securing the Bomb 2007. 
81 Charles Meade and Roger C. Molander Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack 
Technical Report (RAND, 2006)*; Ashton B. Carter, Michael M. May, and William J. Perry The Day 
After: Action in the 24 Hours Following a Nuclear Blast in an American City Workshop Report (The 
Preventive Defense Project, Harvard and Stanford Universities, 2007)*; Ashton B. Carter, Michael 
M. May, and William J. Perry 'The Day After: Action Following a Nuclear Blast in an American 
City' The Washington Quarterly 30:4 (2007) 
82 Lewis A. Dunn 'Can al Qaeda Be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons' Occasional paper #3 
(Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, July 2005)* 
83 Indeed, an article reviewing the field four years back refers almost exclusively to Sandler's papers; 
Todd Sandler and Daniel G. Arce M. 'Terrorism & Game Theory' Simulation and Gaming 34:3 
(2003) pp.319-337. 
84 The recent paper: Kate Ivanova and Todd Sandler 'CBRN Incidents: Political Regimes, 
Perpetrators, and Targets' Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (2006) pp.423-448, does not utilise 
rational choice methodology. 
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and co-workers are the ways by which hardening targets deflects attacks onto other 
85 
targets , how lack of cooperation between countries in the face of international 
terrorism leads to overemphasis on defence over pre-emption thus deflecting 
attacks onto the countries least able to defend themselves86, whether or not a state 
should negotiate with a terrorist group seeking concessions87, the role of private 
sponsors of terrorism88, and, of some peripheral relevance to our chapter 6, strategic 
choice between large and small terrorist attacks as a means to achieve ends against a 
government adversary and a government's balance between defence and 
intelligence in the face of different scale attacks89• 
A handful of other authors have recently applied game theory to terrorism, and 
while surely valuable, are of limited use to us since they too consider special aspects 
of terrorism to the side of that considered here 90. The literature on conventional 
terrorism and game theory is encouraging more generally, in that it demonstrates 
the utility of such a methodology in this field. 
In summary, while the above mentioned exploits combining terrorism research 
and formal methodology are valuable, the application of formal methodology to 
terrorism is a discipline in its infancy, and should be explored further both in 
general and for the special case of nuclear terrorism, to which rational choice theory 
has hardly been applied at all. The literature pertaining more specifically to each of 







Sandler and Arce 'Terrorism & Game Theory'. 
Todd Sandler 'Collective Action and Transnational Terrorism' The World Economy 26:6 (2003) 
pp.779-802; Daniel G. Arce M. and Todd Sandler 'Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis' 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49:2 (2005) pp.183-200; Todd Sandler and Kevin Siqueira 'Global 
terrorism: deterrence versus pre-emption' The Canadian Journal of Economics 39:4 (2006) pp. 1370-
1387. 
Todd Sandler, John T. Tschirhart, and Jon Cauley 'A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational 
Terrorism' The American Political Science Review 77:1 (1983) pp.36-54; Harvey E. Lapan and Todd 
Sandler 'To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That is the question' American Economic Review 78:2 (1988) 
pp.16-20. 
Kevin Siqueira and Todd Sandler 'Terrorists versus the Government: Strategic Interaction, 
Support, and Sponsorship' Journal of Conflict Resolution 50:6 (2006) pp.878-898 
Daniel G. Arce and Todd Sandler 'Terrorist Signalling and the Value of Intelligence' British Journal 
of Political Science 37:4 (2007) pp.573-586. 
Notably: Terrorist motivations for suicide attack were analysed formally by Pittel and Rtibbecke 
'What Directs a Terrorist?' Defence and Peace Economics 17:4 (2006) pp.311-328, and detection of 
terrorists by Basuchoudhary and Razzolini: 'Hiding in plain sight: using signals to detect 
terrorists' Public Choice 128 (2006) pp.245-255. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
A review of the large body of academic literature published on nuclear terrorism 
shows that novel insights have been slow in coming over the last decade or so. The 
same arguments have been repeated with no view to a consensus emerging in the 
debate over the intent and capability of terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons, 
although the world of policy has moved forward during this period and there is 
now a broadly shared understanding in western governments that nuclear terrorism 
is a serious threat. 
An important factor proposed as explanation for relative slowness of academic 
progress is that compared to the number of pages published on the issue of nuclear 
terrorism, relatively few attempts have been made to apply different approaches 
and methodologies to the subject. Great uncertainties stemming from the lack of 
precedents of nuclear terrorism and the clandestine nature of terrorism in general 
make certain claims about motivations and capabilities impossible, a fact which in 
itself warrants the employment of alternative approaches to explore different 
aspects of the potential for nuclear terrorism and policies to defend against such a 
threat. 
Given that many western policy makers appear to have been persuaded of the 
imminence of the nuclear terrorist threat, it seems natural that the academic debate 
now moves from focussing on intent and capability to a greater emphasis on policy 
responses. I propose that a research approach which assumes terrorist intent and 
some capability and uses rational choice theory to explore different scenarios could 
be a fruitful way of obtaining novel insights and inform policy-making. 
Rational choice theory is chosen due to several appealing properties for my 
purposes. As detailed in the next chapter, it has the normative power to devise a 
'rational ideal I against which real actions may be compared, suitable for analysis of 
policy choices in the face of an uncertain threat such as terrorism. Furthermore, the 
use of modelling involves a different mode of argument which enables the 
researcher to step beyond the uncertainties surrounding the premises of the 
discourse (such as the question of the intent and capability of terrorists to Igo 
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nuclear ') and analyse the implications of the assumptions instead91 . A closer 
discussion of the powers and limitations of rational choice theory is provided in the 
following chapter. 
91 The assumptions themselves must in turn be qualified in some way. 
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- 2 - Methodology: problems and strengths of rational 
choice theory 
Rational choice theory, of which game theory and decision theory are special 
cases, has been the subject of heated discussion for decades. Its proponents have 
shown more zeal than that of perhaps any other methodology in social science, with 
matching harshness amongst its critics from most branches in the humanities. 
Bennett summarises: 'Interest in the use of Game Theory ... has alternated between 
periods of high hopes and great expectations and periods of disfavor. The one 
constant has been controversy'l. For this reason, it is necessary to be sure that the 
points raised against this methodology do not derail the enterprise set out in the 
present thesis. 
In the previous chapter I argued that the clandestine nature of terrorism with its 
many uncertainties sets natural limits for the certainty with which questions of 
terrorist capabilities and intentions may be determined from available data. It seems 
reasonable to assume, therefore, that terrorism is a field of research well suited for 
alternative approaches whereby some uncertainties may be sidestepped through the 
explicit use of (arguably) plausible assumptions whose consequences are 
subsequently analysed. The process of modelling a situation from the social sciences 
in a way that is both simple enough to allow transparent analysis and complex 
enough to capture the critical characteristics of the situation is a formal way of 
arriving at just such a set of explicit assumptions with the obvious advantage that 
once a model is arrived at, the analyst has all the tried and trusted tools of 
mathematics at her disposal. 
2.1 Chapter outline 
I start the present chapter by further motivating the use of rational choice theory 
in the field of terrorism. Thereafter I go through a classic example from game theory 
in order to demonstrate what this methodology could look like and introduce some 
1 Peter G. Bennett 'Modelling Decisions in International Relations: Game Theory and Beyond' 
Mershon International Studies Review 391995 p. 19. 
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key concepts drawn upon in later chapters. I go on to review some of the main 
criticisms raised against rational choice theory: those which may be classified as 
'philosophical' and criticisms on grounds of poor performance. Finally I discuss the 
issue of terrorist rationality and introduce a definition of rationality which allows 
me to assume terrorists 'sufficiently rational' for gaming purposes. 
Above and beyond the present chapter discussing the methodology in general, 
each modelling chapter contains a concluding section evaluating the utility of 
formal theory in the context of that chapter's research enterprise. More detailed and 
context specific discussion of strengths, limitations and cautious use of modelling 
are contained in these sections, and summarised in a corresponding section of the 
concluding chapter. 
2.2 Rational choice and terrorism 
Rational choice theory, borrowed from economics, is tailored to inform us on the 
strategic thinking in situations where different actors have conflicting interests or 
where a choice must be made under uncertainty. From this alone it is reasonable to 
presume a priori that such a methodology may be suitable to the field of terrorism. 
Claim Sandler and Enders, two of the most active researchers in the nexus of 
terrorism and rational choice theory2, 
Economic methodology is particularly well-suited to provide insights 
in studying terrorism. Economic analysis can account for the strategic 
interactions among opposing interests - e.g., the terrorists and the 
authorities, or between two targeted countries. Rational choice 
models ... can be applied to ascertain how terrorists are apt to 
respond to policy-induced changes to their constraints. The same 
methods can be used to analyze how governments react to terrorist-
induced changes to their policymaking environment. 
In short, the interaction between terrorist and its target government exhibits all the 
hallmarks of strategic interplay which makes it natural to assume the use of rational 
choice to be a fruitful approach. 
As seen in the preceding chapter, rational choice theory has been employed in the 
field of terrorism with success in the past to analyse strategic interactions between 
2 Todd Sandler and Walter Enders 'An economic perspective on transnational terrorism' European 
Journal o/political EnJ/lOll1y 20 (2004) p.302 
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terrorists and government (such as hostage taking and negotiations\ terrorist 
decision making (such as choice of target and size of attack4) and government 
responses (deterrence vs. pre-emptions). The merits of game theory in the field of 
terrorism are celebrated in two recent reviews6• 
2.3 Game theory and decision theory: concepts and an example 
As an example of what game theory can look like, and to introduce and 
exemplify the key concepts drawn upon in the chapters to come, I will use the most 
classic of all games, the prisoner's dilemma7. 
Here is the situation: Two criminals are arrested suspected of the same serious 
crime which they committed together. The police do not have sufficient evidence to 
convict them, however, and needs a witness to testify. The two are therefore kept in 
separate cells and asked to testify against each other. If one prisoner testifies and the 
other does not, he who testifies goes free but the other receives a long 
imprisonment. If neither testifies, however, both are imprisoned for a much shorter 
time for minor offences. If both testify, both are imprisoned for a long time, but 
receive some rebate for co-operating. 
I will use game theory to analyse this situation. The first concept to be introduced 
is the payoff function or utility function, which depends on the outcome of the game. 
This function defines the rationality of the players: rational play is defined as 
consistently choosing the strategy which maximises the payoff function. The 
outcome of the game in turn depends on the set of strategies employed by the 
players. In this game each player has two different strategies, so there are four 
different outcomes of the game; we will call the strategies of testifying and staying 
silent D and C respectively (for 'defect' and 'co-operate'). Say the short, medium and 
3 Harvey E. Lapan and Todd Sandler 'To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That is the question' American 
Economic Review 78:2 (1988) pp.16-20. 
4 Daniel G. Arce and Todd Sandler 'Terrorist Signalling and the Value of Intelligence' British Journal 
of Political Science 37:4 (2007) pp.573-586 
5 Sandler, Todd and Kevin Siqueira 'Global terrorism: deterrence versus pre-emption' Canadian 
Journal of Economics 39:4 (2006) pp.1370-1387 
6 Sandler and Enders 'An economic perspective on transnational terrorism' and Todd Sandler and 
Daniel G. Arce M. 'Terrorism & Game Theory' Simulation & Gaming 34:3 (2003) pp.326-329. 
7 The prisoner's dilemma is analysed in any introductory book in game theory. For example Robert 
Gibbons A Primer in Game Theory (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992) pp.2-3 
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long imprisonments are respectively 1, 6 and 9 years. Let us assume that the players 
extract a negative payoff equal to the number of years in prison. Then the situation 









Per convention we assume that player one has rows and player two columns and 
the numbers in the cells represent the payoff for each player in each outcome of the 
game. 
Now see it from the situation of player 1, say. He does not know what the other 
player is going to do. If player 2 co-operates (that is, she keeps her mouth shut), 
player 1 is better off defecting, because it will give him a payoff of 0 instead of -1. If 
on the other hand player 2 defects, player 1 is better off defecting as well since it will 
give a payoff -6 instead of -9. Thus the best strategy for both players is to defect even 
though the collective best strategy would have been to co-operate. 
The reason this game has become a classic is probably that its applications as an 
analogy to real situations are almost endless. Consider for example the arms race of 
the Cold War and attempts by both the United States and the Soviet Union to 
disarm. Pledges notwithstanding, disarmament proved difficult and both countries 
still have enough nuclear weapons to destroy the Earth. The prisoner's dilemma is a 
simple way to explain such difficulty: if one player disarms (co-operates) the other 
can achieve military supremacy by defecting and keeping the weapons anyway. The 
solution would seem to be to introduce dialogue into the game and establish 
confidence (this will be a more complex model). 
Other more trivial examples abound in which the socially best solution is not 
obtained because people act selfishly or do not communicate. If everybody waiting 
for their luggage by the baggage reclaim band in the airport were to take one step 
back, for example, all the shoving could be avoided and everyone could see when 
their bag came along. Unless such social behaviour is somehow enforced, however, 
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everybody has an incentive to defect from such a co-operative strategy because they 
can gain an even better position by moving right next to the band. 
A game theoretical analysis will typically aim to establish the equilibria of the 
game. The simplest type, the Nash equilibrium, is defined as a profile of strategies 
{s} so that no player i may do better by deviating from 51 as long as all other players j 
employ strategy Sj. In our example, {s} would be one of four options: (C,C), (C,D), 
(D,C) and (D,D); in more complex games the number of strategies can be much 
larger. In the simple prisoner's dilemma there was a single Nash equilibrium 
{s}=(D,D), that is, assuming all players know all other players will play according to 
this strategy profile, no player has an incentive to deviate from {s}. The social 
optimum (C,C) which maximises the total payoff of both players however, is 
unstable because knowing the other player followed this strategy, each would have 
an incentive to defect. (More interesting analysis can be obtained by repeating the 
game indefinitely. Then each player has the option to 'punish' the other player for 
bad behaviour in the past. Such games are beyond the scope of this section). 
Game theory in its simple form is little changed since it originated with such 
thinkers as Nash and Von Neumann8. Principally we can summarise a standard 
game theory exercise thus: Two or more players face choices among a set of 
alternatives that may lead to one of a set of possible outcomes. Each player is 
assumed to order these outcomes transitively9 by preference represented by a payoff 
function or utility function and act rationally, that is, so as to consistently maximise 
his or her expected payoff. Whilst game theory is characterised by the interplay of 
strategies of several players (the best choice of strategy depends on which strategy is 
employed by the other players), decision theory is its simpler counterpart in which a 
single player faces a choice under uncertainty. 
I will make use of decision theory only in its arguably simplest embodiment in 
this thesis, the peculiarities and details of which are presented in detail in chapter 4. 
There exist several alternative formulations and more specialised branches of 
8 the latter, incidentally, an important figure in the Manhattan Project to design the first nuclear 
weapons .. 
9 A transitive ordering of A, Band C with respect to a logical operator ':<::;' means that if A :<::; Band B 
:<::; C then A :<::; C. 
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decision theory. Some of which emphasise the fear of loss rather than the motivation 
for gain
IO 
and others, like 'statistical decision theory' and 'Bayesian decision theory', 
employ more advanced mathematical toolsll. 
In the simple decision theory I draw upon, the player will somehow assign a 
probability to each outcome; the probabilities formally represent the player's beliefs 
about the state of affairs. The expected utilitl2 of a strategy is the sum of the payoffs 
from the various outcomes that can come of employing the strategy, multiplied by 
the probabilities of the respective outcomes. This form of decision theory is 
sometimes termed 'utility theory' or 'expected utility theory I 13. As before a rational 
player is defined as a player who is consistent in playing according to his or her 
preferences. I will argue that it is reasonable to confine rationality to lie in this 
consistency only, not in the preferences themselves which are left unrestricted, as is 
common in the game theory literatureI4. 
I have chosen to eschew the temptation to attempt the employment of more 
complete and analytically powerful versions of decision theory (and game theory 
for that matter) herein. Partly this is a question of taste, partly for manageability, yet 
I see at least two good reasons why simplicity is commendable in the current 
setting. The goal of the formal analysis in this thesis is exploratory and explanatory. 
Therefore, the simpler the theory that is applied, the more transparent and easy to 
analyse are the results which are obtained from it. In trying to explore or explain a 
phenomenon, it is little use employing a methodology which is so complex that it 
becomes unnecessarily difficult to interpret the results in the real-world setting I 
wished to scrutinise in the first place. Secondly, all else equal, the easier it is to 
follow an argument, the stronger and more fruitful it is. Surely an easily understood 
argument will be more convincing and accessible to more readers and therefore also 
10 e.g. Herman Chernoff and Lincoln E. Moses Elementary Decision Theory (New York: Courier 
Dover, 1988) 
11 See e.g. James O. Berger Statistical Decision Theory (Berlin: Springer, 1985) 
12 'Utility' and 'payoff' are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
13 For a review of expected utility theory compared to alternative formulations of decision theory, 
see Mette Wik 'Individual Decision Theory under Risk: Deficiencies and alternatives to expected 
utility theory' Department of Economics and Resource Management, Norwegian Agricultural 
University, Discussion Paper #D-23 (1996)* 
14 e.g. Osborne An Introduction to Game Theory section 1.2 
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more effective in stimulating debate. This is not to say that my decision theoretical 
efforts in the following chapters avoid somewhat advanced mathematics altogether, 
but the basic principle of utility maximisation is very easily grasped even if the 
formal steps between the game and its consequences are beyond some readers' 
maths knowledge. 
2.4 Claimed capabilities of rational choice models 
The proponents of rational choice theory will count a number of properties of 
rational choice theory as indications of its superior capabilities (almost none of 
which have been undisputed). The theory of rational choice claims to be not only of 
explanatory use, but also normative, providing a 'best response' to real situations. 
The ideal thus upheld is one which celebrates rationality over emotions, consistency 
over whimsicality. 
Further strengths claimed have been listed in a highly useful review by Ward15 
including: 
Modelling forces the user to be explicit about the assumptions behind the 
argument. 
The act of modelling itself necessitates a discussion of which factors are 
important and which are not. 
If applied correctly, formal theory is undeniably logical. 
Even if empirical data deviate from conclusions reached through a rational 
model, it creates a norm against which real actions may be judged. 
As to the first bullet point, it is reasonable to be cautious: explicitness about some 
assumptions is necessary, but partial concealment is still possible, and modelling by 
no means exempts the author from the ethics of research. Quite often assumptions 
inherent in the structure of the model itself are not commented explicitly, 
identifiable only by the trained eye. A model could be said to provide a framework 
which makes it easier to bring assumptions forth however, which is in itself a 
15 Hugh Ward 'Rational Choice' in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds.) Theory and Methods in Political 
Science 2nd edition (Hampshire:Palgrave McMillan, 2002) pp.65-89. Ward's excellent treatment is a 




The third bullet might be the primary argument for the application of formal 
methodology in this context. The use of a model 'moves' the argument to a different 
domain. In a 'standard' argument, a number of premises are laid out and it is argued 
that they imply a certain conclusion. The critic may show that the premises are false 
or incomplete or alternatively that the implication is invalid and that a different 
conclusion should have been reached based on the premises. Using a modet 
however, the logical implications are beyond doubt. The critic must instead turn to 
the assumptions behind the model and show that the model itself is flawed in some 
way, or that the outcome of the modelling does not imply what is claimed. Formal 
methodology does not inherently make stronger arguments, only different 
arguments. 
Thus, a formal model can play the role of fresh blood to a discourse which has 
become stale and repetitive, providing a primary rationale for its proposed 
application to nuclear terrorism herein. 
Finally, the normative ability is of some importance to us, since there exist no 
directly relevant empirical data to draw on; no nuclear terrorist attack has been 
attempted to date. Whichever way the problem is turned, thus, some level of 
speculation will ever be present. The strength of the normative approach was 
demonstrated by Zimmerman and Lewis16 ('assuming intent and capability how 
should the educated terrorist go about the project?') and will be made use of herein. 
2.5 Criticisms of rational choice models on philosophical 
grounds 
The fundamental assumptions of rational choice theory, that players seek to 
maximise personal utility and have the rational capacity, time and emotional 
detachment necessary to choose the right course of action, have been the target of 
the most fundamentat roughly 'philosophical' criticism. Ward names several 
general modes of these, some of which I will treat briefly in turn17: 
16 Peter D. Zimmerman and Jeffrey G. Lewis 'The Bomb in the Backyard' Foreign Policy 
(November/December 2006) pp. 32-39. 
17 Ward 'Rational Choice' p.71 
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1. From sociologists: Rational models downplay social structure and holistic 
explanations 
2. From psychologists: In real life, actions are often not rationally motivated 
3. From mainstream political scientists: the assumptions of rational choice are 
implausible, invariably causing faulty predictions. 
The psychology criticism, closely related to that from political scientists, seems 
reasonable: who couldn't say he has made a choice at some point which was 
impulsive and not very well thought through? Non-rational motivations such as 
revenge, spite, care, and fairness often form basis of human actions, the 
psychologists say, and they are doubtlessly righeB• Particularly, the omission of 
altruism is criticised. For my purposes salvation is threefold. First, there is a rule of 
thumb that the higher the stakes the more rational the players19; nuclear terrorism 
arguably is a prospect with high stakes on both sides. Secondly, and perhaps most 
importantly, it is easy to model preferences other than selfishness by letting players 
extract utility from altruistic action, say. Indeed, this is necessary in order to model 
suicide terrorism from the point of view of the individual bomber, whose actions 
cannot easily be motivated by narrow self interest alone20. Thirdly, in the absence of 
clinical tests of the mental abilities of, say, leading al Qaida figures, a normative 
approach using assumptions that might not be entirely accurate is far better than 
nothing. 
Barry has argued that there is a logical problem with models where preferences 
are not dictated by self-interese1. His argument is that theories become all but 
untestable from empirical data since some combination of self-interest and altruism 
will always give the right prediction. Replacing 'altruism' by 'blood thirst' to model 
fanatical terrorism, the criticism presumably remains the same. While Barry's point 
is valid, it is arguable that this is not so much a problem of methodology as of 
18 More on the psychology criticism: See Jon Elster 'Emotions and Political Economy' Journal of 
Economic Literature 36 (1998) ppA7-74, a reply to Matthew Rabin 'Psychology and Economics' 
Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998) pp.11-46. 
19 e.g. Jon Elster 'When Rationality Fails' in Schweers Cook and Levi (eds.) The Limits of Rationality 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) ppAO-41. 
20 excepting, perhaps, the case where the afterlife is expected to be preferable to the present. 
21 Brian Barry Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978) 
pp.33-37. 
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unethical research: tailoring assumptions in order to produce a certain conclusion is 
never acceptable, regardless of discipline. The key, this author thinks, is explicitness 
of assumptions so that conclusions may be tested against alternative starting points. 
A related criticism is that of post hoc modelling tailored to explain what has 
already happened. Again, this author believes it ultimately an ethical question. 
Rational choice theory has come up with many novel hypotheses22, and papers using 
game theory will often try to show how their conclusions are non-trivial and cannot 
easily be arrived at via other paths. The criticism only partly applies to the research 
herein, since in the case of nuclear terrorism there is no empirical data to be 
posterior to. 
As a last point in this section I mention the following question raised by some: 
why should maximisation of expected utility be the criterion for rationality? This 
question is reviewed by Broome23 who emphasises two sub-questions. Firstly, is it 
necessarily so that 'utility' is an arithmetic quantity which can be quantified? This is 
a deeply philosophical question which was addressed by such thinkers as von 
Neumann and Morgenstern who proposed an axiomatic utility theory in which the 
ordering of preferences, not the utility itself, was the central point. While this 
conceptual problem could be serious in certain contexts, an argument why it 
probably isn't for our purposes is the relative ease with which one can arrive at 
reasonably plausible ways to quantify expected utility in the particular games 
considered. Moreover, the very effort of modelling the terrorist's expected utility 
function creates fertile ground for investigating how different types of terrorists 
behave within the same game, and although no such model will ever be certain to 
yield accurate predictions, it provides ample opportunity for variation whenever the 
goal is not prediction but exploration and explanation. 
Secondly, why should a rational player maximise the expected utility in 
particular? From a pragmatic point of view this objection is probably far more 
serious. The chief problem with maximisation of expected utility is that it implies 
22 One of the few to contest this is Stephen M. Walt 'Rigor or Rigor Mortis?: Rational Choice and 
Security Studies' International Security 23:4 (1999) pp.5-48. Further discussed below. 
23 John Broome 'Should a Rational Agent Maximize Expected Utility?' in Schweers Cook and Levi 
(eds.) The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990) pp. 132-145 
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neutrality towards risk. This will be further elaborated in chapter 6 and also 
elsewhere, but in simple terms stem from the fact that two options which have the 
same expected utility can represent widely different levels of risk. Imagine you were 
given the choice between $10.000 with 1 % probability or $100 for sure. Both options 
have an expected utility of $100, but which alternative is chosen depends strongly 
on how much risk you are willing to take. Someone desperate for money will 
probably take the $100 whereas someone to whom this sum is insignificant might 
take the uncertain option. What the use of expected utility theory means for my 
purposes, thus, is that account of the terrorist and government's attitudes to risk 
must be taken separately. 
Arguably, expected utility theory is the simplest principle upon which to analyse 
games, and has been chosen for that reason. In a field so early in its infancy as 
rational choice theory analysis of nuclear terrorism, the soundest approach is 
arguably to take the easiest route possible and establish simple benchmark results 
upon which future efforts can be based. Efforts to explicitly incorporate the effects 
of risk attitudes would seem a natural extension for the future. Note, however, that 
the concept of 'utility' allows, to some extent, for taking preferences of risk into 
account in many cases. If the player is very risk averse, say, it is sometimes possible 
to manually decrease the utility of options which are always risky. 
2.6 The sociologist criticism 
The main criticism from sociologists is that a model will often inherently assume 
a certain social structure and take this for granted. This is certainly true, and 
something to be aware of: devising a game means explicating how communication 
flows, which player decides what and in which order. Again, one may argue that it 
may not be a fundamental flaw of the methodology but rather the usage of it, and 
disagreeing with a model employed and its assumptions is a valid form of criticism. 
Naturally, any game will vastly simplify the social structures at play, but inferring 
from this that nothing fruitful can come of explicitly disregarding some complexity I 
find much too strong a claim. Taking a step beyond the swamp of complexity by 
means of assumption is just the trait that makes rational choice theory powerful, but 
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in research as in life everything comes at a price. 
The level of simplification, a constant source of criticism24, is always a challenge 
in modelling and is ultimately a question of balance. Simplicity, as it were, is the 
strength and the weakness of rational choice models: a simple model makes for 
simple and transparent analysis, but may miss important aspects of the situation 
modelled; a complex model could capture more of the complexity of the real world, 
but the analysis is more opaque and in extreme cases the very behaviour of the 
model becomes inexplicable25. Accuracy is necessary if the aim is precise prediction, 
but also requires precise input data; simplicity is opportune if the aim is as herein, 
understanding26. Users of game theory furthermore are typically pragmatic: 'the 
proof of the pudding is in the eating', Osborne says, 'if a model enhances our 
understanding of the world, then it serves its purpose'27. 
Further criticism of the assumption of rational players, also from sociologists, is 
of relevance28. Some points are: 
1. actors employ a paradigmatic filter which biases use of information 
2. actors make limited efforts to search for available options 
3. actors are under pressure to appear consistent even at the cost of failure 
It would be wrong to doubt the validity of such objections, but perhaps their 
importance for our purposes is not great. The clandestine nature of terrorist groups 
poses specific challenges, and irremovable uncertainty makes it necessary to employ 
some imperfectly justified presumption about how decisions are made. One need 
not dismiss the importance of such factors as listed above, however; only choose to 
explicitly ignore them to see where it leads. It might bring us forward, or in the least 
provoke new debate. On the whole it falls in with the whole debate over 
simplifications involved in any modelling procedure. 
24 Bennett 'Modelling Decisions ... ' p.27 
25 ibid. p.39 
26 see also Nigel Gilbert and Klaus G. Troitzsch Simulation for the Social Scientist 2nd edition 
(Buckham: Open University Press, 2005) p.18 
27 Osborne An Introduction to Game Theory p.7 
28 Ward 'Rational Choice' p.74. Outtake of Ward's full 'list'. 
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2.7 Criticism on the grounds of poor perfonnance 
Walt, a former rational choice theorist turned sceptic, criticises formal theory in 
an important paper by measuring its performance with respect to three criteria: (1) 
logical consistency and precision, (2) originality and (3) empirical validity29. While 
the last of these points mainly concerns deSCriptive models to explain historical 
trends and events post hoc30, and the first regards consistent use of the theory, merely 
a point to take on board, the second is of great importance to us. 
Nuclear terrorism is a field of research which has not generally inspired 
originality as we have seen. Novelty, however, may not only lie in the research 
questions set out or the answers given to these, but also in the methodology applied 
in the process. Walt, however, argues that formal theory has not been able to serve 
this purpose. 
Walt points to two fundamental problems with the originality of formal 
approaches, the first of which is what he terms Imethodological overkill 131. Formal 
theory, he says, has shown a tendency to show what everybody knows in a way no 
one can understand. Long and mathematically complicated calculations will often 
lead to commonsensical conclusions, Walt says, providing no new understanding at 
the end of the day. One cannot argue that this is not a potential weakness of formal 
theory. If a reader must command advanced calculus to follow the argument, the 
power of the analysis is somewhat diminished in that fewer readers can access the 
content. 
Arguably, this is a problem of how a tool is applied, ethics and sound judgement. 
Exceptionally complex calculations only seem justified if the task itself is 
correspondingly complex or somehow novel and uncharted. It is hard to attribute 
this trait to the methodology itself, however, since the same is in principle true for 
every theory: opaque arguments never serve the purpose of increasing 
understanding be they formal or otherwise, something Walt recognises32. This 
29 Stephen M. Walt 'Rigor or Rigor Mortis?: Rational Choice and Security Studies' International 
Security 23:4 (1999) pp.5-48 
30 Walt makes the point that the employers of formal models have a history of paying little attention 
to whether the hypotheses proposed are supported by empirical data. 
31 Walt 'Rigor or Rigor Mortis?' p.23 
32 ibid. p.21 
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author agrees with Walt on this point and has sought to keep models and analysis 
as simple as feasible. 
Walt's second problem is what he calls 'old wine in new bottles,33. Many efforts 
using formal theory, Walt argues, have practically re-invented previous hypotheses 
using new methodology and sometimes terminology. While it will appear from 
Walt's examples that some authors have indeed overlooked some previous 
publications in their field and invented terminology equivalent with existing work, 
Walt nonetheless comes across as unreasonably harsh on this point. 
There is a need, this author believes, to distinguish between 'trivial' and 'not 
groundbreaking'. Although a conclusion reached by formal means corresponds well 
with previous efforts, the very fact that it was reached by a completely different 
mode of argument typically means it was no waste of time. Rather, the hypothesis is 
thereby strengthened, adding weight to one side of the debate34 • 
To be sure, conclusions like 'countries which have the most to gain and the least 
to lose from going to war will most often do so' adds little to common sense, yet the 
fact that formal analysis has not generally led to counter-intuitive conclusions 
should be reassuring if anything. To flip the argument around: If formal theory did 
not tend to produce the same conclusions as other approaches that would have been 
a sign that something was rotten about it. 
When, if one adopted Walt's strict demands for originality, would commencing a 
formal analysis ever be justified? Upon undertaking a research enterprise, one does 
not as a rule know what the conclusion is going to be - if one did, it would be poor 
use of time at best, unethical at worst. Using Walt's criterion, only a fraction of the 
research done by means of formal methodology - that which turned out counter to 
previous work - would ever be published, and the effort would hardly be 
worthwhile. It will seem that the only practical solution would be to abandon this 
methodology altogether, a conclusion much more extreme than Walt's own. 
33 ibid. p.26 
34 Notably, it is common in the theoretical natural sciences that following a seminal result, several . 
publications will follow, showing the same result in a different manner. Indeed, the novel result IS 
often not widely accepted to be correct until it has been through this process. 
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2.8 Reduction of a state to a single mind 
In two notable papers35 and a now classic monograph36 focussing on the example 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham Allison makes the case that assuming nations 
may be reduced to a single economical mind, while occasionally very useful, is often 
an overly simplistic model of the real process of decision making. In the words of 
Allison (who in more recent years has become a principal debater in the field of 
nuclear terrorism) and co-worker Halperin37, 
[T]his simplification - like all simplifications - obscures as well as 
reveals. In particular, it obscures the persistently neglected fact of 
bureaucracy: the «maker» of government policy is not one calculated 
decision-maker, but rather a conglomerate of large organizations and 
political actors who differ substantially about what their government 
should do on any particular issue and who compete in attempting to 
affect both governmental decision and the actions of their 
government. 
This form of decision making, contrasting the 'single mind I picture typically 
employed, is what Allison terms 'bureaucratic politics ,38• 
In my analysis in chapters 4 through 7 I make just such a simplification; both 
government and terrorist is assumed to be reducible, as an adequate approximation 
in the context of the chapter's research question, to a single mind. In particular the 
scenario studied in chapter 7, where a government must decide on a course of action 
in the face of a nuclear blackmail threat, fits well with the type of confrontational 
scenario typical for the use of Game Theory in the days of the Cold War which 
Allison cautions against. The notion that a government may adequately be reduced 
in this manner and that the same is true for a terrorist organisation are assumptions 
with different motivations and require different kinds of caution. I will therefore 
discuss them separately, beginning with a government. 
35 Graham T. Allison 'Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Rational Policy, 
Organization Process, and Bureaucratic Politics' RAND paper #3919 (1968)*; Graham T. Allison 
'Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis' The American Political Science Review 63:3 (1969) 
pp.689-718. 
36 Graham T. Allison Essellce of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1971) 
37 Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin 'Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications' World Politics 24:2 (1972) p.42. 
38 This criticism is somewhat related to the sociology criticism mentioned above. 
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2.B.1 A government as a single mind 
Firstly, it is of importance to recognise that the example primarily used by Allison 
to make his point, the Cuban Missile Crisis, criticised the single-mind assumption 
being used to furnish an explanation of events after they had already happened. As 
Allison himself notes, making recommendations for future action is a 'related, but 
logically separable enterprise,39. The distinction is partly one between the normative 
and the descriptive domain: how should a government act in a given situation, and 
how were decisions reached in practice. I will argue that in order to make a general 
recommendation, only the first, normative, question must be answered, but in 
putting the general recommendation to action in a specific scenario involving 
specific actors, the second requires analysis as well. 
There are two different perspectives to consider in this case. The first is general, 
independent of which government is in question, and external to the decision 
making process. As an independent researcher considering general and hypothetical 
scenarios it is natural to choose this perspective. The other perspective is specific to 
a particular government at a particular time, and is internal in that it has information 
about the various sub-state actors who interact in the forming of the final policy 
decision. This would be the perspective of a President or Prime Minister, say, who 
would prefer a certain course of action, but is facing pressure from several weighty 
actors with interests beyond or even conflicting with the interests of the hypothetic 
'single actor' state. 
Because the decision making process will be individual to each country, an 
analysis which aspires to apply to many states is limited to making few and general 
assumptions. As a first approach in a search for a policy recommendation, the 
reduction of the decision process to a single mind is then natural. It is probably true 
that the decision making processes in industrialised countries are sufficiently similar 
that a more detailed study of internal considerations could be performed without 
excessive loss of generality, and one could always decide upon a particular nation 
state to study in order to make the analysis concrete. No doubt these would both be 
valuable enterprises which form a next step beyond the analyses herein. 
39 Allison 'Conceptual Models ... ' Am. Polio Sci. Reel., op. cit. p.689, footnote. 
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Assuming Allison is right, the policy recommendations made in this thesis will, 
from the perspective of a policy maker in a particular country, in some sense have 
the form of goals for the outcome of the actual decision process. The policy maker 
wishing to follow the recommendation must in turn recognise who the important 
sub-state actors are, what preferences they have, and try to manoeuver in such a 
way that the policy eventually enacted is the desired one. The fact that a 
recommendation must in practice be accompanied by a plan for putting theory into 
practice under the actual circumstances does not, however, invalidate the 
recommendation itself. 
Put differently and a little simplistically, it is all right for the independent 
researcher with the external perspective to assert that a government should, in its 
own interest, act as though it were a coherent and rational player. The government's 
adversaries, after all, will also be largely external: they will often observe only the 
decisions made and attribute them to the state as a whole, regardless of how they 
were reached. 
In fact, in the normative case the argument can be turned on its head. The fact 
that real decision making is a jumble of conflicting interests and agendas should 
make it all the more important that relatively disinterested experts make solidly 
argued general recommendations which are independent of petty interests of 
conflicting organisations. 
Such arguments are offer only partial salvation and cannot change the fact that 
there is a contrast between how governments make decisions and the model I 
employ, of a single-mind government. The dichotomy of perspectives, moreover, is 
perhaps not quite so clear cut as portrayed. Adopting Osborne's pragmatic view4o, 
however, the important question is a pragmatic one: what is the simplest way of 
modelling which can tell us something useful? If the simplest model can give rise to 
useful recommendations, introducing more complexity is an unnecessary effort and 
could just obscure things. Should it be found to be too general, abstract or far 
removed from reality to be of use, however, more realism must be introduced. 
Opinions will certainly vary from researcher to researcher. I have chosen to try and 
40 See quote above; 'if a model enhances our understanding of the world, then it serves its purpose'. 
Osborne An 111 troduction to Game Theory p.7 
- 50-
establish general frameworks herein, in the hope that applicability has not suffered 
overly from this. 
2.8.2 A terrorist group as a single mind 
In a sense there may be more serious reasons to question the reduction of terrorist 
groups to a single mind because while the analyst can recommend certain actions to 
the government in a strictly normative sense, there will always be a descriptive 
element in questions concerning the terrorist's decision making. As is discussed 
several places in the thesis, the ideal question to answer when it comes to a terrorist 
adversary is not so much how they should think as how they actually do think. 
The motivation for making the modelling assumption that the terrorist may be 
approximated as a single mind is therefore quite different than is the case for a 
government. For any given government in the industrialised world, there exists a 
wealth of information about how decisions actually come about, who the interested 
sub-state parties are and so on, and the single mind assumption is a large reduction 
in complexity. For a terrorist adversary (and especially a generic one such as 
assumed herein), the opposite is the case: one typically has only sporadic and 
incomplete indications of how decisions are actually made in a given terrorist cell, 
and instead of throwing away information one has available, the single-mind 
assumption fills holes where important information is missing. 
One can obviously envisage similar processes within a terrorist cell as those 
which Allison describes within a nation state. Different members can have different 
personal agendas and decisions may not be made in unison. The potential target 
government, however, is again expected to be external to all this, and if it learns of 
the actual course of events at all, it is typically long after the decision was made. 
Considering a particular terrorist organisation, one would quite obviously do 
well not to ignore the information one does have, and should it be known, say, that 
a particular cell is plagued by internal strife, this may be something the government 
can make use of. Furthermore, should evidence surface that a given terrorist 
organisation is making decisions which do not conform to the expectations based on 
a rational and single-minded set of assumptions, the government should take this 
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into account. Yet herein lies a key rationale for my approach: when rational and 
single-minded benchmarks have been established it is possible to compare, and doing 
so may bring the government a little closer to answering the question of how the 
terrorist group really thinks. 
The frameworks I establish in the research chapters must therefore be used with 
caution where terrorist single-mindedness is an important assumption, as it is in 
chapters 5, 6, and, in particular, 7. The games and resulting equations developed in 
this thesis are tools for the policy maker in order to approach the corresponding 
questions in a systematic way, and like other tools they should be applied correctly; 
the consequences of erroneously assuming the terrorist to act in a certain way 
should be analysed as well and the conclusion used to decide the bounds within 
which the theory may safely be applied. 
Note therefore in particular in chapter 7, how the normative value of the 
recommended course of action for the government in that chapter is strengthened 
by the fact that should the terrorist not act according to the assumptions made, the 
prescribed course of action is nevertheless expected to be the best available. Also in 
chapters 5 and 6 the consequences should the assumptions used to model the 
terrorist decision making be faulty do not preclude the use of the model as it is. The 
analysis in chapter 5, if anything, is normative for the terrorist actor, and 
deliberating in line with the model is arguably the best the terrorist can do in her 
own interest. In chapter 6 we find that the best means of deterring a terrorist from 
attempting acquisition of nuclear weapons are also the means which will hinder her 
from succeeding, should she not be deterred. 
2.9 Are terrorists rational? 
Psychologists and sociologists alike argue, as we have seen, that rationality is not 
always a good representation of the working of the human mind at the best of times. 
A human who devotes his endeavours to terrorist activities, one might think is even 
further from the rational ideal. At one level one could argue that since little is 
known about the psyche of specific terrorist leaders, some assumption about their 
reasoning must always be made, and that rationality is always one interesting 
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assumption to explore, whether it represents realistic terrorists or not. For the policy 
maker this is hardly entirely satisfactory, however, because real policy must defend 
against real threats, thus for them analysis of defences against a hypothetical enemy 
is not very useful. It is arguably not reasonable to insist that a real actor must adhere 
perfectly to the assumptions of rationality in order for such a theory to capture some 
of the player's characteristics, and even less so if the theory's goal is instead to set a 
rational ideal that the player should live up to in his or her own interest, yet it is 
worth posing the question whether terrorist organisations can be seen as sufficiently 
rational for a rational choice theory analysis of their choices to connect sufficiently 
well with reality to be of use. 
There exists a considerable body of literature on the question of whether or not 
terrorism may rightly be explained rationally. The key question that concern most 
authors would be whether a homo economicus41 could ever justify the apparently 
irrational action that terrorism is, suicide terrorism in particular. The focus has 
shifted between the leaders of terrorist groups and the individual bomber, and 
conclusions have varied throughout the spectrum from assigning terrorists 
complete self-interested rationality42 to being guided by altogether different forces43 . 
I will briefly survey some key papers from the debate on this topic and how it 
leads to a useful distinction between different definitions of rationality. It IS 
concluded that rational choice models may be used with terrorist actors if 
assumptions of self-interest and rational expectations are relaxed, and it has already 
been argued that none of these assumptions are strictly necessary for modelling. 
One of the most referred to supporters of the notion that terrorists are rational is 
Pape. He argues that terrorists are quite plainly rational even in the strictest sense of 
homo economicus, and the argument is mainly that 'terrorism is rational because it 
41 or homo oeconomicus. A construct sometimes attributed to John Stuart Mill, frequently used in 
economic theory of a 'person' motivated solely by accumulation of wealth, avoidance of 
unnecessary labour and who has the intelligence to take optimal acti~n toward~ these goals. 
Joseph Persky 'The Ethology of Homo Economicus' Journal of EconomIc Perspectzves 9:2 (1995) 
pp.221-231. 
42 Robert A. Pape 'The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism' Americall Political Science Rel'icu? 97:3 
(2003) pp.343-361. 
43 For references to literature applying various models, see Pape 'Strategic Logic .. ' page 343. 
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works'. Among Pape's five principal findings44 are that suicide terrorism is strategic, 
not random, that it is specifically designed to make democracies make specific 
concessions and that the reason that suicide terrorism has been steadily rising over 
past 20 years is that terrorists have learnt that it pays. The rationality Pape 
advocates is perhaps best attributed to the leaders of terrorist groups resorting to 
suicide tactics. 
Pape is harshly criticised by Abrahms45, who upholds that his primary conclusion 
that 'terrorism works' is faulty. Terrorist acts have on the whole done more harm 
than good to the position of the interest groups behind them, he argues, and shows 
how the relative successes of marginalised groups that Pape credits to terrorism can 
be adequately explained by other factors. 
The most important contribution of Abrahms' critique for our purposes may be to 
credit the terrorists a certain rationality46. 'Substantial rationality is concerned with 
the consequences of the decision, while procedural rationality makes no claim that 
the actor correctly perceives the environment,47. Terrorists, argues Abrahms, may be 
said to be procedurally rational but not substantially so. 
The question thus raised is whether 'does it work' is the appropriate criterion by 
which to judge terrorist rationality. The answer leads us to the question of rational 
expectations - is it reasonable or not for the terrorists to expect to gain what they 
hope from their violent actions - a criterion pertaining to the strict homo economicus 
sense of rationality normally assumed in economy. Could it not suffice that the 
terrorist has a belief that violence will somehow have a beneficial outcome for 
himself; a belief which does not have to be justified by historical evidence. In fact, in 
any game theoretical model, the deep beliefs upon which the players base their 
preferences are prerequisites for the model and hence lie outside the model itself. 
They must therefore be argued for in non-rational and non-formal terms. 
It is natural therefore to specify more closely just what 'rationality' is demanded 
44 Pape 'The Strategic Logic ... ' pp.344-345. 
45 Max Abrahms 'Are Terrorists Really Rational? The Palestinian Example' Orbis Summer 2004 
pp.533-549 
46 ibid. p.546 
47 The idea is from Herbert Simon 'From Substantive to Procedural Rationality' in Latsis (ed.) 
Methods and Appraisal in Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge Universit\' Press, 1976) 130-131 
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for modelling purposes. After carefully surveying the debate, Caplan -t~, shows that 
three different interpretations of rationality appear to co-exist which I will refer to as 
the weak, moderate and strict interpretations respectively49: 
Weak sense: Anyone who uses means to achieve ends is rational by definition. 
This is typically applied by high-level theoreticians. 
Moderate sense: Rationality equates with consistently maXImIsIng a well-
behaved utility function. This requires an ordered and transitive set of 
outcomes. 
Strong sense: Rationality is based on narrow self-interest and/ or rational 
expectations. Implying that (1) a person who makes the same mistake 
repeatedly is irrational and (2) preferences must be based on 'economical' 
self interest. This is in essence the homo economicus. 
Regardless of its justification, for our modelling purposes it is arguably natural to 
use the moderate sense in the case of terrorists. The weak sense is useless for 
rational choice theories, and a strong assumption of rationality as argued before is 
not necessary for the purpose of modelling, hence there is no practical reason for us 
to make such strict demands. 
When, moreover, the applicability of the strong sense of rationality to terrorists is 
in some doubt while the moderate (or procedural) sense appears less problematic, I 
conclude from this that a terrorist organisation or group, to the extent that it can be 
mimicked by a single rational mind, may be modelled as rational. However, care 
must be taken to be explicit about just how the preferences of the terrorist are 
modelled since unlike homo economicus who comes with a pre-defined set of 
preferences, the moderately rational terrorist must have his preferences specified for 
each new game. 
2.10 Evaluating the utility of gaming 
When evaluating the role of a model it is important to recognise what a model 
should and should not be expected to do. Towards the end of each of our research 
48 Bryan Caplan 'Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model' Public Choice 128 (2006) 
pp.91-107 
49 ibid. p.93. 
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chapters I have included a short section evaluating the gains from using formal 
theory towards answering that chapter's research question. Here I establish the 
foundations upon which such an evaluation should rest: in particular the goals 
which gaming should achieve beyond what could have been readily done with 
purely qualitative means. 
Importantly, a model can never produce conclusions which are not, in principle, 
already inherent in the assumptions which go into designing it. Hence there will 
always seem to be a certain element of circularity about this mode of argument if the 
model is taken to be a premise of the analysis. Rather, the model should in a sense 
be seen as a conclusion, the conclusion of the process of modelling, a qualitative 
process of applying judgement to decide how best to represent the essence of a 
complicated problem in a condensed mathematical form. 
Hence the model and the mathematical methods of analysing it, are no more (or 
less) than tools which allow the analyst to analyse and visualise the implications of 
the assumptions made in the modelling process. It would be wrong to expect a 
paintbrush to produce an artwork, and somewhat similarly, gaming does not create 
fundamentally new knowledge. If one could say that the artwork exists (in a potential 
sense) from the moment the artist has planned it in his mind, and that painting it is 
but a mechanical means of applying the idea to canvas, it is somewhat analogous to 
the act of gaming. The creation of the artwork corresponds to the creation of the 
game with the judgement and qualitative analysis it entails, and actually gaming it 
out is only a way of extracting the implications of the game in a more explicit form. 
Thus, even if a problem could be well analysed qualitatively, for certain problems 
a game has the potential to extend these arguments in two ways; to explicate 
implications and conclusions which are buried deep amongst the available 
evidence, but which one may not easily realise; and to formulate succinct 
mathematical results which contain a wealth of information which it would be 
ineffective to try to layout in words. 
Just like other tools, game theory and decision theory are effective for some tasks 
but will certainly be ineffective for others. To use the same analogy again, painting 
may be superior to words in capturing beautiful scenery, say, but painting a book 
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would not be as useful as to describe its contents. Likewise, some research questions 
invite the use of formal methodology for their analysis, others do not. Obviously, 
apart from being of general interest, the research questions analysed in the research 
chapters of this thesis have been chosen because they were expected a priory to work 
well with gaming. Therefore, when I conclude that the gaming efforts herein have 
generally proved rather successful, this is perhaps not so surprising. 
When evaluating the value of doing the exercise of gaming, the obvious question 
is whether the same conclusions could be reached by qualitative arguments alone. 
But a second criterion of success would be the derivation of simple formulas which 
make intuitive sense, which form a tool for reducing a complicated problem to the 
limited task of estimating a few parameters, and which contain precise information 
about how these parameters interact in a given rational decision. If a sufficiently 
simple game can be devised, such formulae will tend to follow almost 
automatically, but it is up to the judgement of the analyst and users of these 
formulae to decide whether the model does in fact capture all essentials. 
2.11 Conclusion 
By the strictest standards on rationality, upheld by some and applied by many, 
there is reason to doubt whether suicide terrorism, even from the perspective of 
terrorist leaders whose lives are not typically willingly sacrificed, may be explained 
by rational choice. I argue that by limiting rationality to connote consistency in 
choosing the preferred strategy amongst several while imposing no restrictions on 
the preferences themselves, terrorists are rational enough for modelling purposes. 
Such a definition of rationality, however, necessitates further assumptions about the 
way a terrorist actor extracts utility in various outcomes, which must be made 
explicit and appropriately canvassed. 
I review and discuss a number of criticisms of rational choice theory voiced over 
the years. A discussion of what is reasonable to expect from a model is also given 
for future reference in the later evaluation of use of formal methodology in the 
research questions herein. 
While noting the number of limitations of rational choice theory, it appears I am 
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on reasonably safe grounds in my application of formal theory to nuclear terrorism 
within the framework of the assumptions and simplifications made use of. 
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- 3 - Keeping fissile materials out of terrorist hands: 
HEU, plutonium and a prioritised response 
The three devices that made up the first generation of nuclear weapons - Trinity, 
'Little Boy' and 'Fat Man' - represented two very different weapon concepts. Out of 
necessity the active material that provided the enormous amount of energy released 
in the three explosions came from two different elements, one of which, plutonium, 
was discovered only a few years earlier. The development of the nuclear bomb 
during the Second World War was a race against time to get the new weapon ready 
soon enough to playa part in the war, and since uranium needs to go through a 
slow and complicated process - enrichment - before it is usable in a weapon, enough 
material could not be produced for more than a single bomb. Given the rushed 
circumstances of their creation it should surprise no-one that the first two types of 
nuclear weapons are also considered the most primitive and the two designs it has 
been argued that a terrorist organisation could possibly build l . 
Today the situation is wholly different; neither highly enriched uranium (HEU) 
nor plutonium is in short supply. Thousands of tonnes of them are stored in a range 
of countries all over the world, held in very different locations both private and 
military2. It is no longer necessary for a proliferator to enrich his own uranium or to 
produce his own plutonium in a reactor and extract it from the very radioactive 
spent fuel by complicated chemical reprocessing which was the only possibility 
during World War 2 (WW2)3; he could obtain the materials covertly or overtly, from 
one of the many states holding stores of it. 
All the different measures that are in place to hinder fissile materials4 from falling 
into the wrong hands are commonly dubbed nuclear safeguards. There is much to say 
about safeguards, and it has many aspects, as will be elaborated later in section 3.5, 
1 A classic treatment of this question is J. Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William 
Maraman and Jacob Wechsler 'Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?' in Leventhal and 
Alexander (eds.) Preventing Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington:Lexington Books, 1987)* pp. 55-65. 
2 e.g. International Panel of Fissile Materials Global Fissile Material Report 2007 (IPFM, 2007)* 
3 Plutonium is still being manufactured from spent reactor fuel in reprocessing plants in st:'\'eral 
countries. 
4 i.e. materials that can sustain a fission chain reaction, including enriched uranium and plutonium. 
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where I also define the term more carefully. What is intuitively clear, however, is 
that safeguards like all government activities cost money, and when there are more 
tasks than there is money to do them (and this is nearly always the case) one must 
prioritise. Hence the question: what to safeguard first? 
To answer this I will make use of a formal model from rational choice theory. 
Before embarking on the actual modelling, however, an introduction of the two 
elements is called for. Our question leads naturally to another: which element poses 
the greatest proliferation threat? This question, and the more general one of the 
prospects of terrorists building a crude nuclear device from illicitly acquired fissile 
material, has been studied extensively in the pas{ I will discuss the question in the 
context of the choice between HEU and Pu here, a discussion which serves the 
additional purpose of providing an introduction of the key technical concepts of 
nuclear weapons. 
Potential proliferators may be divided into two groups: state actors and non-state 
actors. The latter is often equated with 'terrorists' since they are the one type of non-
state actor which is typically imagined to have any interest in acquiring nuclear 
weapons. I will argue that, to a proliferating state it would not matter very much if 
their supply of nuclear materials were uranium or plutonium. To a non-state actor 
with very limited capabilities, however, it could make a world of difference6; there 
are several reasons as will be discussed below why the terrorists would prefer HEU 
over plutonium7, the latter posing a significantly greater technical challenge. 
It turns out that with only very moderate assumptions one can show (within the 
limitations of the model employed) that US plutonium safeguards measures are 
probably overfunded at present, and HEU measures almost certainly underfunded. 




See e.g. Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter 'Improvised Nuclear Devices and Nuclear 
Terrorism' Paper #2, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (June 2004)* and Matthew Bunn 
and Anthony Wier 'Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How Difficult?' The Annals of the 
AASPP 607 (2006) pp.133-149 
A detailed study of terrorist weapon construction with a suboptimal choice of nuclear materials is 
found in Michael Levi On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007) pp 
66-97 
In this chapter I will distinguish only between HEU and Pu, not between t~e various f~rms in 
which the two materials may be obtained, which is also of importance. While overlookmg the 
importance of such distinctions, this simplifies the analysis considerably. For a more complete, 
qualitative analysis, see ibid. 
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qualitatively that with regard to proliferation to a non-state actor HEU constitutes a 
graver threat than plutonium. 
3.1 Research question 
The research question to be discussed both in this chapter and the next is 
Based on the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons to terrorists, 
to what extent is there reason to prioritise HEU safeguards measures 
over plutonium safeguards? 
The present chapter is a qualitative treatment of the multifaceted problem of 
prioritisation of safeguards between the two different fissile elements. The next 
chapter draws upon the qualitative analysis found herein to model the situation and 
draw conclusions with important policy implications. 
3.2 Literature overview and outline of chapter 
The numerous authors dealing specifically with nuclear non-proliferation to non-
state actors take somewhat varying positions as to whether one fissile material 
should be given priority over the other. On the one side are Ferguson and Potter 
whose list of 'urgent priorities' against nuclear terrorism lists 'Put HEU first' (rather 
than plutonium and radiological sources) right at the top8. Maerli's doctoral thesis, 
another example, focuses on HEU9• The reports from the 'Managing the Atom' 
project at Harvard10 on the other hand, speak mainly of 'fissile nuclear materials' as 
a group, in effect treating HEU and Pu as equals to terrorists although the added 
technical challenge of using plutonium are duly discussed l1, and the same authors 
8 Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector and Fred L. 
Wehling The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2005)* pp.324-336 
9 This is in accordance with the thesis' research questions. Morten Bremer Maerli Crude Nukes on the 
Loose?: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism by Means of Optimum Nuclear Husbandry, Transparency and 
Non-Illtrusive Fissile Material Verification Dissertation (Dr. Philos.) (University of Oslo, 2004) pp.77-
81. 
10 e.g. Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier and John P. Holdren Controlling Nuclear V\T/lrh~ads and M~terials, 
and Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier Securing the Bomb 2006, reports of the Project Managmg the 
Atom (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 2003 and 2006 
respectiveh')* see also Matthew Bunn 'Preventing a Nuclear 9/11' Issues in Sciel/ce al/d Technology 
(Winter 2005)* pp.55-62 where no distinction is made between HEU and Pu. 
11 Bunn et al. Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials p.28 
- 61 -
hold the opinion that the prospect of a terrorist plutonium bomb is 'very real'12. In 
one of the most cited books on nuclear terrorism Allison likewise treats HEU and 
plutonium as essentially equal for 'build it yourself' purposes13. The same is true of 
Von Hippel, another prominent proponent of safeguards against nuclear terrorismH . 
On the question of prioritisation of safeguards efforts between the isotopes, 
existing literature gives us all the pros and cons, but rarely attempts to weigh them 
against each other by any quantitative means. 
3.2.1 Chapter outline 
The chapter is structured as follows. First I discuss qualitatively what separates 
HEU and plutonium from the terrorist proliferator's point of view. This chapter 
contains much analysis and information which will be referred to in later chapters 
and acts partly as a pre-study for the game introduced in chapter 4. 
3.3 Terrorist preference: HEU 
Physicist Luis Alvarez, Nobel Prize laureate and an important part of the physics 
team at Los Alamos during the Second World War, remarks 15 
with modern weapons-grade uranium, the background neutron rate 
is so low that terrorists, if they had such material, would have a good 
chance of setting off a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one 
half of the material onto the other half. Most people seem unaware 
that if separated U-235 is at hand it's a trivial job to set off a nuclear 
explosion, whereas if only plutonium is available, making it explode 
is the most difficult technical job I know .... Given a supply of U-235, 
however, even a high school kid could make a bomb in short order. 
No doubt the simplest nuclear bomb to build and successfully detonate is by a 






Bunn and Wier 'Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction' p.143. 
Graham Allison Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 
2004) pp.92-98 
Frank Von Hippe!, 'Recommendations for Preventing Nuclear Terrorism' Journal of the Federation 
of AlIlerican Scientists 54:6 (2001)* pp. 1-10 
Luis Alvarez Adventures of a Physicist (New York: Basic Books, 1988) p.125. See foobl( 1le 20. 
Bearing in mind, of course, that design of nuclear weapons is subje~t to strict military secrecy, the 
author cannot pretend to possess knowledge of the plethora of deSIgns that haw been 
successfully attempted over the past six decades. 
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Alvarez describes, simply fires one subcritical17 lump of active material into another; 
the pieces might be shaped as a 'nut' and fitting 'bolt' where the 'bolt' is fired inside 
a cylinderlB, somewhat resembling the interior ballistics of a navy ordnance cannon. 
The 'bolt' hits the 'nut' mounted in the opposite end, the total mass is now 
supercritical and a nuclear explosion occurs; this is the simple principle of a gun 
design. 
This design has rarely been used for military purposes due to its relative 
inefficiency. The United States tested only a handful of these weapons19 (The first of 
which was 'Little Boy', the device used against Hiroshima in 1945) and the onl~' 
other known military devices using a uranium gun design were built by South 
Africa and dismantled when the country gave up their nuclear arsenal in the early 
1990s. Needless to say, although I inefficient I by the standards of nations that sport 
thermonuclear weapons, the images from Hiroshima demonstrate with all possible 
clarity that the successful detonation of such a device would dwarf even the most 
atrocious grand-scale slaughter at the hands of terrorists to date. 
While it is certain that Alvarez exaggerates for dramatic effeceo (one should 
17 When an amount of uranium or plutonium is large enough to just sustain a chain reaction, it is 
called critical. A smaller amount than this is subcritical, and a greater supercritical. 
18 One could equally well fire the 'nut' onto the 'bolt' of course as was done in 'Little Boy'. E.g. John 
Custer-Mullen Atom Bombs: The Top Secret Inside Story of Little boy and Fat Mall (Self-published, 
2004) 
19 See list of US nuclear tests at Carey Sublette's The Nuclear Weapon Archive Online: 
http.//www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Tests/index.html 
20 Actually, it is quite simple to demonstrate that Alvarez' claim is not accurate. Serber (reference 
below) gives a formula for calculating the yield of a fizzle given a number of assumptions (these 
may not be fulfilled here, but we are interested only in an order of magnitude calculation, for 
which Serber's method should suffice). The formula for the fission yield is approximately 
3/2 
VoVT 
E"'=>500(-d-) M em . 
o 
Here Va is the ideal value of the effective number of neutrons per fission (the fizzle will start when 
the pieces are close enough together for the effective neuo:on number to ~ecome positive), v is the 
velocity of the falling slab as it approaches the still slab, T IS the average tIme ~et:veen two . 
spontaneous neutrons in 235U, do is the distance the falling piece travels from fIsslOn starts untIl the 
mounting pressure pushes the system apart and fission stops, M is the total mass of the tw~ , 
pieces, em is the energy released per kg of uranium which is fissioned, Serber uses the quantItIes v, 
= 0.3, T = 1O.8 s, d = 10cm and elll = 20,000 kg TNT per kg fissioned HEU, Furthermore Wl' assum,e 
M = 50kg and with simple Newtonian mechanics find that a piece \,\,hich is dropped I ro~ ,) height 
of 2m will obtain a velocity of about 6m/s (see any undergraduate phYSICS textbook). \\lth tlwc,l' 
numbers one finds a yield of 0.4 kg of TNT, not a big explosion, but enough to kill whoever drops 
the piece (note that this is a rough calculation). This is probably an o\'erestimate, since the tallmg 
piece has so little momentum it will likely be pushed ott of the other before Impact b\ the 
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remember that this was written at a time when the general consensus was that 
building a nuclear weapon required a multi-million dollar 'Manhattan'-scale project) 
and that even a HEU gun will be a very ambitious undertaking for an inexperienced 
technical team, few knew better than the late Alvarez the difficulties of designing 
the other type of weapon, the plutonium implosion device: he was the ver\' man 
J 
who invented the mechanism to detonate the explosives which set off such a 
bomb
21
, whose design was realised in the Trinity test device and the bomb 'Fat !\lan' 
which caused more than 70.000 people to perish in Nagasaki in August 19-iS22 . The 
implosion weapon, the simplest workable design using plutonium, requires 
advanced command of high explosives to produce a very precise spherically 
converging shockwave by detonating a number of shaped charges ver\' nearl\, 
simultaneously. 
3.4 Making a crude Pu implosion device 
HEU and plutonium, as was duly demonstrated during the last World War, can 
both be used for nuclear explosives. But for sharing this vital trait, there are 
important physical differences between the two materials that set them apart both in 
their commercial and military uses and the proliferation concern their continued 
existence, and indeed production, causes. 
3.4.1 The gun and the implosion device explained 
Nuclear weapons and reactors work because of two properties of nuclear fission 
which makes a chain reaction possible. When a heavy nucleus such as that of 235U or a 




pressure from early fission. The likely effect seems to be that no ~xplosion occu~s, b~t t~e neutron 
radiation will probably suffice to kill or seriously injure anyone m the room (this claIm IS not 
verified here). Alvarez' point remains valid, however: the principle of a uranium gun is very 
simple. It seems likely that, given two pieces of HEU metal a 'high school kid'. could, if not make a 
bomb, at least manage to wreak some havoc. Robert Serber The Los Alamos Pnmer (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992) section 17. 
The exploding bridgewire detonator, see Lillian r:odd~son, Paul W. Henriks~n, Roger A. \l~ade 
and Catherine Westfall Critical Assembly: A Techmcal History of Los AllllIlll~ dUn1zg the Oppenheimer 
Years 1943-1945 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp.171-173 
Richard Rhodes The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1 LJl"'b) 
p.740 
All plutonium nuclei eNpu, 2.h'PU, 241pU, and C4CPU) can in principle be fissioned. J. Carson \ l.uk 
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2.52 and 2.95 for the two elements respectively24. The second property is that when 
these neutrons in turn smash into a nearby 235U or Pu nucleus, this causes the second 
nucleus to fission as well. Thus more neutrons are produced and the chain reaction 
is started. Clearly, for a chain reaction to escalate, the average number of neutrons 
per fission must be larger than I, which would just suffice to keep the reaction rate 
constant. Many of the produced neutrons do not produce further fission, however: 
they may escape from the system or be absorbed by the fissile nuclei or another type 
of nucleus present, hence one speaks of the effective number of neutrons per fission 
after subtracting the one neutron necessary to keep the reaction going and the 
fraction of neutrons which do not further the chain reaction. If the effective neutron 
number is positive, a chain reaction starts, otherwise the reaction will die out. 
As explained above, a system where the chain reaction is allowed to increase 
exponentially is called supercritical. If the chain reaction goes on for a sufficiently 
long time, the chain reaction releases enormous amounts of energy and an explosion 
occurs. The system is quickly blown apart by the extreme temperature and 
pressure, however, and the bomb becomes subcritical again. The trick is therefore 
to create conditions under which the chain reaction can escalate for as long a time as 
possible before the device disassembles. 
If one were to build a nuclear bomb using plutonium, the gun method described 
above would not work well. Both in HEU and Pu there is a certain activity of 
spontaneous fission, i.e. heavy nuclei fission on their own account (or so one might 
think of it) at a certain rate emitting neutrons which can potentially start the chain 
reaction too soon. 
Because of the ever-present background of neutrons from spontaneous fission, 
therefore, the two pieces of HEU in a gun design need to be slammed together 
sufficiently quickly - if they approach each other too slowly, neutrons from 
spontaneous fission in one lump will start inducing fission in the other and vice 
versa, commencing the explosion before the two pieces are properly in place. While 
most neutrons are still lost to the gap between the pieces, the fission still generates 
enough heat and pressure to blow the device apart before the explosion can begin 
'Reactor-Grade Plutonium's Explosive Properties' Nuclear Control Institute (1990)*. 
24 Serber The Los Alamos Primer p.20. 
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properly. The result is a very small bang by nuclear standards - a fizzle. HElJ emits 
spontaneous neutrons at a fairly low rate (about a hundred million per second for a 
critical mass25), so a well designed gun can shoot the two pieces completely together 
between two spontaneous neutron emissions. The same assembly speed is not 
nearly fast enough when the material is plutonium, however, whose spontaneous 
fission activity for a critical mass is much higher. A more complex design is called 
for. 
The way military plutonium weapons work is not to slam individual bits 
together, but to compress a 'pit' of plutonium metal into a denser state by making 
clever use of high explosives26. Whilst the initial state is subcritical, shock 
compression of the fissile material forces the nuclei closer together to form an easier 
target for the neutrons to hit27. The increased density makes the pit supercritical, a 
neutron generator, or initiator, starts the chain reaction at just the right moment and 
the bomb goes off. This is the implosion device. 
This is not as straightforward as it sounds; getting the spherically converging 
shockwave right, in fact, was among the greatest challenges to the Manhattan 
project designing the first generation of nuclear weapons2B • It was found that simply 
packing a shell of explosives around the plutonium core would not do: even a 
pressure wave differing very slightly from spherical shape would flatten rather than 
compress the plutonium core, dramatically decreasing the yield of the weapon to a 
fizzle, or no yield whatever. The solution that was found was to use so-called 
explosive lenses: shapes of faster and slower high explosives that produce a 
pressure wave of a desired shape. 
At the time of the Manhattan project, implosion and shaped charges had hardly 
been utilised before - now more than 60 years have passed, and the knowledge of 
spherical shock waves is widely used in several branches of engineering
29
. Half a 
25 ibid. p. 12 
26 For further discussion of the implosion design see Mark 'Reactor-Grade Plutonium's Explosi\'e 
Properties' 
27 The critical mass is inversely proportional to the density squared. Serber The Los Alamos Primer r 
27 
28 See e.g. Hoddeson et al. Critical Assembly chapters 8,9 and H. 
29 See the preface of R. F. Trunin Slwck Compression of Condensed ;\ laterials (Cambridge: Cambridgl' 
University Press, 1998) pp. ix-xi. 
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century of research on shock wave compression physics has provided an}' 
competent engineer with access to a good library just about what he or she needs to 
get a certain understanding of an implosion system30. Computer software and 
calculating power have furthermore progressed immensely even since the 1970s b,' 
oJ 
which time 'the era of new concepts in [US] nuclear weapons design had "irtuall}' 
come to an end
,31
• Finally, terrorist demands on reliability and predictability of yield 
will be much lower than that of any military state, so precision requirements can be 
relaxed somewhae
2
• This said, however, obtaining the skill and experience required 
to make even a finished blueprint into a working device could still be an important 
obstacle33, as discussed further in chapter 6. 
There is also the question of transporting the device after it has been successfully 
built. While a gun design will have the shape of a cylinder, a crude implosion device 
will be roughly spherical and considerably more bulky. The measurements 
pertaining to the two nuclear bombs used in war might give us an idea of what the 
terrorist should expect to move around. 'Little Boy', the uranium gun, was 3.05m 
long, 71cm diameter and weighed something over 4000kg34 . 'Fat Man' (the 
implosion device) was, as the name indicates, more bulky with its length, diameter 
and weight roughly 3.25m, 155cm and 4550kg respectivel/5. To be sure, these 
bombs had bulletproof armour and were designed to be aerodynamic, hence were 
much heavier than would be necessary for a delivery, say, by car. Yet a terrorist 







See e.g. the proceedings of the annual conferences of the American Physical Society Topical 
Group on Shock Compression of Condensed Matter from 1981 to present (for a list of references, 
see www.shockphysics.org), as well as textbooks such as Trunin Shock Compression of Condensed 
Materials. It is probably no coincidence that although the publisher's notes on the back flap of the 
latter volume predicts it will be of interest to 'condensed matter phycisists, material scientists, 
earth scientists and astrophycisists', the only library in the author's native :--Jon\'ay found to hold a 
copy was that of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. 
'Nuclear Weapons Technology' Section 5 of Militarily Critical Technologies List Part II (Washington 
DC: US Department of Defense, 1998)* p. II-5-3 
Bunn and Wier 'Terrorist Nuclear Weapon ... ' p.142 
Brian A. Jackson 'Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by 
Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption' Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 2-1 pp. 183-213 
(2001) 
Surprisingly reports differ slightly. 4100kg is reported in E.F. Newle\' 'Development of the 
Nuclear weapon' in T.1. Williams (ed) A History of Technology \'01. 7 (Oxford: Clarendon Pfl'SS. 
1979) pt.1 p.276. 
e.g. Newle~' p. 276. 
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ordnance workshops at hand and will be unlikely to be able to, nor indeed attempt 
to, optimise their design with respect to weight and size. A mass of some 2-3000 kg 
for the HEU gun and 3-4000 for the implosion device might be a reasonable guess36, 
thus it is clear that such a device is a challenge to smuggle due to its sheer size and 
weight. And the Pu device significantly more so than the uranium gun, although 
this difference is probably much less important than those pertaining to de\"ice 
construction treated above. 
3.4.2 HEU implosion weapon? 
There is also the possibility of making an implosion weapon using HEU. To the 
best of the author's knowledge, all currently stocked military HEU weapons are of 
implosion type. As explained, a gun design would be much easier to realise, yet 
given HEU, the implosion design is always a possibility. The major advantage of an 
implosion type weapon would be that less HEU metal is needed. Therefore it is 
conceivable that a terrorist could consider this weapon, in particular when she has 
too little material for a gun and few prospects of acquiring more37. Combinations of 
uranium and plutonium could also be used, should the terrorist possess a quantity 
of both. It is therefore worth keeping this option in mind, although we shall not 
focus on it in the following. 
3.4.3 Acquiring and transporting the material 
The specifics of nuclear material safeguards, commercial and military uses and 
storage are many and tangled. Providing any completeness on this question is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but an introduction to materials acquisition which 
the reader may wish to refer to is given in the next section, and more extensi\'cly in 




The uranium gun weapons made by South Africa weighed as little as 1 tonne, yet it is doubtful 
whether a non-state group could achieve this, Peter D. Zimmerman 'Proliferation: Bronze Medal 
Technology is Enough' Orbis (Winter 1994) p.77 
For a given mass of HEU an implosion design wO,ul,d also be able, to give a gr~ater yield, yet it is 
unlikely that a well informed terrorist will risk thIS If the gun deSIgn IS an optIon, 
There ~xists an extensive literature that the reader may refer to, A good starting point is Richard 
L. Garwin and Georges Charpak Megawatts and i\ 1cgatons: A Tumillg Poill t ill ,tlle Nuclear Age? 
(Ne\,,' York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001), Other excellent resources include the senes of Securlllg tile 
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reason to believe that one material should be significantly easier to come by than the 
other. 
It is highly questionable whether the sparse record of radioactive materials 
actually seized in transit is any guide as to whether there exists an illegal market for 
fissile materials or not. The list of smuggling cases, rather short once all instances 
involving non-fissile or non-weapons usable materials are removed, paints a picture 
of a disorganised market for nuclear materials with amateurish sellers and no 
visible buyers. Most of the nuclear brokers appear to be opportunist, seeking quick 
profit from what they can get their hands on rather than responding to a real 
demand from a markee9• 
The cases involving smuggling of HEU are both more numerous and also more 
serious (larger quantities involved) than those involving Pu, of which there are only 
two: 6.15g of nearly pure 239pU was seized from the garage of a minor criminal in 
Germany in 1994 and the same year 363g of mixed-isotope Pu was seized at Munich 
airport as the result of a sting operation 40. A list of the known seizures of fissile 
material trafficking is provided in appendix A. Given the small number of cases, the 
relative emphasis on HEU in smuggling seizures might not even represent a 
statistically significant trend, much less a real preference among potential buyers of 
fissile materials. 
The radiation from plutonium might be a little harder to shield from detection 
than that of uranium. However, the needed material is neither large41 , difficult to 
shield nor particularly dangerous if handled with care. 
The most common way of detecting the presence of fissile material IS usmg a 
gamma-ray detector42. Uranium and plutonium nuclei43 are unstable and decay with 
Bomb reports from the Project Managing the Atom and Brian Finlay and Andrew Grotto The Race 
to Secure Russia's Loose Nukes: Progress since 9/11 (The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2005)*. 
39 For an in-depth but somewhat dated discussion, see e.g. chapter 2 of Rensselaer W. Lee III 
Smuggling Armageddon (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998). A more updated 'synopsis' is Lee's 
'Nuclear Smuggling: Patterns and Responses' Parameters 33:1 (2003) pp.95-1ll. 
40 Lists of smuggling cases are given in numerous sources, e.g. the Nuclear Threat Initiative Research 
Library webpage: http://www.1l ti.org/eJesearch/e3 _speciaCnuctrafficking.html 
41 A critical mass of a HEU or plutonium metal sphere is an object the size of a softball or tennis ball 
respectively. 
42 See appendix D . 
.. 1:1 Several uranium nuclei have very long lifetimes, howe\'er, the longest being 238U whose half-life is 
comparable to the age of the universe. 
- 69-
time to other elements, and in each decay radiation is emitted, most often including 
at least one gamma quantum whose energy is specific to the decay process. The 
decay process, in turn, is specific to the nucleus that decayed, providing (in 
principle) a means to identify which nuclei are present and in \,,'hich quantit~·. 
Typical y-energies from 235U (the prominent isotope in HEU) are lower than that of 
relevant plutonium isotopes44, and since as a rule of thumb more energetic radiation 
is more penetrating, a given y-activity of radiation from a lump of Pu is in principle 
somewhat more easily detectable than the same activity from HEU. Furthermore a 
quantity of plutonium will have a higher activity than a similar mass of HEU. 
Nonetheless assuming the plutonium is highly emiched in the isotope 239pU, 
radiation levels are so low that although more shielding will be called for, it is 
debatable whether the difference in radiation detectability is important (for less 
optimal forms of plutonium the radiation levels can be much higher due to the 
presence of light elements). The chances that an item be randomly detected in 
transit this way are remote in both cases if the smuggler is clever42 . For example, an 
experiment conducted by ABC News in co-operation with the Natural Resources 
Defence Council in 2002 smuggled 6.8 kg cylinder of depleted uranium (slightly less 
radioactive than HEU) by air from the United States to Vienna, thence by train to 
Istanbul crossing four extra-EU borders and by container ship back to the States. 
Although the container containing the cylinder was one of the few that were x-
rayed upon arrival in the US, the uranium was not detected.j~. An assembled 
implosion device using plutonium, supposedly easier to detect than HEU, is 
deemed 'almost undetectable with passive methods' in a careful study by Fetter and 
co-authors46. Passive detection en route to construction site, it thus seems, is likely 




With regards to acquisition and transportation, thus, I do not expect the 
Gamma signature energies of 235U is approximately 186 keV, while both 239p.U and 240pU (the 
prominent isotopes of Pu) emit v-photons of energi~s aro~nd 640 keV. DaVId S?ear~ (ed.) 
Technology R&D for Am1S Control (Office of NonprolIferatIOn Research and Engmeermg, US 
Department of Energy 2001)* pp. 46 and 33 respectively. 
Christopher r Paine 'Preventing Nuclear Terrorism', testimony for the Hearing of the '-.;ational 
Security, Veteran Affairs, and International Subcommittee of the House Government Reform 
Committee (September 24, 2002) 
Steve Fetter et al. 'Detecti ng Nuclear Warheads' Science S Global Secli ri ty 1 (19l)()) p.2-i6 
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differences between the two substances to incline terrorist preferences notably In 
either direction. We look therefore to the next phase of a proliferation project. 
3.4.4 Designing and building the device 
Comparison of the requirements for building a gun-type versus an implosion 
type nuclear device has been expertly treated by many authors -\;- and I will not 
reiterate them but focus on what additional requirements a plutonium project 
brings as compared to the uranium gun. 
Apart from weapons design, uranium as a material is significantly eaSIer to 
handle than plutonium. For one, it is less radioactive; in fact a lump of HEU metal 
could be handled by hand without much of a health risk. But the greater danger 
from plutonium is not primarily from bulk radiation but inhalation of airborne 
particles48. In order to form the weapon parts, the metal must be cast and then 
ground, milled or otherwise machined. Metal dust is produced in the process and 
inhaled plutonium dust is lethal even in milligram quantities because of its a-
activity49. Uranium and plutonium are corrosive and are therefore often not stored 
in the pure metal form most usable for weaponsso. If the material is stored as oxide 
powder or an alloy, chemical processing is needed to reduce oxide to metal or 
separate the metal from the alloy; in any such process, plutonium demands more 
care and special equipment to protect the worker from harms1. 
An overall point is that of extreme health hazards when working with plutonium 
with amateur equipment due to the toxicity of plutonium when inhaled or 







e.g. Bunn and Wier 'Terrorist Nuclear Weapon ... ' and Ferguson and Potter The Four Faces. 
pp.131-149. 
If the plutonium is 'reactor-grade', that is, it has a large proportion of the isotope 21'.PU as well as 
contamination of light elements, the bulk radiation can also pose a notable health rIsk. 
R. H. Clarke et al. 'The environmental safety and health implications of plutonium' Joumal of 
Radiological Protection 16:2 (1996) pp.91-105. 
Siegfried Hecker 'Towards a Comprehensive Safeguards System: Keeping Fissile \ laterials out \ 11 
Terrorists' Hands' The Annals of the AAPSS 607 (2006) p.123 
Mark et al. 'Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?' op.cit. p.58 and 61. 
The toxicity of plutonium has often been much exaggerated. For a sober analysis, see Bem.ard L. 
Cohen 'Ha~ards from Plutonium toxicity' Health Physics 32:5 (1977) pp. 359-379. Cohen estImates 
approximately 1 eventual fatality per IS grammes disper~ed in a cit\' and. puts the lethal do.st' \11 
inhaled plutonium dust at 200 microgrammes. Both uranIUm and plutomum are also Chl'mlC11ly 
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at least some simple remote-handling equipment. It should be noted, however, that 
the Afghan drug industry, with which al Qaida is reported to sustain connections, 
employs similar equipment for chemically converting opium poppy seeds to heroin, 
due to the toxicity of airborne heroin53. 
While some will argue that a terrorist who is willing to blow himself up in the 
attack anyway will be unconcerned about hazards to his health, one must remember 
that a weapons project of this type will take many months, more likely several 
years54. Inhaling even milligram quantities of plutonium dust will result in death or 
disability in a shorter time than this. Furthermore, while the quick death in a 
spectacular bang has evidently been attractive to some terrorists, the slow and 
painful death by radiation sickness might not be as appealing55, and finally, while 
pawns may be sacrificed, nuclear weapon scientists are hard to come by, and a 
single death by accident could be a major setback. Hence, whereas little regard for 
the health of the workers could speed up the process by avoiding the stringent 
safety regulations enforced in any legal facility, it could just as easily derail the 
project before a workable bomb is finished. 
Work on explosives will also involve dangers. If an implosion device is made, 
extensive work with high explosives must be performed, presumably more 
dangerous than the relatively slow-burning propellants used in a gun design. Even 
if terrorists have extensive experience with explosives, accidents have been 
widespread in many terrorist organisations. For example, it has been estimated that 
the Irish Republican Army lost approximately 120 members due to accidents with 





Further complications arise because the stable form of plutonium at room 
toxic due to being heavy metals. 
Bunn and Wier 'Terrorist Nuclear Weapon ... ' p.138 
Pluta and Zimmerman expect the building phase to 'exceed one year' whilst a project 
management analysis by Harney et al. indicate surprisingly tha.t as .muc~ as 4 yea~s.could be 
required for a state proliferator to weaponise stolen HEU (bearmg In mmd that mIlItary weapons 
have other and tougher requirements than terrorist ones). Anna M. Pluta and Peter D. 
Zimmerman 'Nuclear Terrorism: A Disheartening Dissent' Survival··1B:2 p.62 and Robert Ilamey et 
al. 'Anatomy of a Project to Produce a First Nuclear Weapon' Science and Global Security 14 (2006) 
p.169. 
A oint elaborated bv Adam Dolnik 'Die and Let Die' Studies in Conflict (-... Terrorism 26 (2003) p.29 P -
Brian A. Jackson 'Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat !\ssessment Informed by 
Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption' Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 2.+ (2001) p.l lJ3 
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temperature (the alpha phase) is brittle and very difficult to machine, necessitating 
some metallurgical solution - several such are well known but not easy to manage57 . 
There can be no doubt that designing either weapon type is not a tri\"ial matter 
and demands much effort by personnel with specialised skills. In their authoritative 
paper Mark et al. prescribe the following requirements58 
The preparation of [weapon design drawings] requires a large 
number of man-hours and the direct participation of individuals 
thoroughly informed in several quite distinct areas: the physical, 
chemical, and metallurgical properties of the various materials to be 
used, as well as the characteristics affecting their fabrication; 
neutronic properties; radiation effects, both nuclear and biological; 
technology concerning high explosives and/ or chemical propellants; 
some hydrodynamics; electrical circuitry; and others. 
This was written in the 1980's however; nowadays computer drawing and 
simulation software requiring no more than a standard desktop computer can vastly 
simplify many of the above tasks and much of the information previously reserved 
for experts is now available on the internet and open sources59 • Furthermore one 
must again emphasise the difference between a terrorist and a mili tary project', 
relaxing very significantly what 'thoroughly informed 1 means for each of the points 
mentioned. 
It is tempting at this point to mention the 'Nth Country' experiment started 1964 
at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in which two recent physics PhDs were 
asked to make a detailed nuclear weapons design based only on open and 
published sources61 . 30 months after it commenced a blueprint was finished for a 
20kT implosion device. A jury of experts deemed it workable beyond question. It 
should be noted that the two students, Dobson and Selden, opted for the implosion 
design because a gun design would be too easy62. Published resources that designers 
57 The plutonium used in the first weapons was stabilised in the so-called delta phase by alloying it 
with a small concentration of gallium. Richard D. Baker, Siegfried S. Hecker and Delbert R. 
Harbur 'Plutonium: A Wartime Nightmare but a Metallurgist's Dream' Los Alamos Sciellct' 
(Winter/Spring 1983)* pp.142-151 
58 Mark ct al. 'Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?' p. 58 
59 Point made by Pluta and Zimmerman Nuclear Terrorism ... ' op.cit. p.63 
60 A military weapon must be safe, reliable and predictable. Terrorist \'\"eapons need not be either. 
e.g. ibid. p. 61. 
61 Dan Stober 'No Experience Necessary' The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59:2 (2003) pr· 5h -h3 . 
62 ibid. p.57 
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will find helpful have grown enormously in number since the 60s, and as Garwin 
and Charpak say, 'It should not be assumed that terrorists or other groups wanting 
to make nuclear weapons cannot read. ,63 One must be careful in extracting too much 
from this particular experiment for, while it shows that designing even an implosion 
device is not an impossible undertaking, the story of the Nth Country experiment 
neglects the practical problems of obtaining the necessary data for the design as well 
as building the actual device. The participating students could ask that experiments 
'be performed I and were subsequently given the data. Many of these experiments 
would presumably involve advanced equipment such as flash X-ray cameras, 
pindomes64 and detectors for neutrons and gamma rays, none of which is easily 
obtainable65. 
In 1977 a Princeton undergraduate designed an implosion weapon from 
unclassified information for a thesis. His professor, who was knowledgeable about 
weapon design, gave him the best mark, and the US government classified the 
paper66. While such events are notable, it is important to bear in mind that the path 
from blueprint to actual assembly poses many additional and significant hurdles. 
By far the hardest part will be creating the converging shockwave in an implosion 
device. The propelling of the moving HEU piece inside the uraruum gun IS 
relatively straightforward (also literally) and the challenge is basically one of 
making a charge of the right strength so that the pieces combine fast enough, but 
without the propellant damaging the casing and tamper nor sending the uranium 
piece flying through the opposite end before a reaction can start. With enough 
natural or depleted uranium available and access to a secluded test field, this can be 
tried with a realistic system until the right balance is found
67
. The same is not the 
case for a plutonium implosion system. Although one can find stand-in materials for 
63 Garwin and Charpak Megawatts and Megatons op.cit. p.348 
64 A device looking a little like a rolled up hedgehog, whose pins measure pressure. It is perhaps the 
simplest tool to measure the achieved symmetry of implosion. See Nuclear .Tr~sfer and Supplier 
Policy Division, Department of Energy (US) Annex 3 of the Handbook for Notificahon of Experts to 
Iraq (UNSC Resolution 1051) (DoE, 1998)* §11.4-§11.5 
65 This point is emphasised in Michael Levi's On Nuclear Terrorism pp.74-76 
66 Allison Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe pp.87-88 
67 Peter D. Zimmerman and Jeffrey G. Lewis 'The Bomb in the Backyard' Foreign Policy 
(November/December 2006) p.37 
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plutonium, accounts of the extensive implosion testing at Los Alamos during WW2 
show that a trial and failure procedure, even with unlimited access to explosive 
lenses (which are non-trivial and time-consuming to cast and shape, and not easy to 
buy in large numbers without detection), will take exceedingly long and more likely 
will never work at all. A considerable theoretical as well as experimental effort will 
b . d68 e requIre . 
3.4.5 Terrorists and fizzling: other plutonium options? 
A large number of papers and books dealing with nuclear terrorism will tell the 
reader that a gun design cannot be used with plutonium, and that implosion will 
only be effective if the shockwave produced by the high explosives is highly 
symmetrical. But what if the terrorist built a plutonium gun nonetheless, or gave up 
trying to get the implosion right and decided to detonate a very crude implosion, 
maybe without explosive lenses? 
The answer seems to be that the explosion would probably be small, but the 
terrorist could be lucky69. If the terrorist got really lucky, a sloppy implosion system 
might be able to yield perhaps a hundred tonnes of TNT. With less luck, a few 
tonnes might be achieved, and in the other lower end of the scale (where the 
plutonium gun is found), only a little more than the energy of the high explosives 
themselves7o• The explosion, if small on a nuclear scale, could still be a most serious 
terror incident. Says Paine, a researcher for the US Natural Resources Defence 
Council (NRDC), 'If plutonium were used in a crude gun assembly device the yield 
most likely would be substantially less than a kiloton, but it could be larger than the 
explosion that destroyed the Federal Building in Oklahoma City.,71 The Oklahoma 
68 See e.g. chapter 8 of Hoddeson et al. Critical Assembly to see how some of the world's most talented 
physicists and engineers struggled to obtain an acceptably symmetrical implosion and diagnose 
it. 
69 For a comprehensive discussion of implosion design fizzle yields, see Mark 'Reactor-Grade 
Plutonium's Explosive Properties' op.cit. The discussion assumes a Trinity-type implosion system 
is used to implode reactor-grade plutonium, somewhat different from the question at hand, but 
the discussion might give some idea of the probabilities involved. Notably Mark concludes that 
'not even the best weapons-grade plutonium is of any interest in connection with a gun-type 
assembly system.' (p. 5) I will not engage in a further calculation of fizzle yields for crude designs 
herein. 
70 Office of Technology Assessment Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards (OTA, 1977)* pp.141-142. 
71 Christopher E. Paine 'Preventing Nuclear Terrorism', op.cit. 
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explosion equalled approximately two tonnes of TNT.72 
What one would get, especially if some fission were achieved, was a large dirty 
bomb
73
, in itself highly dangerous. If the wind and weather was right, the 
radioactive cloud could travel far and make large areas uninhabitable with 
contamination and the public fear and panic it would inspire would likely be very 
considerable, even if the body count might not rival that of previous conventional 
attacks. 
So why not, then, go for plutonium after all, being the most toxic of the fissile 
options, and make a massive radioactive poison bomb? Lewis A. Dunn gives a 
tentative theory why such dirty weapons may not be very attractive to the terrorists 
often deemed likely to employ them. He has studied al Qaida74 throughout its 
history and attempts to see patterns in their choice of terror targets and methods75 • 
He too claims puzzlement that no radiological device has yet been used, but points 
to the trend for al Qaida to attempt to cause what he terms 'spectacular effects and 
visually pleasing destruction'. Whilst a successful nuclear detonation would 
probably satisfy the criterion of 'visually pleasing', a failed weapon might not. On 
this basis, he concludes that radiological weapons are inconsistent with al Qaida's 
past targeting practice76 and one might extrapolate this to include a nuclear device 
in the case where the terrorists herself is fairly certain it will yield a fizzle or less. 
Dunn also points to al Qaida's preference for operations of some complexity, 
often involving simultaneous attacks on several places at once, such as the failed 
'Bojinka' plot to bring down 6 or more aircraft simultaneously in 1995, the 1998 
bombing of US Embassies in East Africa, the four hijackings in the September 11 
attacks and the Madrid train bombings in 2004. 'Simultaneous attacks' says Dunn, 
'demonstrate the organization's operational sophistication to members, potential 
72 Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley Thayer America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge Mass.:MIT Press, 1998) p.155. 
73 Richhard L. Garwin 'The technology of mega terror' Technology Review 105:7 (2002) p. 66 
74 In this chapter as in other chapters, al Qaida will be frequently used as example of a terrorist 
organisation. 
75 Lewis A. Dunn 'Can al Qaeda be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons?' Center for the Study of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University Occasional Paper #3 (2005)* pp.9-10. 
76 ibid. p.ll 
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recruits, other outsiders and opponents,77. Beyond doubt, a successful nuclear attack 
will demonstrate sophistication. The pressure to appear sophisticated in the eyes of 
their audience and get their one shot right could create a significant risk aversion. 
While these arguments may not persuade anyone that e.g. al Qaida would not 
attempt usage given access to plutonium, it indicates that they might not be 
interested in investing great resources in a guaranteed fizzle, especially given that 
there is a preferable alternative, and if so will save their money until HEU is within 
reach. This choice as seen from the terrorist's point of view is detailed in chapter 5. 
3.5 Availability of nuclear materials: safeguards and challenges 
As the last part of the theoretical background, I will briefly go through the 
challenges of nuclear safeguards and the availability of nuclear materials to the 
terrorist in search of them. I will use the term safeguards in a broad sense, and 
define it as any specific measure to secure weapons usable fissile materials and 
nuclear weapons or weapon components from theft, or any other means of 
unauthorised removal, from its legal owner. In line with the focus of this thesis, by 
'safeguards' I will often refer only to fissile materials. Safeguards measures, forming 
what is often termed the 'first layer of defence' against nuclear terrorism, thus 
include such measures as installation of security equipment at storage sites, hiring 
and training of personnel, implementation of improved security routines, relocating 
stores to fewer sites, improving measurement and accounting procedures, 
verification and transparency, as well as measures to dispose of excess fissile 
materials78. By 'specific measures' it is implied that anti-terror and crime reduction 
efforts in general are not included. 
In a notable paper79, Allison sets out what he sees as a simple and workable 
doctrine to halt what he terms 'the ultimate preventable catastrophe' in a 
corresponding book80. Allison introduces the 'doctrine of "Three No's": no loose 
77 ibid. p.1S 
78 Such as by downblending HEU to lower enrichment levels for use in reactors, or storing 
plutonium as mixed oxide or in a matrix with high-level nuclear waste. See Frans Berkhout et al. 
'Disposition of Separated Plutonium' Science and Global Security 3:3 (1993) pp. 161-213. 
79 Graham Allison 'How to Stop Nuclear Terror' Foreign Affairs 83 (2004) pp.64-74. 
80 Allison Nuclear Terrorism: TIle Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe 
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nukes, no new nascent nukes, and no new nuclear states,Sl. The doctrine is based on 
a simple 'matter of physics: without fissile material, you can't have a nuclear 
bomb,s2. 
While this is an undeniable truth, critics have questioned whether Allison's 
doctrine provides much help in practice. Potter, Ferguson and Spector argue that 
Allison's view fails to grasp the vastness and complexity of the problem of 
safeguarding nuclear warheads and materials, and that more nuance is called for. 
Of interest to us is their argument that a sharp differentiation between plutonium 
and HEU is necessary, where the latter should be emphasised over the former. 
Allison, according to Potter and co-authors83, 
... fails to make a crucial distinction between highly enriched uranium 
... , which terrorists may already have the capacity to turn into the 
simplest [improvised nuclear device] ... , and plutonium, which is 
much more difficult to turn into a weapon. Prior to September 11, 
when states presented the main proliferation challenge, it made sense 
to treat HEU and plutonium as roughly equivalent dangers. Today, 
however, when nonstate actors constitute a far greater nuclear threat, 
priority must be given to rapidly securing, consolidating, and 
eliminating the vast global stocks of HEU. 
It is likely that Allison deliberately overlooks details in order to cut through to his 
most important point, that of the paramount importance of improved safeguards 
worldwide, a general principle which none of his critics disputes. Whilst this 
treatise will not attempt to assay the innumerable facets and subtleties of nuclear 
materials safeguards, I shall very briefly go through some of the aspects that make 
keeping these materials safe a unique challenge. Hecker gives five reasons why 
Allison's proclaiming that fissile materials should be kept as safe as the treasures in 
the Kremlin Armoury and the gold in Fort Knox84, inspires an erroneously simplistic 
image of the real challenge:s5 
81 Allison 'How to Stop Nuclear Terror' p.65. By 'nascent nukes' is meant fissile, weapons-usable 
material. 
82 ibid. p.64 
83 William C. Potter, Charles D. Ferguson, and Leonard S. Spector 'The Four Faces of Nuclear 
Terrorism and the Need for a Prioritized Response' Foreign Affairs 83:3 (2004) pp.130-132. Note 
that whether non-state actors form a 'far greater threat' is a disputed issue not to be addressed 
here. 
84 Allison 'How to Stop Nuclear Terror' p.64 
85 Siegfried Hecker Towards a Comprehensive Safeguards System: Keeping Fissile Materials out of 
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1. Existing inventories are thousands of times what is needed for one bomb: 
Approximately 1.9 million kg of HEU and 0.49 million kg of separated Pu86 
exist worldwide. The quantities needed for a crude nuclear weapon may be 
roughly 50kg and 15kg respectively87, much less than even the uncertainties 
with which physical inventories are accounted for. 
2. Fissile materials exist in many different forms: Uranium and plutonium are 
highly reactive metals that oxidise quickly and are therefore not stored as 
pure metal bars like the gold of Fort Knox, but e.g. as oxide or nitride 
powders, uranium hexafluoride gas or in alloys with other metals like 
aluminium88. For weapons and reactor use, metallic or ceramic (oxide) forms 
are required respectively, so to become fuel elements or weapons parts the 
fissile materials undergo chemical processing. In the weapons case, casting, 
and machining are also necessary. For plutonium, moreover, all of these 
processes must be performed with remote equipment in specially sealed 
containers due to its radioactivity, toxicity and special chemical properties. 
Accounting for fissile materials gram for gram throughout all these 
processes is clearly a daunting task. 
3. Fissile materials exist in many and diverse locations: Separated plutonium and 
HEU exist in state owned enrichment, fuel processing and reprocessing 
facilities and in storage facilities, as well as in transport between these. 
Furthermore, HEU is still used to fuel some 140 research reactors in 40 
countries, many of which private and with extremely varying security 
Terrorists' Hands' The Annals of the AAPSS 607 (2006) p.122-125. Figures and facts in the below list 
is from Hecker where nothing else is specified. 
86 This figure differs slightly from Hecker's figure. Obtained from David Albright and Kimberly 
Kramer 'Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials: Summary Tables and Charts' in Global 
Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials (Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), 
September 2005)*. ISIS' periodically updated reports on global stockpiles are probably the most 
authoritative account available in the open literature, although limited by secrecy and lack of 
transparency in many countries. The estimates of the International Panel on Fissile Materials are 
1.7 and 0.50 million kg of HEU and Pu respectively. IPFM Global Fissile Material Report 2007 
(IPFM, 2007)* p.l0 and 14. 
87 These figures assume that crude technology is available, and that a gun design is used for HEU 
and implosion for Pu. 
88 Ferguson and Potter TI1e Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism p.120 
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· 1 89 Insta ments . 
4. Fissile materials are difficult to measure and handle: Keeping track of materials 
means measuring the weight and emichment level of the material, a difficult 
task even in idealised laboratory conditions. Plutonium requires special 
handling for health reasons, and moreover exists in seven different metal 
forms, all of different density. Gamma-ray and neutron detection are 
typically used to measure mass and emichment level for plutonium and 
HEU, but the technique is not perfect because a lump of such heavy metal 
will absorb much of its own radiation, hence the measurement strictly only 
applies to the surface layer of a metal piece while its bulk may hide a 
different isotopic composition. Spoofing measurements is thus possible 
(hiding HEU inside a layer of depleted uranium, for example). Signature 
radiation of 235U is so weakly penetrating, moreover, that its presence is 
easily shielded from detection90. 
5. Military secrecy hampers safeguards and transparency: Nuclear weapons design 
and stockpile specifics are amongst the most closely held military secrets. 
Verification of stockpiles performed by foreign inspectors91 therefore 
necessitates the use of so-called non-intrusive measurements (verification of 
reported weight and emichment level without revealing secrets such as 
weapons design and geometry), which is inherently less accurate than if 
access were more direct. In some secret nuclear weapons sites, foreign 
inspection personnel are not granted access at all, as is also the case In 
worrisome stockpiles such as those of Pakistan, India and North Korea92. 
89 Figures differ slightly. Hecker reports 120, Bunn 147 and the International Panel on Fissile 
Materials (IPFM) reports 140. Hecker 'Towards a Comprehensive ... ' p. 124; Matthew Bunn 
Securing the Bomb 2007, report of the Project Managing the Atom (Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, Harvard University, 2007)*; IPFM Global Fissile Material Report 2007 (IPFM, 
2007)* p.13. 
90 The best overview of technology for verification measurements of fissile materials is perhaps 
David Spears (ed.) Technology R&D for Arms Control Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (US 
Department of Energy, 2001)*. 
91 The government in question, presumably, has every access to its own weapons and materials. 
92 Recent developments show some promise that North Korea may again permit UN inspections of 
its nuclear complex (note that unlike the Pakistani weapons, the nuclear warheads of North Korea 
and India use plutonium, not HEU). Also Pakistan has recently confirmed that it is co-operating 
with the United States on nuclear security and accounting, but very little information is currently 
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For these five reasons, Hecker says, 'simply locking up all of the materials is not a 
feasible course of action. Many states do not even know what" all" is,93. A sixth 
reason is that nuclear materials are tradable and traded commodities and therefore a 
large amount of such materials will be in transit between buyer and seller at any 
given time, much increasing the difficulty of keeping detailed track of it all94 • 
Today's safeguards, sadly, are often assessed to be clearly inadequate to deal with 
the risk of proliferation of fissile materials to terrorism95. Whilst most of the focus is 
directed to Russia, both in literature (such as the reports from Managing the Atom) 
and international programmes (the United States are currently funding several 
bilateral programmes to safeguard and eliminate stocks of fissile materials in Russia 
totalling more than one billion dollars annually96), the amount of material needed 
for one bomb is so small it can be obtained from almost any of the more than 40 
countries in the world keeping such materials97. Bunn and Wier sum up the 
situation outside Russia thus 'There are no binding global standards for nuclear 
security, and in practice the security at sites where the essential ingredients of 
nuclear weapons are located ranges from excellent to appalling,98. The existing 
legislation, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials99 is, 
according to critics, 'vague in its requirements, applies primarily to international 
transport of materials, does not cover military materials at all, and has no provisions 
for verification or enforcement,lOO. 
available as to the nature of this co-operation. Bunn Securing the Bomb 2007 p. 59. 
93 Hecker 'Toward a Comprehensive Nuclear Safeguards System' p.125. 
94 Point made by Peter Zimmerman, private communication. 
95 See e.g. Hecker 'Toward a Comprehensive ... ', and Matthew Bunn Securing the Bomb 2007 (Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 2006)* 
96 e.g. Anthony Wier and Matthew Bunn Funding for u.s. Efforts to Improve Controls Over Nuclear 
Weapons, Materials and Expertise Overseas: Recent Developments and Trends report from Project 
Managing the Atom (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 
2007)*, table 1. 
97 Notably, most research reactors do not store enough fissile material for a weapon, so to obtain an 
adequate amount, thefts would likely include several such sites. 
98 Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier Securing the Bomb 2006 Project Managing the Atom (Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 2006)*, p.19. 
99 International Atomic Energy Agency Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials With 
amendment (2005)* 
100 Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren and Anthony Wier Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven 
Steps for Immediate Action report from Project Managing the Atom (Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, Harvard University, 2002)* p.57 
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Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia's nuclear weapons complex has been 
considerably downsized, leaving thousands of nuclear experts, who used to be 
considered the nation's finest, unemployed or on unsustainably small salaries. The 
complaint was put succinctly by the head of the Russian nuclear inspection agency 
some years ago, saying 'Highly qualified specialists who work in secret nuclear 
towns earn less than the cleaning women who work in the Moscow subway,101. This 
downsizing, concludes Rensselaer Lee III, an authority on nuclear smuggling, has 
'catastrophically corroded employee well-being and morale, greatly increasing the 
risk of nuclear theft,102. 
This fact is underlined by a study of the actual smuggling attempts that have 
been interdicted 103. These incidents tend to be spurred by the economic needs of 
opportunistic personnel seeking quick profits, only to fall victims of police stings 
(indeed, German police has been criticised, by Lee among others, for encouraging 
the theft in the first place, creating the very market they claim to hunt down and in 
the process victimising employees in a desperate situation who would not otherwise 
have perpetrated the misdeed). Noting the ease with which police operations have 
been able to persuade employees to commit theft for money, it is unlikely that 
terrorist organisations will find it more difficult, especially if they have ties to 
Russian organised crime. Such a group would also be willing and able to exercise 
types of pressure on employees that the police never could. 
The situation in Russia has improved somewhat since the 90s, with at least 
temporary employment provided for many former nuclear workers
104
. The fact 
remains, however, that a large number of Russians holding exactly the expertise Al 
Qaida would require in order to turn stolen material into a weapon are still in dire 
economic need, unable to support their families. A report from the Carnegie 
101 Rensselaer W. Lee III Smuggling Armageddon: The Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet Union 
and Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998) p.37. Lee in turn quotes the German magazine Die 
Woche. 
102 Lee Smuggling Annageddon p.35. 
103 For a list of smuggling cases with some details, see e.g. the Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library 
webpage: http://www.nti.orgleJesearch/e3_speciaCnuctrafficking.html. Based on the International 
Atomic Energy Agency's Illicit Trafficking Database available to members from http://www-
ns.iaea.orgisecurity/itdb.htlll, a synopsis of which is foundin appendix A. 
104 Bunn and Wier Securing the Bomb 2006 pp.84-85. 
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Endowment for International Peace of 2001 reported that some 200 scientists in 
Russian nuclear cities proclaimed themselves willing to Iwork for anyone and do 
anything,lo5. While Russia's economic upturn of recent years has improved the 
conditions in the country's nuclear sector, it is likely that should an economic 
recession occur, conditions will again turn to the worse. Russia's economic boost has 
been based largely on high oil prices, a cheap rouble and low domestic labour cost, 
all fluctuating conditions that are not guaranteed to lastlo6. 
Nonetheless, Hecker only rates Russia the fourth greatest proliferation threat 
today, after Pakistan, North Korea and HEU-fuelled research reactors worldwidelo7. 
Hecker's point is a valid one: one must not be blinded by the vastness of the Russian 
nuclear materials stockpile, for the amount of materials needed for a bomb is 
comparatively so minute it could be obtained from a number of countries. Pakistan 
already hosted the notorious A.Q. Khan, a grand-scale broker in nuclear 
technologyl08, and some of its tribal areas in the north are dominated by militant 
Islamic groups sympathetic of al Qaida. Whilst Pakistanis weapons and materials 
might be physically well protected, the threat from armed attacks and inside theft is 
cause for much concern. Given the recent political turmoil in the country, it is not 
hard to envision a worst case scenario in which an extremist Islamic faction comes 
to power, perhaps by a coup d' etat, creating the world's first Islamic fundamentalist 
nuclear weapons statel09. A recent paper by Luongo and Salik downplays such 
concerns, yet admits there are many challenges left, and their sense of security 
seems to depend heavily on the unity and stability of the Pakistani militaryl1O. 
North Korea has already proven its readiness to sell missile technology, even 
assembled missile systems. Recent press reports have indicated that North Korea 
may have supplied a plutonium producing nuclear reactor to Syria
l1l
. While 
105 Jon Wolfsthal'Surveying the Nuclear Cities' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57:4 (2001) pp.15-17. 
Also Valentin Tikhonov Russia's Nuclear and Missile Complex: The Human Factor in Proliferation 
(CEIP, 2001)* 
106 Pluta and Zimmerman 'Nuclear Terrorism: A Disheartening Dissent' pp. 59-60. 
107 Hecker 'Towards a Comprehensive Safeguards System' p.130. 
108 See Gordon Correra Shopping For Bombs (London: Hurst & co., 2006) 
109 Many have voiced this worry, e.g. Ferguson and Potter The Four Faces ... p.125. 
110 Kenneth N. Luongo and Naeem Salik 'Building Confidence in Pakistan's Nuclear Security' Arms 
Control Today (December 2007)* 
111 Glenn Kessler 'N. Korea, Syria may be at work on nuclear facility' Washington Post (September 13, 
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perhaps still a big step, covert wholesale of excess separated plutonium, one may 
speculate, could be a possible next step for a regime desperate for money112. 
Based on this it may not be so surprising of Pluta and Zimmerman to go so far as 
to conclude that 'It seems certain that at some price nuclear explosive material is 
available to well-funded terrorists.,ll3 Assuming this is true, what would the optimal 
strategy be for a terrorist organisation with such ambitions? Much as al Qaida has 
proven to be well funded (the attacks on September 11 alone are estimated to have 
cost them some $400,000-$500,000114), the purchase of fissile material will 
doubtlessly be a large investment. Zimmerman and Lewis find that if al Qaida were 
to choose its method of attack by the appalling index of price per person perished, a 
nuclear weapon would likely be the most cost-efficient by far. But as they point out, 
'spending $5-10 million to kill 100,000 people is a bargain only if you have $5-10 
million to spend in the first place.,lls Such a sum would not be spent lightly, and it is 
likely that Bin Laden and his co-conspirators would think hard and well before 
making their choice of what to buy. The old rule of thumb 'the higher the stakes, the 
more rational the players,1l6 seems to be applicable. 
3.6 Conclusions so far 
This chapter has analysed and compared the nuclear terrorism threat from highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. Our main conclusion thus far is that 
insofar as the terrorist has a choice she would choose HEU over plutonium for her 
nuclear project. As quantitative estimates go (with reference to the next chapter) I 
conclude from the analysis herein that the a priori probability of a terrorist attempt 
to construct nuclear weapons will involve HEU rather than Pu is greater than 50%. 
Most importantly, a HEU gun-assembled nuclear weapon is much simpler to 
design and build than a plutonium device, which would need to be realised by an 
2007)* p. A12; 'Report: North Korea provided technical assistance to Syria to build nuclear reactor' 
International Herald Tribune (February 18, 2008)* 
112 Hecker 'Towards a Comprehensive Safeguards System' p.130. 
113 Pluta and Zimmerman 'Nuclear Terrorism ... ' p.60. 
114 National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States The 9/11 Report (St. Martin's 
Paperbacks, 2004)* p.249 
115 Zimmerman and Lewis 'The Bomb in the Backyard' p. 39. 
116 See e.g. Jon Elster 'When Rationality Fails' in Schweers Cook and Levi (eds) The Limits llf 
Ratiollality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) pp.40-41. 
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implosion mechanism making advanced use of explosives. Even a project to make a 
rather crude plutonium implosion would exceed a uranium gun project in 
operational complexity and its probable yield would still be significantly smaller 
than that of the gun due to a high probability of predetonation. 
Since even a fizzle yield will be a very significant terrorism incident, 
predetonation is only a concern to a terrorist who is either motivated to cause 
maximum damage or has a fear of appearing incompetent in the eyes of potential 
supporters, or both. I argued that there is empirical evidence in favour of the latter 
of these notions, making for a risk aversion which could incline preferences towards 
the safer of the two options: HEU. The notion that Imaximum damage I be a primary 
measure of success in the terrorist's calculus is perhaps a little simplistic, yet is 
arguably a useful assumption for policy making as demonstrated and discussed in 
chapters 4 through 6. 
Furthermore the properties of plutonium pose significant hurdles which a project 
using HEU would avoid. Plutonium is more radioactive and poisonous and 
processing it calls for some extra equipment such as glove boxes, inert atmosphere 
casing and remote handling devices. Moreover, plutonium is a difficult material to 
work with, being extremely brittle in metal form. 
The qualitative analysis presented in this chapter, which synthesises research by a 
number of experts over the years, paves the way for the model introduced in the 
next chapter where a formal decision theoretic analysis will be undertaken. 
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- 4 - Safeguards: HEV vs. Plutonium - a formal 
analysis 
In the previous chapter I argued that there are very good reasons to believe that 
given the choice, a terrorist will opt for highly emiched uranium over plutonium. 
Furthermore a nuclear attack which fizzles, while probably sufficient to dwarf most 
terror incidents to date, is still far preferable to the targeted government than if the 
bomb had the yield of the Hiroshima attack, obtainable with the simplest type of 
nuclear weapons. 
4.1 Chapter overview 
The research question to be addressed in this chapter was introduced at the 
beginning of the previous chapter where it was partially treated in a qualitative 
way. In this chapter I will use the conclusions of chapter 3 to devise a model with a 
view to analysing what policy implications follow from them. The chapter starts 
with a presentation of the key concepts of decision theory drawn upon in the 
analysis. 
Two potentially powerful results (equations (4.10) and (4.12)) are derived and 
their interpretation and significance are discussed. A demonstration of the 
applicability of these formulas is given thereafter, when some estimates for the real 
numbers behind the algebraic symbols is provided in the case of current safeguards 
efforts undertaken by the United States primarily in the former Soviet Union. A 
further development of the theory makes way for a succinct criterion to determine 
situations where full priority should be given to HEU over Pu. Finally, the main 
assumptions and simplifications inherent in the formal model used are discussed to 
assess the robustness of the conclusions drawn from the analysis. 
4.2 Introduction to the methodology and a toy model 
Before embarking on the full analysis, let us consider a Itoy model' in order to 
explain the basic principles of the methodology employed in this and several 
subsequent chapters. 
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The concept of a game in rational choice theory was introduced in chapter 2 and 
we quickly recapitulate the basics as well as introduce the conceptually simpler 
decision theoryl. Each game has one or more players, each with a set of options for 
how to play the game. The word 'game' becomes natural since just as in most board 
games, our formal game also has a sequence of one or more simultaneous or 
subsequent moves. In chess, for example, moves are consecutive and alternate 
between two players. A plan of how to move under different conditions is called a 
strategy. When there are two or more players, we call the theory employed game 
theory, and in this case the best action by a player will depend on which strategies 
the other players employ. For game theory models the analysis is typically a quest 
for so-called equilibria of strategies, that is, sets of strategies (collections of one 
strategy per player) that are best responses to each other. When all players play 
according to a set of strategies which form an equilibrium, no player has any 
incentive to deviate from their equilibrium strategy2. In this way, especially when a 
game has only one equilibrium, the equilibrium concept has been found to predict 
and describe the behaviour of actors in certain real scenarios as our example of the 
prisoner's dilemma demonstrated. 
To define rigorously what is meant by 'the best' outcome for a player, rational 
choice theory introduces the concept of a utility junction, which is a measure of each 
player's utility or payoff. Per definition, a rational player will try to maximise his 
expected utility3. The utility function will depend on which outcome the game has 
(any interesting game has more than one possible outcome), and decides each 
player's preferences with respect to the possible outcomes. In a single game of chess 
the preferred outcome (highest value of the utility function) is obviously to win the 
game, a draw is in between and a loss is the least preferred outcome. We will denote 




There exists a large number of introductory textbooks in game theory and rational choice theory. 
For an easy-to-read introduction, refer to Robert Gibbons A Primer in Game Theory (Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992) 
The equilibrium described here is the so-called Nash equilibrium. This concept has been 
generalised in many ways to extend to more complex games. See Gibbons ibid. 
There are alternatives to utility theory which will not used in this thesis. See discussions in 
chapter 2 and John Broome 'Should a Rational Agent Maximize Expected Utility?' in Schweers 
and Cook The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990) pp. 132-145. 
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A game like chess is said to be a game of perfect information, which means that 
both players know at any stage of the game exactly what the history of the game is -
who has done what. An example of a game of imperfect information could be a 
game of rock-paper-scissors; each player must now respond to the other player's 
action before having observed what it is. 
Chess is also a game of complete information: both players have all relevant 
information about the game and can put themselves in the other player's stead and 
ask 'what would I have done if I were he/she?'. Formally we may say that each 
player knows the other player's possible strategies and corresponding payoff 
function4• In card games, however, the situation is different. Here, each player only 
knows their own cards and hence cannot be sure what the opponents' best 
responses are to his or her own actions. Mathematically, the players must now 
create utility functions by assigning probabilities to the different possible hands the 
other players may have and revise the utility function in the light of new 
information for each step of the game. Most real players will perform this process 
based on experience rather than arithmetics, but professional card players will often 
play by such explicit calculations of odds. 
In the case where there is only one player, the theory is called decision theory. The 
goal is still to devise a utility function and maximise this. Decision theoretical 
models are most interesting in the case where a decision must be made under 
uncertainty, that is, with imperfect or incomplete information about the 
environment in which the decision must be made. Where there is a lack of 
information, the player must form a belief about what the probability is for different 
possible states of the world in which the decision is made. 
Let me first regard a very simple 'toy model' of a game in which a government 
actor must decide how much money to spend on anti-terrorist activities. His utility 
function will have the form 
u=-c-c 'p T T 
where U is the utility, C is the (absolute) cost of antiterrorism measures, CT is the 
4 Specifically, to know the other player'S payoff function one needs to know what the other player's 
possible strategies are. 
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(believed) cost of a terrorist attack and PT is the (believed) probability of such an 
attack. Both CT and PT can depend on C. The utility function will then look 
something like that shown graphically in figure 4.1. Note that payoffs are negative 
for all C as they should in an antiterror game. To the left of the ideal value, the slope 
of the graph is positive, to the right it is negative corresponding to underfunding 
and overfunding respectively. The expenditure C which our government player can 






Illustration 4.1: Utility function of toy game. 
Area of 
overfunding 
As seen in the figure, the utility function in this case will arguably have a single 
maximum and fall off in both directions from this maximum. The reason for this 
assertion is that if the government has spent very little on anti-terrorism measures, a 
relatively large gain in security can be obtained for a small sum of money. On the 
far side of the maximum, too much is already spent and spending more is a waste of 
money. 
As an analogy, consider a house full of valuable things, but whose door does not 
have a lock. Imagine that local thieves in the neighbourhood have been known to 
break into doors without locks with an 80% probability but only 20% if they need to 
force the lock. Imagine furthermore that the thieves are expected to steal $1,000 
worth of goods. If a lock costs $100 it is clearly a good investment, since it decrease 
the expected loss from thievery from 80% '$1,000 = $800 to 20% -$1,000 = $200, that i 
for an expenditure of $100 the owner of the house gets $600 worth of security. If, 
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however, the house is already a fortress and the probability of burglary is negligible 
to start with, one extra lock makes no difference, and the 5100 is a waste of mone\'. 
4.2.1 Improvement by estimate of slope: method of steepest ascent 
The ideal solution would be for the government with the utility function of figure 
4.1 to find the maximum on the curve and spend this sum. In real life, howe er, thi 
strategy is often impossible: In order to estimate the shape of U(C) for all values of C 
the government must estimate a set of probabilities pertaining to all the unknown 
involved in the decision. It is normally possible, with some sound judgement, to 
come up with estimates of what such probabilities might be under the conditions 
one observes today, but in order to determine what U(C) looks like for all values of 
C, the player must also be able to estimate these probabilities as they would be under 
very different, hypothetical conditions. In the situations I shall consider 
uncertainties become so large so quickly that looking for the maximum in thi 
manner is not helpful: even if we managed to allocate it, its position would be so 
uncertain that the result would most likely be useless. 
Maximum 
Illustration 4.2. : Model utility function with two free variables. 
There is an alternative approach, however, which is not a ideal but much m r 
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powerful. Assume now that the government does not spend all of the money in one 
go, but a little at a time. This models how governments typically work, with a new 
budget to be approved every year. For each round, then, the government can re-
assess the parameters that underlie the utility function and find out whether to 
spend more money. The way to determine if enough money has been spent or not is 
then to measure the slope of the curve at status quo: if the curve is pointing upwards, 
maximum is not yet reached and more should be expended. In optimisation theory 
this is called the method of steepest ascentS. If the curve is flat or has negative slope, 
however, enough has been allocated and the government player has come as close 
to the equilibrium as he could. While this procedure could miss the ideal value by a 
fair bit, it has the major advantage that only estimates of present parameters are 
needed, so the approach can be employed with much better confidence. 
In the following section we will consider a game with two free parameters rather 
than one. The generalisation is immediate and is shown in figure 4.2. The obvious 
analogy now is that of a mountaineer wanting to reach the top of a hill, the higher 
he gets, the higher the payoff. He needs now to find the right direction to walk in 
(previously we could only choose between back and forth) in order to approach the 
top of the hill. The ideal solution is if he can see the summit and head straight for it, 
but imagine he is walking in fog so that visibility only extends a little way in every 
direction. This corresponds to a government having very vague information about 
how the world would have been in states different from the actual situation today. 
The best plan in this case is instead to measure the slope of the ground and walk in 
6 the direction where the terrain rises the most steeply. 
There is one sense, however, in which the mountaineer analogy is not good when 
the game is like that above where a level of expenditure is to be decided on. While 
the mountaineer can move equally well in both directions along the east-west and 
north-south axes, a total expenditure can only be increased. There is no way to un-
5 Or 'descent' depending on definition of the utility function. For a more advanced introduction, see 
e.g. chapter 9 of Hubertus Th. Jongen, Klaus Meer, and Eberhard Triesch Optimization Theory 
(New York: Kluwer, 2004). 
6 Mathematically this direction is given by the gradient of the utility function, as \\'e will discuss 
briefly later. See also appendix C. 
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spend money which is gone7• In the hill analogy it is as though the mountaineer 
could only choose from directions in between, say, due east and due north. If, say, 
.-
the walker finds himself to the north west of the peak already, the best he can do is 
walk due east until he reaches a maximum along the east-west axis. That is as high 
has he can come. Analogously, if the government finds it has already spent too 
much on some project, the maximum payoff which was available at the start can no 
longer be obtained. The best strategy is simply to cut funding to this project. 
There is a subtlety when interpreting the kind of game whose payoff function is 
depicted in figure 4.2 in terms of cost and benefit. In the above I have implicitly 
assumed that the payoff function is a static quantity given once and for alt which is 
to say that any change in the state of the world comes about as a consequence of the 
player'S choice of action. If U represents a mountain, this is a good approximation 
on the time scale in which humans operate. In politics, however, this is not 
necessarily so. The player could find that as he takes steps to try and close in on the 
top of the hilt it is as though the hill itself moves bringing him either higher or 
lower in the process. I will return to the implications of the assumption of static 
payoff later in this chapter. 
4.3 The model 
With the analysis presented in chapter 3 and the methodology outlined above I 
now have all the necessary considerations to introduce game theoretical model. The 
model8 is shown in figure 4.3. It is at first a generalisation of the above since it has 
two players; we may call them an antiterrorist ('player A' or just 'A') and a terrorist 
('player T' or 'T'). I will show how the game can eventually be reduced to a choice 
theoretical problem seen from the point of view of the antiterrorist player. 
The antiterrorist is most readily interpreted to be a government9; there is no need 
to specify a specific state, yet we assume the government in question regards itself 
as the likely target of the attack (the calculus changes slightly if this is not the case). 
7 In special cases it might be possible to sell equipment and get most of the money back, but this 
would be the exception. As a rule sunken cost cannot be retrieved. 
8 inspired by one used by Sandler and Arce. Todd Sandler and Daniel G. Arce M. 'Terrorism & 
Game Theory' Simulation & Gaming 34:3 (2003) pp.326-329. 
9 Generalisations are possible, but not considered herein. 
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The 'angle' symbot ", denotes a continuum choice node, a square a discrete choice 
node and a circle is either a chance node or an end node. 
Cu, cp 
( C = Cu + cp ) 
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Illustration 4.3.: Layout of safeguards game: HEU vs. Pu 
The game starts by player A deciding on the costs Cu and cp to be spent on anti 
nuclear terror activities; the former is the sum to be spent on anti uranium terror 
efforts and the latter is the sum dedicated to the plutonium branchlo. Note that the 
dimension of Tu, Tp, C, CU and cp is money ($, £, etc.), whereas all other symbols are 
non-dimensional. For convenience in the following we define the total cost C = Cu + 
cp' In the following we assume Cu and cp to be independent and free variables, but will 
later examine what the consequences would be if C were fixed and player A were 
only free to distribute the total sum among the two branches. 
Much in the way of the natural sciences I do all my calculations with symbols 
rather than numbers - this allows me to reach very general results since the values 
behind the symbols may still be varied in the end. I will return to a discussion of 
10 Strictly speaking these two categories are not mutually exclusive since some facilities such as 
weapons assembly and disassembly factories store both materials. This is not too problematic, 
however, as will be explained. 
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exactly how they fit the real picture later. 
Next, the terrorist, player T, chooses whether to opt for HEU or Pu to achieve her 
nuclear ambitions. Nature in turn decides whether player T manages to acquire the 
necessary material (probability pu and pp for HEU and Pu respectively) and finally 
whether she succeeds in building a working device and using it in a successful 
attack (successful design, construction, transportation and detonation are 
considered a single achievement for simplicity - probabilities qu and qp of success). 
I will focus on player A and therefore only specify the payoffs (i.e. utility) for this 
player in this chapterll. There are six different outcomes of the game. Four of these 
produce no terror attack, and are assumed to give the same payoff for A, equal to 
the cost of the safeguards effore2, -c. In the case of successful attack, there is an 
additional cost. For generality I distinguish between attacks with the two materials: 
if the bomb is made with HEU, the cost of an attack is Tu and if the material is Pu, it 
is Tp. 
The game is one of incomplete information; in particular, player A is assumed not 
to know for sure what player Ts perceived payoff function is for the two options. 
Based on whatever information he has available, however, he has the belief that 
player T chooses HEU with a probability p and plutonium with a probability 1-p. 
The game is viewed from the perspective of player A, and so the quantities pu, PP' qu, 
qp, Tu and Tp are player A's estimates (not necessarily equal to Ts). Explicitly, what 
happens is that by spending Cu and cP' A is able to shift the values of p, PUI pp in a 
favourable way before the terrorist gets the chance to move. Thus, A needs to 
estimate both what the present values are and how different spending levels are 
likely to change this. 
It is worth emphasising that it is up to the beliefs of player A whether he 
considers it likely that a bomb will produce a significant yield, with correspondingly 
large values for Tu and Tp, or if he thinks the bomb has a significant probability of 
being a fizzle but still produce a sizeable bang and considerable radiological 
11 I assume, of course, that the preferable outcome for the terrorist is a successful nuclear attack. 
12 Surely there are many antiterrorism expenses other than nuclear safeguards, but to the extent they 
do n~t affect piS and q's they merely add a constant to all payoffs which is of no consequence to 
our analysis. 
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contamination. However, one must demand that he does not count an attack causing 
a fizzle as a 'failure' at the second chance nodes, since an estimated payoff -C would 
be erroneous in this case; the cost of a grand scale radiological attack will also be 
huge, although small relative to a true nuclear explosion13. 
If player A thinks it overwhelmingly likely that a terrorist produced implosion 
device will produce a fizzle, say, whilst a HEU gun-assembled device is more likely 
to give a several-kiloton yield, this should be reflected in a value of Tp smaller than 
Tu. Formally one might introduce separate damage estimates for fizzle and non-
fizzle, say Tfand Tn, and a probability for non-fizzle, say p, so that T = P Tn + (1 - P)Tr 
(different values of p for HEU and Pu is understood). Tu and Tp are thus estimated 
by averaging over different possible yields (one could generalise this to different 
target choices as well). We will perform such an estimate in a later section of the 
chapter. 
The game in figure 4.3 may be reduced to a decision theoretical problem, because 
since A has so little knowledge of player T's reasoning, T is fully represented by the 
single variable p. By introducing probability estimates not only regarding Nature's 
moves (pu, PP' qu and qp) but the move by the terrorist as well (p), and assuming that 
all player A can do after investing his resources is wait and pray, the terrorist threat 
as modelled is mathematically equivalent to a partly preventable natural disaster. 
The simplification that the q's are constants is discussed briefly later in this chapter 
and at length in chapter 5. 
4.3.1 Mathematical assumptions 
I will need some assumptions about how the probabilities p, pu, PPI qu and qp vary 
with the variables Cu and cp' My first assumption is that the probabilities of 
successful acquisition of material depend only on the amount of resources 
13 Player A could in principle assume that player T would never detonate a weapon unless she knew 
it would work, an unrealistic assumption since a small scale enterprise would have few chances of 
establishing such confidence in the performance of its device before it was tested. Even at the 
Trinity test, the first test of an implosion device, the nuclear physicists at Los Alamos were 
uncertain whether the weapon would work as they hoped. The anecdote goes that physicist 
extraordinaire Enrico Fermi annoyed his anxious colleagues the night before the test by jokingly 
taking bets on all conceivable outcomes of the test, including whether it would ignite the 
atmosphere. See e.g. Richard Rhodes The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1986) chapter 18. 
- 95-
channelled to the branch in question, meaning that 
(4.1) 
and that these are decreasing functions of their argument, that is: the more resources 
are poured into a branch by player A, the smaller the probability that player T will 
get hands on the necessary material becomes: 
(4.3) 
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) are an approximation. In practice they imply that I neglect 
possible synergy effects between the two safeguards branches. While samples of the 
two elements are rarely protected by the same piece of equipment as discussed 
below14, it is plausible that less palpable measures such as security culture could 
spill over between the two branches. There is reason to believe that in the light of 
the large overall uncertainties pertaining to antiterrorism policy decisions, this 
approximation is unproblematic. 
In practice it takes a certain amount of funding to keep safeguards at status quo so 
they do not fall into neglect and disrepair. This causes subtle problems which have 
to do with the assumption of constancy of the utility function as discussed at the 
end of section 4.2.1. We have not worked out U yet but it is clear that it must depend 
on pu and pp hence if A were to do nothing we could be expected to 'drift' further 
away from the optimal value since, left to their own devices pu and pp would 
increase with time at some rate. Clearly, significant funds must be allocated to 
countering this15. On the other hand, other countries could choose to take action to 
improve safeguards on their own, causing the opposite effect. As I will return to, 
however, my model does not in fact have a 'time' and a more complex model would 
be called for if one wished to fully incorporate such effects. The easiest is to simply 
14 Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector and Fred L. 
Wehling The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2005)* pp.120-124. 
15 The US Department of Energy spends in the range of 51.5 billion on domestic safeguards yearly. 
Presumably the majority of this sum is spent on sustaining status quo. Matthew Bunn Securing the 
Bomb 2007,· report of the Project Managing the Atom (Belfer Center for Science and International 
Affairs, Harvard University, 2007)* p.58 
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assume that C does not include costs to retain status quo, only those that go to 
improvement, and that any safeguards measures taken by other states are well 
known and worked into the estimates of the probabilities of the model, hence into U 
itself. 
Player T's believed probability of choosing HEU is assumed to depend on both 
variables 
(4.4) 
in a way so that increasing Cu decreases p and increasing cp increases p: 
(4.5) 
where I have introduced the shorthand notation Ou and op mearung the partial 
derivative with respect to Cu and cpo 
Notably, there is no option left for player T to abandon her nuclear ambitions 
altogether, hence the total level of deterrence, C, cannot change her mind, however 
high. This very notion has been used to define fanatism in a game theoretical 
setting: a fanatical player is one who gains a net benefit even if the mission fails16. 
Much as this is a simplification, I will simply assume for now that T is bent on 
nuclear weapons however low her chances of success and return to the nuances of 
this question in chapters 5 and 6. 
My final assumption of dependences on variables is that qu, qp, Tu and Tp may not 
be influenced at all by player A. First of all this simplifies calculations considerably. 
Secondly, the feasibility of a Isecond line of defence I is not on trial in this chapter1?, 
so assuming it true for simplicity is permitted to the extent that it does not affect 
other conclusions of the chapter. Notably, I do not assume that intelligence and other 
second line measures do not play any role (their expected success is reflected in qu 
and qp), merely that their chances of success are out of player A's hands, on a 
different budget so to speak. Also, measures by player A are assumed not to affect 
the performance of the bombs produced. I furthermore assume that qu, qp, pu and pp 
are all statistically independent. 
16 Sandler and Arce M. 'Terrorism & Game Theory' p. 321 
17 See appendix 0 for more on 'second layers', in which a similar game is used in a brief analysis of 
this assumption. 
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4.3.2 The utility function U and its derivatives 
I shall play the game as seen from the perspective of player A, locating the ideal 
values of some pair of variables that will maximise his expected payoff. The 
expected payoff or utility function of player A, denoted U, is the sum of the payoff of 
each outcome of the game multiplied by the probability of that outcome. With the 
assumption of statistical independence I readily find this value equal to 
(4.6) 
and its partial derivatives are 
8 U=-1+(-8 p)(p q T -p q T )+p(- dPu)q T 
u u u u u p P P de u U 
u 
(·t.7) 
8 U=-1-(8 p)(p q T -p q T )+(l-P)(- dPp)q T p p u u u p P P de P P 
P 
(4.8) 
A notation is introduced to keep track of the sign of the various terms: Where a 
minus is placed inside the differentiation parentheses, such as (-oup), this indicates 
that the derivative itself is non-positive so the entire parenthesised expression is 
non-negative. 
4.3.3 An important quantity: the asymmetry cost 
Prior to further investigation I argue that based on the preceding qualitative 
discussion, the factor (puquTu - ppqpTp) may safely be assumed to be positive: Based 
on the discussion from previous sections it should be obvious that while pu and pp 
are roughly in the same order of magnitude, qu per expectation exceeds qp, probably 
by a margin which is not small18• Also, because I deem an untested implosion device 
more likely to produce a fizzle than a gun design, Tu should be larger than Tp per 
expectation, hence puquTu should exceed ppqpTp. The factor is a recurring one, so I 
define the shorthand notation L1 T = puquTu - ppqpTp and assume L! T > O. 
18 Expressions such as 'not close to' and 'much larger than' are used in our discussion. While such 
terms are not rigorously defined and must be understood in the context they are put, their 
meaning should be unproblematic. As a rule of thumb, 'much larger than' might mean the 
difference in magnitude is at least one order, yet again this depends on the expression in question. 
For example 0.5 might typically be considered 'larger than and not close to' 0.2, and 'much larger 
than' 0.01. 
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Theoretically, whenever t1 T i= 0, it signals an asymmetry of the safeguards 
situation in that the two fissile materials are not equivalent. t1 T > 0 means the threat 
from HEU is in a sense intrinsicall/9 greater than that from plutonium whereas ,J T 
< 0 would have signalled the opposite. The conclusion L1 T > 0 is therefore a 
mathematical expression of the conclusions of the preceding chapter, and I will refer 
to it as the asymmetry cost. 
If one agrees that Tu > Tp and qu > qp independently of expenditures, the only 
region of the cucp plane where L1 T could possibly be negative is a region where Pli « 
Pp' presumably located in a region of very large values of Cu and comparatively small 
cpo An idea of how U might look like as a function of Cu and cp is found in figure 4.5; 
the area where t1 T is negative is found in a slim band of values towards the bottom 
right of such a figure where Cu » cpo Our estimates in the case of the United States 
later in the chapter indicate that its current situation is far from this region. 
The reader should note that the above argument that the asymmetry cost L1 T is 
positive is the only plausibility argument in the symbolic analysis, and will turn out 
to be of crucial importance for the conclusions we are able to draw at the end of the 
day. 
4.3.4 The slope of the utility function with respect to plutonium cost 
The slope of the utility function along the cp axis is positive if opU > 0 and 
negative if opU < O. In the former case it is opportune to spend more on plutonium 
safeguards, since the benefit is greater than the cost, in the latter case the security 
obtained in return for the expenditure is not worth the price. We find that measures 
to improve plutonium safeguards (remember we assume status quo is automatically 
retained) should not be funded further if 
(4.9) 
given some value of Cu as yet unspecified. Whether it holds or not can only be 
determined by a numerical estimate which I will undertake shortly. 
It is not so hard to get a qualitative picture of just what the above inequality sa\'s. 
19 Here this means independently of the choices and preferences of the terrorist in question. 
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On the left hand side is found the product of arguably the three most important 
quantities for a policy maker to estimate when deciding on the amount of resources 
to put into the plutonium branch: 
qp: The likelihood that, given plutonium in some form, the terrorist will be 
able to build some device and use it. Conventional wisdom would indicate 
that this is a small number compared to unity. 
I-p: The perceived probability that a terrorist will opt for plutonium over 
HEU. Putting together notions that terrorists would not be interested in a 
fizzling weapon and a low estimated value of qp, this number should also be 
fairly small compared to unity even after the investment C20• We argued in 
chapter 3 that I-p is at least smaller than 50%. 
dpp/ dcp: This number represents player A's power to do anything about the 
threat from plutonium terrorism. More precisely it is the rate at which player 
A, by pouring resources into the Pu branch, is able to decrease the chances of 
terrorist plutonium acquisition; a measure of 'value for money' of plutonium 
safeguards. A recent evaluation of the progress of US safeguards and 
materials elimination projects in Russia suggests that this value (be it the Pu 
or HEU branch) may be small (compared, for example, with 1/ C), 
concluding that ' .. .for most of these [safeguards and elimination] programs, 
progress is constrained more by limited cooperation with foreign partners 
and bureaucratic impediments than it is by lack of funds.,21 A higher value of 
cp, thus, may not make a great difference to pp. 
The right hand side of (4.9) is at first a little harder to relate to real life quantities, 
but one will notice that since 11 T > 0, the numerator of the fraction must be larger 
than 1 and the entire fraction hence larger than Tp -1. In other words: 
20 
21 
If Player A deems that subsequent to expenditures Cu and c," 
( 
d pp) 1 (l-p)q -- <-
P de T p p 
(-LID) 
Discussed extensively in the next chapter. 
Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier Securing the Bomb 2006, report of the Project \ lanaging the 
Atom (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 2006)*, p. viii. 
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then the planned anti-plutonium terrorism improvement measures 
are overjunded22 • 
If player A finds that (4.10) holds true before the sum cp is spent, the ideal value is 
cp = 0 unless better value for money can be achieved (i.e. a higher value of -dp/de!,), 
If he finds that (4.10) holds true after spending cp, he can conclude that he should 
have spent less. 
If, coupled with the above reasons for believing the left hand side of (-1.10) small, 
player A also believes an attempt at Pu-bomb terrorism will result in a dispersion 
weapon rather than a nuclear explosion, Tp should be scaled considerably smaller 
than Till and the inverse cost on the right of (4.10) might not be so small. This should 
further increase the plausibility of the truth of the inequality, yet it should be noted 
that the more player A believes an implosion bomb to fizzle, the easier it will 
become to build a weapon according to A's expectations, i.e. a larger value of ql" 
Thus a shift of beliefs in this direction will increase the value of Tp- 1, but in (4.10) this 
should be partly but not entirely cancelled by a corresponding increase in the value 
of qp (cetera paribus). 
It should be emphasised already that even if (4.10) holds true at present this 
needs not stay true forever. When HEU safeguards have been sufficiently 
strengthened it could well be opportune to turn to plutonium once more. This will 
be further explained towards the end of our analysis. 
The expression (4.10), used as final result for its simplicity, is a sufficient but not a 
necessary criterion for the conclusion. The weaker, necessary, demand is (4.9). Note 
that if (opp)t1 T is in the order of magnitude of unity or more, the stricter demand 
(4.10) may be much stronger than necessary to conclude the overfunding of 
plutonium, as planned or at present. 
A striking feature of (4.9) and (4.10) is the absence of the absolute quantities Cu 
and c
p 
themselves. The conclusion in other words, is that it does not matter exactly 
how much money is spent (or at some point in time has already been spent), only 
the extent to which spending more will improve the situation. While sunken cost is 
clearly a fallacy, player A can do nothing more about it than add it to his book of 
22 Note already (this is elaborated further later) that this is with respect solely to nuclear lL'rn1n--1ll 
There could" be other good reasons why plutonium should be kept safe. 
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lessons learned. This disables arguments of the sort 'we have spent so much on this 
project already, so it would be a waste if we didn't complete it'. In other words, 
whatever is already spent is important only in that it has brought us to status quo; 
independently of how the present state of affairs was reached, the question is how 
best to improve from here. 
4.3.5 The slope of the utility function with respect to HEU cost 
In exactly the same way we use (4.7) to determine the slope of U with respect to 
Cu. This time, as will be clear, it is more natural to formulate an underfunding 
criterion, i.e. an inequality whose truth implies that ouU > O. We find that more 
should be spent on HEU safeguards improvement if 
(4.11) 
Recognising that the right hand side of (4.11) is smaller than Tu-1, I get a more 
elegant but stronger criterion similar to (4.10) obtained previously: 
If Player A deems that subsequent to expenditures Cu and cp' 
( d PU) 1 P -- q >-de U T 
u u 
(.t.12) 
then HEU efforts are underfunded at the current total deterrence level. 
By comparing (4.11) to (4.9) one may make an interesting observation: while the 
right hand side of (4.9) is greater than l/Tp, the right hand side of (4.11) is smaller 
than l/Tu. This is why the natural criterion for HEU is for underfunding while that 
for Pu was for overfunding, a property which may be traced back to my assertion 
that !1T is presently positive23• This property makes for an important inclination 
towards prioritising HEU over Pu: The reader will be able to verify that if (4.12) 
were found to be true, this makes a much more robust claim about HEU than (4.10) 
does about plutonium if it is likewise true because unless (-oup)!1T and (-o,P)L1T are 
much smaller than unity, (4.12) is much stronger compared to (.t.ll) than (.t.l0) is 
compared with (4.9). Indeed if (-oup)!1I>l, HEU efforts are sure to be underfunded 
2J In tum a consequence of the relatively greater belief in a terrorist HEU project to succeed. 
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according to the model, since the right hand side of (4.11) is then negative while the 
left hand side is positive24! 
4.4 Numerical estimation of parameters 
The two inequalities (4.12) and (4.10) form a powerful toolkit for a government 
worried about nuclear terror attacks against it to divide its resources between the 
two branches. The potential power of this result, however, may only be drawn upon 
if the government is able to estimate with some confidence numerical values for the 
parameters and variables that form these conditions. Let me therefore briefly 
discuss the various quantities involved so as to tie the so far algebraic analysis to the 
present day political picture. It turns out that a very rough estimate allows me to 
draw some conclusions about the US safeguards programme in the former Soviet 
Union, demonstrating the power of the tool developed. 
It is reasonable to assume that a government such as the United States or Britain 
will have access to considerable amounts of data exempt from the public domain 
and employ experts able to estimate the numbers in question with much greater 
authority than I may using data from open sources only. The inequalities (4.12) and 
(4.10) may thus be regarded as tools for analysis and synthesis of intelligence. 
However extensive the amount of intelligence data available however, there will 
always be a considerable element of judgement and 'gut feeling' involved in 
estimating parameters. Numbers like qu and qp, for example may not be determined 
from previous cases, since there are none. Hence uncertainties will inevitably be 
large, and while some of the parameters could with sufficient effort be estimated 
quite accurately, I deemed there would not be much to gain from this. The 
numerical estimation is therefore somewhat rough. Surprisingly, some fairly robust 
conclusions and interesting analysis may nonetheless be drawn from this analysis. 
4.4.1 The cost of a nuclear terrorist attack 
The damage inflicted by an attack depends on the choice of target and means of 
delivery; it is not obvious that even a successful attack using a nuclear dey ice i" 
24 Note that a big increase in HEU expenditures would eventually bring (-aup)c\Tbe]o\\, unity again 
by decreasing p and p,. 
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devised to maximise carnage. Given the large number of deaths on ;"1anhattan, it is 
easy to forget that two of the four aeroplanes hi-jacked on September 11 2001 were 
destined for targets that could not have produced similar body counts (the Pentagon 
and probably Capitol Hill), but were powerful symbols. Hence the estimate for a 
value of the T's due to Bunn and companions discussed below, assuming the 
weapon be detonated at Grand Central, New York at a busy hour, although 
'conservative' given this assumption25, may not represent the real choice of target, 
hence might be an overestimate. Yet how to estimate such numbers, at the end of 
the day, comes down judgement. 
The value of human life is not easily be measured in dollars, and yet, \,,'hen 
estimating the relative costs of different evils, be it earthquakes, wars, traffic 
accidents or cigarette smoking, this is what a government must do. Resources are 
always limited and avoiding death tolls from dramatic events altogether is wishful 
thinking. Governments must be concerned with the continued existence of the 
nation and choose the lesser of evils where necessary. In the following I will specify 
how I proceed to put numbers to lost lives and property. 
We will very roughly estimate Tu and Tp using numbers from the September 11 
attacks for comparison. Bunn and co-workers provide an estimate for this value 
which in the author's view is a sound one25. The scenario treated is one in which a 
bomb with an explosive yield of 10kT is detonated at Grand Central train station, 
New York on a normal working day. This is exactly the scenario that was allegedly 
reported to US intelligence in October 2001 and only determined to be a false 
warning weeks later26. The estimate presented is half a million people dead and a 
direct cost to the United States alone amounting conservatively to at least one 
trillion dollars. Upon redoing the calculations somewhat less conservatively (details 
in the following) I find a more realistic estimate of approximately 53 trillion. For 
perspective, this is approximately the value of the entire US federal budget for fiscal 
25 Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier and John P. Holdren Controlling Nuclear ~\~Irheads and ,\1aterials 
report of the Project Managing the Atom (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 
Harvard University, 2003)* pp. 15-19. 
26 Massimo Calabresi and Romesh Ratnesar 'Can We Stop the Next Attack?' TIME Magazine (\larch 
112002)* 
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year 2008, of $2.9 trillion27. Including the many indirect expenses from after-effects 
on economy, the total cost would 'inevitably be several times the direct cost', Bunn 
and co-workers claim2S although their notion might be too strong since some long 
term effects are accounted for. 
Table 4.1: Estimated economic impact of terrorist attacks. 
September 11 10kTbomb 1 T fizzle 
Lost physical capital 22 300 15 
Lost human capital 9 1500 0.7 
Lost Gross National Product 50* 500 50 
Medical treatment 8* 100 8 
Economic revitalisation 5* 5 5 
Cleaning & Decontamination 0.6 20 5 
Long term lost GCP 58 580 80 
Total: 153* 3005 164 
Numbers in $billions, approximated to nearest integer value. Lost Gross City Product (GCP) 
calculated over first 3 years after attack. Lost GNP does not include lost GCP. *Deviates from 
Comptroller estimate, commented below. 
The scenario described is something of a 'worst case': the bomb has a yield similar 
to the Hiroshima bomb and the target is chosen to have the gravest effect on the 
targeted state. A more detailed analysis was performed at the RAND think-tank of a 
scenario in which the port of Long Beach, Los Angeles was the target of a 10kT 
bomb as it arrived in the harbour by container ship28. With the great uncertainties 
involved, which scenario is used matters little and the RAND numbers coincide 
fairly well with mine29; the report is nonetheless an excellent introduction to the far-
reaching consequences of such an attack. 
Let me also estimate very roughly the effects of a fizzle, also in central New York. 
27 Office of Management and Budget, The White House Budget of the United States Govenzment 
FY2008 (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2007)* 
28 Charles Meade and Roger C. Molander C[lll~idcrillg the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack 
Technical Report (RAND, 2006)* 
29 ibid. p.7. The numbers, totalling $1 trillion, do not include long-term effects. 
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I will choose a yield at the lower end of the scale of nuclear yields, at 1 tonne of 
T 30 NT . To help me I have the calculations of Bunn and collaborators as well as the 
estimates of the fiscal impact of the 2001 attacks on Lower Manhattan b\' the New 
York City (NYC) Comptroller31. The Comptroller estimates the direct cost to :,,\YC 
from the attacks to amount to between $82 and $94 billion and upon adding the 
impact beyond NYC and after-effects, I argue that the likely cost of a fizzle would be 
in the same order of magnitude. Costs of the three different scenarios are 
categorised in table 4.132• 
The area affected by a 10kT blast at Grand Central station delivered on the 
ground is visualised in figure 4.4 based on the online 'nuclear weapon effects 
calculator' provided by the Federation of American Scientists33• If the terrorists were 
to deliver the weapon by air, for example in a suicidal detonation on board a hired 
aeroplane, the affected area would be considerably larger. 
Physical capital 
The physical damage of the September 11 attacks were estimated to $22 billion by 
the Comptroller (the historical and cultural value of a landmark such as the World 
Trade Center can, of course, not be measured in dollars). For the 1 T fizzle I put this 
at somewhat less. The blast itself will probably cause much less damage than that of 
September 11, being similar in size to the bomb that destroyed the Murrah building 
30 It is highly improbable that a design conceptually able to produce several kilotons could possibly 
produce a yield this low (Peter Zimmerman, private communication). Our estimates include, 
however, designs which are all but guaranteed to fizzle, such as the plutonium gun and other 
more creative designs which the terrorist might think of. 
31 William C Thompson, Jr., Comptroller New York City One Year Later: The Fiscal Impact of9/11 on 
New York City (New York: Office of the Comptroller, 2002)* 
32 Numbers from Thompson p. 1 and Bunn et al. Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials p. 18, 
though the latter holds only tentative numbers. No attempt has been made to compensate for 
changing dollar value since 2002. 
33 Lucas Royland 'Nuclear Weapon Effects Calculator', online from the Federation of American 
Scientists http://wwwfas.orglmain/content.jsp ?formAction=297 &con ten tId=367. Based on Samuel 
Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan (eds) The Effects of Nuclear Weapons 3rd edition (Washington 
D.C:GPO, 1977)*. The high quality photo is from Google Earth©. The Effects Calculator does not 
offer a photo of New York; the circles were fitted by comparing a Google Earth© photo of 
Washington D.C at exactly the scale used in figure 4.4 to the photo of D.C in the effects 
calculator. The circles were then transferred to the photo of New York, centered at Grand Central 
Station. The uncertainties following this procedure are probably much smaller than those of the 
calculation itself, which does not take into account the screening by geography and buildings. 
(Google allows use of data from Google Earth for all non-commercial educational purposes; 
please adhere to Google's conditions if reprinting figure 4.4). 
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in Oklahoma in 1995, but much additional damage will be caused by buildings 
which must be demolished due to high contamination levels. The physical damage 
of the 10kT blast is set, probably rather conservatively, to some 13 times that of 
September 11th 2001, based on figure 4.4. 
Lost human capital 
Lost human capital for the 10kT bomb is found by extrapolating the 
Comptroller's number for the approximately 3000 dead on Manhattan to 500,000 
dead. The Comptroller's number, in turn, is based on the value of the workforce as 
indicated by the sum of salaries of those dead. The number must be lowered 
somewhat, since the area affected would include areas where average income is 
lower than on lower Manhattan. On the other hand, there would be a large number 
of wounded and disabled in addition to casualties, probably more than making up 
for this in terms of lost working force. 
The number of dead in the IT fizzle attack is likely to be much lower than that of 
2001: the blast will presumably be similar in size to that which destroyed the 
Oklahoma City Federal building, an incident which took 168 lives and injured 800. 
Using these numbers to extrapolate the September 11 figures, I end up at some $0.7 
billion (some account is taken for disability following injury). 
Medical treatment, economic revitalisation and cleaning 
Costs of medical treatment for the attack is found on the basis of the 
governmental compensation and benefit payments following September 11, 
provided by a comprehensive RAND report34• These totalled $8 billion following the 
September 11 attacks. For the IT fizzle the same number is used: While the number 
of 800 injured is not large, the number of wounded from the September 11 attacks 
was small compared to casualties. A nuclear attack, however, small, will probably 
cause widespread fear and anxiety, and calls on medical services to test for possible 
effects of radiation will possibly be out of proportion with the actual health risk 
posed by the fallout. 
34 Lloyd Dixon and Rachel Kaganoff Stem Compensation for Losses from the 9/11 attacb (RA\JO, 
2004)*. Tables on p.132 and 135 
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Illustration 4.4.: Damage area in case of a lOkT bomb at Grand Central Station New York. 
Bomb assumed delivered by car, based on the Nuclear Weapon Effects Calculator by Lucas Royland33• 
Blue circle: homes completely destroyed and stronger commercial buildings severely damaged due to 
high pressure blast wave. Red circle: Widespread fires due to intense heat. Yellow circle: Moderate 
damage to buildings, risk due to flying debris caused by blast wave. 
Cleaning costs are extremely hard to estimate, and the numbers must be taken as 
utterly tentative (no numerical estimates are given by Bunn et al.). Economic 
revitalisation to individuals and businesses following September 11 covered by the 
government amounted to around $5 billion34 . This may be regarded as something of 
a voluntary undertaking by the government, and while the need for measures to 
restore normality will be huge following a true nuclear attack, the calls on the 
government's purse will be so enormous in such an event that such efforts likely 
cannot be given funding proportional to the damage done. Expenditures for 
revitalization will aim to mitigate the long term economic effects, represented b th 
lost GNP, hence could, if implemented well, payoff in the long run. 
Lost Gross National and City products 
Whilst after September 11 airports were closed, cargo freight 0 er ea and land 
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continued; after a nuclear attack, all ports will probably be closed for a while after, 
having enormous effect on the economy. The Comptroller's estimate, at that, 
includes only NYC, whilst the rest of the nation suffered indirect costs as well. The 
$500 billions tentatively include lost GNP, including indirect costs. According to 
Bunn and associates, this is conservative, yet their claim that the direct cost (which 
already includes almost all of the long term effects, save behavioural shift in the rest 
of the country) should be multiplied several times to obtain the indirect might seem 
an overcompensation. 
The Comptroller does not include the indirect costs of lost national product 
beyond that of NYC, yet only a very tentative assessment is needed in this already 
very rough calculation. Adding another $50 billion to the above sum should cover 
national losses in airline traffic and other effects35, in which case I end at a very 
rough total cost of $140 billion for the September 11 attacks. 
A further $580 billion is estimated to be lost from Gross City Product (GCP) over 
the following years. The Comptroller estimate for September 11 of $58 billion is 
used for the 1 T fizzle as well, whereas an ostensibly very high $580 billion is used 
for the 10kT bomb. There are several reasons why this should be a high sum in my 
opinion. The majority of the cost of property damage after September 11 was 
covered by insurance34, but following such a major catastrophe as the 10kT bomb, 
there will be an acute shortage of insurance mone/6. With possible widespread 
bankruptcy among insurance companies reconstruction is likely to be delayed, and 
the economic consequences could persist for much longer than the three years by 
which New York City was back on track after the devastating attacks. 
The loss in GCP for the 1 T fizzle is somewhat higher than for September 11, since 
a larger area must likely be evacuated for clean-up and for a longer time. Howe\'er, 
since the evacuated workers will not generally be injured, it is likely that solutions 
will be found to mitigate these effects by moving business to temporary locations. 
Long-term (after first year) effects are assumed to be like the effects suffered by New 
35 The airline industry's losses 2001-2003 have been estimated to amount to some $23,/ billion b\' the 
Air Transport Association 'Airlines Outline War Impact' News Release (ATA, 2003)*.1l is 
unknown how authoritative this account is. 
36 Meade and Molander Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack p. nii 
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York from 2002 onwards so that the difference is due to the first year after the 
attack. 
The total cost 
Notably, the expenses from the U.s. 'Global War on Terror' on Afghanistan and 
37 h Iraq t at followed the attack are not included in table 4.1, nor is this cost included 
in any of the estimates for antiterrorism expenses elsewhere. The costs of the 
military conflicts engaged under this banner will have cost the United States alone 
some $737 billion by the end of 2008, surpassing the cost of the Vietnam War, 
measured in 2006 dollars38. An assessment of the helpfulness of these wars in 
abolishing terrorism is beyond the scope of this thesis. Some perspective on the 
sums of money involved may be offered, however, by noting that this is almost 100 
times what Congress has spent on non-proliferation programmes in the former 
Soviet Union since 199239. 
Using the model from page 95 I put Tp somewhere between Tf =$164 billion and 
Tn =$3005 billion, and write Tp = pTn + (l-p)Tf where p is the probability of the bomb 
exploding with 10kT yield. Since improvised devices using HEU and Pu will have 
similar yields in the fizzle and non-fizzle cases, Tn and Tf are used for both, with a 
higher value for p in the HEU case. How to estimate p in each case is a question of 
judgement. I will choose figures which in my opinion (based on considerations in 
chapter 3) are certainly not underestimating the threat from plutonium terrorism 
and also not overestimating the HEU threat, since we will be using the numbers to 
evaluate (4.10) and (4.12). I put p at 20% for Pu and 70% for HEU, giving the 
estimates to one significant figure 
11 d T =$7·10 an p (4.13) 
The difference between the two is approximately a factor 3. Note that both of these 
37 Noting that the connection between Iraq and the September 11 attacks is highly que~tionable in 
the least. The alleged connection nonetheless formed an important part of the rhetonc. 
38 Stephen M. Kosiak, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 'The Global War on Terror: 
Costs, Cost Growth and Estimating Funding Requirements' Testimony before the Senate Budget 
Committee (June 6 2007)* p. 2. 
39 US Government Accountability Office tVCtlPlll/~ of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs ,\'Ct'd 
Better Integration GAO-OS-IS7 (200S)* p. S 
-110 -
estimates are lower than an alternative estimate of Bunn's of $4 trillion-tO. 
4.4.2 Rough estimate of value for money in US safeguards programs 
The other quantities in equations (4.10) and (4.12) are even harder to establish 
than the costs. Especially probabilities may be extremely hard to establish with 
confidence, even for an intelligence organisation like CIA or SIS, with their access to 
classified information. 
Regard the quantities (-dpu! dcu) and (-dppi dcp). For very tentative numbers, 
consider US grants to safeguards efforts, primarily in former Soviet states, in fiscal 
year 200541 • During this year, the United State spent some 51.5 billion on safeguards 
and security in DoE's own installations 42 and a further $1.08 billion abroad43, chiefly 
in Russia. For simplicity I assume that the efforts on US ground were just adequate 
to maintain status quo, hence I do not count it as part of C. The efforts in Russia, 
however, surely had a much larger impact. During this period, a further 3% of fissile 
material in Russia was upgraded to a 'comprehensive' level of safeguards, whereas a 
further 3% received 'rapid' safeguards arrangements44 • 
Such figures, however, paint an overly simplistic picture. Equipment and alarm 
systems are no good if personnel can be paid to bypass them, and the corruption in 
Russia is cause for much concern and a prerequisite assumption that Russia is able 
to maintain status quo by themselves might be flawed 45 (indeed, Bunn and Wier 
warn against the use of such numbers as a direct measure of progress46). 
Furthermore, safeguards are only as good as the weakest link, provided the terrorist 
knows where the weakest link is to be found. By the end of fiscal year 2006 an 
estimated 70 buildings in Russia have yet to receive rapid upgrades 47 and with 
40 Matthew Bunn 'A Mathematical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism' The Annals of the AAPSS 
607 (2006) p.l06. 
41 I use the US as example here as elsewhere. 
42 Bunn and Wier Securing the Bomb 2006 p.47 
43 ibid. p. viii 
44 ibid. p. 54 
45 e.g. Anna M. Pluta and Peter D. Zimmerman 'Nuclear Terrorism: A Disheartening Dissent' 
Survival 48:2 (2006) p. 56-60. 
46 Bunn and Wier Securing the Bomb 2006 p. 15 
47 Bunn Securing the Bomb 2007 pp. 6.t-66 
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sufficient reconnaissance a terrorist proliferator could disco\'er which buildings 
these are and target these rather than those which are more secure. As an upper 
bound for these slopes, 3 % / $1 billion might be reasonable, yet the indication is that 
this is an overestimate. 
The difference between the slopes for uranium and plutonium may also be 
perceivable; the US-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement for 
example, has yet to be implemented48, and once commenced can make a real and 
relatively cheap difference. A similar effort, the blending down of HEU, is under 
way and its achievements are notable49 . Global stockpiles still amount to thousands 
of tonnes, however, whilst one bomb requires merely tens of kilogrammes. The 
above estimates being so rough, thus, I approximate the rate of change of pu and pp 
with Cu and cp to be equal. 
Whilst (-Pi') = 3%/$1 billion (i = u, p) is a high estimate, let us keep it for further 
calculations. Importantly, however, Bunn and Wier conclude that this ratio could be 
much higher with improved cooperation. 
With the above estimated numbers inserted, the 'overfunding criterion' (4.10) 
reads approximately 
(4.14) 
As the left hand is a probability squared, 0.05 is not particularly small and would 
be obtained, for example, if (1-p) and qp were both ::::::22%. On the basis of this very 
rough estimate it is difficult to conclude whether this is true or false at present, 
merely that it may not be dismissed on grounds of being unlikely; in truth there is 
serious reason to believe the inequality holds true. If instead (-PI') = 1 %/51 billion, 
an equally likely estimate, the corresponding (l-p) and qp must each be 39% for the 
inequality to be false, a very generous estimate indeed for their true values! The 
indication is thus that plutonium efforts could be overfunded at present, but the 
numbers are too rough for a definite conclusion. 
Equation (4.12) is estimated the same way. I use the same rate of change of 
acquisition probability (-dp/dcu) = 3%/$lB, as I used for pp with cp abo\'e and Tu 
48 ibid. p.99-101 
49 ibid. 
-112 -
from (4.13) to find the sufficient criterion for HEU efforts to be underfunded as 
(-1.15) 
If one assumes, as argued above as well as in the next chapter, that p is at least 
greater than lj2, an umeasonably small value of qu is required for this to be false. 
Using, say, p = 0.6, qu would need to be no more than about 3%, and probably even 
less if the less strict criterion were applied. Even using a smaller rate of change, like 
(-dp~dcu) = 1 %/$1 billion, a value of qu of 5-10% is still required. Notablv, Bunn 
judges q to be 28% not specifying whether Pu or HEU is used5o• Assuming the 
probability that the material is HEU is P < 1 the quantity qu will be somewhat larger 
than this since a nonzero probability of Pu will tend to decrease the chances of a 
successful weaponisation of the fissile material. 
While my numerical calculations indicate that plutOnium efforts may well be 
overfunded, it seems certain from the above calculations that HEU efforts are 
underfunded, implying an ideal value of Cu significantly larger than c/1• It is 
important to note that the value for money numbers used are specific to US efforts, 
thus the result strictly speaking applies only to the US programmes. It is reasonable 
to assume, for example, that Russia and other countries of proliferation concern 
could achieve far more per dollar domestically. 
Our 'local' method of measuring slopes must be thought of carefully. Consider 
safeguards efforts in Russia for example. At the start of the Materials Protection, 
Control & Accounting (MPC&A) pro gramme 52, for example, there was a large 
number of facilities to secure, and by the 'weakest link' reasoning above, each new 
site which was secured increased the overall security only very little. Now that the 
number of sites left to secure is relatively small, each site will close a relatively large 
gap compared to the number of buildings left to secure and the instantaneous value 
for money is much better. Still the increased slope would not have been possible had 
the period of little increase in security not been undertaken. At the outset, thus, a 
50 Bunn 'A Mathematical Model ... ' p.106. 28% is the product of figures given for successful assembly 
and delivery respectively. 
51 If Pu efforts are indeed overfunded at present, of course, it implies an ideal value of cp to be zero. 
52 A programme by the US Department of Energy to safeguard fissile materials primarily in the 
former Soviet Union. 
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calculation like that above could have shown that HEU efforts were overfunded, but 
seen as a whole, the MPC&A project has clearly been worthwhile. 
This problem is not a fundamental weakness of the model, but of the wa\' the 
derivatives are calculated. When interpreted as mean derivatives of an entire project 
like MPC&A and its many sub-projects, inequalities (4.10) and (4.12) give good 
information whether upgrade programmes give good enough value for money. 
While 3%/$1 billion might be a gross overestimate of the immediate security 
payback from money spent, when comparing the cost of the entire programme to 
the security gain the programme is expected to yield, such a figure might still be 
reasonable. Since 1993 through fiscal year 2008 the United States has 
spent/budgeted around $11 billion dollars to safeguards abroad, primarily in the 
Soviet Union53 • An average value of 3% per billion dollars and a rough assumption 
that half of the funding was spent on HEU measures would indicate that pu has been 
reduced by 66% over this period, which is a high number, but maybe not 
unreasonably so. 
Further precautions must be taken as well, for the numbers employed are 
tentative and the model very simple. A fair amount of judgement must be applied 
when estimating the numbers, and other authors would doubtlessly have chosen 
different figures. Nonetheless, the above values could be changed considerably 
without changing these tentative conclusions, and so this author finds them 
convincing. 
4.4.3 The effect of changing stockpiles 
As also discussed later, when making such estimates as I have above one should 
notice that there could be external reasons why parameter values can change with 
time due to other reasons than safeguards improvement. I already discussed the fact 
that a significant budget post will be to maintain protection at status quo, which \'\'e 
assume is not included in the model. Of real-world trends which will be of 
significance, however, the most notable is perhaps the different rate of growth or 
reduction of the global stockpiles HEU and separated plutonium. 
53 Based on Figure A-I of Bunn Securing tile bomb 2007 p.lS.!. 
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While a number of measures have been under way for years to reduce the global 
stockpiles of HEU54, and the production of HEU has virtually stopped in most 
countries55, neither is true of plutonium. Efforts to dispose of excess Russian and US 
plutonium have made no progress56 and civilian separation of plutonium continues 
in several countries, at a total rate of approximately 10 metric tonnes a year57. If this 
trend continues, it seems likely that the day will come when illicitly obtaining 
plutonium is significantly easier than acquisition of the terrorist's material of choice, 
HEU. 
The model introduced in this chapter can account for this change to a large 
extent, when realising that its intention is to give advice to a government at a 
particular point in time. Assuming we find ourselves in a future situation where 
plutonium is much more easily available than HEU, however, the above estimates 
and plausibility arguments for parameter values will not all be valid any more. 
Inequalities (4.9) and (4.11) will be, since they derive directly from the model, which 
does not in itself assume anything about the values of the parameters. 
For equalities (4.10) and (4.12) to be stricter versions of these, however, one must 
require that the asymmetry cost 11 T is positive, and this key conclusion, which I 
argued is all but certain to hold true today, could change with increasing Pu 
availability. The premise for the guaranteed positiveness of I1T was that a HEU 
project has a greater probability of success than one using plutonium, whereas the 
availability of the two materials is approximately the same. Clearly the former 
statement will not change with changing stockpiles, but the latter will, and could 
eventually balance out the asymmetry or even reverse it. In fact, thinking about 
such a scenario demonstrates the power of devising a general model because while 
our conclusion of HEU overfunding and possible Pu underfunding could change 
with changing conditions, the inequalities (4.9) and (4.11) will be equally valid. 
On the other hand, if the goal were to analyse the long term effect of changing 
stockpiles, rather than be a policy making tool at a particular point in time, a 
54 International Panel on Fissile Materials Global Fissile Material Report 2007 (IPF~l, 2007)* p.2S. 
55 ibid. p.ll. 
56 ibid. p.41. 
57 ibid. p. 7. 
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different model which explicitly incorporates how the environment changes with 
time could no doubt shed further light on the matter. Such a model, if it were to take 
account of the terrorist's decision as well, would likely have to be more complex and 
make more assumptions, since the timeline of varying stockpiles, which is 
comparatively well known and documented, must run alongside the timeline of an 
unfolding terrorist plot which is not known. Ways could probably be found to 
salvage this now familiar asymmetry of available information. A reasonable 
approximation could probably to let probabilities associated with clandestine 
terrorist activity to be measured per time unit and incorporate the changes in 
stockpile and stockpile protection in a more detailed and time-dependent \ovay. 
Indeed, this could be a valuable extension of the research reported herein for the 
future. 
On a rough level, however, the model in this chapter and its resulting inequalities 
can give a good idea about how prioritisation of safeguards would be affected by 
changing stockpiles, simply by seeing what happens to the inequalities (4.9) and 
(4.11) upon varying the relevant parameters: the probability of the terrorist choosing 
Pu over HEU, and the 'value for money' along the plutonium branch. It will be a 
rough tool only, however, because the model is fundamentally instantaneous and 
cannot be used to account for changes over time in a fully consistent way. 
4.5 A numerical example for further analysis 
Given the surprising conclusions so far it would be interesting to get some visual 
impression of what the utility function (4.6) could reasonably look like in a plane 
where the axes are Cu and cpo To do this, however, I must make rather more specific 
assumptions than what we have so far, and primarily for the sake of illustration let 
me assume the following form of p, pu and pp: 
:::: 01 + 0.5 
Pp . c/2+1 
p 
Here, Cu and cp are per $billion. We use like before qu = 0.7 and qp = 0.2 and T", Tr, as 
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given by (4.13). 
Cp 
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Illustration 4.5. : Contour plot of numerical example utility function. 
It is important to note that the above examples are for demonstration only, and 
the absolute numbers used have no significance in themselves. They fulfil the 
mathematical assumptions set out at the beginning of the chapter and use numbers 
in the order of magnitude of those estimated in the previous section. Regardless of 
whether the reader finds these particular functions satisfactory examples, the 
resulting graph gives important insights into how to interpret the analytical results 
of previous sections. 
The utility function which follows from these assumptions is shown as a contour 
plot in figure 4.5. The example yields the maximum (Nash equilibrium) choiceS at 
around Cu = $30 billion, and cp = $10 billion; a total cost C = $40 billion. If player A 
finds the solution unreasonably expensive, he may try to employ diplomatic tool to 
improve cooperation with countries of proliferation concern in order to change the 
behaviour of PH and pp into falling off more steeply. This would move the rna imum 
to a lower value of C. In the opposite case, if cooperation were to ground to a full 
stop, more money would make no difference, the slopes of PII and PI' ould fall t 
5 A Nash quilibrium i a stra tegy profile {51} such that no pIa er i can do b tter b d vialing fr m 
their trat g _II giv n that all other players tick to {51}' 
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zero and the point optimum value moves to infinity. Although based on input data 
which are so uncertain they border on the arbitrary, the figure shows some 
interesting properties which we will use for the analysis in the following. 
4.5.1 Could Pu measures possibly be overfunded? 
While the conclusion that HEU measures should be boosted considerabh' is 
relatively uncontroversial and conforms with the assertions of several analysts as 
we have seen, the notion that plutonium measures could be overfunded \yill no 
doubt cause surprise. I noted that my numbers are not precise enough to come to a 
definite conclusion on the matter, but indicate the definite possibility that 
plutonium measures could be overfunded. How to interpret this result? 
There is at least one intuitive reason to doubt whether the overfunding 
conclusion is correct, namely the 'weakest link I argument. If there are still unsecured 
buildings in the world holding stores of plutonium large enough to fuel nuclear 
weapons, how can Pu measures then possibly be underfunded before every 
building is secure? 
The way to address this question is, I believe, twofold. It is important as pointed 
out above, to look beyond next year's budget when estimating the security reward 
which follows from a safeguards project. While securing one more building might 
not seem worthwhile, securing all the remaining buildings could still very well be. 
This could lead to an underestimate of the relevant slope, although as we have 
argued, it seems unlikely that I have been guilty of doing this in the present context. 
If even after carefully considering the whole enterprise and its effect one finds 
that (4.10) is still satisfied, the conclusion is that the present level of safeguarding 
together with the perceived difficulty of building a plutonium implosion device 
together provide security enough. The probability of success of a terrorist 
plutonium plot, and hence the expected damage from plutonium terrorism, is 
sufficiently small that further spending to decrease it is not justified. This is an 
uncomfortable conclusion which must certainly be regarded in much greater detail 
than I have above to be taken at face value. The fact that better plutonium safet~, 
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lllustration 4.6.: Zoom of figure 4.5 with two possible scenarios and best responses. 
!he blu~ areas .are forbidd~n si~ce sunken cost cannot be retrieved. 1}ze black-rimmed circle to the left 
In each zmage zs present sztuatzon, the red circle to the right is optimum value. A: the plutonium 
expenditures are not yet past optimum value, but slope is initially negative in Cp direction. B: more 
than the optimum value is already expended. Best approach is to improve HEU measures until 
maximum is reached in the CII direction. 
And yet, a conclusion of plutonium overfunding is perhaps not as problematic a 
it first appears, as I will explain. Regard figure 4.5 once more. Forget about the 
actual numbers on the axes and the sums of money spent so far (the number u ed 
to create the plot are so uncertain that these numbers are of little significance 
anyway). The question is then: where are we at present? In fact59 if we assume that 
the actual expenditure of something like $5 billion along both axes gives an idea of 
where we are, the situation in the figure matches our assertion. Thinking of th 
contour plot as a map, we find a steep uphill in the Cli direction as we should, and a 
slight downhill along the cp axis. But notice now that $5 billion might still be below 
the ideal value! In fact, starting from the origin Cli = cp = 0 we see that the direction of 
steepest ascent is along the Cu axis for some time until around $9 billions where it 
suddenly becomes opportune to spend money on plutonium. Only very little at 
first, and then more until the summit is finally reached at something like cp =$5-6 
billion. 
The important implication is that while plutonium efforts seem to be 0 erfund d 
at present, they need not stay so if sufficient funds are allocated to HEU. So long a 
the plutonium slope is estimated to be negative, funding should be direct d at HE 
59 And not entirely accidentall ,since the numbers used were cho en to match our pr vi u 
timat s. 
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efforts. If the maximum has already been passed as in figure 4.6B, one \\·ill find the 
best value one can reach when the slope along the HEU direction becomes zero. If 
the ideal plutonium value is not yet reached as in figure 4.6A, the plutonium slope 
will turn positive again at some point. 
The policy recommendations that follow from the above analysis should 
therefore be to heavily prioritise HEU measures and secure sufficient funding for 
this branch. The above analysis is not a sufficiently steady fundament upon which 
to recommend the complete cessation of plutonium safeguards improvement 
measures, but plutonium projects must not be allowed to get in the way of the more 
important safeguards projects involving HEU, for example during budget 
negotiations. In case of a shortness of resources it seems justified to halt plutonium 
projects temporarily in order to ensure that improvement of HEU securi ty 
continues. 
4.5.2 Special case: Fixed and insufficient total spending level 
Before concluding I mention briefly an interesting modification of the model in 
which the government at the start of a fiscal year has a fixed sum ~C to spend on 
safeguards measures that year (the period can of course be shorter or longer, the 
point being that the government can take one step towards improving the situation 
each period). This reflects the fact that in a typical democratic state governmental 
expenditure is bounded by a budget passed by a parliament each year. 
Let me furthermore assume that the current situation is one in which one is quite 
far from the optimum value of U(cu, cp) (compared to what can realistically be 
achieved in one period), and that the allocated L1C is quite far from enough to bring 
the situation from status quo to the maximum value of U or the best obtainable value 
as in figure 4.6B. Such a model is attractive for modelling reality reasonably well, 
and because it is an immediate and moderate generalisation of what we have done 
so far. 
Standard multivariable calculus says (see appendix B) that the direction in the c"c,,-
plane in which the value of U rises most steeply is given by the vector
60 
we define as 
60 In this context we can think of a vector as simply an arrow pointing in a direction on our 'map'. 
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(4.16) 
where square brackets denote a set of vector components, the first along the c. al 
and the second along the cp axis, and the vector operator N ('nabla') is defined a 
\7 = [ aUf a p ] = Cu au + Cp a p 
where a hat denotes a unit vector61 . This readily gives us a simple formula for 
optimal spending if the incremental spending llC can only take us a bit of the wa 
to the final optimum: a distribution between HEU and Pu branches so that the urn 
llC increases the expected utility maximally62. This is illustrated in figure 4.7. In fact 
there are more rigorous ways of solving this problem, but the formalism of teepe t 
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The incremental change L1C can take the government player from the initial position (red circle with 
black rim) to any point on the red dotted line. The vectors point to the optimal division of L1C in both 
cases. 
In the case of the United States, there is some doubt, as we have seen, whether 
opU is positive or not; if Pu safeguards and elimination measures are overfunded in 
the sense we explained above, opU is negative and the vector prescribed by (4.16) 
points into the forbidden area. No vector component can be allowed to be negati 
since sunken cost cannot be retrieved. In this case, since ouU is certain! po iti ,th 
optimal solution is to spend the entire sum llC on HEU safeguard, 0 that 
61 A unit vector has 1 ngth 1 and no dimension. 
62 In g n ral, thi is only exactly true if LlC i infinitesimally mall (it i then den t d dq, but it i. a 
good e timat of optimal divi ion if U i well behaved if C i uffici nll ' mall. 
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If opU is found to be positive, however, (4.16) yields the ideal distribution as63 
(4.17) 
One could also write out more specific expressions by inserting equations (4.7) and 
(4.8). 
4.5.3 Fixed total spending level 
We can push our analysis even a little bit further as an extension of the above. In 
this section I will have to assume that the reader has a basic command of differential 
algebra. Assume now that the total spending level C is fixed. As shown in figure .f.8 
the possible values lie on a straight line in this case. We have chosen C somewhat 
below $20 billion for illustration. 
A more rigorous way of finding the best obtainable value is now to measure the 
slope as we move along this line either down (towards higher cu) or up (towards 
lower cu). Note that in the former case dcu is positive, in the latter it is negative. 
While planned costs which are not yet expended can be increased or decreased at 
will, once more the available final value is limited by what is already spent, shown 
as usual as a forbidden blue area in figure 4.8. 
Along the red dotted line, Cu and cp are constrained by the condition Cu + cp = 
constant, which implies 
Moving along the red dotted line by varying Cu and cp by dcu and dcp, the variation of 
the utility function is 
d U=8
u
U·dc u +8p U·dc p=(8u U -81' U)dc u 
=[(-8
u
p).1 T+(i\p).1T+.1 T']dc u 
where I have used (4.7) and (4.8) and defined the quantity 
(4.19) 
63 Note that ~C is the sum of the lengths of each vector component, not the length of the H'ctor. 
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Illustration 4.8.: Contour plot of same utility function with fixed 
total cost. 
The optimal point along the dotted line is where dU = 0, but this point could lie 
in the forbidden region as in figure 4.8. The alternative is to move along the line in a 
direction so that dU is positive until either a maximum or a forbidden boundary is 
reached. What is clear from (4.18) is that if the expression in the square brackets is 





p)L1 T + L1 T 1>0 
the optimal value lies at a higher value of Cu (correspondingly: a lower value of cp). A 
sufficient criterion for this to hold true is that L1 T and L1 T' are both positive. 
Considering the definition of L1 T', it is clear that this quantity is positive roughly in 
the same region of the cucp plane where liTis positive: everywhere except a slim area 
in the lower right corner of the contour plots where clI > cp by a large margin&!. 
A new and very succinct criterion for priorities is thus found: 
If per estimate L1 T and L1 T' are both positive after the entire sum of C 
is spent on HEU safeguards, this is the optimal division of C. 
64 The reason for this are the same as argued in section 4.3.3 combined with the condu ion from 
chapter 3 that p > l-p. If the rate of change of pu and P" with resp ct to Cu and cf are thu in lh 
ame order of magnitude, L1 T' i ure to be po itive e cept in a lim region Cu »c \vh r lh lall r 
two as erti n no longer hold. 
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An important corollary is that 
If L1 T and L1 T' are both currently positive, incremental spending 
should be allocated solely to HEU efforts until this is no longer the 
case. 
There is reason to believe, as we have seen, that the latter situation holds true for the 
United States today. 
While holding no new information compared to that found before, these criteria 
arguably sum up the essence of safeguards priorities in the face of the threat of 
nuclear terrorism and could be just as powerful and probably as applicable to the 
real political picture as the free variable criteria (4.10) and (4.12). 
4.6 Assumptions and limitations of the model 
Every model is a simplification. Indeed, this is the very strength of formal social 
science; it allows the analyst to cut through the jungle of complexity which is almost 
always present, and reach a conclusion which may in turn be tested empirically. Of 
course, with nuclear terrorism no such empirical data exists; I find myself, therefore, 
in the normative rather than descriptive domain, where rather than hypothesising 
about mathematical regularities of human interaction, the analysis aspires to create 
a rational ideal for future action. 
I have gone from a qualitative discussion of the problem to devising a model and 
thence to using formal logic to show what the model implies and draw conclusions 
by attaching it once more to the real world by numerical estimates. What remains 
for my argument to be on as firm a ground as possible is to examine the 
assumptions upon which the model rests. 
In doing so, I must consider what criterion should be applied to judge the 
appropriateness of a simplification. As we argued in chapter 2, the appropriate 
requirement of a simplification is that it somehow aids the understanding of the 
problem considered. There are at least two somewhat related ways a simplifying 
assumption can achieve this: by explicitly ignoring complicating minor effects 
which are not essential, and by making way for simple and transparent analysis 
(mathematical or otherwise) with clear cut arguments. 
The more unrealistic the simplification, the more reason there is to justify it. On 
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the other hand, says Bennett65 the more empirical data one has to compare with, the 
more complicated the model can be, since one has then better data bv which to test 
it. In the strict sense, I have no empirical data on nuclear terrorism, hence a verv 
simple model seems a priori like a reasonable first approach. A simple model, while 
a crude reproduction of reality, requires fewer explicit assumptions about how the 
world behaves, assumptions which in the absence of empirical results will be 
somewhat ad hoc. 
The second criterion is an assay of how fundamental the approximations made are. 
By fundamental is meant, quite literally, whether the assumption forms a modelling 
fundament so that changing or replacing it will change qualitatively the behaviour 
of the model (or possibly make it collapse). Clearly, if our analysis were to fall apart 
at the alteration of an unrealistic assumption, it would be of questionable 
soundness. A problematic assumption is thus one which is both unrealistic and 
fundamental. 
4.6.1 Time and time ordering 
The model of figure 4.3 contains only a pseudo-time. Much as moves are ordered 
consecutively, one will notice that the model as presented does not necessitate any 
true passing of time - we may as well imagine that player A moves, player T moves 
an infinitesimal time later, and the game is over in no time whatsoever. 
This is quite deliberate, motivated by the fact that one can only have a very vague 
idea of the real timing of the process such as portrayed. Each player knows their 
own timing, but that of the other player is unknown: Player A must defend against 
an attack that may already be on the way, in the planning stage, or which may never 
be attempted at all. It is deemed that this trait, as well as simplifying calculations, 
reflects reality well. Introducing an explicit time would increase the complexity of 
the model, but might not do much in terms of improving the realism of the model, 
hence the chosen approach seems justified. 
65 Peter G. Bennett 'Modelling Decisions in International Relations: Game Theory and Beyond' 
Mershon Illtenzationai Studies Review 39 (1995), p.39 
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4.6.2 The terrorist has yet to obtain the material 
Arguably it is a sensible stance for A to assume that player T has not yet acquired 
the fissile materials she needs, given our assumption that the game is bevond his 
control as soon as fissile material has been acquired66. If I were to allow player A a 
chance to alter the q's as well (as discussed in appendix D), the assumption becomes 
fundamental and must be tested. Here, the worst A can do by assuming that T is not 
yet beyond the acquisition stage is spending money defending against a threat that 
might not be real, whilst the opposite assumption could lead to a decision to do 
nothing when a major catastrophe could have been avoided. Hence it seems 
reasonable that A sets the level of deterrence prior to the terrorist's choice and 
subsequent materials acquisition. 
4.6.3 The division into HEU and Pu branches 
Plutonium and HEU are not regularly stored in the same facilities67; HEU of 
terrorism concern may typically be found in research reactors, enrichment facilities 
and in naval fuel (fresh and lightly irradiated) whilst plutonium is found primarily 
in reprocessing plants, in storage for conversion into mixed-oxide fuel or in civilian 
reprocessing plants. However, there are instalments (for example nuclear weapons 
assembly / disassembly facilities and weapons component storage sites) where both 
materials are kept, and the safeguarding of these places does not fit cleanly into one 
of the two branches of my model. 
Mathematically, the formalism only demands that no dollar may be counted in 
both categories. For the formalism to be consistent, this can be ensured in any 
arbitrarily chosen way, for example by splitting in half wherever both materials are 
safeguarded by the same equipment; deciding how exactly to make the split 
ultimately becomes a question of judgement. If the motivation for using the above 
model was, say to check if plutonium efforts are worthwhile, one may place in the 
Pu category only the funds that go into safeguarding solely plutonium. In 
conclusion, the exclusiveness of the categories can alwavs be ensured, and the 
66 This simplification is treated below 
67 Ferguson and Potter TI1e Four Faces ... pp.120-124. 
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shortcoming is not fundamental. 
4.6.4 Non-deterability of terrorists 
It has been assumed herein that player T may neither opt not to attack at all, nor 
choose conventional means instead of nuclear. The simplification might well be an 
unrealistic one and I have devoted chapter 6 to this question alone68. Here, 
however, one should remember that the model is devised so as to be beheld by the 
government player, and since I am not testing whether to defend against a nuclear 
threat or not, but how, it would not do to assume the threat is anything but real. One 
may believe, like Kamp and Frost69, that the threat is not real and question the 
relevance of testing defences against it, but this is a different debate. With reference 
to chapter 6 the question discussed herein might be what happens if the deterrence 
schemes outlined in that chapter fail or are not implemented. 
A major problem with deterrence of terrorism as discussed in chapter 6 is that it 
IS very hard to verify whether a deterrence campaign works or not. It should 
therefore be accompanied by a safeguards programme as a backup. Furthermore 
our analysis in that chapter shows that safeguards form an important element of 
relative deterrence by decreasing the terrorist's perceived chances of obtaining 
fissile materials, so there is no conflict between believing in the possibility of relative 
deterrence and giving full priority to safeguards programmes. 
As a general note all the different games presented in this thesis could be devised 
to be played simultaneously to try and capture more of the dynamics between the 
players. Safeguards priorities, priorities between safeguards and second layers of 
defence, terrorist choice of nuclear or conventional means and in the former case, 
choice of nuclear material could then be analysed in a single scenario. While this 
would certainly be more realistic, it would also be mathematically vastly more 
complicated. I deem therefore that playing one part of the game at a time will suffice 
mainly for the reason that the signalling between government and terrorist is of a 
68 Deterrence is simply defined as measures which persuade an adversary that a certain cause of 
action is not in his or her own interest. Thus relative deterrence from nuclear to conventional 
means of terrorism can be achieved (I argue in chapter 6) by changing important parameters of 
the terrorist player's cost-benefit analysis. 
69 See section 1.3. 
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weak and sporadic character, so modelling the situation so that each player plays in 
isolation where the other player acts as a part of the environment (and is able to 
influence that environment) is likely to be a good approximation. The price to be 
played in complexity for undertaking the more realistic game is therefore unlikely 
to payoff in terms of better understanding in this framework70• 
4.6.5 The role of a 'second line of defence' 
I have already mentioned the simplification that player A cannot affect the 
passing of matters beyond hindering T's acquisition of nuclear materials (This 
shortcoming is analysed briefly in appendix D where a model similar to that in 
figure 4.3 is used to discuss the relative emphasis between a first and a second layer 
of defence). I will not delve into the matter here. Although it would not be difficult 
to incorporate a second-layer model into that used in this chapter, it was deemed 
wiser not to do this for the sake of keeping the two discussions apart and not 
complicate calculations unnecessarily. One may think of it as though a budget has 
already been split into first and second layer efforts so that C is the sum to be spent 
on safeguards; then in turn the above model yields how best to split C. 
4.7 The gains of gaming 
In this chapter I have considered a question which has been treated in the past by 
qualitative means. A natural question to ask is what was gained by formulating the 
problem in the form of a game and going through the calculations. 
Indeed policy conclusions reached herein for the special case of the United States 
- the underfunding of HEU and possible overfunding of plutonium - were reached 
before by Ferguson and Potter71 by qualitative arguments alone. Moreover, it is clear 
that these conclusions hinge upon the qualitative analysis of chapter 3, where it was 
argued in a qualitative way why HEU is of greater proliferation concern. For the 
sake of these conclusions alone, it is not perhaps obvious that the gaming effort was 
more than a detour on the way to a conclusion which was implied in rough terms 
already from the previous chapter. It is true, as demonstrated by the book of 
70 It could nonetheless be an interesting undertaking for future research. 
71 Ferguson and Potter The Four Faces ... 
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Ferguson and Potter, that in order to make qualitative recommendations about the 
prioritisation between the two fissile materials, qualitative arguments suffice. On 
the other hand, other experts who have surveyed the same evidence as do Ferguson 
and Potter, have not necessarily reached the conclusion that a heavy emphasis on 
one material should be qualified72• 
In view of the discussion of criteria for evaluating the gains of formal analysis of 
section 2.10, it is clear that the main outcome of gaming is not these qualitative 
conclusions in themselves, which stem from the application of roughly estimated 
numbers in a particular context as a way to demonstrate the usage of the model. The 
primary product of devising a game and analysing it is the most general set of 
inequalities, (4.9) and (4.11). These inequalities reduce the large and complicated 
problem of safeguards priorities to one of estimating a few parameters, and are 
valid independently of what the values of these parameters may be73 • Beyond 
simply inserting numbers, they can be used in a variational sense, such as I did in 
section 4.4.3 where we could use these formulae to analyse the effect of fissile 
material stockpiles changing in time. 
While such results are potentially powerful, they must be used with caution. It is 
a weakness as well as a strength of a model that it never captures the full picture, 
and before taking such general formulas at face value, the user should understand 
what assumptions were employed to produce them, and assess whether these match 
the special case under evaluation. The mathematical model is never equivalent with 
the real problem, only a condensed representation of it, and judgement has been 
made on the side of the analyst in order to devise it. 
Therefore, in order to apply it in practice with confidence, the user must either 
fully understand the model and its premises, or have a high level of trust in 
someone who does. Powerful tools though they are, when applied wrongly such 
formulae are of limited use at best, misleading at worst. This necessity for special 
training is perhaps the greatest weakness of the methodology from a pragmatic 
72 See e.g. Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier 'Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How 
Difficult?' The Annals of the AAPSS 607 (2006) 133-149 
73 The simplified and stronger criteria (4.10) and (4.12), notably, are not,.beca~se they depend on the 
assertion that!:1T is positive, a plausibility assumption based on real-hfe estImates. 
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point of view. 
A final and related limitation to bear in mind is what we might call the 
information problem. Because the game and subsequent analysis in this chapter 
have assumed a generic government at some unspecified point in time, I ha\'e 
assumed to have Significantly less information than a real government will ha,'e 
when facing the same question. Before making use of the equations derived the real 
government must ask itself the additional question: does any of the extra 
information I have make it necessary to use a different gaming representation than 
the general one? There seems no way of solving this problem in general; it is 
another point to bear in mind. 
With these cautions in mind, however, the modelling in this chapter has yielded 
some simple and intuitive formulae and some striking results. The concept of the 
asymmetry cost, which proved to be a crucial quantity, fell out of the analysis 
almost automatically while it would not be immediate to recognise qualitatively that 
just this quantity is of such prominence. Another property of the scenario which is 
not easy to detect qualitatively is the tendency of the system to lean heavily to one 
side depending on the sign of the asymmetry cost; the form of the inequalities 
amplifies the asymmetry. Because we argued on intuitive grounds that this cost was 
positive, the system automatically inclines steeply towards HEU74 • 
It is never possible to say with certainty what conclusions could and could not 
have been reached with a different methodology, since the logic which I formulate 
mathematically could, at least in principle, be formulated in words. That question 
can thus best be answered subjectively by each researcher; could I have reached this 
conclusion otherwise? That HEU safeguards should be given higher priority is 
certainly a conclusion one could reach qualitatively, but the notion that plutonium 
safeguards may be overfunded was one which ran counter to my intuition and was 
not so easy to swallow until the more detailed quantitative analysis of section 4.5.1 
had been performed, providing a deeper understanding of how such a result could 
be possible. 
74 This is particularly true if the government's decision influences the terrorist's choic~ of material. 




My calculations indicate that with respect to terrorism, a strong emphasis on 
HEU in safeguards efforts is soundly justified in the US safeguards programmes 
abroad. There is reason to suspect from our analysis that US efforts to throttle 
proliferation of plutonium by improving safeguards are being overfunded at 
present and should be put on hold or at least not be allowed to get in the wa:' of 
more urgent HEU efforts. The rough numerical evaluation indicates such a 
conclusion, but uncertainties are too large to establish certainty at this stage. 
It seems certain from our analysis that HEU funding should be increased 
dramatically since the security benefits of investing in HEU safeguards are 
significantly greater than the corresponding costs. This conclusion is in line with 
those arrived at by Ferguson and Potter75 by a different methodology. 
While expenditures to further improve plutonium safeguards could decrease the 
expected utility at present, this is not necessarily a permanent conclusion. After a 
further improvement of HEU safeguards, the estimated terrorist preference could 
shift sufficiently in the direction of plutonium as to make investment in security 
upgrades opportune for this branch once more. 
Another conclusion that may be drawn is the importance of building trust and 
good international relations between countries of proliferation concern and those in 
a position to pay for the lessening of such concern. If investment is to be beneficial, 
adequate value for money must be ensured. The importance of the rate of 
improvement with increased expenditure is made clear by the prominence of the 
quantities dpu/ dcu and dpp/ dcp in concluding results. 
What has already been spent is important only in that prior efforts have brought 
us to status quo, hopefully with a few lessons learned. The absence of the absolute 
cost of safeguards and stockpile elimination from our criteria for optimal operation, 
however, renders clear that as future strategies go, threat reduction per dollar is the 
relevant number, whereas for example a weighing of accumulated cost of 
safeguards versus estimated cost of an attack is not. Roughly speaking, as long as 
one dollar invested in a safeguards branch lowers the nuclear terrorism threat b:' 
75 Ferguson and Potter The Four Faces", pp.324-336. 
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more than one dollar equivalent, safeguards spending should be increased for that 
branch. 
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- 5 - The HEUfPlutonium choice: From the Terrorists' 
Point of View 
I have considered the threat from HEU and Pu as a government sees it. We will 
now turn the situation around and view the same choice as seen from the view of a 
terrorist actor. It may seem daunting to attempt to understand the motives and 
deliberations of a given terrorist leader, and I shall make no attempt to enter into the 
field of terrorism psychology. Rather, I follow the scheme laid out in chapter 2 and 
consider a generic terrorist whom I assume to be rational and intelligent in the way 
that these terms are understood in rational choice theory: 'rational,l means the 
terrorist consistently chooses the action that is best for her; 'intelligent' means, in 
layman's terms, that she is able to work out what the best option is, based on the 
available information. 
The two previous chapters have considered a question of very direct policy 
implications, namely the division of resources between HEU and plutonium 
safeguards as seen by the government paying for such an enterprise. The question 
treated in this chapter of a somewhat more theoretical nature and lends support to 
the more policy oriented analyses in the rest of the thesis more indirectly. While the 
question treated links the analysis below directly to the two preceding chapters, it 
will become clear that theoretical implications which result from the formal analysis 
hint at important realisations about terrorist actions and preferences in general, to 
which I will make frequent references in the next chapter. While policy implications 
from this chapter may not flow so directly from the analysis herein as they do in 
other gaming chapters of the thesis, the realisations and conclusions drawn are 
nonetheless of great relevance to a government trying to understand a rational 
terrorist adversary. 
5.1 Research question and outline 
The research question to be discussed in this chapter is 
1 A discussion of the proper understanding of this term is found in c;l'dion 2.9. 
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What are the conditions determining whether a rational and 
intelligent terrorist who seeks to maximise the damage done to a 
target country would choose plutonium or uranium for a project to 
build a nuclear weapon, and how can a government opponent affect 
such a decision? 
5.1.1 Chapter Outline 
As a general backdrop to our analysis complementing that already presented in 
chapter 3, I discuss summarily an aspect of terrorist acquisition of nuclear materials 
which has not been treated in the previous, namely the choice of whether to mount 
an overt attack on a nuclear facility or to approach with stealth, for example through 
bribing insiders to theft. 
I then go on to devise a model with which to analyse the terrorist's choice of 
fissile material and use the model to compare the two arguably most important 
candidate strategies: the opportunistic strategy of taking whatever material becomes 
available first, and a more patient strategy of waiting until the preferable material, 
HEU, becomes available. A standard multiplicative system of discounting is 
introduced to model the cost of waiting. I thereafter discuss the meaning of the price 
of lost time and link it to the concept of time failure, reflecting the fact that the 
probability of unforeseen events derailing the terrorist efforts increases with the 
time spent on the project. In relating the terrorist's fear of failure mathematically to 
the notion of discounting, however, an anomaly appears which makes way for an 
important realisation about absolute deterrence of terrorists. 
Finally, a brief discussion about reasonable limits of terrorist intelligence (as 
defined in rational choice theory) is provided, and a discussion of the possible 
extension of the model to allow for the terrorist to make a 'hopscotch' bomb out of 
small batches of different fissile material. Finally the policy implications of the 
analysis are discussed. 
5.2 Acquiring the material: strength or stealth? 
The discussion in this section may not be a direct necessity to the formal analysis 
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below, but forms a backdrop which may help in connecting the formal to the real 
situation. In applying the gaming conclusions to policy, qualitative discussions of 
this sort are also necessary to determine how best to make use of the knowledge 
gained from the formal procedure. The reader is also encouraged at this point to 
review the sections on the intricacies of nuclear safeguards and security, presented 
summarily in section 3.5. 
When a terrorist organisation wishes to acquire fissile materials, it has the choice 
between two main approaches: to mount a bank robbery style attack on a facility 
and force their way to the desired weapons components, or to use stealth to acquire 
the material undetected, most likely by use of insiders at facilities storing such 
materials, for example by threats and/ or bribes. 
From the point of view of whoever is in charge of the logistics of the terrorist 
organisation post acquisition - smuggling, building, transport and detonation -
there can be no doubt that undetected acquisition will be preferable by far. As soon 
as the disappearance of several kilogrammes of HEU or plutonium is detected, 
efforts to track down the perpetrators of the theft and hinder use of the materials 
will almost undoubtedly be initiated immediately. If the theft is discovered within 
hours, the thief must expect that border crossings and other ways out of the country 
where the material was stolen will suddenly be more crowded than usual with 
inspectors bent on recovering the dangerous contraband. 
Perhaps as importantly (as will be discussed in chapter 6), the knowledge that 
police and intelligence are trying very hard to track the material down will add 
considerably to the stress of the group of technicians actually building the weapon, 
increasing the probability of errors and even accidents derailing the project. It is 
likely that this alone is enough to make terrorist leaders contemplating the best 
route to the bomb want to keep the existence of the ambitious and expensive 
terrorist nuclear proliferation project secret for as long as possible, preferably until 
the bomb goes off. 
While it is true that terrorist organisations have mounted armed military style 
attacks on public targets in the past, the incidents most often cited have not been 
part of a larger plot \"hose success depended in part on staying clandestine. Bunn, 
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Wier and others of Project Managing the Atom have repeatedly warned about the 
threat from groups of armed terrorists against nuclear instalments quoting such 
incidents as the plane hi-jackings of September 11, 2001, the seizures of a Moscow 
theatre in 2002 and the school in Beslan in 20042, all of which carefully planned and 
coordinated attacks by a group of terrorists. All of these incidents, however, had a 
violent ending which, apart from the tragic killing of innocents, precluded further 
near-term terrorist activity for any of the perpetrators involved. 
In a recent book of journalistic nature, Langewiesche makes the case that such 
tactics are not preferable if the goal is to steal material which must subsequently be 
brought to a safe place for further construction3. Clearly it is not unthinkable that a 
well organised and well equipped group could succeed in such a spectacular act of 
robbery, yet it seems unlikely to ever be preferable as long as the alternative of 
using insiders is there. Langewiesche brings up the questions the terrorist leader 
must ask when planning the attack: Once the group is inside, what then? If they do 
not know exactly where to find what they are looking for, locating it and gaining 
access to it will take time and probably involve pressing employees for information. 
The Russian nuclear cities for example, storing the greater share of Russia's fissile 
materials, each contain hundreds of buildings so getting past the outer perimeter 
will only be one small step. Even assuming the terrorists know exactly where to find 
what they need once inside, the operation will take at least minutes, time enough for 
guards to organise themselves to try and keep the intruders from escaping. Even if 
they do escape the plant, safety is still far from secured. With police or the military 
on their tail, crossing borders will be much more difficult than if no suspicion were 
raised. Reaching a border will in most cases take hours, ample time for the nearest 
border controls to be alerted and reinforced. 
4 Knowing exactly what materials the terrorists have stolen, government 
anti terrorists will know what else the group needs in order to weaponise the 
uranium or plutonium and a number of incidents which would normally not attract 
2 e.g. Matthew Bunn Securing the Bomb 2007 report from Project Managing the Atom (Belfer Center 
for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 2007) p.13 
3 William Langewiesche The Atomic BI7::.aar (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2007) pp.4I"-50 
.+ This, of course, requires the government to have good accounting procedures in place, which may 
not always be the case. 
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attention, such as purchase of special workshop equipment, could nm,' cause red 
flags to go up. If it has good records, the government will know the isotopic 
composition of the stolen material for identification purposes, and what chemical 
and metallurgical processing is needed to make the needed components. While 
random detection of smuggled uranium and plutonium is very difficult, it is made 
somewhat easier by knowing exactly what one is looking for, especially if one has 
some idea about where to look. Even very small quantities of airborne uranium and 
plutonium dust can be detected using sampling aeroplanes, for example5. 
If a plot using an insider goes askew, on the other hand, the terrorist can often 
vanish and resurface for another attempt somewhere else. The insider who was 
bribed or coerced into helping could be given so little information as to be of little 
use to the police. If the theft succeeds it will presumably be detected at some point, 
but with luck and a clever ploy terrorists could have gained enough time to escape 
to safety or even finish the attack. For these reasons, Langewiesche concludes, and 
this author agrees, that 'a rational bomb-maker would abandon any idea of 
commando heroics ,6• 
The choice between strength and stealth clearly matters to the probability of 
success in the subsequent construction and attack. For my modelling purposes I will 
use only one probability of success however (as in the previous chapter). Although 
the above arguments indicate that the rational terrorist will try to acquire the 
material undetected, it is not necessary to explicitly assume this, only bear in mind 
the importance of the manner of acquisition. For numerical estimates, an 
assumption would be necessary. 
5.3 A different angle 
Although the situation in this chapter may be thought of as the same as that 
modelled in the previous chapter, the analysis I will employ is formally rather 
different. I argue in this section that such a different approach is natural and fruitful. 
s 
6 
Says Bennett, 'Of all the limitations of the basic game model, arguably the most 
Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William Maraman and Jacob Wechsler 'Can 
Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?' in Leventhal and Alexander (eds.) Preventing Nuclear 
Terrorism (Lexington:Lexington Books, 1987)* p. 60 
Langewiesche TIlL' Atomic Bazaar p.SO 
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fundamental is the assumption that all the players see the same" game,,,7. In the case 
where the situation to be modelled is highly asymmetric the assumption that a 
single game can fruitfully portray the relevant options and preferences of both 
players could well be too strong. 
Terrorism, under study here, is an extremely asymmetric conflict: the government 
on the one side has access to vast resources, military forces, police and intelligence 
services, whilst the terrorist must manage with limited funds and a comparatively 
tiny workforce most often recruited more for their ideology rather than for their 
skills. Also the information situation is very different for the two players; whilst the 
terrorist's success depends on all her plans and moves remaining clandestine, the 
government is to a large extent a public player - his plans and information 
(provided by intelligence services and the like) may be kept secret, but major moves 
by the government will be monitored by the press. Budgets will be scrutinised by 
the political opposition and many of its actions will be physically visible to the 
terrorist: the deployment of troops or border guards or the installation of bulky 
radiation detection equipment in key positions are not invisible operations and the 
terrorist is likely to be watching. 
In the previous chapter it was possible to reduce the game theoretical model to a 
decision theoretical one, involving in practice a single player. This could be done by 
assuming that all relevant information that the government player could obtain to 
aid his choice would only be received after the choice had already been made. The 
cost of doing this, however, was that the previous model could not be used to 
analyse the factors influencing the choice of material the terrorist had to make. 
The scarcity of information makes it natural to once again model the situation as 
a one-player game, set in an environment of imperfect information. A truly game-
theoretical model where strategies could be played against each other would 
perhaps have been ideal in some ways. There are paths one could possibly pursue to 
achieve this, yet the situation at hand is not one that is easily modelled as a two 
player game. Terrorism differs from conventional warfare and even as~'mmetrical 
guerrilla warfare in the extreme sparsity of information exchange; communication 
7 Peter G. Bennett 'Modelling Decisions in International Relations: Game Theory and Beyond' 
Mershon Internatiollal Studies Re'l,iCll' 39 (1995) p. 30. 
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between adversaries is sporadic and of a stochastic nature and might be best 
simulated in a computer programme. Such a project would likely be fruitful and a 
natural continuation of the analysis presented herein, but the simplicity, 
transparency and forcefulness of the reduced, decision theoretical approximation is 
appealing enough to justify it as a first approach for my largely exploratory 
purposes. 
5.~ The choice of fissile materials from the terrorist's point of 
vtew 
When studying the choice of material for a nuclear programme seen through the 
eyes of the terrorist (player T), I will largely disregard the government's perspective, 
reducing once more to a 'decision theoretical' model. The interactions between the 
players is of a sporadic and random nature, and I will therefore see the two players 
as non-communicating as an approximation and in turn discuss how the 
government might influence the situation indirectly by affecting the values of some 
of the parameters of the game. 
In the first round of the game, shown in figure 5.1, player T is gIVen an 
opportunity to obtain a sufficient quantity of fissile material, and Nature decides 
whether it is HEU or separated plutonium8• HEU is picked with a probability I-p 
and Pu with probability p, 0 ~ p ~ 1. Player T can now choose to take the opportunity 
(accept) or wait for the next round (decline). 
If T decides to decline and wait, the waiting period will induce discounting, a 
system to model the extent to which harvesting a payoff now is preferred to 
receiving it at a later time. Similar concepts exist in the economic literature, but the 
standard multiplicative discounting system typically employed in game theory9 is 
somewhat different, which should not confuse the reader. Here, for every round 
player T waits, all payoffs (whether positive or negative) are discounted by a factor 
8 Of course, the success rate of the project will furthermore depend on what form the fissile material 
is in, that is, how much processing it needs before it is usable in a weapon. Plutonium from ver\, 
radioactive spent reactor fuel, for example, is separable in principle, but will in practice almost 
certainly be useless to the terrorist. I disregard spent reactor fuel throughout this thesis (lightly 
irradiat~d spent HEU fuel from research reactors, however, is another matter altogether). 
9 e.g. Martin J. Osborne An Introduction to Game Theory (New York: Oxford Uni\'ersity Press, 2004) 
pp.421-422 
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() E [0,1] . Waiting two rounds, payoffs are discounted by a factor r/ and so on. 
The discount factor represents the impatience of player T (a nuanced interpretation of 
discounting in this particular case is an important part of the analysis in the 
following). 
There are a number of reasons for the terrorist to be impatient to get started with 
a planned nuclear project. The longer she waits, the larger the chance that her plans 
might be discovered. Assuming that a certain level of searching activity will be 
required in order for the opportunities for obtaining fissile material to keep 
appearing, each new round means exposure and risk of detection. Furthermore, 
safeguards on storage places for nuclear materials may improve with time, causing 
perhaps an expectancy that getting the materials in the future might be more 
difficult than it is now. All in all there should be ample reason for 0 to be smaller 
than unity. 
A second reason for choosing a multiplicative model is that I wish my model to 
reflect my assumption from the previous chapter that player T is bent on going 
nuclear and will not change her mind with time. Doing nothing, as I will argue, will 
give a payoff of zero, and so discounting must then be devised so that payoffs that 
are initially positive will not drop below zero with time. The multiplicative system 
does this and hence seems a good choice. It turns out, however, that I run into 
trouble, necessitating a reconsideration of the assumption that player T cannot be 
deterred with time. But I will leave this for later. 
Once player T has accepted an opportunity, Nature decides whether the 
construction and attack succeeds - probability qi, i = u,p - or fails - probability 
(l-qi)' It is important to note that now qu and qp are as estimated by player T, not 
necessarily equal to the values of the same name in the previous chapter, which 
reflected the government's belief. The same goes for all quantities whose value 
cannot be determined beyond doubt, for example the damage inflicted on the 
antiterrorist/ government (player A), Tu or Tp, which the terrorist may estimate 
differently than the government. 
In the case where the attack succeeds, the terrorist receives a payoff -CT+vT, 
where i = u,p. CT is the cost of the operation for player T, and the reward for the 
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success is vTj , proportional to the damage inflicted on player A. The proportionality 
constant , as we will see, has an interesting interpretation. In the case of failure, 
player T receives an extra cost of failure, cpo This reflects possible costs in addition to 
the mere building of the bomb, this could be e.g. loss of credibility, loss of funding 
or loss of property or personnel if the project ends in an accident. It is likely that this 
quantity is small compared to CT, but greater than zero. One could generalise the 
game in such a way that the terrorist could try again after a failed building attempt, 
a possible future development not undertaken here. 
I have assumed for simplicity that the cost of building a uranium bomb is equal 
to the cost of building a plutonium bomb. While this is perhaps a coarse 
approximation, it simplifies the analysis and may be good enough as a first 
approach. 
The assumption that the terrorist's reward for a successful attack is proportional 
to the damage inflicted has implications that cannot be ignored. Adopting the 
distinction introduced by Arce and Sandler10 between political and militant 
terrorists - the former using terrorism as a means to obtaining a place at the 
negotiation table but is eventually interested in political reform, the latter bent on 
incurring damage on the adversary until concessions are made - such a reward 
system implies that player T falls heavily on the militant side. An example to 
illustrate the distinctionll is that of Spain, which has suffered attacks from the 
Basque separatist organisation Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) for many years, and 
which was also victim of an Islamic terrorist attack on Madrid train station in 2004. 
Whilst ETA's attacks were discriminate, seeking to avoid mass casualties, the train 
station attack was the direct opposite, designed to maximise the carnage and 
escalate violence. It is fairly safe to assume that any terrorist organisation with the 
slightest interest in detonating a nuclear device in a populated area will be bent on 
mass casualties and be firmly in the militant camp. The signals sent through a 
terrorist attack by such immensely destructive means are several - the 
demonstration of technical sophistication to equal that of the adversary might be 
10 Daniel Arce M. and Todd Sandler 'Terrorist Signalling and the Value of Intelligence' British 
Journal of Political Science 37:4 (2007) pp.573-586. 
11 Ibid. p.2 
-141 -
one - yet a main motivation must remain the perverse will to kill in the hundred 
thousands
12
. A model where reward is proportional to the harm inflicted, while 
possibly simplistic, seems to mirror such preferences reasonably well. 
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Illustration 5.1.: The HEUjPu game seen from the terrorist's point a/view. 
The present model, of course, is not well suited to explain why most terror 
organisations are not interested in acquiring nuclear weapons13. If the payoff system 
were modelled differently, moreover, for example in terms of bargaining power or 
concessions in the wake of the attack, a spectacular bloodbath might very well 
defeat the purpose entirely, effecting harsh retaliation rather than negotiation 
power14. It is important to be aware of these aspects of the model: it is designed to 
describe a logical process of decision making based on utterly fanatical preferences. 
In so doing it is necessary to strongly limit the effect of actions and strategic 
considerations which more moderate actors might perceive as deterrents1s. 
12 A possible exception could be if the nuclear weapon is detonated in a remote area as a warning 
shot to create fear and possibly lever the government into concessions. However, such a plan 
would demand that the terrorist holds (or credibly claims to hold) at least one more nuclear 
weapon, and the delivery of the second will be very much complicated by the increased security 
guaranteed by the first blast. 
13 See e.g. chapter 2 of Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter with Amy Sands, Leonard S. 
Spector and Fred L. Wehlin The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2005)* 
14 Morten Bremer Maerli 'Relearning the ABCs: Terrorists and «Weapons of Mass Destruction»' The 
Nonproliferation Review (Summer 2000), p.llO. 
15 A 'deterrent' in this thesis is understood as anything that can persuade an actor that a certain 
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The relevant terrorist strategies in the game of figure 5.1 are the following: An 
opportunist strategy (0) where the first opportunity is accepted whatever the fissile 
material, a uranium strategy (U) where the player waits until an opportunity for 
uranium comes up, and a plutonium strategy (P) where plutonium is likewise 
awaited. More complicated strategies are thinkable, of course, but one may show 
that with a multiplicative discounting system, at least one of the three simple 
strategies will always have a higher payoff than such a combined strategy16. 
Notice furthermore that, unlike in the model in the previous chapter, player T 
now has the option to not try to go nuclear at all, by declining every opportunity 
forever. The payoff for this strategy is 0 in this model: the strategy does not have its 
own end node, but the result is nonetheless evident. If one thinks instead of a 
strategy where player T waits for N rounds and then takes whatever is available, the 
payoff will be discounted by a factor ON. As N goes to infinity, the payoff becomes 0 
(assuming 0 < 1; in the special case 0 = lone can still define this strategy to have 
payoff 0). This constitutes a fourth strategy that I denote (N) for 'no attempt'. 
As player Tis financing goes, I will not be very specific in this chapter, but merely 
assume that she has a budget pot of CT designated to the nuclear project and that 
project alone. Note that the Izero level l of finances is set as status quo. 
5.4.1 The opportunist strategy 
I commence by examining the opportunist strategy. The expected utility of this 
strategy is easily found to be 
U(O) =- CT -cpr P (1- qp)+(l- P )(1- qJ ]+v[ T u(l- P )qu + T ppqp]. (5.1) 
For the terrorist to be better off trying to build the bomb than saving the money for 
something else (strategy (N), payoff 0), U(O) in (5.1) must exceed O. This brings me to 
defining the following criterion for v that mayor may not be fulfilled: 
(5.2) 
cause of action is not in his or her own interest, not restricted to threats of retaliation as was the 
typical Cold War interpretation of the term. See chapter 6 for a discussion. 
16 More on this below. I will not show this rigorously here, but it will be fairly obvious from the 
following analysis where more detailed waiting strategies are discussed. 
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I will refer to (5.2) as the 'bloodlust' or 'blood thirst' criterion. When (5.2) holds for 
all values of p (as opposed to the one value that player T believes to be the correct 
one), this implies that strategies (0), (U) and (P) are all preferred to (N) since they all 
will have expected utility higher than O. This follows since in all these strategies 
some opportunity is accepted at some point, and if building either option in the first 
round has a positive expected utility, so will it after a few rounds' waiting since 
discounting as implemented here does not change the sign of the payoff. If (5.2) is 
fulfilled, in other words, it means player T extracts so much pleasure from inflicting 
destruction that attempting a nuclear attack is worth the risk and cost both using 
HEU (p = 0) and Pu (p = 1)17. 
5.4.2 Uranium 'waiting strategy' 
Upon considering strategy (U) the relevant question regards the expected 
discount factor. The probability that an opportunity for HEU first comes up in 
round n is 
the discount factor in this case is 011 - 1 so the expected discount factor in the 
uranium case is found from standard statistics to be 
The expected payoff of the uranium strategy is then found to be 
l-p [ ()] 
U(U) 1-8p V Tuqu-CT-CP l-qu . (5.4) 
Notice that from (5.3), (1 - p) ::;; Q(U) ::;; 1. This implies that waiting is always 
preferable to giving up and opting for (N), that is, the terrorist cannot be deterred 
absolutely through changing the parameters 0 and p. To understand this, consider if 
instead of the fraction in (5.4) one had the factor (1 - p). The reader may verify that 
this would be the expected payoff of the strategy 'accept in the first round if material 
17 Note, importantly, that player T has no other alternatives than commence a nuclear project or do 
nothing. The situation changes completely once one allows her to opt for a conventional strategy; 
see next chapter. 
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is HEU, otherwise give up (decline forever)', and with (1 - p) $; !l,e, this is never 
better than strategy (U). But then the same must be true for a strategy of the type 
'wait for HEU, but if none arrives in the first n rounds then give up'. Assume T 
follows such a strategy and after round n-1 she has still had no HEU coming up. 
She is then in the situation described above (accept next round if HEU or decline 
forever) which is inferior to the strategy 'wait forever if necessary', so sticking to the 
former strategy cannot be preferable18• 
This is interesting, since such a strategy (wait but give up after some time if no 
luck) is one that we would recognise from everyday life and intuitively makes sense 
in many cases. So why not in this case? Reasons for this may be traced back to the 
simplicity of the model, the 'blood thirst' criterion (5.2) and the discounting system 
used. 
There are at least two principal reasons to decide to stop waiting for the ideal and 
settle for the less preferable but certain. Either (1) conditions have changed since the 
waiting period started; for example one could have an ultimate deadline by which 
something must happen, in which case the cost of waiting becomes unbearable at 
some point (0 becomes small), or (2) preferences can change with time. One can 
imagine a situation where either of these happens for the nuclear terrorist: 
something can convince T that if no material is obtained by a certain date the project 
is sure to fail. Or a new leadership of the terrorist organisation (that is, a change of 
T's preferences or 'type') might be of the opinion that spending the resources on 
conventional means or even political activities is preferable to nuclear activities. 
By assuming all parameters except 0 and p to be constant with respect to time, 
these scenarios are ruled so long as the bloodlust criterion is satisfied, which 
certifies that player T is bent on the nuclear option and will under no circumstances 
give up her plans. But if I allowed quantities such as qu, qp or cp to vary in time I 
could simulate both of the scenarios mentioned as reasons for preferences to change 
in time. The first reason to give up could be simulated by letting both q's drop 
suddenly to zero in round n (guaranteed negative payoff if any option is chosen). 
The second, change of leadership, could be modelled by moderately altering the q's 
18 The term in Game Theory is that the strategy is not subgame perfect. 
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(new leadership believes it more unlikely that build will succeed), cp (new leaders 
are more afraid of failure) or v (new leadership is less bloodthirsty; extracts less 
utility from major carnage) in round n so as to shift preferences amongst the 
strategies (notably, (5.2) would then not hold after round n). 
Ruling out such Iwait, but not forever ' strategies, thus, is possible only because of 
the multiplicative discount system which never changes the sign of future payoffs. 
They do become possible once a more realistic system of discounting is introduced, 
as we shall see. 
5.4.3 Discarding the plutonium strategy 
With a principally identical argument to that for (U) I deduce the expected utility 
for the (P)-strategy as well: 
U = P [v T q - C -cp (1- q )]. 
(PI 1-8(1-p) p p T P (5.5) 
With the arguments from the previous chapter in mind, there seems to be little or 
no reason to expect that strategy (P) should be preferable to (U), yet before I go on 
let me make a quick comparison. Strategy (U) is preferable to (P) if and only if 
or 
(1-p)-8(1-p)2 ~ vTpqp-CT-cp(l-qp) =Ap 
p-8/ vTuqu-CT-cp(l-qJ Au (5.6) 
where I have defined the quantities Ap and Au: 
A vT q -C -cp(l-q)' Au-vTuqu-CT-cp(l-qJ (5.7) p p p T P , 
If the 'bloodlust
' 
criterion (5.2) is satisfied, both Au and Ap are positive. Ai, as we see, 
is the expected utility if T could obtain material i with certainty in the first round 
and accepts it. 
Figure 5.2 shows a plot of the fraction on the left side of (5.6). For given values of 
p and 0, the ratio Api Au must lie below the graph for (U) to be preferred to (P). If one 
accepts, based on the arguments laid out in chapters 3 and 4, that Api A" < 1 then 
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this is always the case if p < 1/2, which should be obvious from common sen e. 
Even for higher p this is most likely true if the discounting is modest like 0 = 0.9. 
This is also most intuitive: if the expected payoff using HEU is higher than that for 
Pu and discounting is modest it is better to wait for HEU than to wait for Pu even if 
the probability of HEU in each round is smaller than that for Pu. Indeed, if Api Au « 
1 (for example if Ap is only just positive whereas Au is positive by a fair share - not 
an unlikely situation) then waiting for HEU is better even when discounting is harsh 
(e.g. 0 = 0.1) and the chances of HEU each round is small. 
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In summary, if as one expects Api Au is smaller than and not close to unity19, the 
only time when (P) might still be preferable is when the discount factor 0 is small 
and the probability of obtaining Pu is much larger than that for obtaining HEU. 
With the discussion of Pu versus HEU in the previous chapter and the assumption 
that player T will very roughly share this opinion, it appears I can safely disregard 
19 A note is required here: I assume Ap < All based on our arguments from this chapter and the 
previous that a plutonium bomb is more likely to fizzle, hence cause less damage. To assume that 
the terrorist holds this belief, however, is another matter, for our understanding of 'rationality ' 
does not require rational expectations, as detailed in section 2.9. An argument for as uming 
rational expectations in this case, however, is our motivation to deal with the 'wor tea e' kind f 
terrorist, arguably the terrorist who wants to cause maximum damage alld ha good knowl dg of 
how to do so. 
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the strategy (P). 
5.4.4 A comparison of (U) and (0) 
A more interesting comparison is that between waiting for HIU and accepting 
the first available option. Intuitively I would expect these two strategies to be the 
two real options: wait until weapons-grade uranium becomes available or start right 
away using plutonium if that is what is at hand. 
In reality, building the weapon and performing the attack will take time, and if 
the expected time interval between offers is shorter than the building time, a third 
strategy might emerge as a compromise in the case where player T is exceptionally 
well funded: start building Pu if that is what is available, but still be on the lookout 
for HEU and get it as well if the Pu bomb project is not yet far advanced. This would 
call for free resources possibly as large as 2Cr in our terminology. In the interest of 
keeping the degree of detail at a manageable level, I will not discuss this strategy 
beyond this paragraph. As a note on cost, however, much as two parallel bomb 
projects will be able to share some resources, the fissile material itself might well be 
the costliest part of the project (in the tentative calculation of Zimmerman and 
Lewis, fissile material alone makes up more than 70% of the total cost Cr ; $4 million 
of the total $5.4 million20). Hence if T does not really believe in the feasibility of 
using Pu, buying it anyway might mean wasting her one chance to get it right. 
The strategy of opportunism is opportune if it brings at least as high an expected 
utility as waiting for HEU, that is, when 
U(O)~U(U)· 
This is solved with respect to the discount factor and use of the relations
21 
(5.8) 
(Au and AI' are defined in (5.7)) to find, quite simply, that (0) is at least as good as 
20 Peter D. Zimemrman and Jeffrey G. Lewis 'The Bomb in the Backyard' Foreign Policy 
(November/December 2006) p.36. Note that this is for a HEU gun-type device: I assume i~ this 
chapter that similar numbers would apply to a project to build a crude plutoruum ImplOSIOn 
device. 




This result is readily interpreted. If HEU comes up ill the first round, the 
strategies prescribe identical action, so all T needs to decide is what to do in the 
opposite case. Consider therefore the situation where Pu has come up in the first 
round and T is deciding whether to accept or not. If she accepts, the expected utility 
is Ap but if instead she waits one more round and then takes whatever comes up 
('just to see if HEU comes up next time ... '), the expected payoff is 6· U(O). Just when 6 
= 60 as defined in (5.9), we see that the two expected payoffs become equal. If 6 < 60, 
accepting the plutonium (opportunist strategy) is better than to keep waiting and 
vice versa if 6 > 60. If she decides to decline the plutonium, however, and in the next 
round Pu comes up again, she will face the exact same choice. Hence 60 must be the 
critical value that distinguishes whether to grab the first available option or wait for 
HEU for as long as it takes. 
Note at this point that equation (5.9) is a very general result and does not depend 
on the exact forms of Ap and U(o) which result from the specific modelling, in our 
case (5.7). A different payoff system would give different expected payoffs for 
different strategies yet so long as the structure of the game is as drawn in figure 5.1, 
equation (5.9) is the same. In later sections where I generalise the discount factor 6 
into a discount function, equation (5.9) must be revised. 
The choice between an opportunist strategy and one of waiting for the better 
option to occur is then entirely decided by the cost of waiting balanced against the 
expected payoffs. This should not be unexpected since, if HEU has higher expected 
payoff (equal to Au when undiscounted) than Pu (Ap undiscounted) - hence also 
than (0) which randomises between the two - wasted time is the only cost of 
choosing (U) over (0) in our model, just as lower expected payoff in the first round 
is the only cost of choosing (0) over (U). 
Given our previous argument that a plutonium bomb is likely to do less damage 
on average than a HEU gun, it might be preferable for a government player if the 
terrorist could be pressured into adopting an opportunist strategy. From (5.9) and 
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U(O) from (5.8), notice that there are two main parameters for player A to seek to 
influence: 
0: If the terrorist player can be stressed into sufficient impatience so that 0 
drops below 00, (0) becomes preferable to (U). 
p: If the probability that HEU will come up is small (that is, p close to unity), 
00 approaches unity, and 0 might slip beneath it. 
This result is intuitive: if player T is impatient, and thinks the waiting time for 
HEU might be long (p is large), she may find the wait too long, and opt for a 
strategy where she takes whatever she can get. However, the result is more precise 
than could have been found by qualitative means alone. Given only two qualitative 
assumptions, that T discounts future utility by a multiplicative model and that the 
plutonium project can be discarded, I find in (5.9) the mathematical way in which 0, 
p and other parameters determine which strategy is preferable, thus (5.9) (together 
with the definitions of Ap and U(O)) holds much more information than the mere 
conclusion about patience and waiting time above, which one could arrive at 
intuitively. For example, I may read out directly how the situation would change if 
other parameters, e.g. cp, v, qu or qp, change, variables which are largely out of A's 
power to influence but whose values he may estimate and re-estimate given new 
information. 
The direct use of the formula (5.9) and others will demand some numerical 
estimate of the quantities involved. In section 4.4 I did a similar exercise as seen 
from the government's point of view, while estimation as performed by the terrorist 
adversary is more difficult and will involve an added layer of speculation. Therefore 
I will not include a numerical study in this chapter. Nonetheless, simple 
mathematical relations such as (5.9) are valuable in that they provide a method to 
reduce the large and multifaceted problem of terrorist preferences to one of 
estimating three quantities. Analytical studies of how these quantities interrelate, 
furthermore, provide models describing what effect may be achieved by altering 
different parameters of the model and, while difficult to quantify, gives at least a 
better qualitative understanding of how policies may affect terrorist preferences. 
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5.5 Analysis: the price of time and the fear of failure 
It is of interest to take a closer look at the discounting system employed and see if 
a more 'physical ' understanding can be assigned to it. The notion of discounting is 
an inherently elusive term, difficult to pin down and give a clear interpretation22, 
and it will be shown how several options are possible. Let me explore one plausible 
way of interpreting discounting: as the impatience due to fear of failure, because 
waiting increases the probability of unforeseen incidents23 . With this I am able to 
establish a relation between the discount factor 0, and the expected time r between 
two opportunities for fissile materials. What emerges is an inconsistency of 
formalism (i.e. the interpretation is inconsistent with the standard mathematical 
form of discounting employed above) and with it an understanding of absolute 
deterrence of terrorism 24. 
The probability that some unforeseen incident happens and derails the project 
will most often increase with time25, and examples that come to mind are: 
Searching for fissile material involves sticking your head out to some extent, 
and many of the seizures of nuclear material in transport have been the 
consequence of police sting operations. 
Co-conspirators possessing less zeal than their leaders may get cold feet and, 
given time to contemplate, decide to send an anonymous tip to player A or 
otherwise defect. 
A's intelligence officers, moreover, will be working constantly to try and 
22 See e.g. discussion in Osborne An Introduction to Game Theory pp.421-422. 
23 Another and less concrete interpretation is used in the next chapter where I do not link impatience 
directly to a fear of failure. 
24 Absolute deterrence is used in the meaning 'deterring actors from terrorist action altogether' as 
opposed to relative deterrence of some forms of terrorism (e.g. nuclear) meaning deterrence from 
the use of certain means of terrorism (e.g. from nuclear weapons to conventional means). See 
chapter 6 for further details. 
25 There is a subtlety here: probability increases with the time left to wait, whilst the time already 
waited is (I assume) irrelevant. Here's an analogy: A couple is planning to have five children. 
Before any of them are born, there is a large probability that at least one of them will be a boy 
(about 97%). But after they have had four consecutive girls, the chances have shrunk to abou~ 
50%, since the probability of the sex of each child does not depend on the sex of any other chIld. 
The probability of the incident 'boy' happening at least once over the next five chi!dre.n is much 
larger than that it happens over the next one child, just as the chances that the project IS hamstrung 
by some unforeseen event is larger over the next year than over the ~ext month. The underlymg 
assumption is that the incident that derails the project takes a short tIme compared to the ()\l'r,lll 
time frame, which does not restrict us too much. 
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detect the activities of player T, and the longer they search, the more 
probable it is that they will catch a drift. 
Pre-emptive strikes could randomly knock out the project even if no 
intelligence pointed to it, as could police raids and other unforeseen events. 
Possibly some of the key participants of the terror project will already be 
wanted for previous acts of violence, and must be ever watchful not to get 
caught 
5.5.1 Time failure 
The various ways by which the project may randomly derail with time listed 
above are not modelled individually or explicitly. As a simplification I will treat 
them all compiled, dubbing them collectively as sources of 'time failure' since they all 
increase in likelihood the longer the time horizon of the project. 
Assume that there is a very small probability L1Pt that time failure will occur 
during the short time interval L1t. Let N be a real number greater than 1 (it is natural 
to think of N as an integer). The probability that a longer time t = N . LH passes 
without time failure is then26 
P (0 failures duringt)= ! (0 )=(1-.1 Ptt. 
Using that ab = exp(b 'In a), and N = t/ L1t, I write this as 
! (0 )=e1n(l-LlP,)lltlt. 
A simple expression is thus obtained for the probability of non-failure by the time t: 
!(0;tI8)=e- tl8 (5.10) 
where I have defined the quantity 8: 
-.1t 
8= . 
In(l-.1 PI) (5.11) 
In statistics this is a special case of the so-called Poisson distribution
27 
where the 
26 P denotes 'probability'. I assume all time intervals are independent of ~ll others, that is,. whether a 
time failure happens in one interval is independent of whether or not It has happened In another 
already. 
27 See any university level textbook in statistics. The Poisson distribution is ~'pically used to . 
describe events that happen stochastically in time so that the number of tImes I t happen~ dUrIng a 
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parameter tl8 is the expected number of ltime failures I during the time period t and 8 is 
the average time between each time failure.f(O; t18) is then the probability that exactly 
zero ltime failures I have happened during a time interval t. 
The time 8 I will refer to as the penetration time, borrowing the analogy of 
penetration depth from physics: just as the penetration depth is about as far as (say) 
light is able to penetrate into a certain material, the penetration time here is about as 
far as player T can expect to Ipenetratel in time before it is becomes overwhelmino-h' D. 
probable that the project has failed. The chances that the project will survi\'e a 
waiting time equal to 8 are II e ~ 37%. 
The logarithm in (5.11) has a simple interpretation which becomes obvious if one 
lets L1Pt and L1t be infinitesimally small: L1t ~ dt, L1Pt ~ dpt. Then one may Taylor 
expand the logarithm to leading order only without loss of precision: 
tJ.->d dp In(l-.1p)/.1t~ --
t d t 
and hence the penetration time can be written 
~=( dtt; (5.12) 
quite simply the reciprocal of the rate of probability of time failure per unit time
28
• In 
practice, however, it is probably easier to determine the penetration time directly 
(from experience) than estimate this slope. 
The observant reader might question whence came the restriction that the 
derivative be taken at t = 0 in (5.12). The reason is that I demanded e to be a constant 
with respect to time whereas the derivative in general is not - it has a non-linearity 
that disappeared in the linearisation of the logarithm above. For absolute rigour 
therefore the slope (5.12) must be calculated at t = 0, but a t significantly smaller 
than 8 is a good approximation. The reader can easily verify these statements by 
setting PI = 1 - f(O; t18) and differentiating with respect to time. 
For complete consistency, a time-based model for the probabilities qu and q" 
time interval is proportional to the length of the time interval. The probability t.hat ~n event 
happens x times in a time interval during which the expected number of events IS II IS f(:ql) = 
(/1'lx!) -exp(-jl), 
28 Stricth', the fraction containing the logarithm in (5.11) is the exact one. 
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should be implemented as well, yet I will assume for simplicity that 'time failure' 
during the construction period have already been calculated into these quantities. 
Since I have assumed that all probabilities are statistically independent, the 
exponential form of f(O; tl e) makes the two formalisms equivalene9. In summary: it 
is unproblematic to apply time failure only to the 'waiting and searching' stage and 
treat the building process as instantaneous with a finite and sub-unity probability of 
success. 
5.5.2 Relating discounting explicitly to time and the cost of failure 
In order to relate f(O; tl e) to b it is necessary to designate a payoff for the event of 
time failure. One natural choice is the defeat cost, -cp, assuming if so that none of the 
resources CT have yet been spent; from Lewis and Zimmerman's estimates'l) it is 
reasonable that the majority of CT is fissile material and construction costs, so this 
choice of failure payoff is roughly equivalent with assuming time failure occurs 
prior to materials acquisition and construction. Since the following discussion is 
mainly of theoretical interest it does not really matter whether -cp or -CT-cp or 
something in between is used; the reader can simply choose a higher or lower value 
of -cp if preferable. Moreover, the relation betweenf(O; tie) and b depends on what 
T is waiting for. I argued that (P) is a strategy we can ignore, hence assume that the 
only relevant 'waiting strategy' is (D). 
Assume thus that T is waiting for HED. The payoff for choosing this strategy 
from the start is U(U), and the payoff for waiting one round and then choosing (U) is 
b ·U(U). We will now think of U(U) independently of the specific discounting system 
that leads to the equation (5.4), merely as 'the payoff of strategy (D) if the strategy is 
commenced now', independently of exactly how this payoff is calculated. I will 
assume that the expected time between two opportunities is T. For simplicity, let us 
assume that every round takes exactly the expected time r. 31 There is then from (5.10) 
29 Say waiting takes a time tw and building and attacking a time te. If then the pr~bability of success 
during build was given a time-failure form, we would have q, = exp( -t~,./ 8), ~ E u , ~ and the 
total probability of success would be q,' exp(-t,,';8) = exp[-(t" + 11,,)/8], l.e. the hme-fallure 
formalism applied to the total time (,. + II",. 
30 Peter D. Zimmerman and Jeffrey G. Lewis 'The Bomb in the Backyard' Foreign Policy 
(November/December 2006) p.36 
31 In reality, T ""ill be statistically distributed. Introducing this adds little or nothing to our 
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a probability exp(-r/8) that time failure will not yet have occurred after one time 
period. Assume that in the first round, Pu came up, so that the expected payoff for 
sticking to the strategy (U) (rather than opt for the plutOnium) is, with our standard 
multiplicative system, 0 ·U(U). An alternative way to discount, without the factor 0, is 
by introducing the possibility of time-failure. Now there is a probability exp(-r/8) 
that the payoff will be U(U), and 1 - exp(-r/8) that the payoff will instead be -qJ due 
to some event that derails the project during the time interval T. We now insist that 
the payoff be equal in the two pictures, and get the equation 
or 
8U =e- Tle U -(1- -Tie) 
IU) IU) e cp (5.13) 
(5.14) 
Inserting (5.4) with Au from (5.7) into (5.14) and solving with respect to 0 gives us 
8 = (1 - p ) e - TIe - ( 1 - e - TIe) cp / Au 
(1- p) - p( 1- e-Tle ) cp / Au (5.15) 
Equation (5.14) uncovers a problem with our discount system: if T is large enough 
and qJ > 0, 0 becomes negative! A negative 0 as implemented above would cause 
payoffs to alternate between positive and negative values for each round, which is 
clearly absurd! Note moreover that (5.14) is plainly inconsistent with the way 
discounting is performed: if it were derived assuming instead that T waits two 
rounds, for example, the left side of (5.14) would become 02 whilst the exponents on 
the right hand side would be -2r/8; a whole different equation. Something is 
obviously more subtle than meets the eye!32 
The problem can be solved both mathematically and to our intuitive satisfaction 
by re-interpreting the discount system. Let there be instead a discount junction, o(t), 
by which payoffs harvested a time t from now are discounted regardless of whether 
t is long or short. If t is one round, the discount function is o(r), if it is two round~, 
the discount function is now 0(2r) and so on. The discount function used before (the 
understanding, however. 
32 The paradox disappears in the limit cp = 0, which has interesting implications, as we shall Sl'C. 
Notice also that, except when p=l, there are no problems in the limit r«8. 
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multiplicative model) is equivalent with a discount function 
(5.16) 
where Om is the factor by which payoffs used to be multiplied for every round that 
passes, which I used to call just 0 (redubbed to avoid confusion). The reader should 
be able to verify this. 
The simple equation (5.9) derived above is very general in that it does not require 
any detailed specification of how the payoffs Au and Ap are calculated. However, it 
was derived assuming a simple multiplicative discounting system, and does not 
hold when such is no longer the case. When now departing from such a simple 
system for a more general o(t), it is not possible to find a straightforward 
generalisation of (5.9) along the lines of the qualitative argument which follows that 
equation as I will now argue. Thinking now of discounting as an operation, the time 
failure understanding not only multiplies payoffs by a factor exp(-r/B), but also 
subtracts a term [l-exp(-r/ B)]<p. A naIve generalisation for one round would then be 
8( T )=e- T1e _ (l-e-Tle)~. 
U(U) 
but this cannot be generalised to other times than t = r because U(U) is defined at 
the time when an opportunity arrives, disallowing t <r, and for longer times such as 
t = 2r, 3r etc., such a form would presuppose that Pu came up at the first, second etc. 
opportunity, suppositions we may not, of course make. Moreover, such a discount 
function would depend on p, which is not as general as it should. 
One can, however, derive a simpler and p independent discount function by use 
of a simple argument. As before we will insist that 
where <o(t» is the expectation value of the discount function assuming the first 
opportunity to happen immediately (an average, which does not depend on t). If o(t) 
is a continuous function, it follows that there exists a time t* so that 
Now imagine T has to wait a time t before the next opportunity comes up. \VL' will 
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require that the discount function is then 6(t+t*) Au. But since discounting should 
account for the probability of time failure, it must also equal 
which gives the equation 
{) ( t + t') = {) ( t .) e - tI e - ( 1 - e -I / e) ~ 
A . 
u 
Making use of the obvious initial condition 0(0) = I, this implies that 





Note that (5.16) and (5.18) are equal in the special case where <p=0 and 6
m
=exp(-T /8), 
as the reader may verify - this is no coincidence and has interesting interpretations, 
as we will see. The reader may verify in any preferred way that (5.18) is a solution of 
(5.17). 
5.5.3 The' deterrence time' 
With the new discount function (5.18) it is no longer the case that waiting for 
however long is always better than giving up. At some time, which I shall call the 
'deterrence time' and denote Td, payoffs that were initially positive become negative. 
If player T believes she will have to wait longer than the deterrence time, thus, it is 
better for her to do nothing and get a payoff of zero. 
So how long can player T afford herself to wait and how long should she expect to 
have to wait until HEU arrives? The expected waiting time can be calculated by 
summation over all rounds, just like Q was calculated in equation (5.3) before. The 
probability that HEU comes up precisely in round n is pn-\l - p), and after waiting 
n-1 rounds, the time passed is (n-1)T, hence by summation over all n: 
The expected waiting time is plotted in figure 5.3 as a function of p; notice that it 
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Illustration 5.3.: Expected waiting time, equation (5.19). 
The expected time can now be compared with the deterrence time. I set the right 
hand side of (5.18) equal to zero and solve with respect to t to get the expression 
(5.20) 
Note again how general this equation is, involving only the fear of failure, the 
expected utility if HEU were obtained right away and the penetration time, 
independently of the exact form of Au. Equation (5.20) is visualised in figure 5.4. 
Using this I can compare the expected waiting time for uranium with the 
maximum time player T can wait until it becomes preferable to do nothing. 
Expected waiting time is too long if 1 ~ Td, that is when 
T 1-p ( Au) -~--ln 1+- . e p cp (5.21) 
The fraction on the left hand side one recognises as the expected number of time 
failures per round of waiting. Note that the waiting time is alwaY5 too long when p 
approaches unity (fraction on the right hand side goes to zero), and likewise Ilel ' ('/' 
too long if cp is zero (the logarithm diverges), although notably the divergence as 
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Illustration 5.4.: The deterrence time, equation (5.20). 
Thus is uncovered the true condition for absolute deterrence to be possible in 
principle: that player T has nothing to lose. Only if the terrorist has absolutely no fear 
of failure is there no chance of deterring her. As long as cp is greater than zero, 
however, it means that there is something that player T holds dear that is imperilled 
by an unsuccessful attempt. This is an important theoretical finding33: even a wildly 
fanatic terrorist like the one I have modelled, whose pleasure is proportional to the 
damage inflicted, may in principle be deterred, for while the individual terrorist 
footman prepared to blow himself up may be beyond persuasion, his organisation is 
not suicidal - if its support or very existence is at risk, attacking may in principle be 
worse than doing nothing. Given that the aspiring nuclear terrorist will always have 
the alternative of choosing other means, this conclusion is primarily of importance 
to conventional terrorism research. 
I strongly indicate, thus, that it may be impossible to devise a model based on 
plausible assumptions in which a rational actor cannot, even in principle, be 
deterred from terrorist action. This conclusion was reached as a by-product of a 
game designed to analyse a different question, and the question of absolute 
deterrence of terrorists should be analysed again with a more suitable model; this 
task is interesting but too peripheral to our overall research question to fit into the 
33 It has been concluded bv several other authors before bv qualitative arguments; notable among 
them are Robert F. Trag~r and Dessislava Zagorcheva 'Deterring Terrorists: It Can Be Done' 
Illternational Security 30:3 (2006) . 
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thesis. The generality of the results which lead to this conclusion in the current 
setting however, leads me to the hypothesis that this conclusion is quite general. 
If the deterrence time is shorter than I, of course, none of the nuclear strategies 
has a positive payoff. This would be the ideal situation that Allison speaks of, where 
fissile material is guarded las closely as the gold in Fort Knox l34. While the preferred 
strategy in this chapterls game would then be (N) the implication is of course not 
that the terrorist should simply surrender; in reality the terrorist's alternative to a 
nuclear strategy is not doing nothing, but to keep to her tried and trusted tools of 
car bombs and other conventional means. What it does show however is the 
(intuitively obvious) conclusion that if such Fort Knox security could be achieved 
worldwide it would achieve relative deterrence, deterrence from a particular mem15 
of attack rather than attack itself, from nuclear terrorism. The question of relative 
deterrence is treated in the next chapter, where it will be demonstrated by a 
numerical simulation that safeguards is one of several policy options to achieve a 
relative deterrence by creating conditions so that nuclear terrorism is not the 
preferred option even to the terrorist bent on maximum destruction. 
5.5.4 Waiting or not: the choice between (0) and (U) revisited 
Now that the concepts of expected waiting time, penetration time and deterrence 
time are introduced, it is time to make a brief revisit to the equation (5.9) which, in 
the old discounting system determined the deciding value of 0 above which waiting 
for HEU, strategy (U) became preferable to accepting the first opportunity. 
We derive the result in the same way (5.9) was derived before, by first working 
out an expression for the expectation value of the discount function before using 
this to compare U(U) to U(O). The expectation value of the discount function (5.18) is 
readily calculated just as in (5.3) by averaging over all rounds from 0 to infinity: 
Note how this reduces to the form (5.3) when cp=O and Dm=exp(-r/8) as it should. 
Since U(o)=pAp + (l-p)Au, we find that an opportunist strategy (0) is preferable to the 
~4 Graham Allison 'Hov\' to Stop Nuclear Terror' Foreign Affairs 83 (2l104) pp.64-6S. 
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uranium waiting strategy (U) if 
~~ln( u(O)+<p) 
e A + ' p <p 
which can be written in the more instructive form 
(5.22) 
Observe that in the following limits this relation guaranteed to hold true, that is, 





p ~ 1: The probability of Pu is overwhelmingly greater than for HEU; 
e ~ 0: Extreme impatience, i.e. very short penetration time; 
T ~ 00: Fissile materials are becoming extremely hard to obtain at all; 
Au ~ Ap: The terrorist becomes indifferent between the two materials. 
Note that in all of these limits the corresponding side of the inequality approaches 
zero or infinity in a linear fashion35. Likewise, waiting for HEU is guaranteed to be 
preferable to opportunism when 
• Au ~ 00: The payoff from an HEU attack is so large that it overwhelms all 
other concerns (provided the same is not true of plutonium) 
• Ap ~ -cp: A project using plutonium is expected to imply almost certain 
failure. 
In both of these 'waiting limits I the right hand side of inequality (5.22) diverges to 
infinity logarithmically, much slower than the linear tendency in the 'opportunism 
limits'. The difference, which is inherent in the fact that time failure incidents are 
distributed according to the Poisson distribution, means that it is much easier to 
change the terrorist's preferences towards opportunism than towards patience. 
Roughly put: the terrorist with a fear of failure comes with an inherent affinity for 
opportunism. 
To be sure, all of these limits could have been arrived at by intuitive arguments 
alone. However, equation (5.22) contains much more information than these limih, 
35 One may see this by performing a first-order Taylor expansion in the relevant small parameter. 
-161 -
about how these parameters interact, when deciding ,,,-'hich strategy is the more 
opportune, also when they are not close to these limiting cases. 
Of special cases one could note the asymptote where Au»Ap, in which case (5.22) 
reads 
e
T ~ In (1 + 1 ---r ); A »A 1 +cp A up. 
u 
This is not so unlikely a case in light of our discussions in chapter 3. If in addition 
the terrorist has a relatively small fear of failure, Au»rp, the condition for 
opportunism to be preferable becomes payoff independent: 
In the opposite case is the risk averse terrorist for whom qJ-HIJ. In this case one finds, 
using the definitions of Au and A p, that (0) is preferable to (U) if 
Now the right hand side is dictated by the probability of operational success in the 
two cases. 
5.5.5 Limits to terrorist intelligence? 
We defined above that the terrorist's rationality lies in her consistency in choosing 
her best option, and her intelligence equivalent to her ability to work out what the 
best option is. While many will agree that terrorist masterminds may adhere to 
some notion of rationality, the above analysis is somewhat mathematically 
complicated and it may seem unrealistic to assume the terrorist will actualh' 
perform such an analysis prior to making her decisions. 
There are, this author believes, three reasons why the analysis as performed is 
valuable, and should be calculated assuming no restrictions on the terrorist's 
intelligence (the way such is defined). 
The first is of a philosophical nature. The problem pertains to much of game 
theory, a theory which often becomes much more mathematically complc\. than 
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what reasonably reflects the way decisions are actually made, and several attempts 
have been made to mitigate it. Examples of models with restrictions on either 
rationality or intelligence are the field of bounded rationality36. The problem with 
such models is that they do not necessarily help our understanding, but rather the 
introduction of some limitation of intelligence into the model is another ad hoc 
assumption whose consequences must be kept track of. 
A second is that the problem that the consequences of ideal rationality and 
intelligence may be unrealistic is one which becomes important primarily in the 
transition from the normative to the deSCriptive domain37• As long as results are 
interpreted as normative (how should terrorists think), there is no problem, and the 
corrections which may be necessary in the transition to the descriptive question 
(how do they think) is a separate question which may be approached in several 
ways. This transition lies beyond the scope of this thesis, but could be a ver\, fruitful 
continuation of the present chapter. 
The last and perhaps most compelling reason is that while the final equations 
drawn from modelling may be of a mathematical nature, they should aim to give 
rise to intuitively graspable conclusions which make sense independently of the 
precise form of the model and parameters chosen. If this cannot be achieved, the 
modelling has not been very successful whereas if it is achieved, one is lead to 
believe that the same conclusions could, at least in principle, be arrived at by a 
qualitative argument. Having reached these conclusions by a mathematical method, 
however, has important bonuses because it explicitly allows the analyst to keep 
track of all relevant parameters throughout the argument, and the equations arrived 
at in the end can be varied with respect to different parameters (as exemplified by 
the graphs in figures 5.2 through 5.4), potentially allowing the extraction of much 
more information than a single intuitive main conclusion. 
5.6 Fissile material in small batches: the hodgepodge b0111b 
In the modelling above I have assumed that all the necessary fissile material can 
36 See e.g. Hugh Ward 'Rational Choice' in D. :v1arsh and G. Stoker (eds) Theory and Mclhods ill 
Political Scicncc 2nd edition (Hampshire:Palgrave McMillan, 2002) pp.65-89. 
37 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 'Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions' in Sch\\"L't',rs 
Cook and Levi The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: The University of Chicago PrL'ss, 1990) pp. 60-~9 
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be obtained in one batch. This is of course not the only possible scenario: it may be 
just as likely that the terrorists will need to obtain fissile material from several places 
in order to acquire enough for a bomb. 
While not ideal, it is not a problem if the HEU used in a gun consists of material 
with different degrees of emichment, so long as the bomb-maker is able to measure 
the emichment of each batch so as to calculate the critical mass correctlv. If the 
material comes from a black market broker, it is almost certainly desirable for the 
terrorist to ensure the material is genuine in any case, and whenever the origin of 
the material is in any doubes, measurement of radiation, in particular neutron and 
alpha radiation39, from the acquired lumps of HEU or Pu should be performed 
anyway to avoid criticality accidents and failed explosions. Fresh HEU fuel from 
submarines or research reactors40, for example, could be used in a gun design.fl, but 
calculations of critical mass and safety precautions may have to be modified 
compared to the case of fresh fuel. 
Indeed, uranium and plutonium could be used together in the same weapon and 
while nuclear weapon details are classified, there is no reason to believe this would 
not be the case in military weapons in states such as the US making military use of 
both materials. This raises the natural question: why not accept every offer of small 
batches of both HEU and plutonium until there is enough combined and try to 
make it explode one way or another? As explained in chapter 3.4 HEU and 
plutonium pose very different challenges to the bomb maker, and designing a 
reasonably reliable 'hodgepodge bomb', at least one with a several kilotonne yield, 
will likely be significantly more difficult than the HEU gun. For one, estimating the 
critical mass of such a jumble theoretically will be challenging, probably 





Most probably, such measurement will be deemed necessary even if the material is of certain 
origin. 
Alpha radiation can produce neutron radiation indirectly in the vicinity of light elements. 
Research reactors may also contain lightly irradiated fuel whose radioactivity could be small 
enough to be useful to terrorists as well. 
See, for naval fuel: Morten Bremer Maerli 'Timely Options for Increased Transparency and 
Nonintrusive Verification on Fresh Highly Enriched Uranium Naval Fuel' Joumal of Nuclear 
Material Management 31:4 (2003) pp. 18-30. For research reactors: ~le~ander C:laser 'On the , 
Proliferation Potential of Uranium Fuel for Research Reactors at \ anous EnrIchment Levels 
Scicl1ce and Global Security 14 (2006) pp. 1-24 
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Furthermore, as Levi points out the higher the number of purchases the more 
vulnerable the terrorist becomes to stings 'in which government agents pose as 
sellers. Repeated transactions would also extend the group's plot over longer 
timelines, increasing its chances of being detected by law enforcement or 
intelligence.,42 This is just the concept of time failure described above. Sting 
operations as a disruptive means is further discussed in chapter 6. 
It is therefore far preferable, but not necessary, for the terrorist bomb maker to 
acquire all the fissile material from the same source. A closer examination of this 
would be an interesting continuation of the work presented herein. 
5.7 The gains and weaknesses of gaming 
There is an obvious weakness to the whole of the analysis presented, namely that 
all parameters are as estimated by the terrorist, hence not available to the analyst. 
This weakness is not primarily one of methodology, however, but a fundamental 
problem in answering the research question at all as discussed early in this chapter: 
one simply does not know how terrorists really think. 
It is an obvious gain from using a gaming methodology based on an assumption 
of rationality and intelligence is then that I am able to derive a number of intuitive 
insights based on only a few assumptions. It mayor may not be a good 
representation of the decision making of a given, real terrorist group, but it is a 
benchmark. The rational and intelligent assumption was discussed in section 5.5.5 
above. 
Another obvious gain from formalising the question in terms of a game is that it 
was a help in conceptualising the question and structuring it in an intuitive way. 
This point is somewhat subjective; it is always possible that another analyst could 
have done equally well in finding useful concepts and framework for thinking 
about the decision in question. Regardless of whether or not this is so, it is certainly 
the case that the devising and analysis of a game proved a functional wav of 
producing a framework and concepts. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, after laying out all the pros and cons in tl 
matter, reaching a conclusion means finding a way to weigh one against the other. 
42 Michael Levi 011 Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, I\lA: Harvard University Press, 2007) p.29 
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This chapter is another example of this. 
Similarly, in the limits listed in section 5.5.4, for example, it is intuitively ob\'iou5 
what the conclusion would be for the terrorist's choice. These could all ha\'e been 
laid out qualitatively, almost trivially. The achievement of the game above and 
beyond this list, however, is twofold. Firstly, the inequality (5.22) is valid also far 
from these limits when no single concern of the terrorist's dominates all the other. 
Indeed, the intuitive limits could be seen merely as reality checks of the full result. It 
is when the system is not close to these limits that the weighing of one strateg:' 
against another is difficult and may require a quantitive methodology. Secondly, 
inspection of inequality (5.22) immediately produces such a list, and the analyst can 
have some confidence (equalling his confidence in the reality of the model itself) 
that these limits are all the limits there are, in which one strategy is sure to be 
trivially preferred to another. Similar things could be said about other formulae in 
the chapter. 
Moreover, the mathematical form of (5.22) shows that tilting a parameter in the 
direction of opportunism can be expected to have a greater effect than tilting it 
towards waiting, because of the order of divergence in the limits presented. 
Whether it would be possible to foretell this with qualitative arguments is difficult 
to say, but with the present methodology it is a conclusion which is immediately 
visible to the trained eye in inequality (5.22). 
When making assumptions about how a terrorist may think, as we do in this 
chapter as well as chapters 6 and 7, one is again susceptible to the information 
problem as discussed in the previous chapter. Herein I have assumed that virtually 
nothing is known about the terrorist's preferences, and that they conform with those 
most experts have arrived at, that HEU has a higher probability of success cetera 
paribus than plutonium. For a government facing a particular terrorist group, 
however, information might emerge which sheds more light on the real preferences 
of the terrorist, for example if it is known that the organisation has been on the 
lookout for plutonium in particular, say. Some such information could be easil:' 
incorporated into the current model by simply changing the \' alues of the variables, 
but some kinds of information might necessitate that a different game be de\·ised. 
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Likewise, the assumption that the terrorist organisation is a single deciding body 
may become questionable given more information from inside a particular 
organisation's decision making circles. The particular simplification of assuming an 
organisation or government to be representable by a single rational mind was 
discussed in chapter 2. As discussed there, the arrival of such information could let 
a government or intelligence agency shift its perspective somewhat, from one which 
is completely external to the terrorist group's 'mind' to one where some details of 
the real decision making becomes visible. Should such be the case, the intelligence 
agency might do better to try and incorporate the new knowledge into their 
understanding of the thinking of this particular terrorist group, and perhaps 
abandon the general model presented herein. 
5.8 Conclusion: policy implications 
I have found that a terrorist's choice between HEU and Pu as fuel for his or her 
nuclear weapons project depends primarily on two key parameters, both of which 
are in a government adversary's power to influence. Given that the terrorist shares 
our perception that a project to make a true nuclear weapon using plutonium is 
expected to wreak less havoc than is a project whose end product is a HEU gun-type 
weapon, at least one of the following criteria must be fulfilled for the terrorist to 
decide to accept the first offer of fissile material even if it is plutonium: 
1. The terrorist is highly impatient (low value of 6 in a multiplicative 
discounting system or a short perceived penetration time e with the discount 
function formalism of equation (5.22)) 
2. The terrorist perceives that there is a much greater chance that the next 
available material will be plutonium than uranium (that is p close to 1) 
3. The terrorist believes it will be very difficult to obtain any fissile materials at 
all, and that the waiting time between each opportunity will accordingly be 
very long. 
4. The terrorist is for some reason indifferent between HEU and Pu. 
The exact criterion for a preference of one strategy over another is given in (5.22). 
These results are in no way counterintuitive, which is reassuring. HO\\'('\'cr, an 
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equation like (5.9) or (5.22) contains both more and more precise information than 
the enumerated points above, which could both have been derived by qualitative 
arguments alone. 
Point number 1 above, terrorist impatience, forms an important part of the policy 
implications of the next chapter, where relative deterrence of terrorists from a 
nuclear onto a conventional path is discussed. While there is some reason to assume 
from our previous comparison of the two fissile elements that it would be preferable 
for a government to seek to create an environment in which the terrorist could 
rationally opt for a plutonium solution, making the terrorist wait forever for HEU 
might be even better. The reader should refer to the following chapter for a more 
complete discussion of the potential of disruptive means to increase terrorist 
impatience. 
Points 2 and 3 may be addressed through safeguards measures as discussed in 
previous chapters, especially by 'putting HEU first,43. The policy of giving HEU 
priority in safeguards and stockpile reduction activities is supported by the analysis 
of this chapter as well as the previous and following chapters. As in chapter 4 the 
conclusion can be traced back to a qualitative assumption that HEU is preferred 
over Pu. 
All in all the assumptions employed to reach the above conclusions are few and 
plausible: apart from the way time and moves are modelled, shown in figure 5.1, 
there are three main assumptions upon which the model and subsequent analysis 
rest: 
• The terrorist has a preference for HEU over plutonium. If one accepts the 
arguments laid out in the previous two chapters expressing this view, this 
assumption is implied by the assumption that the terrorist be an intelligent 
player. Even if the preference is slight, this assumption implies that the 
strategy 'wait until plutonium is available' is always inferior to either the 
strategy 'wait until uranium is available' or 'take whatever is available first'. 
• 
Some assumption has been made about how the terrorist discounts future 
utility; two options were explored herein, a standard multiplicative model 
43 Ferguson and Potter The Four Faces ... p.325. 
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• 
and a model where discounting is linked directly to the fear of failure. 
The necessary quantity of fissile material for a weapon is acquired in its 
entirety from a single source. 
In fact, the analysis has come up with more findings than it set out to achieve. 
When I tried to take a closer look at the real-life interpretation of discounting, it was 
discovered that my system, a standard model from the economic literature which 
would ensure that an attack by either means was always preferable to doing 
nothing, was flawed. There appears to be no plausible way to model a rational and 
absolutely non-deterrable terrorist, excepting the unlikely case where the terrorist 
has absolutely no fear of failure. This finding is primarily of theoretical interest since 
the deterrence situation discussed (where the alternatives are nuclear attack or no 
attack) is unrealistic and a real scenario involves many other options. It is, however, 
a suitable prelude to the next chapter, and supports conclusions arrived at by other 
44 
authors. 
While no obvious conclusion has be drawn as to what is the preferable direction 
for a government to influence the terrorist's choice of fissile materials, the analysis 
shows that to the extent that it is in the government's power to change the terrorist's 
assessment of the probability p and the time T, T's calculus is expected to change as 
well, in ways expected to adhere qualitatively to the relations derived in this 
chapter. It is a main conclusion of chapters 4 and 645 that safeguards should be 
strengthened in general, and in chapter 4, moreover, I argue that measures to 
improve security for HEU should be given priority over those for plutonium. The 
findings in this chapter and the next analyse how implementing this can change the 
terrorist's calculus, to the extent that real efforts by the government result in an 
updating of the terrorist's estimates of relevant parameters. 
44 Such as Trager and Zagorcheva 'Deterring Terrorists' 
45 And also appendix D. 
-169 -
- 6 - Deterring terrorists from attempted use of nuclear 
weapons 
It is a common notion that deterrence is ineffective against terrorist adversaries!. 
Religious terrorists in particular, amongst whom al Qaida and its accomplices are 
notorious, are said to be beyond reasoning with. The US National Security Strategy 
states that 1 Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist 
enemy'2 and Brian Michael Jenkins, a world leading expert on terrorism, concludes 
that 'The Al Qaeda enterprise cannot easily be deterred ,3 . In a notable speech to the 
graduates of the West Point Military Academy, President George W. Bush asserted 
that in his view '[d]eterrence - the promise of massive retaliation against nations -
means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to 
defend. 14 
Typically, literature discussing terrorist deterrence explores the potential for 
persuading terrorists to refrain from attacks on the whole5. Our own notion of 
deterrence is of a different nature. In the model of the previous chapter the only 
alternative to a nuclear path for the terrorist was doing nothing at all. In a more 
realistic scenario, however, terrorists contemplating embarking on a nuclear project 
will not compare it to giving up but to continuing to do what they know best: 
executing conventional attacks which have already proven to be effective and for 
which infrastructure may already be in place. This makes for the possibility of a 
1 e.g. Brian O. Lesser et al. Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999)* p. 36, Bruno 
S. Frey and Simon Luechinger IDecentralization as a disincentive for terror l European Journal of 
Political Economy 20 (2004) pp. 509-515. 
2 President George W. Bush The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington 
DC, 2002)* p.15 
3 Brian Michael Jenkins Countering Al Qaeda: An Appreciation of the Situation and Suggestions for 
Strategy (RAND, 2002)* p.17. Note that Jenkins refers to deterrence in a narrower sense than that 
adopted in this chapter. 
4 George W. Bush, Speech at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York aune I, 
2002)* 
5 The most thorough analysis may be that in Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins Deterrence & 
Influellce ill Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda (RAND, 2002)* p.xi-xii. Another 
report with similar conclusions is Neil J. Smelser and Faith Mitchell (eds.) Discouraging Terrorism: 
Some Implications 0/9/11 report from the Panel on Understanding Terrorists in Order to Deter 
Terrorism, Center for Social and Economic Studies, National Research Council (Washington D.C.: 
National Academies Press, 2002) 
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relative deterrence from certain means of terrorism rather than absolute deterrence 
from terrorist acts on the whole. 
In the bipolar world of the Cold War, deterrence theory became a discipline in its 
own right and to many the word still bears connotations such as the logic of 
"Mutually Assured Destruction". An aspect of the classical sense of deterrence was 
that each side adhered to agreed limits of violence and that consequences for non-
compliance were well understood; and the 'carrot' for compliance was a continued 
and relatively peaceful co-existence6• Deterring terrorists is a whole different matter 
not only because of the strong asymmetry of the situation7• There is no acceptable 
limit to terrorist violence other than zero, and co-existence is no incentive to either 
side. Consequences of non-compliance, moreover, are unpredictable since terrorists 
have no single 'return address' at which retaliation may be directed. 
A primary concern is to be concise about what exactly is meant by 'deterrence'. I 
shall be fairly inclusive in my understanding of the term here and use Schelling's 
famous definition: 'persuading a potential enemy that he should in his own interest 
avoid certain courses of activity,8. Where e.g. Jenkins and Davis distinguish between 
deterrence, influence, co-optation, inducement, dissuasion and persuasion9 I will 
take a simpler approach. Note that this definition is much broader than the narrow 
definition employed in the quote by President Bush at the start of the chapter 
(restricted to threats of retaliation against nations). 
The property that distinguishes deterrence, thus, IS that deterrence measures 
affect the terrorist psychologically, actively or passively, at the time of deciding on a 
strategy, as opposed to measures that physically disrupt or block the actual 
execution of such a strategy, although some government actions can be both as will 
be argued later. A further defining feature is that the terrorist realises that refraining 
from a certain course of action is in her own interest, or to use the nomenclature of 
rational choice theory: that a conviction is conveyed that a nuclear strategy does not 
6 Jenkins Countering Al Qaeda p.25. 
7 e.g. Wyn Q. Bowen 'Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-State Actors and Mass Casualty Terrorism' 
Contemporary Security Policy 25:1 (2004) p.58; 'Deterring Mass-Casualty Terrorism' Joint Force 
Quarterly 31 (Summer 2002)* pp.25-29 
8 Thomas Schelling The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MAHarvard University Press, 1960) p.9. 
9 Davis and Jenkins Deterrence & Illfluence ill Counterterrorism p.xi-xii 
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represent a maximisation of the terrorist's utility function. 
Two mechanisms of deterrence are typically recognised: deterrence by threat and 
by denial lO, the former involving a credible promise of retaliation and the latter 
sending the message that a plan of action is too unlikely to succeed to be worth the 
money and effort. I will argue that for the purpose of relative deterrence of terrorists 
(as opposed to their potential sponsors), the latter is by far the more important. 
In keeping with Schelling's definition, one furthermore distinguishes between 
deterrence and coercion, the former seeking to preserve the status quo (persuading 
an actor to continue not doing something), the latter to change it (persuading an 
actor to stop doing something)l1. Status quo in this case being the situation where no 
terrorist nuclear weapon programme has yet left its starting block, deterrence is the 
relevant term; this could change should it emerge that a project of this sort is 
underway. A number of coercion strategies could be considered in such a case but I 
shall not focus on coercion in this chapter. 
6.1 Research question and scope 
This chapter's research question is 
Is it possible and if so under which circumstances and by which 
means, for a target government to deter a terrorist organisation from 
attempted acquisition of nuclear weapons? 
Our scope is limited by a set of assumptions about terrorist reasomng and 
available means as will be specified below. Thus the research presented is anything 
but exhaustive, but adds another perspective to the very scarce work already done 
by others. 
As in previous chapters, I shall consider a nuclear terrorism project in which a 
terrorist group builds its own device from stolen or illicitly bought fissile material. 
While the theft or purchase of an intact device from a country's arsenal falls within 
the definition of nuclear terrorism in section 1.2, I exclude it from the analysis in this 
chapter, primarily for reasons of manageability. The comparison of two possible 
10 e.g. Bowen 'Deterrence and Asymmetry' 
11 ibid. 
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strategies is useful even if not all possibilities are taken into account12. 
The research question speaks of a generic terrorist organisation, but I shall use al 
Qaida extensively as example, causing no significant loss of generality or topicality 
in doing so. 
6.2 Chapter outline 
I start by surveying briefly the literature on terrorist deterrence. First the scarce 
literature on deterrence of nuclear terrorism specifically is discussed where the 
emphasis on the possibility of state sponsorship is discussed. Thereafter the 
literature on deterrence of nuclear terrorism in general is discussed in connection 
with the research question at hand. The fundamental difference between relative 
and absolute deterrence of terrorists is discussed. 
We thereafter devise a model to analyse the terrorist's choice between 
conventional and nuclear means of attack. The model is then used for a numerical 
simulation in which particularly a plot of the utility functions of nuclear and 
conventional utility functions as a function of terrorist impatience yields important 
insights into the dynamics of the rational terrorist's calculus when faced with this 
choice. From this a discussion of possible political means of relative deterrence 
follows from these, along with the policy conclusions of this chapter. 
6.3 The literature on terrorism and deterrence 
Surprisingly little has been done in the field of terrorism and deterrence in 
general, and almost nothing on the special issue of deterrence of particular means of 
terror by addressing the cost-benefit calculation of the terrorists themselves13. 
Nearly all the literature on deterrence of terrorism has concentrated on deterring 
states from actively supporting terrorist nuclear missions. I will argue that the 
12 Of course, there are the possibility of chemical, biological and radiological means as well, not 
treated here. A comparison of the four using a similar methodology as this chapter might be a 
useful extension for future study. One could hardly ever justify the claim that all possible 
strategies are included, however; for example no-one had foreseen, to the author's knowledge, 
that passenger aircraft would be used as piloted missiles to attack buildings. A useful overview of 
the threats one has thought about: is Richard L. Garwin 'The Many Threats of Terror' TIle New 
York RCl'iczl' of Books (November 1st, 2001) and its epilogue (see bibliography)* 
13 Exceptions include Bowen 'Deterrence and Asymmetry' and Lewis A. Dunn 'Can al Qaeda Be 
Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons?' Occasional paper #3 (Center for the Study of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, National Defense University, 2005)* 
-173 -
discourse on deterrence of terrorism in general poses fundamentally different 
challenges than relative deterrence as discussed here. Indeed, I find that the two 
often contradict each other and attempts at a unification of the two (by formal 
methods or otherwise) could form a fertile field of study for the future. 
6.3.1 Deterrence of state sponsorship 
There exists a number of papers considering the indirect deterrence by deterring 
state actors from sponsoring a nuclear terrorism project14• This idea comes up quite 
naturally if one accepts the two notions that terrorists cannot be deterred directly 
and that a nuclear-armed state sponsor is the easiest way for a terrorist organisation 
to acquire a nuclear weapon. As discussed in chapter 1 and 3, state sponsorship is 
arguably not necessary for nuclear terrorism; it is far from unthinkable that a 
terrorist group can obtain all it needs for a small-scale proliferation project without 
governmental help. Moreover, terrorist leaders have demonstrated definite rational 
capacity, and as such could be deterable. While the discussion of state sponsorship 
is one that will not be treated in detail in this thesis, it is such an integrated part of 
the literature on deterrence of nuclear terrorism that it deserves a brief discussion at 
this point. 
A common notion is that state sponsored nuclear terrorism can be deterred by 
way of attribution15. By analysing the debris and fallout following a nuclear 
explosion, experts can in principle work out where the material came from since a 
particular history of enrichment, conversion and storage of nuclear material leaves 
specific traces of isotopic composition and chemical properties. If potential sponsors 
know that the finger of blame can be pointed with confidence soon after the attack, 
the argument goes, and retaliatory attacks (perhaps even nuclear16) were promised 
14 Recent propositions for deterrence of state sponsorship and other support mechanisms are Caitlin 
Talmadge 'Deterring a Nuclear 9/11' The Washington Quarterly 30:2 (2007) pp. 21-34 and Daniel 
Whiteneck 'Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework' The Washington Quarterly 28:3 (2005). 
Other optimists are Dunlop and Smith, who argue for the establishment of an international 
nuclear forensics team. William Dunlop and Harold Smith 'Who Did It? Using International 
Forensics to Detect and Deter Nuclear Terrorism' Arms Control Today (October 2006)* pp.6-10 
15 e.g. Michael A. Levi 'Deterring Nuclear Terrorism' Issues in Science and Technology Online (Spring 
2004)* 
16 As suggested by Robert L. Gallucci 'Averting Nuclear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme 
Responses to U.s. Vulnerability' The Annals of the AAPSS 607 (2006) pp.51-58 
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in such an instance, this could deter states from helping terrorists develop nuclear 
weapons in the first place. To establish the nuclear forensics capacity the preferable 
route, some argue, is to create an international database of fissile material from 
every possible source worldwide17. A suggested way to ensure that all countries 
supply samples of their fissile materials is through a 'Prove Innocence Treaty,18. 
Other commentators are more careful in their optimism, yet do not object to the 
feasibility of deterrence of state actors in principle19• 
There are at least two potential problems with the strategy of deterrence by 
attribution. The first is of a practical nature: the attribution needs to be perceived as 
reliably correct by the parties that are to be deterred. Today this seems to be far from 
the case, as demonstrated by the erroneous conclusion published in 2005 by US 
analysts at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory that the uranium hexafluoride 
surrendered by Libya was of North Korean origin Iwith a certainty of 90 percent or 
better,2o. An independent study by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 
Vienna was inconclusive and after a much publicised row in which it was suggested 
that the original statement was politically motivated, it was concluded that the 
material was originally Pakistani21 • 
More importantly perhaps, knowing that the material used in a nuclear weapon 
came from a specific source does not prove that the state in question actively 
presented the material to the terrorists. The accused state will likely claim to have 
donated the material unknowingly and unwillingly, and it is very difficult to prove 
that this is not so; the material could have been obtained by theft or by bribing low-
level employees. Even if documentation can be found that senior officials were 
explicitly involved, the state can always claim that the person or persons in question 
acted without permission. 
17 e.g. Michael May, Jay Davis and Raymond Jeanloz 'Preparing for the Worst' Nature 443 (26 
October 2006) pp.907-908. 
18 Hans Binnendijk and Peter D. Zimmerman 'New nuclear deterrents' The Washington Times op. ed. 
(August 19,2007)* 
19 Matthew Phillips 'Uncertain Justice for Nuclear Terror: Deterrence of Anonymous Attacks 
Through Attribution' Orbis 51:3 (2007) pp.429-446 and Michael Miller 'Nuclear Attribution as 
Deterrence' Nonproliferation Review 14:1 (2007) pp.33-60 
20 Phillips 'Uncertain Justice ... ' p.434 
21 ibid. 
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Should a country wish to donate fissile material or other help to a terrorist 
organisation, it is not difficult to ensure such layers of deniability, and it seems 
likely that a regime interested in its own survival will do so. This is clearl\' 
demonstrated by the case of A. Q. Khan, the head of a division developing the 
Pakistani nuclear weapons, who set up his own clandestine proliferation network 
exporting nuclear technology to such states as Libya, Iran and North Korea. 
Although there has been much speculation that the Pakistani government must 
have been aware of these activities, proving such claims turned out to be ver\, 
difficult22 . A tacit handover of some tens of kilograms of nuclear material can be 
done much less spectacularly than the A. Q. Khan deals, and could easily be made 
to look like the independent actions of an unfaithful servant, one would think. 
Whether a country can avoid a retaliatory attack in this manner might depend on 
the country in question. If the country has a history of suspect nuclear activities 
outside the Non-proliferation Treaty (or at least arguably so), the threat of 
retaliation on grounds of suspicion alone can be credible enough to deter terrorist 
sponsorship, argues Jenkins23. 
Nonetheless, the US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism includes a 
deterrence stance based on the pillars of attribution and subsequent retaliation: 
A new deterrence calculus combines the need to deter terrorists and 
supporters from contemplating a WMD attack .... We require a range 
of deterrence strategies that are tailored to the situation and the 
adversary. We will make clear that terrorists and those who aid or 
sponsor a WMD attack would face the prospect of an overwhelming 
response to any use of such weapons .... Finally we will ensure that 
our capacity to determine the source of any such attack is well-
known, and that our determination to respond overwhelmingly to 
any attack is never in doubt.24 
While the Strategy also describes the determination to deny terrorists access to 
necessary materials through safeguards and disruption, the idea of deterrence by 
denial is not mentioned. It was recently reported that notions of deterrence by 
22 See Gordon Carrera Shopping For Bombs (London: Hurst & co., 2006) 
23 Brian Michael Jenkins Unconquerable Nation: Knowing our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves (Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand, 2006)* pp. 138-141 
24 National Security Council (US) National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington D.C., 
September 2006)* p.14 
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punishment are seriously contemplated amongst senior strategic planners of the 
Bush administration25• (It is notable that this quote from the National Strate£\' ·for 
b. 
Combating Terrorism is somewhat at odds with the quote in the introduction to this 
chapter, from the National Security Strategy, where it was stated that deterrence is 
not useful against terrorism.) 
Notably, there are other very good reasons to develop a good capability to 
recognise the source of a nuclear weapon after its detonation. As pointed out by 
Davis26 as well as Dunlop and Smith27, in the political frenzy that will surely follow a 
nuclear terrorist explosion, it is of vital importance to establish who didn't do it to 
avoid rushed conclusions and hasty allegations which can have very grave 
consequences. 
I will argue in the following that while deterring state sponsors is perhaps more 
difficult than some believe and only a partial solution, relative deterrence still has an 
important role to play. Assuming the terrorist is a rational cost-benefit calculator, it 
is both possible and beneficial to try and deter the terrorist from a nuclear path into 
staying with the tried and trusted conventional means, since the tools of deterrence 
are to a great extent tools of denial which will help lowering the probability of 
success of a nuclear terrorism project even should deterrence fail. 
6.3.2 Terrorist deterrence in general and the use of formal methodology 
The problem of no return address, mentioned above, is one of three problems of 
terrorist deterrence countered by Trager and Zagorcheva, who make the case for 
absolute deterrence of terrorism28. Allegedly, terrorists are moreover held to be 
'irrational' hence unresponsive to cost-benefit calculations, and finally the 
motivation of terrorists willing to die for their cause must be so strong that 
deterrence is impossible. Pape summarises29 : 
25 David E. Sanger and Thorn Shanker 'u.s. Debates Deterrence for Nuclear Terrorism' The New York 
Times (May 8 2007)* 
26 Jay Davis 'The Attribution of WMD Events' Journal of Homeland Security (April 2003)*. 
27 Dunlop and Smith 'Who Did It?' 
28 Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva 'Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done' International 
Security 30:3 (2005) pp.87-123. 
29 Robert A. Pape 'The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism' American Political Science Review 97:3 
(2003) p.347 
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Although the capture and conviction of Timothy McVeigh[301 gave 
reason for some confidence that others with similar political vie\",s 
might be deterred, the deaths of the September 11 hijackers did not, 
because Americans would have to expect that future Al Qaeda 
attackers would be equally willing to die. 
There should be little reason to doubt that Pape's point is at least partly \'alid: the 
individual suicide bomber can hardly be deterred by threats of violence against his 
person since he is already on a death mission. He might, however, worry about 
threats against his family, and the possibility of failure; says Lesser and co-workers: 
'the terrorists themselves are often concerned by operational risk - they may be 
willing to risk or give their lives, but not in futile attacks.,31 One must distinguish 
between the bombers and the leaders who mastermind their missions. While 
footmen may be expendable tools, even terrorist organisations such as al Qaida have 
goals and resources that are precious to them and that may be held at risk32. As 
Davis and Jenkins point out, mission success is of great importance to leaders of 
terrorist groups33, making for a possible risk-aversion that could give considerable 
leverage to policy makers, discussed in some detail below. Furthermore, al Qaida, 
for example, is not only comprised of its leaders and 'muscle' but also 'lieutenants, 
financiers, logisticians and other facilitators, ... recruiters, supporting population 
segments, and religious and otherwise ideological figures.,34 Financiers of terrorism 
living the good life in a secular world may possess less zeal, and such peripheral 
players, Davis and Jenkins argue, might be easier to influence. 
Deterrence as defined here requires that the deterred party be a cost-benefit 
calculator35. I concluded in my introductory chapter that it is reasonable to assume 
that terrorists may be seen as 'sufficiently rational' for modelling purposes, in that 
they 'usually have a set of hierarchically ordered goals and choose strategies that 
best advance them.,36 This is the process modelled through the maximisation of a 
30 perpetrator of the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, 1995, killing 168. 
31 Lesser et al. Countering the New Terrorism p. 16 
32 Trager and Zagorcheva 'Deterring Terrorism' p.88. 
33 Davis and Jenkins Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism p.xii. 
34 Ibid. p.xi. See also Dunn 'Can al Qaeda Be Deterred ... ' 
35 Bowen 'Deterrence and Asymmetry' p.59. 
36 Trager and Zagorcheva 'Deterring Terrorism' pp.93-94. 
-178 -
payoff function, forming the backbone of rational choice theory. 
The literature treating formally the strategic countering of conventional terrorism 
is not large but is steadily growing, with professor Sandler still its centre of 
gravity37. The threat from nuclear terrorism projects has peculiar properties, 
however, which the existing debate on general terrorist deterrence cannot cover. 
6.3.3 Relative deterrence of terrorists from non-conventional means 
The challenge of 'relative deterrence' is fundamentally different from that of 
deterring groups from terrorism tactics altogether. Its goal may be said to be 
intermediate or preliminary: to persuade attackers to stick with their tried and 
trusted methods, in themselves potentially very destructive. Some available means, 
such as disruption of finances, are common to both categories of deterrence, yet 
while the debate on general terrorist deterrence forms a useful backdrop, it is of 
limited use to my analysis here. 
Given the large scholarly interest in the nexus of terrorism and non-conventional 
arms38, surprisingly few have dealt with the particular strategic interplay between 
terrorists and antiterrorists when threats of mass casualty means are involved. This 
author is only aware of a handful of papers of direct relevance, which will be 
reviewed briefly, plus one by Sandler and Arce exploring the terrorist's decision to 
opt for 'spectacular' attacks. 
On deterrence of non-state actors in general, a very thoughtful overview is given 
by Bowen39. He lays out the concepts, strengths and limitations of terrorism 
deterrence, lending much theoretical support to the more applied effort presented 
here. Key aspects of asymmetry and its impact are discussed, and key questions to 
be answered in order to go from theory to best policy are presented. Bowen's paper 
thus forms a fundament upon which the present effort rests, its sole weakness being 
perchance the lack of a clear distinction between absolute and relative deterrence, 
37 Recent works of interest: Todd Sandler and Kevin Siqueira 'Global terrorism: deterrence versus 
pre-emption' Canadian Journal of Economics 39:4 (2006) pp.1370-1387, Daniel G. Arce ;"1. and Todd 
Sandler 'Counterterrorism: A Game-theoretic Analysis' Journal of Conflict Resolution .+9:2 (2005) 
pp.183-200, and Kevin Siqueira and Todd Sandler 'Terrorists versus the Government: Strategic 
interactions, support and sponsorship' Journal of Conflict Resolution 50:6 (2006) pp.878-898. 
38 See chapter 1 for an overview of the large body of literature on the subject. 
39 Bowen 'Deterrence and Asymmetry' 
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which I find to be of importance. His paper provides a framework only, and rather 
than drawing definite conclusions, Bowen points to future directions of study, some 
of which I pursue here. 
Franck and Melese, ill an almost unIque application of game theory to the 
strategic deliberations of terrorist acquisition of non-conventional means, makes a 
useful contribution to the understanding of terrorist's strategic choice of whether or 
not to embark on non-conventional projects40 • The authors assume terrorists are 
primarily motivated by a will to impress their audience (and not alienate them) 
from which they arrive at some conclusions which may be described as somewhat 
vague; that fanatical terrorists pose a greater 'WMD threat' than political ones, but 
that the latter is also worrisome; that terrorist 'WMD decisions' can be influenced; 
and that 'while the choice of countermeasures to reduce effectiveness of an attack is 
important, reducing the probability [of a 'WMD attack'] impressing the audience is 
1 . ,41 a so Important . 
Some of the weaknesses of their paper (concerning rather unrealistic 
assumptions) the authors themselves recognise42. The analysis is based on relatively 
restrictive assumptions, not in itself problematic, but some of the conclusions (such 
as those mentioned above) are all but corollaries of the assumptions employed, 
something the authors do not fully appreciate. For example, given the modelling 
assumption that disruptive measures are effective against non-conventional but not 
against conventional terrorist projects43, it is an unsurprising conclusion that a target 
country should choose a disruptive course of action if it knows the terrorist 
adversary has 'WMD,44. This is a general potential problem with game theory as 
discussed in chapter 2: A model will never give fundamentally new information 
beyond the assumptions that go into it, but can be a powerful tool to visualise and 
analyse the consequences of these assumptions. When the conclusions that result 
could have been reached equally well without the detour of modelling, however, 
40 Raymond E. Franck and Francois Melese 'Exploring the Structure of Terrorists' WMD Decisions: 
A Game Theory Approach' Defense & Security Analysis 20:4 pp.355-372. 
41 All ibid. p. 370 
42 ibid. p.369 
43 ibid. p.362 
44 ibid. p.366 
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the model serves no purpose other than maybe to complicate. The graphs and 
diagrams of the paper are useful, but considering the complexity of the model 
involved, it is my opinion that the conclusions are disappointingly self-evident from 
the model itselts. 
Franck and Melese's modelling effort, however, is a useful starting point and 
commendable for attempting what, mysteriously, nobody else seems to ha\'e tried 
before to the author's knowledge: to model formally the economy of terrorists' 
employment of non-conventional means. 
A somewhat similar analysis is performed by Sandler and Arce46, who, like 
Franck and Melese analyse the incentives of terrorists to choose Ispectacular' attack 
tactics. The model, in the form of a classic signalling game, is more useful than that 
of Franck and Melese in that it involves uncertainty as well as discounting and a 
model of terrorist financing. Distinguishing between 'large' and 'small ' attack 
instead of the narrower but woolly IWMD,47 only makes the analysis clearer. The 
focus is on government response to a terrorist attack from an organisation whose 
objectives, resources and commitment are hitherto unknown, however, and hence 
lies somewhat to the side of the research question considered here. Somewhat 
simplified Sandler and Arce conclude that intelligence has become increasingly 
important in the new world order where political and militant terrorists co-exist, 
since the best response to a terror attack depends on the nature of the terrorist 
group. Although not directly relevant to this chapter, the game found in their paper 
is valuable for its clarity and is an inspiration for that found below. 
45 The process of modelling implicitly involves asking the question 'what are the important factors 
that could influence this choice?'. A qualitative analysis answers this question and makes way for 
the resulting model. When the conclusions from the modelling in turn are of the form 'these are 
important factors', essentially equalling the factors that went into the model in the first place, it 
indicates that a simpler and more transparent methodology could probably have done the job. 
46 Daniel G. Arce and Todd Sandler 'Terrorist Signalling and the Value of Intelligence' British Jounzal 
of Political Science 37:4 pp.573-586 (2007) (a preview was kindly provided by Professor Sandler 
prior to its publication). 
47 Franck and Melese treat 'WMD' collectively (understood to mean nuclear, biological, chemical 
and radiological weapons in this context, although no definition is provided) \\'ithout 
emphasising the differences in scale, challenge and consequences among the various projects that 
would fall under this very large umbrella. 'WMD' they say are very costly and cause large 
casualties. This is certainlv true for a successful nuclear project, yet historically, non-conventional 
attacks have proven disappointing in terms of body count: Kate Ivano\'a and Todd ~andler 'CBR\; 
Incidents: Political Regimes, Perpetrators and Targets' Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (2(l(lt)) 
pp.423-448. 
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A different approach is taken by Melese and Angelis, who propose a classical 
policy of deterrence by punishment of terrorists considering acquisition of '\V~ID,-t8. 
They suggest a 'brinkmanship strategyl49, aided by the UN whose Secretary General 
would promise to 'allow' unilateral pre-emptive strikes from such states as the 
United States if non-conventional arms were acquired. Melese and Angelis seem to 
overlook a few important problems with their plan however, notably (but not only) 
the obvious Ireturn address problem I mentioned above which, peculiarly, they fail 
to mention. I shall not consider their proposition further. 
Perhaps worth mention is an oft cited paper by Rapoport in which he argues that 
terrorists will effectively deter themselves from non-conventional means because 
they have historically been hard to master and rather ineffectiveso. Interestingly, he 
seems to imply that terrorists choose their methods rationally using some sort of 
cost-benefit analysis, yet this assumption is not made explicit. Rapoport spends 
considerable effort lashing out at what he sees as alarmism from Ithose of the 
physical sciences ,s1, and although his arguments build vaguely on some assumption 
of terrorist rationality, no formal methodology is employed. 
The most convincing treatment of whether al Qaida may be deterred from the use 
of nuclear weapons might be that provided by Dunns2 whose points relevant to us 
go hand in hand with our formal analysis. Dunn's question is mainly that of 
deterrence from use of nuclear weapons after acquisition, hence his research 
question only partly overlaps with ours. Another key paper which forms an 
important guide through our analysis is Jackson's treatment of terrorist technology 
48 A preliminary study is found in Francois Melese and Diana Angelis 'Deterring !errorists. from 
Using WMD: A Brinkmanship Strategy for the United Nations' Defense & Secunty AnalYSIS 20:4 
(2004) p.337-341, while the full analysis is found in a conference paper: Francois Melese 'A 
Brinkmanship Game Theory Model of Terrorism' presented at the 3rd Conference ~n . 
Mathematical Methods of Counterterrorism, Washington D.C. (September 2006) (kindly proVided 
to me by Prof. Melese). 
49 Brinkmanship: 'The practice, especially in international politics, of seeking a~vantage b~· c~eating 
the impression that one is willing and able to push a highly dangerous situatIon to ~e l.lmlt rather 
than concede. ' The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Houghton MlffIm, 2006). 
50 David C. Rapoport 'Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse' National Security Studies Qu~rterly 
5:3 (1999) pp.49-66. The paper only discusses chemical and biological means, apparently seemg 
nuclear means as too far fetched to mention. 
51 ibid. p.51 




, drawing on experiences from private companies - a lucid discussion 
of the process of adopting new technology in general which I draw upon to an equal 
extent. 
In conclusion, the literature on terrorism and deterrence is scarce and the 
literature on deterring the particular use of nuclear means is almost absent despite 
the large interest in nuclear terrorism in general. The highly enlightening papers by 
Bowen and Dunn, the former non-applied, the second purely qualitative, point the 
way to further enquiry. Franck and Melese begin to fill this space, yet their 
approach is (intentionally) limited in scope. My own approach is not much less 
limited in its assumptions, but different choices are made. Unlike Franck and Melese 
I will assume that the terrorist does not care overly much about her audience bu t 
simply wishes to cause as much destruction as possible with limited resources and 
under pressure. Obviously my analysis will then tell me little or nothing about the 
effect which the project has on the terrorist's audience - for a formal analysis of this 
the reader is referred to Franck and Melese - instead its conclusions concern the 
importance of other parameters which are more easily influenced by a government 
antiterrorist. It is the author's opinion that this makes for a stronger and more useful 
treatment. 
6.4 The model 
As in the previous chapter I will assume a rational terrorist motivated by 
wreaking maximum havoc, presumably the most difficult type of terrorist to deter 
from nuclear weapons. One could argue that this is simplistic, yet the real strategic 
process behind a terrorist's choice of nuclear versus conventional means remains a 
'crucial unknown l54 and some assumption must be made. Precaution makes it 
reasonable, thus, to assume the 'worst case' for deterrence and be sure not to 
53 
54 
Brian A. Jackson 'Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assess~ent Informed by 
Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption' Studies ill Conflict & Terrorzsm 24 (2001) pp.183-
213. The paper was later followed by an extensive two-volume ~ND rep~rt: Bri~ A. Jackson, 
John C. Baker, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, John V. Parachini, HoraclO R. TruJl~lo :,-ptztude/or 
Destruction, Volume 1: Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its ImpircatlOns for ~ l'lIlhllmg 
Terroris11l and Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 2: Case Studies of Organizational Lean1l11g 111 FIVe 
Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005)* 
Joshua Sinai 'Forecasting Terrorists' Likelihood to Embark on "Conventional" to CBR\: \\"arfare' 
International Studie~ Review 7:1 (2005) p.151 
-183 -
conclude on the feasibility of deterrence based on unjustified optimism. 
6.4.1 Working hypotheses and assumptions 
I shall work under the hypothesis that acquisition equals attempted use when it 
comes to terrorists and nuclear arms. For a state power, arguably the worst number 
of nuclear weapons to have is one - once that has been used, the targeted country 
has no incentive not to retaliate with full force. For a terrorist group without a 
'return address', the situation is different since retaliation is less well defined. The 
United States have made it a pillar of their security strategy to 'make no concessions 
to terrorist demands and strike no deals with them,55, meant to deter terrorism in 
general, but potentially backfiring somewhat for the purposes of relative deterrence, 
providing an incentive to terrorists to detonate an acquired weapon rather than try 
to gain political leverage through threats56. The common assumption is therefore 
that al Qaida would surely detonate a nuclear weapon as soon as they got their 
hands on it, but Dunn concludes that 'it would be ill advised to reject out of hand 
the possibility that, for Osama bin Laden, nuclear weapons could be too valuable to 
detonate,57. My assumption is for simplicity and not to be interpreted as an off-hand 
dismissal of Dunn's conclusions. A detailed discussion of the strategic value of 
terrorist nuclear weapons is undertaken in chapter 7 of this thesis. 
When testing whether deterrence is possible, it seems reasonable to make 
modelling assumptions that should intuitively make deterrence harder, not easier. 
One such assumption is that the terrorists are driven solely by the wish to inflict 
destruction. The author does in no way believe the motivations of the leaders of e.g. 
al Qaida are so simple. In many contexts, reducing the terrorist adversary to nihilists 
driven by bloodlust alone is misleading and counterproductive. However, the goal 
here is not to fully understand how terrorists motivate their outrageous actions 
55 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America p.5 
56 Holding beyond sway that no concessions will ever be made ~g~t deter a ~olitically ?,otiv,lted 
terrorist who sees murder as a necessary evil, but for the terronst m possesslOn of ternble 
weapons, the message would imply that attack is the only option .. ConverseIY'.'alhm·.ing' c1 certain 
level of small-attack terrorism could make the bloodthirsty terronst content, d1ssuadmg her from 
seeking more destructive means. This is an interesting dynamic, su~t~ble for iurther. study but not 
treated in depth here. An investigation of terrorist nuclear blackmaIl 1S undertaken in chapter 7. 
57 Dunn 'Can al Qaeda Be Deterred ... ' p.25. 
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many authors have contributed expertly to such understanding58• The question is 
rather: 'if maximum destruction is (for whatever reason) the preferred outcome for 
the terrorist, what options still remain?'. A working assumption here, as before, is 
therefore that terrorist utility from a successful attack is proportional to the damage 
inflicted. 
6.4.2 The game 
The game is laid out in illustration 6.1 in the form of a decision theoretical game. 
Squares denote choice nodes and circles denote chance nodes. Imagine that there is 
also a shadow antiterrorist player present, in whose power it is to shift some of the 
parameters of the game, thus taking part indirectly by 'setting the stage'. 
In the first round of the game, the terrorist player (player T) can choose to plan 
and execute a conventional attack. For simplicity, let us assume that these attacks 
are on a smaller scale than the largest conventional attacks such as September 11, 
using means that are well known to the terrorist. Such an attack is therefore 
assumed to take a short time to prepare (planning and execution within one round), 
has a high probability pc of success and a relatively small cost Cc to the terrorist. On 
the down side the damage Tc inflicted on the antiterrorist is modest. Alternatively, T 
can choose to embark on a nuclear project. This project has a high cost Cn, takes a 
long time to plan and prepare (several rounds) and has a relatively small probability 
pn of success. The award for the terrorist upon successful detonation, however, is 
enormous. The cost of failure, -cp, is assumed equal for the conventional and nuclear 
attacks, as an approximation. 
The aftermath of the spectacular attacks on September 11 makes it reasonable to 
believe that such a huge attack as a nuclear detonation would be followed by a 
period of unrest worldwide. The perpetrators of the attack will be hunted and will 
most probably need to go into hiding like the al Qaida leadership did after the CS 
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. I therefore introduce a penalty period following a 
58 Rather too much in some commentators' opinion: Avishag Gordon 'Terrorism as an Academic 
Subject after 9/11: Searching the Internet Reveals a Stockholm SYlldrome Trend' Studies In ~olljlict {-r 
Terrorism 28 (2005) p.45-59. For an analysis of terrorist motivations to employ uncomL'ntlOn..11 
weapons, see Bruce Hoffman 'Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Analysis pi 
Trends and Motivations' Rand Paper #8039-1 (1999) * 
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Like before I use discounting to model player T's impatience. As I argued in the 
previous chapter, there are numerous reasons why T would prefer to see re ult 
sooner rather than later. However, this time around I will not think of D a the 
mathematical representation of the risk of time failure
59
, but in a more ab tract en e 
representing the terrorist's mindset. This is so as not to double count the ri k of 
failure, both through pn/pc and a ltime failure I notion, and also becau e the am 
discounting is employed for the building period as during the penalt p ri daft r 
an attack, although the price of ltime failing' in the two period ar diH r nt. Th 
risk of failure for the nuclear project is surel increa ed b the fact that it tak 
59 Whi h, rem mber, call for a discountfilll cnOI1 rath r than factor . chapt r 5. 
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several rounds to prepare an attack, but this is assumed to be incorporated into the 
difference between pn and pc. Project failure is not the only thing the terrorist might 
be concerned about, however: If too much time passes \".'ithout attack, follm\"l'rs 
might begin to doubt the credibility of terrorist leaders. Moreover, player T may 
anticipate that attacking might become more difficult with time, for example 
because the antiterrorist is taking steps to make nuclear weapon acquisition and use 
harder. 
I will think of the terrorist player as keeping two different accounts: accumulated 
payoffs and 'real' funds. Per assumption real money has no value to the terrorist 
beyond the use for attacks, so doing nothing and saving the money for other 
purposes is not assumed to be an option. While the unit used to measure payoffs for 
each round will be dollars, one should bear in mind that neither the utili tv T extracts 
from inflicted damage nor her grievance at failing a mission represent gains or 
losses of real money. Failing a mission could send a message of incompetence and 
jeopardise the perception amongst followers that 'our side is winning'. The 
additional failure cost, cp, may be thought of as the sum of money T would have 
been willing to pay to avoid being in such a situation. Thus, as the game progresses, 
I keep track of the real money (an attack project of either type may only be 
commenced if sufficient resources are available, otherwise T can do nothing and 
must wait for more money to arrive next round - the 'insufficient funds' option is 
not shown in the figure) but the goal is optimisation of the 'accumulated payoff' 
account. 
Discounting only affects the payoff account whereas all 'real' money, both income 
and cost, are undiscounted6o• The preparation time for a conventional attack is short, 
so one such attack may be performed each round, whereas a nuclear project takes m 
rounds to prepare. Following a nuclear attack, T must wait another n rounds before 
another attack may be commenced (m=3 and n=5 are used in figure 6.1). 
As a final note, it must be emphasised that my analysis concerns player T's 
decision whether or not to attempt a nuclear strategy. Thus all parameters are 
interpreted as perceived by the terrorist at the time of decision, not necessarily 
60 thus disregarding such phenomena as interest rates and inflation. 
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representing physical realities. Remember from our discussion of the le\'el of 
terrorist rationality in chapter 1 that I do not demand for player T to haye realistic 
expectations. Nonetheless, the tool employed here is shown to have great analytical 
potential independently of whether one agrees with the numbers used, and the 
reader is of course free to insert his or her own numbers. 
For this reason, the exact numerical values of different quantities in the following 
must not be taken literally: they are all products of the somewhat arbitrar:' 
numerical data used in the simulation. The qualitative understanding that comes 
from considerations of the resulting data, however, is independent of the exact 
numbers and constitutes the important conclusions of this chapter. 
The game is assumed to have an infinite time-horizon, which makes for 
somewhat different dynamics than if it only lasted for a given number of rounds. If 
player T knew that there were only m rounds left of the game, say, starting a nuclear 
project would be more opportune than before, since the game would then end 
before the penalty period could start. Such tactics are impossible when the time 
horizon is infinite or unknown. In our actual simulations, the number of rounds is 
obviously finite, but infinity is mimicked by disallowing tactics that are possible 
only with a known horizon 61. 
6.4.3 Strategies 
While complex strategies are thinkable, suffice it for our purposes to compare the 
two simplest: those in which conventional and nuclear attacks respectively are 
attempted as often as sufficient funds are available. 
6.5 A discussion of means of deterrence in light of a simulation 
The game of figure 6.1 is sufficiently complex that analytical calculations become 
cumbersome. Using a computer allows us to test the model numerically, howc\'(:'r, 
varying the different parameters on the way. The programme (I have used C++, but 
any programming language could easily do the job) is detailed in appendix B. 
61 
For each run of the programme 1 choose one parameter to vary while keeping thc 
The number of rounds in the simulation is so large that payoffs in the last few rounds are for ,111 
practical purposes zero due to discounting anyl.vay. 
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others constant. The average accumulated payoff per round may then be plotted 
against the values of parameter which is varied to acquire a graphical 
representation. For each chance node in figure 6.1 I randomise«~ using 
predetermined probabilities for success and failure. This means the result can van' 
~ 
greatly - from utter failure to a series of successful attacks. Therefore, each point of a 
graph represents the average payoff from 10,000 runs of the model in order to 
remove some of the 'noise' and obtain a graph of the expected payoff which is 
smooth enough to read63• 
Varying 15 produces a graph, shown in figure 6.2, which I ,,,-ill interpret in the 
following. In the figure I have used different probabilities pn for the nuclear strategy 
and different levels of damage Tc for the conventional strategy. It is important to 
note that the absolute values of parameters and payoff are of no importance in 
themselves - only the qualitative behaviour of the graphs is. The important points to 
take on board all regard the interplay of the different graphs, independently of the 
chosen values of numbers themselves64 • 
The numbers used in the numerical exercise deserve some comment. Measures 
for the damage caused by a conventional attack are deliberately set significantly 
lower than the approximately $90 billion of September 1165. The 2001 attacks have 
many properties in common with a nuclear project, particularly in that it was 
unusually spectacular and involved long preparation time, planning and training. 
Compared to a nuclear attack, it would be a 'medium size' attack, the option of 
which I omit from my model for simplicity. Damage costs in the order of a few 
billion dollars are reasonable for smaller conventional attacks (see section 4...1.1). 
This also goes with our relatively high estimate of 80% success rate for such attacks. 
Conversely, the success rate for nuclear strikes is assumed to be low. This assumes 
that the percentage is as perceived before any preparations have commenced, the 
62 The computer equivalent of throwing a die. 
63 Instead of randomising, I could simply calculate expected payoff directly, obtaining a smooth 
graph right away. However, the 'noise' of figure 6.2 visualises risk as will be explained. 
64 One should note, however, that all qualitative phenomena discussed do not appear for all sets of 
parameters. The parameters used are partly chosen so as to demonstrate the full range of 
important observations. 
65 William C. Thompson, Jr., Comptroller, New York City One Year Later: The Fiscal Impact 0/9111 all 
Nell' York City (New York: Office of the Comptroller, September 2002)* 
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necessary expert personnel recruited etc. As the project proceeds the probability of 
eventual success will increase. Nonetheless, the numbers used (10% and less) are 
lower than those suggested by some66, but is in agreement with the numbers used in 
Bunn's mathematical demonstration67• 
The points of intersection are of particular importance, as they represent border 
values where the conventional strategy attains a higher expected payoff than the 
nuclear, or vice versa. Between these points lie different regions which all have 
interpretations and implications. 
6.5.1 Interpreting the graphs: points of intersection and noise level 
I consider the main graph (the topmost) of figure 6.2 and will interpret what I call 
the four different areas of the figure, points of interception separating these areas, 
and the 'noise' of the graphs, going from lower to higher values of D. The areas are: 
Impatience area: (higher conventional payoff) To the far left at small values of 
D, conventional strategies have far higher expected payoff. A small value of 
the discount factor means high discounting, or in other words, great 
impatience. In this area, player T is in such a hurry to get quick results that 
waiting the three rounds (in our numerical examples) before a nuclear 
weapon is ready is simply too long. Note for future reference that the lower 
the probability of a successful attack, the higher the 'impatience limit' of D 
where the graphs intersect. 
Nuclear first strike area: (higher nuclear payoff) Disregarding for a moment 
the topmost conventional graph, one sees that the nuclear option becomes 
preferable to conventional means for higher (intermediate) D. Here, T has the 
time to wait the time it takes for a nuclear device to be finished and reaps 
66 Notably, in a testimony before the US Congress in Marc 2007, the prominent physicist and nuclear 
weapon designer Richard L. Garwin is reported to have estimated the probability of nuclear . 
terrorism against the United States at 20% per year, that is, 90% over a decade! CouncIl of Foreign 
Relations 'How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack on the United States' Online Debate between 
Michael Levi and Graham T. Allison (April 20, 2007)* 
67 Matthew Bunn 'A Mathematical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism' The Al1l1als of tile AAP55 
607 p.l03-120 (2006). Note that Bunn's probabilities are measured per Year, since thc\ are . 
estimated as perceived by the government plower, who does not know v"hen a n~clear projl'll 
starts. The terrorist will obviously have this knowledge and is onl\' concerned With the SUCll""''' 
probability of the single project at hand. 
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great rewards in the case of a successful attack, but D is still small enough 
that the penalty time is too far into the future to be a major concern. Thi 
area is the primary area in which terrorists would choose to opt for nuclear 
weapons. 
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Long time bombing area: (higher conventional payoff) At even higher 0, the 
tables turn once more as is more clearly seen in the inset to the right of the 
figure. This area, marked with grey for the lower-damage conventional 
graph, is where the penalty time following a nuclear detonation becomes a 
strong argument for the conventional option. In this area, higher expected 
payoff is harvested from repeated conventional attacks over a long period 
than can be matched by a nuclear attack, because of the penalty the latter 
entails. This region is small, the marginal gain from conventional means is 
small, and it only even occurs for special combinations of parameters against 
very patient terrorists. It might be seen as representing the power of 
promised retaliation following an attack. 
Second nuclear strike area: (higher nuclear payoff) For values of 0 very close to 
unity, the nuclear graphs rise once more and surpass the conventional 
option as the inset shows. The in this case extremely patient terrorist is 
contemplating a second nuclear attack far into the future. This region comes 
up as a consequence of modelling, but is hardly relevant for our analysis 
henceforth. 
The 'noise' of some of the graphs is notable, and of importance. Bearing in mind 
that each point of the graph is the average of 10,000 runs of the model, the fact that 
much noise still remains (and the reader should note that the ordinate axis is 
logarithmic, masking much of the effect) signifies that although the expectation 
value of a nuclear plot may be high, the outcome is very uncertain68 • As one should 
expect, this is especially the case in the situation where the chances of succeeding 
with a nuclear project are very small. Here, the probability of failure (modelled to 
represent a negative payoff of $500.000) is almost overwhelming, but a success, in 
the rare cases that it happens, entail an enormous payoff of $160 million in this case, 
making for a positive expected payoff, but at an enormous financial risk. Thus, 
expected utility alone is an insufficient measure of how inviting the nuclear project 
69 h '11' is to the terrorist in that it does not capture the risk of a strategy ; er \\,1 mgness to 
68 Statisticallv: the mean value is well defined, but has a large standard deviation. See below. 
69 See chapter 2. 
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place vast resources on a wildcard must be taken into account as well. 
6.5.2 Decreasing the terrorists I chance of success 
Arguably, the region of the graph where the antiterrorist player would like T to 
be is the impatience region. Quite apart from the fact that making it harder for the 
terrorist to obtain nuclear weapons provides a very physical and concrete protection 
for the antiterrorist player (who, I assume, believes he will be the target of all 
attacks), if player T can be made to believe that such a project has a low probability 
pn of success (pm remember, is player T's belie(o), this could drastically raise the 
limiting value of a below which a nuclear project takes too long. 
It is thinkable that T's perception of pn could be shifted by other means than 
actually trying to block her way to the Bomb, say by a propaganda campaign or 
deliberate spread of misinformation by the government. With the assumption that 
the terrorist is rational, this is a possible strategy, but in applying theory to practice, 
such a plan has drawbacks. First, the effect of such a deterrence strategy is hard to 
measure. Secondly and more importantly, perhaps, the assumption of terrorist 
rationality, while highly useful in understanding terrorist reasoning in many cases, 
ought to be made with some care. 
Increased nuclear security would have the very beneficial side effect that it will 
aid physically blocking a nuclear project, should deterrence fail (whether by a 
breach of the rationality assumption or not). A lesson to take on board is therefore to 
make sure that security against nuclear acquisition is not put in place tacitly, but its 
publication used in a way so as to convey the message that 'it's getting harder'. The 
graphs, as one would hope and expect, clearly make the case in favour of safeguards 
efforts, not only for physical threat reduction, but also as part of a deterrent. vVe see 
quantitatively what Ferguson and Potter recognise by non-formal arguments: 
'Prevent access to materials or targets, and the terrorists I decision-making calculus 
changes .... Thus, terrorists may be deterred from nuclear terrorism by being denied 
70 One school of thought amongst statisticians, the Bayesian school, upholds that all probabililil''' 
must be interpreted as subjective, like pn is for player T. Hence they discard the standard 
'frequency interpretation' of probability as the average rate of success if the event could have bl'l'n 
repeated indefinitely. For our purposes I note that pn and pc need not be at all the same when 
perceived by player T as by player A. 
-193 -
access to key materials and/or targets,71. Members of the US administration ha\·e 
also noted this point in recent times72. Of course, for deterrence purposes it does not 
matter exactly how the government makes a nuclear programme more difficult to 
achieve for the terrorist, and while safeguards measures may be the most potent, 
'second layer of defence' measures will pull in the same direction73• 
6.5.3 Impatience: the role of disruption 
As our colloquial dubbing 'impatience area' is meant to indicate, the low-D area 
where the nuclear option is not preferred, even for a terrorist with no second 
thoughts about risk, represents great impatience. Anyone about to murder 
thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of people, would worry about word 
spreading about the project, since it is very safe to assume that a report about an 
ongoing nuclear terrorism plot with a credible chance of succeeding will spur an 
intense endeavour by governments who imagine themselves as potential targets to 
track down and derail the project before a disaster happens. While it takes a cold 
mind to perform the kind of calculus by which a nuclear attack on civilians is a best 
course of action, a nuclear project will be a large and costly undertaking and 
however cynical he or she may be, the person in charge of it will be deeply 
concerned with its success. This alone should create an atmosphere of some urgency 
to get to business. 
There are means available to a government player to increase the impatience, 
possibly to the extent where a terrorist feels the need to abandon the thought of 
acquiring a nuclear weapon or even discontinue an ongoing project74 • 
One such measure is a credible promise that it is getting ever harder to obtain the 
necessary assets to do the job. Further drastically improving safeguards with a view 
71 Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector and Fred L. 
Wehling The Faur Faces afNuclear Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2005)* p.32 
72 Stephen Aoki, Deputy Undersecretary of Energy for counterterrorism say.s: 'B.arriers to acquisition 
also provide an important element of deterrence. If terrorists believe that It wIll be extremely, 
risky, or impossible, to acquire weapons or materials, they may seek other avenues of attack. 
testimony (July 2006)* 
73 See appendix 0 for a review of such measures. 
74 Note that this option is not possible within the model, yet is an intuitively obvious continuation of 
it. 
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to create a leak-free system of handling weapons-usable materials once again enters 
as an effort of great importance. Its value in the particular case of causing 
impatience is by no means a primary motivation for improved safeguards:-5: the 
message could well be interpreted as a 'now or never' for the terrorist on the lookout 
for fissile materials76, which could work either for or against the government player. 
In keeping with the findings of the previous chapter, the terrorist might feel under 
pressure to opt for the first available source of what she believes is usable materials, 
which could turn out to be either plutonium of some grade, usable only in a more 
complicated weapon design, or uranium of a suboptimal or even useless isotopic 
composition or in a form that is difficult to handle. On the other hand, the perceived 
increase in difficulties of accessing fissile materials might be the push that makes the 
terrorist decide to commence a nuclear programme while there is still time. 
Another government strategy is persistent disruption of terrorist plots by various 
means, a tactic employed extensively by the United States and its allies since the 
terrorist attacks on September 11 2001. As Jackson reasons, 'a terrorist group under 
pressure of pursuit will ... have a serious disincentive to seek out or attempt to 
adopt new technologies 177. Excepting the train bombings in Madrid in 2003, attacks 
since 2001 have been comparatively small, using conventional means and directed 
at easier targets78, including troops in Iraq and Afghanistan79• An explanation has 
been that increased stress has led al Qaida to eschew complex terror operations for 
simple but deadly bombings closer to home80. 
The banishing of al Qaida from its safe haven in Afghanistan is an example of a 
disruptive action that may be argued for based on the impatience facet of terrorist 
75 Strictly speaking, the impatience created by improved safeguards concerns only the nuclear, not 
the conventional project, and the notion is thus somewhat at odds with our model; a consequence 
of simplification. 
76 Note that I have not considered the option of parameters, e.g. pn, changing with time. 
77 Jackson 'Technology Acquisition ... ' p.195. 
78 Martin C. Libicki, Peter Chalk, and Melanie Sisson Exploring Terrorist Targeting Preferellces (RA\JD, 
2007)*, e.g. figure p.48. 
79 Often termed 'insurgency' rather than 'terrorism', a distinction whose subt1eti~s .1 .shall not del.ve 
into. Notably, violence against exclusively military targets fall outside my defmltIon of terronsm 
in section 1.2. 
80 Todd Sandler and Walter Enders 'September 11 and Its Aftermath' illternational Studies Reviezc 7 
(2005) p.167 
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choice of action presented here81 . 
6.5.4 Terrorist financing and risk aversion 
There are several aspects of risk and aversion to risk in this context, one of which 
regards the cost of failure, to be explored further below. In this section I shall focus 
on the risk of undertaking a project whose potentially enormous payoffs come at the 
cost of a large probability of failure and what a study of al Qaida's previous modus 
operandi tells us about their attitude towards risk and what role their financial 
prospects play. 
Without doubt, the purely financial risks involved in undertaking a nuclear 
project depend upon the fiscal stature of the group. Lack of funds could make the 
project infeasible altogether, but a mere stemming of the flow of fresh funds will be 
sufficient to increase risk. When running the same simulations as above, assuming 
sufficient initial funds for a single nuclear attack but with no new funds coming in, 
the graph changes little from that shown in figure 6.282. However, this may not be 
interpreted to mean that throttling the flow of money to al Qaida is ineffective. 
Imagine that you were given a 1 % chance of winning $1 billion at the price of 
everything you own, which for the sake of argument we assume to be $100,000. The 
expected payoff of this deal is a neat $9.9 million, yet none but the craziest gambler 
would accept the deal because the likely outcome is a very severe loss. If $100,000 
was an easily affordable loss to you, however, the situation would be very different. 
In the face of a stemming of the flow of finances to al Qaida, thus, it is probable that 
spending what they have on a new and unknown enterprise becomes too daring a 
choice. 
One way of considering the risk of a strategy is looking at how much the outcome 
of that strategy varies. A safe plan will produce a similar outcome every time, while 
one that is risky could bring both big benefits and big losses. I calculate
83 
the 
standard deviation of the distribution of the payoff over a large sample (of N=10,OOO 
runs of the model). Sample standard deviation a is a measure of how much a sample 
81 The legality and ethical aspects of the war and its aftermath is a question not to be addrl'~sed hew 
82 The onI\' qualitative change is that there is no 'second nuclear strike' area. 
83 Using a slight modification of our C++ programme from before. 
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of measurements (say of accumulated payoff from one run through our model) 
varies in value. Specifically it is the root mean square of the deviation of the 
outcome of one run from its mean value, defined as 
(6.1) 
where fi is the accumulated payoff of run i and the expectation value fl is found a 
1 N 
I1=NL fl . 
1=1 
(6.2) 
I have calculated a for a large sample of runs of the model following a nuclear 
and conventional strategy respectively. From plotting a as a function of 6 in figure 
6.3 it is clear that for moderately high values of the discount factor, the region in 
which the Ifirst nuclear strike I area is typically found (the area in which the terrori t 
is arguably most likely to wish to opt for nuclear weapons), the standard deviation 
of the nuclear sample is 3-5 times larger than that of the conventional sample. 
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The reason for the standard deviation for smaller values of 6 being maIler than 
that of a conventional strategy is solely that any payoffs from a nucl ar trat , will 
be small in this area due to the long preparation time: for 6=0, of cour , the nucl r 
. t' t't ffil'ght b th tandard payoff i invariably zero. A more mstruc lVe quan 1 
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deviation relative to the expected payoff, which we have plotted in figure 6.4. 
Relative to the expected payoff (approximately equal to /A), the nuclear option ha 
standard deviation four times or more that of the conventional strategy throughout 
the a-scale. Indeed for the nuclear strategy the relative standard deviation i more 
than four times the expected utility itself for most values of a, and only decrea e for 
very high a values. This is four times or more the relative standard de iation a for 
the conventional strategy almost throughout the a scale. Of course, the exact ration 
between these standard deviations and payoffs will depend on the numerical alue 
of the model parameters, but insofar as the data used are not exceedingly far from 
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I will keep the theoretical analysis of this point on an intuitive level and therefore 
not draw on economic theory of risk or other relevant theories here. A good wa to 
analyse the problem further would be the extension of rational choice theor call d 
regret theory84 in which the player's utility does not only depend on the outcom that 
comes to be, but also that which could have been if a different choice had b n mad, 
thereby introducing the concepts of regret and rejoicing for ha ing mad 
84 Graham Loome and Robert Sugden 'Regret Theory: An Altemati 
under Uncertainty ' The Economic ]ollmal 92 (1982) pp.805- 24 
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wrong/ right choice. This theory automatically takes some account of risk aversion 
in the level of regret associated with a wrong decision. 
I turn quickly to the example of the bet once more. Arguably, for the two players 
(one Ipoorl and one Irichl) the most important variable is the relative change of their 
wealth as a consequence of the gamble. Assume the wealth of the rich player is S10 
million. To him, a loss would imply a reduction of his fortune of only 1 %, while on 
average, taking the bet would double his fortune. To the poor player, the loss \vould 
mean a devastating reduction of his fortune by 100%, while accepting the bet ,yould 
on average increase his fortune 99 times. The present value of the Ifortunel of a 
terrorist who receives a sum R of money every round is R/ (1-6) plus whatever she 
has got to start with. When 6 approaches 1 such a regularly funded terrorist is 
therefore to be considered very wealthy, provided she has the patience to wait for 
the money. For this reason, whether the terrorist identifies herself as the Irichl or the 
Ipoorl player in our analogy will depend on the reliability of the income flow and 
the patience of the terrorist. Efforts to increase terrorist impatience, therefore, not 
only push the terrorist towards the impatience region (where she will opt for 
conventional means) due to lower expected payoff from a nuclear strategy, but also 
increases risk aversion, adding to the same effect. 
Being the group most often seen as a likely aspiring nuclear terrorist, let me turn 
to the example of al Qaida for a moment. Dunn has studied al Qaida in depth and 
recognises a distinctive aversion towards risk in their history, a Ipersistence in doing 
what it knows and does well .... Similarly, its choice of targets ... reflects persistence 
in staying with the tried and true. 18S Nonetheless attacks such as September 11 show 
a definitive ability to think creatively and innovate, even if the novel requirement of 
those attacks was restricted to learning to fly commercial aircraft. 
Religiously zealous terrorists could have additional reasons to fear public failure, 
argues Jenkins. As he puts it Ijihadists believe that Godls will is expressed in success 
and failure. To succeed is to have Godls support. Failure signals Godls disapproval. 
• 186 As a consequence, jihadist planners are conservatIve. 
Another point that could enhance al Qaidals sense of risk is the organisational 
85 Dunn ICan al Qaeda ... 1 p.16 
86 Jenkins Unconquerable Nation p.81 
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changes it would probably require, another departure from the tried and trusted. So 
large are the costs involved (millions of dollars) that a project to build a nuclear 
device will probably be kept under much closer scrutiny by the leaders than is 
normally the case with the activities of the many loosely affiliated al Qaida cadres 
worldwide
87
. A more hierarchical structure could make the organisation more 
vulnerable to intelligence as well as military action. The successful designing of a 
working device requires a sound scientific climate where ideas and opinions may be 
presented freely88, the lack of which has been an explanation for Aum Shinrikyo's 
failure to weaponise biological agents89. Finally, it has not been al Qaida's practice to 
rely on one or a few exceptional individuals for the success of their operations90; a 
nuclear project, on the other hand, stands or falls with the scientists and technicians 
employed91 • 
6.5.5 The perceived cost of failure - how important? 
In the previous chapter I found that only when the perceived cost of failure is 
zero is there no theoretical possibility for deterring a terrorist from attacks 
altogether92 • I have performed simulations like those depicted in figure 6.2 in which 
the cost of failure is varied from zero to several million dollars with other 
parameters constant. When considering relative deterrence, unlike its absolute 
counterpart, increasing the cost of failure leads to no qualitatively new features 
emerging, but plays the role of lowering the expected payoff of attacks in general, in 
particular the nuclear strategy whose probability of failure is large. For the purposes 
of relative deterrence it is of modest importance, primarily because there is little a 
government player can do to influence player T's assessment of the value of qJ. 
87 Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell 'Does intent Equal Capability?: Al-Qaeda and Weapons of 
Mass Destruction' Nonproliferation Review 12:3 (2006) pp.616-617 
88 Ferguson and Potter The Four Faces ... p.40 
89 William Rosenau 'Aum Shinrikyo's Biological Weapons Program: Why Did it FaiP' Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 24 (2001) pp.289-301. 
90 Dunn points to almost exclusive reliance on personnel trained in al Qaida camps; Dunn 'Can a1 
Qaeda ... ' p.16 
91 e.g. Jackson 'Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups' p.201 
92 This was rigorously shown only in the context of the model in that chapter, but reasons \\ere 
given why the conclusion is probably far more general. 
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6.5.6 The' bloodlust' parameter: no longer as important 
Likewise, the 'bloodlust parameter' v which played an important role in the 
previous chapter is of less consequence here; the assumption that payoff is 
proportional to the damage inflicted with some positive proportionality constant, 
however, is still very important. To understand the role of v in this context, consider 
the following simplification of the model: Assume just for now that no new funds 
come in (R=O) and that there is no cost of failure (<p = 0)93. Assume furthermore that 
initial funds suffice for M conventional attacks or one nuclear attack after n rounds 
of preparation. The utility from a conventional strategy is thus (the first round is not 
discounted) 
I-8M 
--pvT 1-8 c c (6.3) 
(see appendix C for mathematical details) while that of a nuclear attack is 
8 ,,-1 T p"v n (6.4) 
where as in figure 6.1, n is the number of rounds it takes to prepare a nuclear attack. 
The conventional strategy is preferable in terms of expected payoff given these 
assumptions iff 
(6.5) 
The bloodlust factor v disappears and is of no importance to the choice of 
12 d 9 strategy! For demonstration, let's put Tn = $1.6,10 an Tc = $5.0·10. Say 
furthermore that pn/pc = 0.1, then the fraction on the left must be larger than 
approximately 32. If I assume for example that M=10 the numerical solution is that 
conventional strike is preferred for approximately 0 < 0.2. The only significance of v 
is now determining the sign of the payoff at a given value of <p, of modest interest in 
the context of relative deterrence. 
Clearly, when <p > 0 and R > 0, the bloodlust parameter does not entirely vanish, 
but a numerical study reveals that its importance is modest. 
The level of 'bloodlust' decides whether terrorist action IS worthwhile at all, 
93 This is for simplicity only and is hardly a realistic assumption. 
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setting the minimum level of damage for the attack to be worth the risk; the more 
bloodthirsty the terrorist, the smaller the smallest feasible attack. Hence a terrorist 
with great bloodlust is hard to deter absolutely, but may be satisfied with long term 
violence on a lower scale, another case where absolute and relative deterrence work 
against each other. On the whole, however, for a terrorist who extracts utilit\· 
proportional to damage, the important question is 'how much damage how soon?', 
regardless of the proportionality factor. 
6.5.7 The danger of hardening targets against conventional strikes 
The dynamic between absolute and relative deterrence is highlighted when 
considering the topmost conventional graph in the topmost panel of figure 6.2. 
When assuming a somewhat higher damage per conventional attack, the 
'impatience' and 'long time bombing' regions merge with no 'nuclear first strike' area 
in between at all. Clearly, if the terrorist is able to inflict more damage (in our 
example the equivalent of $5 billion) per conventional attack, the incentive to go 
nuclear diminishes, the terrorist being content with her current progress in her 'war 
of a thousand cuts,94. Seen in isolation, thus, for the sake of avoiding nuclear 
terrorism, hardening targets against conventional attacks is counter-effective. 
This 'deflection' effect has many faces. Sandler and co-workers have pointed to 
how one state may deflect attacks onto another by making itself a harder target, 
initiating a 'deterrence race' in which the target state least able to protect itself gets 
the most attacks95, and how hardening business targets deflects attacks towards 
tourism96. These findings are consistent with previous findings on crime and 
warfare, quoted by Melese and Angelis: making one kind of crime harder will 
reduce that crime but increase others, and defending against one kind of military 
attack may 'drive opponents to new methods of attack and, therefore, generate nc\\' 
... threats,97. For example, the installation of metal detectors in airports in January 
94 Libicki et al. Exploring Terrorist Targeting Preferences p.93. 
95 Todd Sandler and Kevin Siqueira 'Global terrorism: deterrence versus pre-emption' Calladia1l 
Jou mal of Economics 39:4 (2006) pp.1370-1387 
96 Todd Sandler and Daniel G. Arce M. 'Terrorism & game theory' Simulatio1l & Gaming 34:3 (2003) 
p.326 
97 Melese and Angelis 'Deterring Terrorists from Using WMD' p.338. 
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1973 led to an immediate change from skyjacking to other terrorist tactics such has 
hostage taking
98
. As Garwin notes, keeping our planes safe is not a plan for lasting 
peace, since 'if hijacking passenger aircraft will no longer work, motivated terrorists 
will doubtless choose something else.,99 Nuclear weapons are but one option. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is not to 'allow' a certain level of 
conventional terrorism, but to make sure that for every effort to prevent 
conventional terrorist attacks, a correspondingly convincing effort should go into 
preventing nuclear terrorism to avoid the deflection effect. Our analysis shows that 
a disproportionate emphasis on conventional terrorism, although it may seem like 
the more immediate threat, could undermine other efforts to achieve relative 
deterrence from nuclear terrorism. 
6.5.8 Smaller payoff from nuclear attack 
I have assumed above that the terrorist extracts payoff proportional to the 
damage done, which may be something of a worst case terrorist. Some have raised 
the question whether it is absolutely certain that a terrorist organisation which 
appears on the surface to want nothing more than to cause death and destruction 
could not have reservations against killing such a vast number of people in a single 
bl 100 ow . 
If this is so it is good news given the previous analysis of deterrence: the only 
motivation that my modelled terrorist has to go for a nuclear programme in the face 
of slim chances of success is the enormous payoff she can reap from it. If important 
strategists have some limitations as to how many they would like to see dead, 
however, this motivation quickly diminishes. Even if the expected payoff is positive, 
only a very large payoff is worth a great risk, and even more so if the terrorist is 
averse to risk in the first place. The policy implications of this are not perhaps great, 
however, since there is little a government can do to enhance the moral stature of a 
terrorist adversary. It is a point worth bearing in mind, however, in line with Levi's 
98 e.g. Todd Sandler and Walter Enders 'An economic perspective on transnational terrorism' 
European Journal of Political Economy 20 (2004) p.3ll. 
99 Garwin 'The Many Threats of Terror' p.237. 
100 Dunn 'Can al Qaeda ... ' pp. 9-11 
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stance that it may not always be helpful to consider only the worst case101. 
Another point, emphasised in particular by Levi, is that measures can be taken to 
diminish the effects should a nuclear attack happen102. The effects of a successful 
attack will be dreadful, but if hundreds, perhaps thousands of additionalli\'es could 
be saved with good emergency response, planning for the worst is likely to be 
worthwhile based on a simple rationale of self defence. Levi makes the case for a 
simple sheltering strategy to minimise harm from radioactive fallout103 for example. 
Important for our purposes is the possibility that the terrorist could be persuaded 
that the government is well prepared and will be able to take measures to minimise 
the damage done. If Tn can be lowered, the effect on relative deterrence is immediate 
and proportional to the reduction. 
6.6 The advantages of gaming versus a qualitative approach 
The advantages and disadvantages of gaming out the terrorist's decision in this 
chapter are rather similar to what the case was in the previous chapter. The only 
substantial difference between the two in terms of methodology is that the present 
chapter performs the gaming numerically whereas the previous chapter was 
symbolical. Many of the points discussed in section 5.7 such as the limitations of 
assuming a terrorist organisation be representable as a single, rational actor, also 
apply to this chapter. 
As with the other research chapters of the thesis, the research question in this 
chapter was chosen partly because it was expected to work well with the chosen 
methodology. It is another case of a choice between two strategies under uncertainty 
where the pros and cons of each strategy are easy to layout in qualitative terms - on 
the one hand the terrorist would harvest great utility from a successful nuclear 
acquisition, but on the other it is a difficult, expensive and risky project compared to 
tried and trusted means - but weighing the pros and cons against each other is more 
difficult in qualitative terms. 
Clearly, after laying out the arguments for and against a nuclear strategy, there 
101 Michael Levi On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007) pp. Ll-12 
102 ibid., pp.61-64 
103 ibid, pp.61-64, 161-163 
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could be different ways of going about the weighing, and the gaming approach 
used here, while a natural choice for someone with a mathematical background, is 
almost certainly not the only fruitful option. Analysts \yith a background in 
psychology might draw on available historical evidence on terrorism to do an 
analysis of terrorists' risk aversion versus their drive towards spectacular attacks. 
With information on the way certain terrorist groups are organised, a study might 
focus on the internal tensions within the group, should different factions dissent on 
what is the best way forward, in line with Allison's idea of bureaucratic politics1D4. 
These different approaches should not be seen as competitors as much as 
complements of each other. The present effort lays out the strictI v economical side 
of the issue in terms of an abstract monetary unit (pleasure in success, aggravation 
in failure), and thus adds a piece to the jigsaw that is relative deterrence of 
terrorism. Additional efforts of analysts with different background and training 
could add to my economical analysis to paint a more nuanced and complete picture 
of the effects of efforts towards relative deterrence. The effects of realistic deviations 
from the purely rational and calculating ideal assumed, for example, could be a 
valuable addition to the efforts presented in this chapter. It is useful to recognise 
that one approach alone cannot replace all others, and seek ways of unifying results 
of different approaches rather than focus on which methodology is best. 
Compared to the efforts reported in chapter 5 the formal approach has at least a 
couple of disadvantages when a numerical procedure is employed rather than the 
symbolical methods used there. Firstly, one does not end up with simple and 
powerful criteria such as (5.22) from which a wealth of information may readily be 
drawn, and which forms a conclusion in itself. The most important information 
which a model gives away is how a conclusion varies when the parameters are 
varied. An explicit formula permits the variation of every parameter at the same 
time, but numerically it is normally only feasible to vary one or two parameters 
while keeping all others constants105 . This is a serious limitation v"hich diminishes 
104 
105 
e.g. Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin 'Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some 
Policy Implications' World Politics 24:2 (1972) pp.40-79 
There exist more sophisticated methods for multivariate systems, but as argued above, such 
methods could easily obscure the ongoing analysis and introduce another set of tid hoc 
assumptions because they require much information about the functIOn under stud\". 
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the power of the analysis somewhat. The procedure one follows in practice is to 
experiment with varying different parameters in search of interesting behaviour 
which can illuminate the problem. I found such behaviour when varying the 
impatience factor 0, as shown in figure 5.2. It is difficult to ascertain that the model 
does not hold much more information, however, which I did not chance upon. 
The second limitation using numerics is that numbers must somehow be chosen 
for all parameters in order to run the simulation. This introduces an extra layer of 
application of judgement on the part of the analyst, and fixing numbers to ever\, 
parameter necessarily reduces the generality of the analysis. Therefore, I must focus 
on the qualitative behaviour of the model when parameters are varied. This was 
found to be feasible as in figure 5.2 because, as the figure shows, the graphs have the 
same general shape even if the numbers change its actual values. 
Where the analytical treatment in the previous chapter allowed strict criteria, I 
am here reduced to introducing less rigorous, semi-quantitative concepts for 
interpreting the graphs: impatience area, first bomb area and so forth. These are 
arguably good and intuitively useful concepts, and with reference to Osbourne's 
view 'if a model enhances our understanding of the world, then it serves its 
purpose,106 it is the author's view that the gaming was successful. 
However, since these concepts may readily be formulated in a qualitative way, it 
is less obvious that they could not have been arrived by qualitative arguments 
alone. The role of the gaming and simulation was to formulate the problem in an 
alternative way to view it from a different angle. When represented graphically as 
in figure 5.2 the classification of terrorists in terms of their impatience became 
obvious. With the benefit of hindsight it seems quite possible to arrive at the same 
taxonomy without the gaming, but whether one could do so in practice is a 
hypothetical question for the individual analyst to answer. 
6.7 Conclusions and policy implications 
At a very general level I am in agreement with Melese and Angelis that a relative 
deterrence project must 'make it relatively more costly for terrorists to acquire' 
106 Martin J. Osborne An Introduction to Game Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 200 .. l) p.7 
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I 107 . h . nuc ear weapons WIt respect to conventional means. The means of achie\'ing this, 
however, differ radically from those suggested by these authors. 
Indeed, I show with some clarity that with the assumptions employed about 
terrorist motivation, the threat of retaliation as suggested by Melese and Angelis has 
unambiguous effect only under very special circumstances108. Obviously, one must 
be careful, because the model used represents only one possibility, and it is 
thinkable that the value of retaliation is underestimated in our work109. The 'penalty' 
time for the terrorist organisation represents the terrorist's belief that retaliation will 
render her inoperative for a time after a nuclear strike. This causes preferences to 
change only in the 'long time bombing' area in figure 6.2, a small interval of large 
values of D over which the expected payoff of a nuclear strategy is slightly smaller 
than for conventional means. The strategy only works against the patient terrorist 
who has high hopes for the long term future but is of little consequence to a terrorist 
in some rush. While threats may not be altogether impotent, it is shown here that 
there are better options available to the government intent on dissuading al Qaida 
or others from nuclear means. 
6.7.1 Three effective roads to relative deterrence 
I identify three paths by which relative deterrence from nuclear projects may be 
achieved. 
The primary means of relative deterrence should remain continuing to make it 
harder for terrorists to carry out a nuclear project by protecting nuclear materials 
from theft because of the beneficial effects of these efforts beyond deterrence. 
Secondary measures such as border controls and scanning of freight containers, 
advocated recently by Levillo, are probably a useful addition, although no careful 
cost-benefit analysis of such measures is undertaken in the present thesis for reasons 
107 Melese and Angelis 'Deterring Terrorists from Using WMD' p.338. 
108 
109 
i.e. very specific values of model parameters. 
Possible extensions of the current modelling effort which could increase the effect of retaliatll 'n 
would be if the government actor could incur large economic damage to the terrori--t Also, the. 
assumption that payoff depends only on damage inflicted may overlook the often argued pOSItIOn 
that even the most fanatical terrorists have goals and \'alues they hold dear. Ho\\,ewf, the penalty 
time does take account of this to some extent. 
110 Levi 011 Nuclear Terrorism 
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of manageability (some thoughts on this issue are presented in appendix D). :-\5 
figure 6.2 shows, nothing is as effective in lowering the expected payoff of such an 
operation as boosting the perceived difficulty of success in the mind of the terrorist. 
Improved safety measures furthermore play on terrorist risk aversion and 
tendency to choose to be safe rather than sorry. Davis and Jenkins sav111 
oJ 
the empirical record shows that even hardened terrorists dislike 
operational risks and may be deterred by uncertainty and risk. A foot 
soldier may willingly give his life in a suicide mission, and 
organizations may be quite willing to sacrifice such pawns, but 
mission success is very important and leaders are in some ways risk-
averse. 
I demonstrate that the flow of payoff from nuclear projects is far more volatile than 
that from staying with the tried and trusted conventional tactics, an effect which 
becomes more pronounced the smaller the perceived chances of a successful nuclear 
attack. An explicit modelling of risk aversion could be a fruitful extension of the 
analysis performed herein. 
Defensive measures beyond safeguards, often termed the 'second line of defence' 
are not discussed in detail in this thesis; the reader may refer to the excellent 
treatment by Levi112• Although the effectiveness of secondary means in actually 
blocking a terrorist organisation is a matter of some dispute, one must not forget the 
indirect effect which efforts to, say, detect nuclear materials in sea container cargo 
can have through deterrence. If the message can be communicated that 'there is no 
safe way to deliver a nuclear attack' this could play effectively on terrorist risk 
aversion. Terrorists have shown considerable scepticism about recruiting outsiders 
for specific tasks such as advanced smuggling operations, and any action that can 
force the terrorist to divert from her known and trusted members and methods will 
probably increase the perceived risk in the terrorist's mind. 
Secondly, measures to disrupt terrorist operations and put strain on the terrorist 
groups that might be planning a nuclear enterprise (thereby decreasing 0) could, 
together with decreasing PIl' force the terrorist player into the 'impatience region' of 
figure 6.2 in which conventional attack is always preferred. The combination of 
111 Davis and Jenkins Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism p.xii 
112 Levi 011 Nuclear Terrorism 
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safeguards and disruption is shown in the above analysis to form a powerful tool in 
persuading terrorists from attempting the nuclear option. 
Finally, strangling terrorism funding will further play on terrorist risk aversion. 
Blocking terrorist access to money is of course a physical way of hindering a project 
ever taking place, but even creating significant uncertainty about the economic 
future could well make the terrorist opt for conservative expenditure. 
An important additional conclusion is the danger that hardening targets against 
conventional terrorism could achieve the opposite effect and become an incentiYe 
for the terrorist to opt for a nuclear approach. Therefore, spending in deterrence by 
denial of conventional terrorism (absolute deterrence) must always be accompanied 
by a proportional spending in anti-nuclear proliferation efforts113• If the right 
balance is found, our model indicates that defensive measures can at the same time 
deter some terrorists altogether and deter others relatively, away from nuclear 
terrorism. 
The United Statesl National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
interestingly, contains several elements in accordance with our recommendations 
for relative deterrence, but apparently without fully realising this potential. It reads, 
for example: lIn addition to our conventional response and defense capabilities, our 
overall deterrence posture against WMD threats is reinforced by intelligence, 
surveillance, interdiction, and domestic law enforcement capabilities,114 . Intelligence 
and surveillance concord with our 'disruption' point above, whereas the improved 
safeguarding of fissile materials, while mentioned briefly as one of many 
measures115, is not recognised for its value as deterrent in the Strategy, and the 
impression which is left is that the prevailing ideas of deterrence are still primarily 
threats of retribution rather than deterrence by denial. One does well to note, of 
course, that the report in question is primarily concerned with proliferation to 
states, a different question than that considered herein. Given the amount of 
113 The same goes for other forms of non-conventional weapons, although this is not discussed in 
detail in this thesis. 
114 US National Security Council National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington 
D.C.: NSC, December 2001)* p. 3 
115 alongside such measures as recycling of nuclear waste, of much lesser proliferation conn'rn. Ibid. 
pp.4-5 
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attention devoted to nuclear terrorism in later years, however, there seems no 
particular reason why relative deterrence of nuclear terrorism should not make its 
way into future deterrence policies. 
In conclusion, our analysis strongly indicates that deterring terrorists into opting 
for conventional means over nuclear ones is not only possible but indeed doable b~' 
increasing emphasis on efforts that are already ongoing. While it requires the term 
I deterrence I to be freed from its narrow Cold War interpretation, influencing the 
way terrorists choose their strategies is probably a relevant and important aspect of 
the struggle to keep the ultimate catastrophe from becoming reality. 
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- 7 - Nuclear blackmail and other strategic uses of a 
terrorist nuclear weapon 
Assume that an international terrorist organisation has acquired a nuclear 
weapon. What will it do with it? Up until now we have assumed that the terrorist 
organisation's plan is always to mount a devastating attack as soon as feasible. Si, 
decades of nuclear-armed states not attacking each other despite animosity certifies, 
however, that there are other possible uses of nuclear weapons besides detonating 
them at the enemy's doorstep. Deterrence is one: if you can persuade your enem~' 
that in the instance of attack upon you, you will retaliate with nuclear means, he 
may not dare to attack at all. A more short-term possibility is blackmail: 'concede to 
these demands or we will blow you Up'. There are important differences between 
states and non-state organisations, however, and part of the aim of this chapter is to 
explore these. 
A few analysts have considered it possible that a terrorist obtaining a nuclear 
weapon might not necessarily attempt to detonate it right away. Ferguson and 
Potter comment that '[t]he credible threat created by controlling a nuclear weapon 
would significantly bolster any political goals of the terrorist group'!. Levi also 
devotes four paragraphs of his book2 to the question, concluding that nuclear 
blackmail is difficult to pull off in practice - a point I will return to shortly. 
Steinhausler mentions nuclear blackmail but focuses on the feasibility of smuggling 
a weapon into a US harbour while taking the utility of the blackmail strategy itself 
for granted3. Probably the most careful and thorough analysis of the question is that 
of Dunn 4, whose arguments I will consider in more detail below. 
On the whole, however, the question of whether there could be alternati\'e 
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Lewis A. Dunn 'Can al Qaeda Be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons?' Occasional paper #3 
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several statements by the al Qaida leadership indicating that it sees the potential of a 
nuclear weapon to deter attacks upon itself from western powers or Israel5• Of 
course, such statements should not be accepted uncritically, and the real rationale 
for making them could be different from what meets the eye. In line with the outset 
of the thesis, I will assume that the terrorist adversary is rational and will give 
thorough consideration to the question of what is the best use of a nuclear weapon, 
should he acquire one. It is therefore worth taking a closer look at the strategic 
interplay of a few scenarios in order to get a clearer picture of the incentives and 
threats involved. 
7.1 Research question and chapter outline 
The question I will address herein is the following is twofold: 
Could a rational terrorist plausibly have other strategically beneficial 
uses of a nuclear weapon than its detonation in an attack, namely 
extortion or deterrence of attacks upon him/herself? 
and furthermore 
What stance should a government adopt in the face of attempted 
extortion by terrorists with the threatened use of a nuclear explosive? 
In this chapter I will assume that a terrorist organisation has already acquired a 
workable nuclear weapon and is considering the strategic options for the use of this 
asset. The set of assumptions used is somewhat restrictive, and the chapter does not 
aspire to exhaust this question but merely to present a few of the most plausible 
scenarios. Of the conceivable alternative uses of nuclear weapons I consider only 
blackmail and deterrence. A scenario of nuclear terrorist extortion will be gamed out 
in a classic signalling game, well known from the literature on game theor/, in the 
final sections of the chapter. 
The reader should note how the word I deterrence I will be used about two in some 
sense opposite scenarios in this chapter. The first accords with the way the term was 
5 See references below. 
6 See any textbook on Game Theory, for example Robert Gibbons A Primer in Game Theory (Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1992) 
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employed in chapter 6 and concerns measures by the government player to 
persuade a terrorist organisation not to commence a nuclear attack, either before a 
nuclear plot is instigated as in the previous chapter or after the bomb has been 
acquired. In the second sense of the term the situation is reversed: here the terrorist 
player mimics a state by having a nuclear weapon at the ready in order to deter 
attacks upon him from a hostile government or other organisations. 
7.2 Example: al Qaida 
In a notable paper, Lewis A. Dunn asks whether al Qaida could see other uses of 
nuclear weapons than simply a clandestinely delivered attack7. His analysis is useful 
as a backdrop for our discussion of the same question. 
Dunn considers four aspects of the available knowledge about al Qaida and 
discusses how well these observed traits concord with the use of nuclear weapons 
for attack or as a tool either for blackmail or as a deterrent against attacks upon 
them by, say, the United States. Dunn's approach is well summarised by the four 
ways in which he approaches his research question of whether al Qaida may choose 
not to detonate a nuclear weapon they have already acquired: 
• Ground truth: What does the physical evidence (notably seized documents in 
Afghanistan) indicate? Dunn concludes that the ground truth proves that al 
Qaida has attempted acquisition, but gives nothing away about the intended 
uses of such a weapon post acquisitionB. 
• Personnel make-up: Al Qaida, as previously discussed, is made up of members 
with a range of roles and responsibilities. While the core members of al 
Qaida are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of retaliation, some of the 
more peripheral players such as funders and logisticians may be, Dunn 
argues9. The latter might also have ethical scruples. For the purposes of the 
present chapter, which deals with the high-level terrorist strategy, hindering 
a planned attack by deterrence of peripheral players would be equivalent to 
7 Dunn 'Can a1 Qaeda Be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons?' 
8 ibid. pp.5-6 
9 ibid. p.6-8 
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• 
any 'second layer of defence' measure10. It is part of the overall question of al 
Qaida's capability to mount a nuclear attack with all the different obstacles 
this entails and is not considered further here. 
Operational code: Recognising trends in al Qaida's historical targeting and 
attack preparations Dunn considers whether a nuclear attack seems a natural 
extension of the operational code al Qaida has been practising so far. Dunn's 
conclusions of interest here are that 
• A nuclear attack is consistent with al Qaida's preference for 
spectacular attacks, 'visually pleasing' destruction and 
sophistication. 11 
• An attack following acquisition is consistent with al Qaida's tend('nc~' 
to want to 'finish the task,12. 
• The long time spent planning and preparing for attacks (often a year 
and more) indicates that al Qaida's planners have a long time 
horizon. This indicates that they might think seriously consider what 
the best use of a nuclear weapon would be13. 
• Consistency with political vision: al Qaida's proclaimed political vision is the 
establishment of a Muslim caliphate in an empire stretching from northern 
Africa to south-east Asia. Perhaps the most important question, Dunn 
reasons, is whether the detonation of a nuclear weapon will forward this 
goal or if another usage of the weapon would be preferable14. Al Qaida's 
concerns could include alienation of the Muslim populations in case of 
attack, as well as using the nuclear weapon as a means of deterrence on the 
way to establishing their kingdom. 
Upon extracting its essentials, Dunn's paper tells us some important lessons that 
will be discussed in the following before we engage with the strategic gaming. 
10 See appendix D for further details. 
11 Dunn 'Can al Qaeda be Deterred ... ' pp.8-9 
12 ibid. p.ll 
13 ibid. p.14 
14 ibid. pp.17-21 
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7.3 Principal issues of use or non-use 
Based on the analysis by Dunn, the reasons why a given terrorist organisation 
might choose not to use an acquired weapon in an attack as soon as possible can be 
divided into five different categories which will be discussed shortly (?\ote that 
these categories are not mutually exclusive): 
1. The terrorist group's leadership decides nuclear attack does not sen"e their 
purposes or forward their goals. This is the kind of argument that is 
normally used to assure that a poZiticaZ15 terrorist would not wish to detonate 
a nuclear weapon
16
; a political terrorist group depends on not alienating its 
followers by excessive violence. 
2. The leadership would have preferred to detonate, but decides before 
delivery the probability of failure is too high. 
3. The leadership has been persuaded that a nuclear attack is morally wrong. 
4. The leadership decides the nuclear weapon can be more fruitfully used to 
blackmail a government into concessions. 
5. The leadership decides the nuclear weapon IS best used as a deterrent 
against attacks on them by an adversary government or organisation. 
Let me consider al Qaida again. Dunn points to the possibility of alienation as a 
concern which could keep al Qaida from detonating a nuclear device. Bin Laden's 
stated goal is to rally the Muslims of the world to form his Caliphate, a goal towards 
which repulsing millions of Muslims with excessive violence would likely be 
counterproductive. Whether this is his real goal or not is a relevant question which 
lies to the side of our discussion, but whose answer clearly matters if one were to 
answer the question of what use al Qaida specifically would have of a nuclear 
weapon. In the gaming part of this chapter I consider as usual a more generic 
terrorist organisation whose motivation is, for generality, part militant and part 
15 That is, a group which uses violent means to gain bargaining power as a means to achie\'{.' 
political goals. See discussion in section 5.4. 
16 Most famously the series of papers by Brian Michael Jenkins and co-workers: 'Will T errori-;t-; (~(l 
Nuclear?' RAND paper (1975)*; 'The potential for nuclear terrorism' RAND paper (FJ77)*; '\\'ill 
Terrorists Go Nuclear?' Orbis 29:3 (1985) pp.s07-515; 'The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism' 1.;.<\,\0 
paper (1985); Peter deLeon, Bruce Hoffman, Konrad Kellen, and Brian Jenkins 'The Threat of 
Nuclear Terrorism: A Reexamination' RAND paper (1988)*. These papers argue that terron"ts 
want attention and that a large body count is not a goal in itself to such groups. 
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political. 
Worries about alienation conforms to the conventional wisdom as regards 
political terrorist groups. Until the early 1990s terrorism was typically more or less 
equated with political terrorism, which made leading analysts such as Brian ~1ichael 
Jenkins assert that terrorists would have no use of such a massively destructi\"e 
weapon
17
• A political terrorist organisation depends on the sympathy and support 
of an audience of less radical bystanders, and the killing of innocents in large 
numbers would almost certainly not serve their purposes. 
In a gaming setting this can be translated into an assumption that a political 
terrorist expects to extract a negative payoff from detonating a nuclear bomb, hence 
such action is not preferable compared to doing nothing (payoff zero). Presumably, 
the rational terrorist will in this case probably not have acquired the weapon in the 
first place. 
Point 2 on the list is an example of deterrence by denial as discussed in chapter 6 
and is not so important to the analysis undertaken herein. The rational terrorist will 
have thought through the entire plot from start to finish, including delivery, before 
attempting to acquire the real weapon, and all else being equal, the project's overall 
failure probability will be lower after successful acquisition than it was at the outset 
of the project. However, new information could have become available to the 
terrorist during the acquisition phase which changes his cost/benefit analysis, but 
this is not a focus point of this chapter. 
There is also some reason to question, argues Dunn, whether bin Laden and his 
closest associates could still have some moral qualms against killing such a vast 
number of people (including, most likely, a number of Muslims) in one blow; point 
3 above. Such considerations will be little more than informed speculation however, 
and one is probably ill-advised to base policy on such hopes. In a game, moral 
concerns would translate to lower expected payoff from a nuclear attack for the 
terrorist and at least entail that the assumption employed previously, that terrorists 
extract payoff proportional to the damage done, is not correct. Lower payoffs wi II 
serve to enhance self-deterrence as discussed in chapter 6. 
17 See footnote 16. 
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Arguably, the two last points in the above list are the most interesting for the 
present analysis. Blackmail and deterrence are two ways by which a nuclear 
weapon could conceivably be of use to a nuclear terrorist without its actual 
detonation. 
Osama bin Laden, for example, has been quoted mentioning the possibility of 
obtaining nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes. In 1998 he commented that 'It 
would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would pre\'ent 
the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.,18 Two months after the 2001 attacks 
on the US east coast he told a Pakistani journalist 'I wish to declare that if America 
used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and 
nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as deterrent.,19 To the author's knowledge, 
no serious analyst has believed bin Laden's claims that he already has nuclear 
weapons. Nonetheless, these quotes show that al Qaida has done some thinking 
about what to do with a nuclear weapon should they ever acquire one. 
7.4 The credib Ie threat 
Assume now that a terrorist organisation has a nuclear weapon and wishes to use 
it to blackmail a government into certain actions. There are, as several other authors 
have pointed out in the past, a number of obstacles to overcome in order for such a 
plan to succeed. 
Importantly, the terrorist would have to ensure that his nuclear threat is credible. 
Assume the terrorist has built his bomb himself. No non-state actor has ever been 
known to obtain a nuclear capability before, so proving that he has succeeded will 
not be easy. One could imagine the terrorist providing some physical proof which at 
least makes the successful acquisition of a bomb probable. He could send a sample 
of the nuclear material for a start. This could be risky, however, since nuclear 
forensics might be able to find out where the material originated from and hence 
help intelligence to track down and intercept the ploeo. 
Nuclear material alone is not enough to have a bomb, however. A considerable 
18 Rahimullah Yusufzai 'Conversation with Terror' TIME magazine Uanuary 11, 1999)* 
19 Hamid Mir 'Osama claims he has nukes: If US uses N-arms it will get same response' DawII 
(November 10, 2001)* 
20 Levi 011 Nuclear Terrorism p.121 
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technical capability must also be in place21. One could imagine the terrorists making 
public a videotape showing production equipment and assembly, again a 
potentially risky enterprise, should anyone be able to recognise the location and 
localise the group. Indeed, in his book, John McPhee goes so far as to argue that it 
may be necessary for the terrorist bomb-maker to make two bombs and detonate 
one as a demonstration in order to be believed22. It will not be necessary to prove the 
existence of the weapon beyond all doubt, however - the gravity of the 
consequences of an attack will probably make the government take the threat very 
seriously unless it can certify that the threat is not real. 
In addition to proving the bomb really exists and will plausibly work, however, 
comes the problem of delivering it. Simply having the weapon hidden in some 
faraway country may not be enough. This is why a nuclear programme in a 
proliferating state is normally accompanied by a missile development programme: a 
bomb without a means of delivery is of limited value23. Thus a credible threat 
should also provide some proof that the terrorist is able to deliver the bomb to a 
target of great value to the government. 
As has been extensively discussed by Levi24 smuggling a ready-built nuclear 
weapon into a different country is not a trivial task at the best of times25, even when 
the target country is not looking for it. After an official threat has been issued, the 
inspection of incoming goods and traffic is bound to toughen, hence arguably the 
most effective blackmail or deterrence scenarios seem to be such in which the bomb 
is already in place at or near to the target before the threat is pronounced (hidden, 
say, in an American city ready to be detonated) or where the target is easily reached 
or difficult to defend but may in this case be somewhat less valuable to the 
government in question (an example could be American forces in Iraq) 2tl. 
21 See chapter 3. 
22 John McPhee The Curve of Binding Energy (New York Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 197-1) pp.1-l-l-H5 
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See appendix D for further details about such 'second layers of defence'. 
For deterrence purposes it is possible that the small probabilit\· t~at a weapon in a farima\' <; 
countr\' could be used in an attack upon, say, the US might be a nsk large enough to deter attack, 
But se~ further discussions in the following. 
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I will largely limit myself to considering scenarios In which a goyernment 
receives a threat that a nuclear weapon is on its way to or is hidden somewhere in 
one of its bigger cities. The weapon may be claimed to be a deterrent or could come 
with a threat of detonation unless some demand is met. Given some kind of proof 
which makes the reality of the threat plausible, it is likely that the government will 
take the threat seriously. One may remember at this point the episode discussed in 
section 4.4.1 in which a CIA agent codenamed Dragonfire reported that a plot was 
underway to detonate a 10kT nuclear bomb at the Grand Central Station in central 
New York. The threat, even though it was an unconfirmed report by a single agent 
without (presumably) any supporting physical proof, was taken very seriously27. 
Few politicians would risk taking the blame for dismissing as bluff what turns out 
to be a full scale nuclear attack. 
One aspect that may have led the authorities to taking the 'Dragonfire' incident so 
seriously was the implication that the purported weapon was already in the US 
somewhere. Had the threat been Iwe have a weapon ready in the mountains of 
Pakistan and will explode it in the US unless so and so', the threat would have been 
less imminent, since it would have allowed the government considerable time to try 
and intercept the delivery somewhere between Pakistan and New York. With 
enough resources poured into a short term action, the government can significantly 
boost the probably of detecting such a big metal object weighing perhaps several 
tonnes and radiating neutrons and gamma-rays, although no such defence can ever 
be guaranteed to succeed and the staggering number of ways in which such a 
smuggling operation could possibly embody itself would be on the terrorists I side2~. 
In most plausible scenarios29, a terrorist in his right mind30 would not issue such a 
threat before smuggling the device, since the smuggling operation would be 
27 See e.g. Graham Allison Nuclear Terrorism: the Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times 
Books, 2004) pp.I-3. 
28 e.g. Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier 'Terrorist Nuclear Weapon ~onstruction: Hm\" Difficult?' 
The Annals of the AASPP 607 (2006) p. 142 or Matthew Bu~ ~uardlan~ at the c.a/(:~ ll( l-!cll: 
Estimating the Risk of Nuclear Theft and Terrorism - and Identifyzng the Hlghest-Pnonty Risks of Nuclear 
Theft PhD dissertation (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007)* p. 157 
29 Possible counterexamples might be such in which the terrorist lied about the location of the 
weapon to divert the government's defensive measures. 
30 Some would argue that terrorists are never in their right mind. But see the discussion of tl'rrorl~l 
ra tionali tv in section 2.9. 
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complicated a great deal as a consequence of providing the crucial information that 
it exists. 
7.5 Scenarios and incentives 
Assume that a terrorist organisation has successfully hidden a nuclear weapon in 
a western city. What can it do with it? Our list contains two strategic options apart 
from detonation: blackmail and deterrence of attacks. 
7.5.1 The terrorist's deterrent 
If deterrence is to work, that is, if the planted nuclear weapon is to create a new 
order in which the targeted government refrains from attacking the terrorist's 
interests out of fear, the threat must be sustainable over a long period of time, 
maybe decades. For any government, having a nuclear weapon of unknown yield, 
safety and predictability sitting in one of its cities for the foreseeable future is an 
utterly unacceptable situation, and over time it is hard to imagine that the estimated 
cost of attempted removal of the deterrent will be enough to keep the government 
from taking action. For this reason the placement of a nuclear bomb in a target city, 
say in the US, will almost certainly create a situation too unstable to be upheld 
beyond the short term. 
If bin Laden's talk of deterrence is to be taken seriously, what he may have in 
mind is to keep a nuclear weapon within the area he wishes to defend and threaten 
to use it tactically against invading forces or against easy-to-reach targets of some 
value to the attackers. 
Perhaps the most likely scenario is one in which the terrorist organisation holds a 
nearby city hostage, to which it is credible that a nuclear weapon could be 
delivered. If a large portion of the casualties belong to the population group whose 
interests the terrorist purports to defend, it is questionable whether carrying out 
such a threat is in fact the terrorist's best option if deterrence fails and he is in fact 
attacked, and of course, once detonated the deterrent is gone. Thus the terrorist's 
challenge is to make this scenario sufficiently probable in the mind of the deterred 
actors. Deterrence is all about psychology, argues Freedman, and as such 'all 
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deterrence is self-deterrence in that it ultimately depends on the calculations of the 
deterred,31. It works, in simple terms, if the terrorist threat can make the 
government's estimated cost of attacking worse than the continued existence of a 
nuclear armed terrorist organisation. During the Cold War the consequences of 
deterrence failure could have been all-out nuclear annihilation, a scenario so bleak 
that it rendered almost any other option preferable, even if there \,\Tas a significant 
probability that an attack would not in fact be retaliated despite the threats. 
Whether a terrorist could achieve the same end with a single weapon or whether, on 
the contrary, the acquisition of nuclear arms by a terrorist organisation would 
provoke 'pre-emptive' attacks upon it, is an important and many-faceted question 
which will only be considered briefly towards the end of this chapter for reasons of 
manageabili ty. 
7.5.2 The likely candidate: blackmail 
I will henceforth consider threats of attacks directed against the government 
itself. In this case I argued that the more likely strategy would be blackmail. One can 
imagine, for example, an al Qaida nuclear weapon planted in a US city with the 
threat that it will be detonated unless the US pulls out of Afghanistan. The US 
government would then be faced with difficult questions. Accept withdrawal or risk 
a potentially devastating attack? And even if the government does as the terrorist 
demands, can it trust that the bomb will not be set off anyway? It is worth 
considering such a scenario more closely. 
Accepting withdrawal or some other concession will come at a considerable loss 
of political prestige. The US National Security Strategy, for example, explicitly states 
'The United States will make no concessions to terrorist demands and strike no deals 
with them.,32 Yet if the consequence is half a million people dead", many would 
argue that such principles should no longer be upheld. The President who dares to 
stand fast in the face of such a threat will also risk bearing some of the blame for the 
31 Lawrence Freedman Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) p. 30 
32 President George W. Bush The National Security Strategy of the United Steltc:,; of America l \\'ashington 
DC, 2002)* p.5 
33 See discussions in section 4A.1. 
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subsequent attack. On the other hand, pulling forces out of a country is not a quick 
operation and the time it takes will allow the government to try and hunt dm\"I1 the 
plot and derail it34 • The terrorist must be able to uphold the threat throughout the 
withdrawal process, otherwise the government will have no further reason to carr\' 
through with their promise. Thus one would think that demands for concession5 
which can be given almost immediately (the release of prisoners, say) would be 
more likely to succeed than such long term concessions, all else being equal. 
Also, if the terrorist really wants concessions he must create a real incenti\'f' for 
the government to meet his demands. This will surely involve handing o\,er the 
nuclear device when the demands are deemed to be met, since, if he gets to keep the 
weapon he can issue new demands again and again, an unacceptable situation for 
the government. Furthermore, having received a threat the government will work 
very hard to localise it and, at least if the threat was made publicly, evacuate people 
from the area (if the terrorist threat is publicised, people living in the large citil'5 
may have started fleeing to the countryside on their own initiative). Armed with 
time and the knowledge that the plot exists the government has a fair chance of 
locating the bomb. 
7.5.3 Alternative: the fake blackmail 
It is important to recognise at this point that the terrorist can have two very 
different strategic motives for issuing a nuclear blackmail. On the one hand he could 
genuinely want the concessions involved, for example the withdrawal of forces or 
release of prisoners. On the other, if the terrorist realised the demands would not 
realistically be met, the plot could be devised so as to create some justification for 
the attack and at the same time place some of the blame on the government in 
question. This option is missed in all of the literature on nuclear terrorism that the 
author is aware of. 
By issuing a well publicised blackmail threat the terrorist shifts some of the blame 
for the subsequent attack onto the target government, should it not concede to 
terrorist demands. It is not difficult for the terrorist to ensure that the gO\'l'rnment 
J4 Levi 011 Nuclear Terrorism p.121 
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does not concede: the threat can be made to appear incredible (e.g. containing poor 
or faulty information) prompting the government to dismiss it as a hoax, or the 
demands could be greater than what the government could possibly grant in the 
face of which the government has little choice but to take military action. If the 
terrorist announces that the bomb is in 'a major US city', for example, mass hysteria 
could be achieved. When the detonation subsequently takes place, additional 
damage will have been caused to the government beyond the attack itself, and the 
terrorist may have harvested some sympathy for ostensibly giving the government 
a chance to avoid the terrible outcome. 
This scenario is interesting not only because it has not been considered in the 
literature previously, but also for having a peculiar property: When talking of 
attempts to extort concessions by nuclear hoax one thinks of individuals attempting 
to gain something by blackmailing the government based on an insubstantial threat. 
The United States has faced a number of such hoaxes over the years and none of 
them have even been publicly commented on by the government.35 In the scenario 
just laid out, on the other hand, it is not the nuclear threat that is a hoax, but the 
blackmail itself, since no concessions are in reality expected. I will henceforth term 
the former a 'hoax blackmail' and the latter a 'fake blackmail'. 
The ploy is somewhat risky on the terrorist's part, and perhaps for that reason 
unlikely based on the history of terrorist risk aversion discussed in the previous 
chapter. The plot means waiting in place probably for several days after the threat 
has been issued before detonating, while the government may be working to track 
down the weapon. 
7.5.4 Public or tacit blackmailing? 
Arguably, the fake blackmail strategy discussed above depends on the threat 
being publicly disseminated to be sure to be effective36• If, on the other hand, the 
35 Jeffrey T. Richelson 'Defusing Nuclear Terror' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58:2 (2002) pp. 3~--t3 
Also Levi On Nuclear terrorism p. 120 
36 One could of course imagine the terrorist organisation warning the government tacitly, setting off 
the bomb and then making the public announcement that the government had been ~\·arned .. Tlw 
government could deny that any threat had been received, however, whereas a p.ubhc warmng 
would have been indisputable proof. As importantly, the terrorist \\'(1uld not achleH'.the ma~~I\'e 
panic which would make ewrv citizen aware of the government's predicament, pOSSibly 
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terrorist really wants concessions, it is at least arguable that he will stand a better 
chance if the threat is communicated to the government secretly. 
As previously mentioned, a true blackmail must create a real incenti\'e for the 
government to concede. In short, the government must estimate that the large 
political cost of negotiating with terrorists and the expected outcome of doing so is 
in fact preferable to an even less desirable outcome. This presents the terrorist \\'ith 
a very difficult exercise in communication: he must make the government belien1 
that while he is perfectly willing to slaughter perhaps a hundred thousand citizens 
in a single blow, he is nonetheless to be trusted to keep his part of the bargain and 
hand over the weapon if demands are met. Thus it is necessary for the terrorist to 
make every effort to convey the message that it is 'playing fair'. Adding enormous 
pressure on the government by creating public panic is hardly useful towards this 
end. 
At the outset the government appears to have every reason to doubt the terrorist. 
Unless satisfactory proof is provided, the threat will likely be thought to be a hoax. 
As previously discussed, the terrorist must make a convincing case for the reality of 
his nuclear capability whether it really exists or not. A question the government 
should and probably would ask is why they are seeing a blackmail threat instead of 
a straightforward attack. An obvious candidate answer, at least when the terrorist is 
of a type believed likely to wish to kill in large numbers, would be that he does not 
believe the weapon will work and turns to 'plan 8' instead. For this reason a hoax 
blackmail must be made very believable in order to stand any chance of producing 
concessions, a conclusion supported by the failure of nuclear hoaxes over the years 
37 
to produce any response from the US government. 
With proof provided, the government still has reason to doubt whether the 
terrorist will keep his part of the bargain and hand the weapon over. If the terrorist 
is known to be militant and extremist, like al Qaida, the government must always 
fear that its intention is to use the weapon to extort all that it can before finalh' 
detonating it, in which case the government would have been better off using force 
to try and stop the plot right away. 
persuading some that the government is at least partly at fault for the dreadful outcome, 
37 Richelson 'Defusing Nuclear Terror' 
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If the organisation is known to be of a more political nature, on the other hand, 
the situation is somewhat less clear, yet as argued by many in the past:' and 
discussed further below, a politically motivated group will have a very serious 
disincentive to actually explode the bomb as it will arguably not serve its purposes, 
for which reason the threat will not be credible even if the weapon itself is real. ;"'lost 
likely a group with a political agenda will not find a nuclear project worthwhile in 
the first place, however, and the threat is likely to be a hoax. While such logic makes 
good sense in principle, to what extent a government will dare to take the risk of 
trusting the terrorist's own cost/benefit analysis to keep it from exploding the 
weapon is an open question. For much the same reason as Jenkins and co-workers, I 
find the scenario of a believable nuclear threat from a political terrorist organisation 
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Illustration 7.1.: Simple decision theoretical model of nuclear terrorist blackmail. 
While this argument may not encompass the full set of possible scenarios, it 
strongly suggests that if the terrorist really intends to go into negotiations, it will 
communicate its threat secretly, in which case the fake blackmail scenario 
previously analysed is out of the question. If one buys this argument, it leads to an 
obvious policy implication: 
A sufficiently credible nuclear blackmail threat issued publicly should 
be met with force and every effort to try to hinder the threatened 
attack. 
38 e.g. Jenkins 'Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?' (1975). See footnote 16. 
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What exactly is meant by 'sufficiently credible' can be formalised by a simple 
decision theoretical model similar to previous efforts. Consider the situation in 
figure 7.1 where a threat has been made public by a terrorist who either has a real 
weapon (state denoted [W], 'with') or does not (denoted [Wo], 'without'). I assume 
for simplicity that the terrorist with a weapon will always successfully detonate it. 
The government estimates that [W] has a probability of p and [Wo] of I-p. The threat 
being public, the government concludes (in accordance with the above argument) 
that concessions are out of the question and chooses between responding with force 
(denoted (R)) and dismissing the threat (denoted (D)). An attack has a cost of -T, 
with an additional political cost of -b in the case where G dismisses a threat which i~ 
real. The cost of forceful response is -CR. The method of analysis is simple and so 
similar to that of previous chapter that I will skip the details. It is easily verified 39 
that according to the simple model, forceful response is at least as good as dismissal 
if 
(7.1) 
Arguably b is likely to be much greater than CR, in which case dismissal is preferable 
only when the government is very sure that the threat is a hoax. A refinement of the 
game in which the government has a finite probability of actually hindering the 
attack will only strengthen this conclusion. 
Thus a straightforward policy conclusion is reached: a publicly announced 
blackmail whose reality has an estimated probability satisfying (7.1) should be met 
with a forceful response. Indeed, the indication is that a publicly announced nuclear 
extortion attempt is in fact either a hoax or a fake blackmail, the latter merely one of 
the many ways in which a nuclear terrorist attack may embody itself. In the 
remainder of the chapter I will assume that the threat is issued quietly. 
7.6 Strategic interplay of nuclear blackmail: a gaming approach 
In order to try and formalise the strategic logic of nuclear blackmail we will no\\' 
introduce a game theoretic model belonging to the class of games commonly called 
39 The expected payoff from opting for (R) is U(R) = -.pT - CR~ and that for (0) is U([)) = - pT - 1'/1, 
from which (7.1) follows immediately through the mequaht\' U(R) ~ U(O), 
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signalling games. This section will inevitably be tough reading for the reader with 
no previous experience of this type of game, for which reason I will go through the 
main concepts of such games as the analysis progresses. Signalling games are not 
normally difficult mathematically, but can be conceptually challenging, and the 
reader may wish to refer to an introductory textbook in game theory at this point -Ill. I 
will start the analysis with possibly the simplest non-trivial game which captures 
some of the essentials of a nuclear blackmail situation and continue by making 
gradual generalisations of the game to study more detailed aspects of the scenario in 
keeping with the qualitative discussions above. 
As discussed above the game will only deal with the question of nuclear 
blackmail, and a number of assumptions will be made regarding the situation to be 
modelled. I assume a nuclear threat is communicated secretly to a government. The 
scenario one could have in mind is one where a bomb is claimed to be present in or 
on its way to a major city in a western country. This is the scenario which will be 
used when making plausibility arguments about the quantitative relations between 
parameters, but the model is in itself general enough to also capture blackmail 
against the government's interests outside her own territory (with different values 
of parameters as appropriate). 
We denote the government player G and the terrorist as player T. Since, unlike in 
previous chapters, the government moves last, player G is assumed female and the 
terrorist male in this chapter per convention. 
After receiving a nuclear threat with a demand for concessions, the government is 




Respond forcefully (R): the government responds forcefully either 
domestically or abroad in an attempt to hinder the attack. 
Concede to demands (C): Concessions are pledged to meet the terrorist's 
demands in an attempt to hinder the attack. 
Dismiss terrorist threat (D): Threat is dismissed as a hoax and no action is 
taken. 
As is standard in game theory in games of incomplete information we assume that 
40 e.g. Gibbons A primer in Game Theory 
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there are two types of terrorist: the type who really has a nuclear ' d \\ eapon, an a type 
who does not. The two types have the same sets of possible actions but \\'ith 
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Illustration 7.2.: The general layout of the two-player nuclear blackmail game. 
Later the rounded boxes will contain the payoffs for the two players for each outcome of the game 
instead of the dots; player GiS payoffs above, Tis payoff below. 
The general game is laid out in figure 7.2 and may be summarised thus: First 
nature picks the terrorist type from a set of two options: the type with nuclear 
weapons, [W] and the type without [Wo]. [W] is picked with probability p and [Wo] 
with probability 1-p. Player T, knowing his own type, then decides whether to 
blackmail (B) or attack (A). If he has no nuclear weapon [Wo] the attack has no effect 
(equivalent to doing nothing). If action (B) is chosen, the government can choose 
from a set of three different actions in response, (R), (C) and (D) as described above. 
Each player has a strategy which is a set of actions, one for each possible state the 
game could be in at the time of decision. Since in our game each player only moves 
once
41 
so there is no difference between a strategy and an action. In this simple game 
there are four different possible sets of strategies for player T: two possible actions 
for each of the two types. There is only one type of G which has three different 
41 This is not strictly true, as will be seen, since the terrorist [W] is given a choice whether or not tl) 
detonate in the c~se where the government pledges concessions. This choice is trivial tl) deal \\Ith, 
as will become obvious, and we can play the game as if the terrorist onl\' makes a single choice, 
between (A) and (B). 
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possible actions/ strategies. 
7.6.1 The perfect Bayesian equilibrium: definition 
The standard way to analyse signalling games is to look for so-called perfect 
Bayesian equilibria. A very readable introduction to this type of games is found in 
Gibbons' book42. For the reader who is well versed in signalling games, this section 
can safely be skipped. 
An equilibrium of the Bayesian game 43 considered here consists of the following 
information: 
• A set of strategies, one for each player. The terrorist's strategy, remember, 
consists in turn of two actions, one for each type. 
• The belief p of player G. 
Player G has a prior belief at the start of the game, where p equals nature's 
probability p, and a posterior belief after a signal is received. Roughly, the primar~' 
components of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) are that 
• It is a Nash equilibrium, that is, for each type of player T, T's strategy is a 
best response to player G's strategy, and given player G's belief p, GiS 
strategy is also a best response to player T's set of strategies. Put in other 
words: given that all other players and types follow their equilibrium 
strategies, no player has an incentive to deviate from her/his equilibrium 
strategy. 
• It is Bayesian, that is, player G has a belief about the type of player T, and the 
belief follows Bayes' rule. Bayes' rule is a mathematical theorem which 
dictates how a player should update his or her beliefs in a consistent way as 
a consequence of new information, in this case a signal. In the present game 
+l 
the signal which G receives from T is whether (B) or (A) has been chosen . 
42 Robert Gibbons A Primer in Game Theory Chapter 4 
43 i.e. games of incomplete information, that is, when a player is uncertain about the preferences 01 
another player. 
44 In the latter case it does not matter what the government chooses to do, but this make..; no 
fundamental difference to the \\'ay the game is played. If one pleased, one could equivalently let 
G choose between (R), (C) and (D) following both (A) or (B), but in the former case let the payoff~ 
be identical independently of G's action. 
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That the equilibrium is Bayesian simply means that the belief of player G 
must be consistent with the information she has45• The information G has 
here is: what Tis strategy is46 and what the payoffs are for different outcomes. 
One can think of the equilibrium as if the game is played out on paper and the 
players may change their strategies in response to each other any number of times 
until both players have no reason to change further. If there is a unique equilibrium, 
this will have been reached; if there are several equilibria, one of them will haye 
been reached - which one depends on how the gameplay was started, and if there 
are no equilibria the process will not converge at all. An analogy to the game with a 
single Nash equilibrium may be a marble set to roll in a bathtub; after a while it will 
settle in the drain which is the only equilibrium position. The randomness of the 
roulette wheel, in contrast, is provided by the fact that there are many equilibrium 
positions in which the ball may finally settle, the thirty-odd 'pockets' of the wheel, 
and which one it settles in is determined in a complicated way by exactly how the 
ball is thrown. Repeated play of a game with no equilibria may behave something 
like a cat-and-mouse chase; the cat always has an incentive to change its position to 
get to where the mouse is, for which reason the mouse has an incentive to change its 
position all the time. 
For a more rigorous definition of the PBE, the reader is referred to textbooks in 
game theory. Several refinements of the equilibrium are available, yet I will as a rule 
only introduce the minimum of general game theory required for the task at hand. 
I will denote Tis strategies as for example (A, B), where the first strategy refers to 
type [W] and the second to type [Wo]. T's strategies (A,A) and (B,B) are called 
pooling strategies since both types of T choose the same action, and the strategy 
couples (A,B) and (B,A) are called separating strategies since they dictate different 
actions for the different types. Note importantly that even though T could well 
45 
46 
The reader may be confused by looking up the actual Bayes' rule at this point, which in lls g~neral 
form represents methodological overkill in such simple games as t~ese. The conc~pt of c~nslst~nt 
beliefs will be treated in a more pragmatic way in the following, SUItable for the slmple slgnalling 
game. 
This statement is a little simplistic as will be explained. In fact the.proc.es~ of f~ding equilibria 
goes 'backwards' so that one starts by assuming what the equilibnum. 15, m whlCh C,1 .... l' all . 
strategies are assumed known. Candidate equilibria which do not satisfy the necessary cntena are 
thereafter discarded until one is left with the true equilibria. 
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employ the strategy (A,A) which means that G does not get to act at all, G has a 
strategy nonetheless, which would have been used if T's strategy had involved 
blackmail. This is just what happens in real life: the US is stating that it will never 
concede to terrorist demands, a policy which exists whether such demands are 
made or not. 
The process of finding an equilibrium goes as follows. First one assumes that a set 
of strategies is a candidate PBE (in this game there are 12 possible candidates: G has 
three strategies for each of TIs four). Each candidate is then compared to the criteria 
for a PBE47 and candidates not satisfying these are discarded. Remember that a PBE 
consists of a strategy profile and player GIS belief. Specifically the definition of the 
PBE requires that G cannot believe with finite probability that the state of the game 
at time of decision is one that could not be reached unless T did not follow his 
equilibrium strategy. In other words, an equilibrium cannot depend on a player 
believing it is not an equilibrium. 
That the belief is Bayesian in the context of our simple game means only that 
given a candidate equilibrium strategy profile, G must believe that the state of the 
game is one which can possibly be reached by all players playing according to this 
profile. Before the game starts G holds a prior belief that the probability of [W] is 
equal to that with which nature picks between the types, that is p=p. Given a signal 
and a candidate equilibrium, however, G must update her beliefs. If T's strategy is, 
say (B,A), then if G observes a signal (B) (that is, receives a blackmail) it implies that 
T is of type [W] and thus the posterior belief must be p=l. Any other value would 
imply that G believed T might not play according to his equilibrium strategy set 
(B,A) after all. Likewise for (A,B), a signal (B) implies p=O. Since G is allowed no 
action following (A), we need not consider this signal here. 
7.6.2 The normative value of an equilibrium 
An important question which has been a source of debate for some time is what 
normative value one can ascribe an equilibrium of a game, should one exist. In the 
previous cases of decision theory it is relatively unproblematic to think of the 
47 See e.g. chapter 4 of Gibbons A Primer in Game Theory 
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solutions as the way the player in question should play if he/ she is perfectly rational 
and intelligent. In a multi-player game, however, the interpretation is not so simple, 
because, as Goeree and Holt put it, 'the best way for one to playa game depends on 
how others actually play the game, not on how some theory dictates that rational 
people should play.,48 These authors compare ten experiments where test persons are 
given one chance to playa given game, and note very significant deviation from the 
play dictated by the games I Nash equilibria49 • 
This problem is serious, and there may be no way to circumvent it, at least in 
generalso• In the present game, however, I will argue that there are certain 
conclusions one may draw based on plausibility analysis of the dynamics of the 
game. Even if the game has a unique Nash equilibriums1 it is not in general true that 
a player is always better off playing according to this equilibriums2, yet in cases 
where a certain course of action is dominated by the other strategies (i.e. it is under 
no circumstances the preferable one), it would seem on intuitive grounds as a safe 
normative prescription that this particular course of action should not be chosen. In 
the game below we find that one strategy nearly almost dominates the others. 
Secondly, upon finding a unique equilibrium one may apply qualitative analysis 
to assess the Isafetyl of playing according to the equilibrium. The relevant question 
for the government to ask would be 'how grave are the consequences if I play 
according to equilibrium and it turns out T does not?'. In certain situations G may be 
fortunate and find that even if the strategy employed by T is off the equilibrium 
path, the equilibrium response is still the best available, in which case the 
equilibrium arguably has a normative value. On intuitive grounds it is reasonable 
that the worse the loss from erroneously assuming T to play rationally, the less the 
normative value of an equilibrium is. It turns out that I am lucky in this case and 
while game theory is in general not guaranteed to yield normative prescriptions, the 
48 Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt 'Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuiti\'t:' 






Nash himself allegedly reached this conclusion. ibid. p. H19. 
H there are several equilibria, naturally, drawing normative conclusions becomes even more 
dubious cetera paribus. We will find that in the present game there IS ah\'ays only one PBI 1m ,) 
given set of parameter values. 
This is only so provided all other players play according to the equilibrium. 
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equilibria found in this particular game arguably hold some clear addce for a 
government facing nuclear blackmail. 
7.6.3 The basic game 
The first game we will consider is designed to be as simple as possible while still 
capturing some of the dynamics of the extortion situation. A number of simplifying 
assumptions are made. The following assumptions will hold throughout the 
gamIng: 
• The terrorist is assumed to be bloodthirsty and to extract a positive payoff 
from detonation. 
• The terrorist's cost of acquiring the weapon is not taken into account. This is 
arguably a reasonable assumption since this sum is already sunken cost for 
the terrorist. 
• The terrorist type with a nuclear weapon can also choose not to issue the 
threat, but simply detonate without warning (strategy A). The terrorist 
without a nuclear weapon can also choose to either issue a hoax blackmail 
(strategy B) or do nothing (also strategy A for simplicity). 
The following assumptions will furthermore be made for now and be relaxed later: 
• Forceful response by the government will successfully derail the attack. This 
is obviously umealistically optimistic as discussed later. 
• The real and political cost to the government in responding forcefully IS 
assumed negligible compared to other quantities. 
• If the government dismisses the threat and a nuclear attack subsequently 
occurs, no additional political cost is suffered. 
• The terrorist receives no additional payoff for incurring additional terror or 
political damage beyond the attack itself, such as by a fake blackmail 
considered in section 7.5.3. 
This leads to the game depicted ill figure 7.3. The symbols are explained as 
follows (all quantities are defined positive or zero): 
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-T GiS cost from a nuclear attack 
-C GiS political cost of conceding to terrorist demands 
A Tis payoff for successful detonation 
i 
-cp T's general cost of failure (apprehension, I 
destruction, etc.) 
G T's payoff for harvesting concessions 
p The probability that [W] is picked, equal to GiS prior 
belief that the terrorist has nuclear weapons. 
p GiS posterior belief that the terrorist has nuclear 
weapons, given T's strategy. 
It is of some importance to bear in mind that it matters who estimates the 
parameters above. Since my goal is to inform policymaking, I assume the 
parameters are all as estimated by the government. In particular, A and G are the 
payoff the government believes T will extract in these cases, as opposed to 1's actual 
preferences which G cannot know. 
Note that the form of the game implies that A > o. If A were negative, the terrorist 
with a nuclear weapon would rather do nothing (payoff 0) than detonate the 
weapon, and the game would need to include such an option for [W]. This means 
the present game implicitly assumes that T is not a purely political terrorist, but has 
at least a distinct militant streak. 
For generality, if G pledges to concede to the terroristls demands, T is left with 
the choice whether to detonate the weapon anyway or to give up the weapon and 
collect the rewards (I assume these are of such a nature as to be impossible for G to 
take back after the nuclear weapon is given up). In the case where T breaks his 
promise and detonates anyway, his payoff is A, the same as for a simple attack. This 
is mainly for simplicity, but could possibly be interpreted thus: while he may ha\'l' 
been able to collect concessions the benefits from this are cancelled by loss of 
support amongst potential followers due to unchivalrous behaviour (presumably 
the public will eventually be made aware of the manner in which the drama took 
place). 
One sees from figure 7.3 that in the case where the threat is real, [\\'], and C 




, and we will consider each of these cases separately. Note, crucially, that 
whether or not blackmail can succeed depends not on what the terrorist's real 
preferences are, but what G thinks they are. This will become clearer in a moment. 
Assume now that A > G, that is, G believes T will detonate his weapon even if 
concessions are pledged. I consider GiS options in the case that a threat has been 
issued, that is T has played strategy (B). GiS expected payoffs for the different 





I now introduce the intuitive concept of dominated strategies, which are strategies 
that are never the preferable one. In (7.2) we see that, excepting the case where p=O, 
U(R) is always the highest obtainable utility, that is, whatever T does, G's best 
response is to respond forcefully. In other words, (C) and (D) are strictly dominated 




fr\ (R) \V P (C) 
...... ------""'1I-------t 
p Nuclear weapon 
[W] 
No nuclear 
l-p weapon [Wo] 
(B) 
Illustration 7.3.: The game in its simplest embodiment. 
This conclusion, reached without any detailed analysis of the game, still holds if 
we let A < G (since A > 0 the terrorist is still believed to wish to kill large numbers of 
people, but is even more interested in the concessions). The pa~'offs are no\\' 
53 Since all parameters in the game must be understood ~s the players' best estimates and th:refore 
somewhat coarse, 'critical' cases where one parameter IS exactly equal to some number ar 






In this case it is no longer true as in (7.2) that (0) also strictI)' dominates (C), but still 
U(R) is the best strategy except the case of p=O when G is indifferent between (0) 
and (R). 
There are therefore the same two equilibria in both of these games. The first of 
which is the special case p=O 
ill which the terrorist only blackmails if he does not have a nuclear weapon, 
whereupon the government dismisses it and nothing happens. This is not an 
important equilibrium since, in a slight refinement of the model the terrorist will 
extract a small bonus for the political damage incurred by a government when it 
dismisses a threat which turns out to be real. In this case the equilibrium no longer 
holds. It is not a stable equilibrium since it hinges on [Wo] choosing to blackmail 
even if he is indifferent whether to blackmail or not. The equilibrium, finally, holds 
little normative value because in practice it requires G to be absolutely certain that T 
is playing the separating strategy (A, B) - if he is wrong about this, he could in the 
worst case find himself dismissing a real threat. With reference to the discussion in 
section 7.6.2 therefore, I can safely discard this equilibrium on qualitative grounds 
and turn to the more interesting one. 
The other equilibrium is 
(7..+) 
which is the equilibrium whose stability will be tested in the remainder of the 
gaming section by gradually generalising the game. In this game the terrorist does 
not issue any blackmail but simply attacks if it has a nuclear weapon. The 
government on its side has resolved to respond forcefully to any nuclear blackmail 
threat. Of course, if T follows the strategy (A,A) no such threat will ever be issued in 
the first place, and so (R) must here be understood as a threat from the government. 
Note how this equilibrium chimes well with the declared US policy to not 
negotiate with terrorists. As such the following analysis tests the robustness of the 
- 236-
conclusion that such policy is a best response to nuclear blackmail threats and thus 
has very direct implications for the stance of the US and other potential target 
nations in the face of such threats of extreme violence. 
7.6.4 First generalisation: forceful response not guaranteed to 'work 
The equilibrium (7.4) was reached with great ease and appears, within the confine~ 
of the very simple game of figure 7.3, to be a very stable equilibrium. However, 
some of the simplifying assumptions made clearly act to strengthen the assertion 
that (7.4) represents normatively rational play of the game. In the following I will 
therefore test the hypothesis that the uniqueness of the equilibrium (7A) is due to 
simplifying assumptions, and that more nuanced game-play will emerge upon 
relaxation of these assumptions. 
One such assumption is that forceful response to a nuclear threat is guaranteed to 
successfully stop the attackers, an assumption which is clearly unrealistically 
optimistic and makes the government's threat of forceful response more persuasive 
to the terrorist than is the case in reality. Let me therefore generalise the model so 
that the efforts by G to stop the attack has a probability P of succeeding. 
To avoid excessively lengthy analysis, I also introduce at this stage an additional 
political cost b for G in the case where he dismisses a threat which turns out to be 
real, and a bonus p for T when this happens. The resulting game is depicted in 
figure 7.4. 
Consider once more the case of A > G. Now the payoffs for G following (B) are 
U(R)=-p(l-P)T 
U(C)=-pT-C 
U(D)= -p (T +b). 
(7.5) 
Because of the restrictions on the values the parameters can take the reader will 
easily verify that 
p(l-P)T<p(T+b), pT+C 
and therefore once again (R) is the best response except in the special case p=O, just 
like before (which is worse amongst concessions and dismissal is now not certain). 
Note that neither the introduction of P < 1 nor b > 0 can change this result. This time 
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around there is no separating equilibrium where T has strategy (A, B)54. The only 
equilibrium is therefore once again (7.4), which holds for all legal values of the 
gaming parameters. In short, when G assesses that A > G, the equilibrium is 




p Nuclear weapon 
[W] 
No nuclear 
l-p weapon [W 0] 
(B) 
-(l-P)T 
-Pcp + (l-P)A 
Illustration 7.4.: Generalised game: response could fail, dismissal has cost. 





This is a little more interesting since while (R) dominates (D) except for p=O, (C) can 
be preferable to (R) depending on the value of p. One easily verifies that this is so if 
In this case there is an equilibrium 
:>-: C 
P7 T(1-P)' (7.7) 
(7.8) 
This equilibrium is interesting and captures some of the dynamics of the game. The 
situation here is this: the terrorist has succeeded in making the government belil'\'L' 
54 If 1's strategy is (A, B), G will be indifferent between (R) and (D) following a signal (B) since she 
knows there is no real bomb. If he plays (R), however, [Wo] is better off changing strategy, so the 
only possible equilibrium would be [(A, B), D, p=O]. However if G is to play (D), [\\'j is better off 
changing strategies from (A) to (B), hence this is not an equilibrium. 
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that it truly wants the concessions more than it wants to kill large numbers of 
innocents, and will in fact give up its weapon in return for government co-
operation. The government considers that the terrorist is likely to possess a real 
nuclear weapon and also that an attempt to try to disarm the blackmailers is quite 
likely to fail. If she moreover considers making concessions to terrorists a 
considerably lesser evil than a successful attack, this equilibrium could hold true. 
While depending on a somewhat delicate balance of parameters, this is the situation 
in which the terrorist could possibly be able to successfully blackmail the 
government. As argued, however, it may be very difficult to persuade G that G > A. 
If the inequality (7.7) is reversed, however, the only equilibrium is one like (7.4): 
(7.9) 
The case of a bloodthirsty terrorist for whom A > G, one quickly verifies that (R) 
once again dominates both (C) and (D) and there is only one equilibrium, namely 
[(A,A),R,p=p; A>G] (7.10) 
similar once more to (7.4). 
7.6.5 Generalisation: attack without warning has non-unity probability 
of success 
As argued above, T will have great difficulty convincing G that while it is willing 
to commit such an extreme atrocity as to detonate a nuclear bomb killing thousands, 
it will nonetheless co-operate if G gives concessions. I turn therefore henceforth to 
the likely case where A > G (in GiS estimation). 
Another assumption employed hitherto is that if the terrorist chooses to attack 
without deliberate warning he has a 100% chance of success. Since this unrealistic 
assumption clearly makes the option of simply attacking more lucrative to T than it 
really is, there is reason to investigate whether generalising this will change the 
conclusion thus far that if A > G in GiS estimate, the only plausible equilibrium 
(which also, as argued, has considerable normative value) is one with "tratcg~' 
profile [(A,A), R]. 
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Letting the probability of attack success be q and assuming A > G the game of 
figure 7.4 is obtained. As before for G (R) domm· ates th It t· . 
" e a erna Ive strategIes 
whenever p>O in this case, and is arguably the only rational response to a blackmail 
threat. Knowing G will respond forcefully, however, [Wo] will never be better off 










p Nuclear weapon 
[W] 
No nuclear 
l-p weapon [W 0] 
(B) 
-(1-P)T 
-P<p + (1-P)A 
Illustration 7.5.: The game assuming A>G and nonzero direct attack failure rate. 
qA - (1 - q ) qJ ~ A ( 1 - P ) - P qJ , 
that is, assuming A > qJ,55 
q~l-P. 
In other words, as long as the probability of a successful attack with no warning is 
greater than the probability of a successful attack in the face of a forceful response 
from G, the equilibrium (7.5) still holds. It is reasonable to assume that, except in 
very special cases56, this is always so. 
55 I assume this is true without much discussion. If this is not so, the rational terrorist will not -.t.ut ,1 
nuclear project in the first place, since it will probably have a negatiw expected payoff and 
certainly a very large operational risk to the terrorist. See chapter 6 for further discussion. 
56 One could imagine the terrorist very cleverly leading governmentalcttl1rts on the \\rong track 
thus managing to lower rather than increase the chance of successful attack subsequent tt) the 
warning. 
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7.6.6 Final generalisation: cost/penalty for failed interdiction 
By now it will seem that, at least in the case of the bloodthirsty terrorist who is 
more interested in attacking than concessions, the only rational play is for the 
terrorist to not issue a blackmail and for the government to affirm that it will 
respond forcefully to such a threat should it occur. My final attempt to explore the 
limits of stability of this equilibrium is to let G have a considerable cost when 
responding with force. This cost could be the actual price of a large operation and a 
political cost for not heeding the terrorist threat and thereby placing the population 







(;':\ (R) -Pcp + (l-P)A 
\:!:.J P (C)--
p Nuclear weapon 
[W] 
No nuclear 
I-p weapon [Wo] 
(B) 
Illustration 7.6.: The game of fig. 7.5 with forceful response penalty. 
With these payoffs one readily finds that following an observation of (B), (R) is 
preferable to (D) for G if 
CB 
P > b+PT 
Since T is a large number, this is probably true except when the probability of the 
. d to be \'l'f\' low CB i~ terrorist having a real nuclear weapon IS assume -' 
I t (A B) so that p = 0 The latter ca-;l' i-; unreasonably large, or when Temp oys stra egy , . 
57 
no equilibrium here, however . 
B) ' d' ' 1 'nwhichcasei\\lisbetter(ltt 57 With a non-zero CBI G's best response to (A, IS ISffilssa I 1 . 
choosing (B), 
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Similarly, (R) is preferred to (C) iff 
c -c pp>_B_ 
T 
This, similarly, is also expected to hold true except for P and p very close to O. 
Indeed, the more probable estimate will put C greater than CB (the political cost of 
agreeing to terrorist demands is arguably expected to be higher than that of 
responding forcefully to a threat as outrageous as that in question), in which case 
the fraction is negative and the inequality is true for any P ~ O. 
In conclusion, unless umeasonably large, a taxation of the option of forceful 
response does not render the equilibrium (7.4) notably less stable. 
7.7 The merits of modelling 
As in previous chapters, I will discuss briefly the gains of applying the chosen 
methodology, in this case game theory, to the problem at hand. In the present 
chapter, one does well to notice that much of the chapter is in fact purely qualitative, 
and many of the new insights stem exclusively from this first part of the chapter. It 
is only after analysing the different options in this way that the more specific 
scenario of blackmail was chosen for gaming. 
The blackmail scenario has all the typical traits which point in the direction of a 
classic signalling game. One player sends a signal which the other player acts upon. 
This is exactly the kind of scenario which signalling games are designed to deal 
with, and if one is to study the question of nuclear terrorism blackmail, such a game 
is a reasonable choice for a first approach. 
As I discussed in section 7.6.2, whereas the decision theory exerCIses m the 
previous chapters have a clear normative value, such is not guaranteed from a two-
player game such as that used in the latter half of this chapter. The fact that the 
equilibria of the game turned out to hold normative power (according to the 
pragmatic criteria laid out in section 7.6.2) may be seen as a strike of luck. Had such 
not been the case, if for example the consequences of erroneously assuming thL' 
terrorist to follow an equilibrium path were devastating whereas the equilibrium 
would not have been, the game would not have pro\'en so useful even if it might 
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still have provided useful insights. It is hard to know beforehand whether this will 
be so, and the easiest way to find out is perhaps simply to perform the analysis. 
An assumption used throughout this chapter is that both the government and the 
terrorist may be reduced to single rational actors. This assumption and its 
ramifications were discussed in general terms in chapter 2. In the present setting we 
found that this simplification may not be so essential for two reasons. Firstly, the 
analysis is normative and describes a scenario which has not yet happened. Hence 
one could always argue that, although due to the interaction of various sub-level 
actors the decision made is not always that of a single rational actor, it should be. The 
recommendation is for the outcome of the state's decision making, and how that 
decision is reached is a separate question. Secondly, one may reasonably argue that, 
due to the scarce communication between the players, the terrorist and government 
can be assumed to have little knowledge of the way in which the adversary makes 
decisions. 
Towards the latter point, however, finding the corrections to this first approach is 
clearly an avenue to explore further. For example the terrorist can read up on the 
target country and find out more about how decisions are actually made, and 
possibly use this to play sub-state actors against each other. Such scenarios would 
primarily be expected to add more detail and nuance to the treatment, but it is also 
thinkable that new insights emerge which run partially counter to those produced 
by the simplest method. 
It seems clear that the gaming out of nuclear blackmail provided a good deal of 
insight which would have been hard to obtain by other means. Yet one should 
notice that a large fraction of the conclusions reached stem from the qualitative 
analysis of the first half of the chapter. 
7.8 Conclusions and policy implications 
I asked at the beginning of the chapter whether there could be other fruitful uses 
of a terrorist nuclear weapon than immediate detonation. I argue that both of the 
two specific options, deterrence and blackmail, may be of use to the terrorist under 
special circumstances, but that there are significant drawbacks with both ot thcsl' 
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strategies which would be senous disincentives for the nuclear armed terrorist 
contemplating deterrence or blackmail. 
It is argued that for a terrorist, hiding a nuclear weapon on the territory of a 
target country in order to deter it from taking action against the terrorist's interests 
is not a viable strategy, since such a situation would be too intolerable to the 
targeted government for the deterrence situation to be stable. A more likel\' scenario 
would be one in which the terrorist held the nuclear weapon in an area it deemed 
safe and threatened to use it against nearby or easy to reach targets. Also in this case 
upholding the deterrent over time will be a problem for the terrorist, and the 
announcement of a nuclear capability could well provoke the pre-emptive attacks it 
is supposed to deter. 
I analyse a few different scenarios of nuclear blackmail, outlining the strategic 
concerns of the terrorist player and government respectively. I argue with the help 
of a signalling game that a government can very plausibly make nuclear blackmai I a 
suboptimal strategy for the terrorist both in the case where he has control of a 
nuclear weapon and in the case where he has not. For nuclear blackmail to work, the 
terrorist must overcome the great challenge of convincing the government that it 
will in fact keep its side of a deal to surrender the weapon undetonated in return for 
concessions; if the government is unconvinced it will have little reason not to 
respond with force, in which case the terrorist is arguably worse off than if the 
attack had been conducted without warning. 
For this reason if a nuclear blackmail attempt is issued publicly by the terrorist I 
argue that it is unlikely that the terrorist truly expects the concessions, especially so 
if the group in question has a history of militancy. In the (arguably) highly unlikely 
scenario where a politically motivated group has acquired a nuclear weapon and 
uses it for extortion, the situation is less clear, and blackmail might be successful in 
this case, although it appears unlikely that such a group will have gone to the 
trouble of acquiring the weapon in the first place. 
In the face of nuclear blackmail by a group known to be militant, I fi nd that the 
best response is nearly always for the government to make every effort to hinder the 
attack with force (despite a terrorist threat to detonate if the government takes slIch 
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action). This fact is what should most likely deter the nuclear armed terrorist from 
attempting blackmail and rather opt for a non-advertised attack instead. The 
corresponding equilibrium situation is one in which no blackmail happens. A test of 
the restrictive assumptions made reveals that the normative \'alue of this 
equilibrium appears soundly established: a government should respond with force 
against a nuclear terrorist blackmail threat except possibly under very special 
circumstances as described above. 
As for defences, the ability to respond in a forceful and directed way to a credible 
nuclear threat when it occurs is essential. Because there is such a multitude of 
shapes and forms which such a threat can take, building a static defence to take on 
all possibilities is probably not as helpful as developing the necessary flexibility and 
mobility of finances, equipment and manpower to mobilise rapidly if and when 
necessary, to support the defence mechanisms which are already in place. 
All else equal, it may be favourable if the terrorist attempts extortion, since it 
buys the defending government time to hamstring the attack. However, \",hat 
appears to be the best response to nuclear blackmail in most cases, forceful 
defensive action, is also the response which will likely deter blackmail in the first 
place. Incidentally such a stance will also form part of a defence which has the very 
desirable side effect of potentially deterring a nuclear terrorism plot before it even 
gets started, as treated in the previous chapter. Given these considerations, 
provoking an extortion scenario (e.g. by sending the message that a nuclear threat 
will not be taken seriously 58) would risk damaging deterrence of nuclear terrorism 
in general and is thus not worthwhile. 
Thus the stance taken by the United States, that no deals will ever be struck with 
terrorists, is probably a sensible one with respect to nuclear terrorist blackmai1
59
. 
While it does create an incentive to the terrorist to detonate the weapon once 
obtained rather than try to use it for negotiation, the prior declaration of a 'no 
deals'-policy could allow the government to respond with force to such threats and 
58 This is very far from the political signals sent, particularly by the United States, today. 
59 Note carefully that this refers to the response to a direct threat of grand scale terrorist violence. It 
is not to be u~derstood to mean that no negotiations should in general take place \",-ith groups that 
have been defined as terrorists by the United States. Such considerations lie far beyond thl' SCl1pl' 
of this thesis. 
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at the same time appear consistent in its policy. 
On the part of a bloodthirsty terrorist, the above analysis indicates that nuclear 
blackmail and attempts to use an acquired nuclear weapon as a deterrent are 
probably suboptimal choices compared to simply using the weapon for attack. The 
likely conclusion is thus that as long as he believes it probable to succeed, the 
rational terrorist who extracts utility from death and destruction will probably not 
try to draw on other strategic potentials of possessing a powerful weapon, but try to 
use it in an attack. 
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- 8 - Conclusions and outlook 
In chapters 3 through 7 I have analysed different questions related to nuclear 
terrorism as I defined it in chapter 1. I shall here summarise the conclusions reached 
and briefly discuss the bottom lines from different chapters. In particular, where the 
conclusions reached are of direct applicability to policy, it is of interest to discuss 
how different policy prescriptions combine: do they contradict each other or 
reinforce each other. I find that the overlap between the different chapters of the 
thesis is limited, but discuss the combined implications for fissile material security. 
In the present thesis I have considered a series of separate sub-questions to the 
overall goal of establishing best policy approaches to the threat of nuclear terrorism, 
so that the conclusions reached do not form a complete strategy. In particular, an 
important issue not treated in detail in this thesis is the question of second layers of 
defence, analysed in detail in Levi's recent book1 and reviewed in appendix D. 
Finally I discuss how the different research efforts in the thesis open ne",\' 
questions and indicate future directions of research on nuclear terrorism using 
formal methodology. 
8.1 Conclusions from research chapters 
Here I briefly recapitulate the main conclusions from the research chapters of the 
thesis. 
B.l.l Safeguards against nuclear terrorism: HEU vs. Pu 
In chapter 3 I analysed qualitatively a (presumably well informed) terrorist's 
choice between using highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium (Pu) for the 
purpose of building a crude nuclear weapon and concluded, as have a number of 
analysts in the past, that HEU is a far better choice for a number of reasons. This 
discussion is not new, but forms a necessary backdrop for the decision theoretical 
analysis in chapter 4, where it is argued on the basis of cost and benefit, that <1" 
1 Michael Levi On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Universit\" Press, 20U7) 
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concerns safeguards against nuclear terrorism, a heavy spending emphasis on HEU 
as compared to Pu is justified. 
While this conclusion could have been reached by qualitative arguments2, the 
results from the quantitative analysis undertaken are arguably powerful tools for 
informing policy in that they reduce the question of the division of available funds 
between safeguards branches into one of estimating numerical values of a small 
number of parameters. 
Indeed, I find there are two key quantities to determine the ideal level of 
expenditure of the two branches: the threat level (importantly, the probability of 
successful terrorist attack) and the value for money (more accurately: expected 
threat reduction per monetary unit spent) of different safeguards efforts. Notably, 
the amount of money already spent is irrelevant to the question of future spending, 
as is consistent with economic theory. 
A rough numerical estimation of key parameters shows3 that Pu safeguards are 
possibly overfunded at present, whereas HEU measures are almost certainly 
underfunded. The former conclusion might seem counter-intuitive since there is 
every reason to believe that some storage facilities holding quantities of Pu are still 
inadequately protected. It is important to note, however, that while further 
spending in plutonium safeguards may not be warranted today, extensive upgrades 
in HEU security could once again make such measures worthwhile in the future, as 
is demonstrated in a further numerical analysis in section 4.5. 
For policy-makers it will be useful to note that the value for money of safeguards 
measures is as important as the funding level itself. While this may be intuiti\'Cly 
obvious, the clarity with which this emerges from the mathematical results of our 
gaming is notable. It is essential, therefore, to sustain and improve co-operation 
with countries of proliferation concern, for example Russia and Pakistan. 
8.1.2 HEU or Pu: the terrorist's choice 
In chapter 5 I turn the tables and analyse the choice between HEl; .lnd Pu as 
2 As do Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector and Fred 
L. Wehling The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (New YorkRoutledge, 2005)* 
3 See section .tA. 
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building material for a simple nuclear weapon from the terrorist's point of yiew, a 
continuation from the qualitative study in chapter 3. This chapter is of a more 
theoretical nature than the other research chapters in that policy conclusions do not 
flow quite so directly from the decision theoretical endeavour as they do in other 
parts of the thesis. 
I establish a formal framework for thinking about this choice in terms of concepts 
such as the penetration time (the time the terrorist may expect to spend on a gi\'en 
project before some incident is likely to cause it to fail), the deterrence time (the 
project duration above which the probability of success is so small it is no longer 
preferable to doing nothing) and the critical period (the average time between two 
fissile material acquisition opportunities above which it is preferable to accept the 
first available option rather than wait for the optimal choice of material, HEU). A 
number of nontrivial relations between these quantities are established, several of 
which, it is indicated, apply more generally than the specific payoff model 
employed in the chapter. 
The terrorist's choice, I demonstrate, is (at least within the confines of the model 
employed) governed by two key parameters: 
1. Terrorist impatience represented by the discount function. In particular, 
when the impatience is due to fear of failure, it is well described by the 
intuitive concept of a penetration time - roughly the time the terrorist 
believes he can wait before being apprehended. 
2. The perceived probability that the next opportunity to obtain material 
involves HEU. 
3. The estimated time between opportunities for obtaining nuclear 
materials. 
4. The terrorist's degree of preference for HEU over plutonium. 
All of these parameters (with the possible exception of the terrorist's preference for 
fissile materials) are, notably, within a government's power to manipulate to some 
extent. Most notably a terrorist can be forced to accept a suboptimal choice of fissile 
material for her nuclear project if she is stressed into impatience and the ideal fissik 
material (HEU in metal form) is harder to obtain than other less favourable l)ptions. 
- 249-
On the other hand, luring the terrorist into waiting forever for the material of 
preference might be as good an option, hence it is not altogether ob\'ious which wa.y 
a target government might wish to influence the terrorist's decision. I find 
quantitative criteria for the values of these parameters which will change the 
terrorist's ideal strategy, and the relations produced from the modelling endea\'our 
can in any case inform a government as to how its actions may affect the terrorist's 
choice of strategy. 
A conclusion of theoretical interest which comes out of the decision theoretical 
analysis in chapter 5 is a criterion for when absolute deterrence of terrorism is 
possible, namely whenever the terrorist extracts a negative payoff from a failed 
attack. A terrorist with no fear of failure, in other words, cannot be absoluteh' 
deterred, while a terrorist with a fear of failure in principle always can be. 
8.1.3 Relative deterrence of nuclear terrorism 
In chapter 6 I discuss the question of whether and under what circumstances a 
terrorist can be deterred from embarking on a nuclear weapons project in the first 
place. A decision theoretical model is devised which is too complicated for algebraic 
analysis to be usefut but which is readily treated with numerical means. The policy 
conclusions from this chapter are several and directly applicable to policy. 
I recognise three main routes to achieve relative deterrence (i.e., convincing a 
terrorist that it is in her own interest to stick to her tried and trusted conventional 
means of attack), in order of importance: 
1. Decreasing the perceived probability of success of a nuclear terrorism 
mission is the most effective means of deterrence. It both lowers the 
expected payoff of the nuclear strategy and increases the operational 
risk. 
2. Disruptive measures to induce impatience and pressure mav 
furthermore deter the terrorist from long-term ambitious projects into 
continued reliance on tried and trusted conventional means. 
3. Threatening the future of terrorist funding increases inn:'stment risk 
from a nuclear project and forms a tertiary means of relative deterrence. 
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These conclusions come from analysis of the conditions under which the terrorist's 
expected utility of a nuclear project is lower than for a series of conventional attacks 
coupled with qualitative considerations of risk which are not captured by utility 
theory (which is inherently risk-neutral). The observation that terrorists ha\'e 
historically exhibited a distinctive aversion towards operational risks further 
increases the potency of these measures towards deterring the terrorists from long 
term, expensive and ambitious projects in general, nuclear terrorism in particular 4, I 
conclude with confidence that relative deterrence of nuclear terrorism is both 
possible and doable by these means, and may indeed be at work already", 
Threats of retaliation against the terrorist's own interests has been suggested by 
some analysts in the past as a possible means to deter terrorists in the classical Cold 
War sense of deterrence6• I argue in light of the decision theoretical results, however, 
that the threat of retaliation will probably have but a modest effect on terrorist 
decision making7. Indirectly, however, such threats could deter peripheral terrorist 
members such as funders and logistical support from taking part in a nuclear 
project, which could lower the terrorist's perceived chances of successful attack, 
which will in turn help to shift the terrorist's cost/benefit analysis towards 
conventional attacks. Threats of retaliation thus primarily count as just another 
'second layer of defence' in the context of deterrence and aids relative deterrence as 
part of point 1 aboveB• 
Another policy relevant conclusion is that hardening targets against conventional 
terrorism can create an incentive for the terrorist to opt for unconventional means. 
To the extent that a government prefers a 'war of a thousand cuts' to a single nuclear 
attack, this recommendation should be taken carefully into account. An obvious 
conclusion to draw is that in order not to undercut the above mentioned measures 
4 See e.g. Lewis A. Dunn 'Can al Qaeda Be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons?' Oc.casiollal 
paper #3 (Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense Uruvers)t:·, 
2005) p.16 
5 This point and several related points are also made by Michael Levi On Nuclear Terrorism 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
6 Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva 'Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done' Illtcnllltiollal 
Security 30:3 (2005) pp.87-123 
7 The deterrence of state sponsorship of terrorism is a somewhat different question not tfl'atl,d in 
chapter 6, but see section 6.3.1 for a discussion and references. 
8 See appendix D for more details. 
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towards achieving relative deterrence of nuclear terrorism, resources poured into 
anti conventional terrorism efforts must be matched by resources allocated to the 
denial of nuclear terrorism. 
Notably, relative deterrence of nuclear terrorism does not depend directly on the 
values of the parameters mentioned in points 1-3 above, but on how the terrorist 
herself perceives these. Thus it is important that the right signals are sent and that 
any improvement of safeguards, intended disruptive actions and economic 
sanctions are well publicised in order to affect the terrorist's internal cost/benefit 
calculus. 
8.1.4 Nuclear terrorist blackmail and a terrorist nuclear deterrent 
In chapter 7 I discuss the feasibility of other strategic uses of a terrorist nuclear 
weapon, namely as deterrent or for extortion. I argue that neither of these options 
are probably preferable options to a terrorist with a nuclear weapon who is militant 
and extracts utility from massive killings (a terrorist of political nature, who prefers 
not to detonate a nuclear weapon, I argue, will most likely not have the required 
incentive to acquire such a capacity in the first place). 
Faced with a nuclear blackmail threat from a terrorist group known to be 
militant, I argue by means of a signalling game that the best response of a targeted 
government is nearly always to respond forcefully in an effort to hinder a 
detonation, even though the terrorist threatens to detonate her weapon if such 
measures be taken. Proclaiming the stance that a nuclear blackmail threat will 
always be met with force (which is close to what e.g. the US is doing today) will 
most likely deter the rational and nuclear armed terrorist from attempting blackmail 
and rather attempt to use the weapon directly in a clandestine attack. 
All else equal, provoking a blackmail threat from a nuclear terrorist rather than 
an immediate attack might be beneficial for a target government in that it allows a 
little extra time to attempt to stop the attack. However, building the rapid response 
defensive capacity which can make use of this time slot is the measure which will 
most likely deter nuclear blackmail from occurring in the first place. Combined with 
the relative deterrence effect which all defensive measures ha\'L' (as detailed in 
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chapter 6) the positive aspects of a defence which can respond rapidly to a reported 
threat (be it a deliberate warning from the terrorist or otherwise) far outweigh the 
concern that should an attack nonetheless occur, no blackmail letter will probably 
have been received beforehand9. 
The terrorist in possession of a nuclear weapon might find that keeping it as a 
deterrent against attacks upon it could be a feasible strategic use of the weapon. 
Hiding a nuclear bomb on the territory of a potential attacker country is not a 
feasible deterrence strategy, since such a situation cannot be upheld in the long 
term, but the threatened use against a target near to the weapon's location or one 
which is relatively easy to hit could be. In any instance, the declaration of a credible 
terrorist nuclear deterrent is not sure to create the long-term safety that the terrorist 
might hope to achieve with it. Quite likely the situation would be unpredictable and 
unstable and such a declaration could indeed provoke the very attacks it is meant to 
deter. 
8.2 Comparing policy implications of different chapters 
The overlap between the different policy conclusions in this thesis is on the whole 
quite modest. Chapters 3-5 deal exclusively with the acquisition of nuclear 
materials, whereas chapter 6 is concerned with the terrorist's decision whether or 
not to attempt a nuclear project, a choice which arguably only depends on the 
overall probability of success for the entire project, of which materials acquisition is 
only one part. Chapter 7 deals with a situation in which the terrorist has already 
acquired a nuclear weapon, and as such is quite separate from the other research 
chapters. The primary field in which conclusions interact is therefore safeguards of 
fissile materials. 
S.2.1 Safeguards against nuclear terrorism 
In chapter 3 I recount an assertion which is agreed upon by nearly all anal~'sts of 
nuclear terrorism lO, namely that when it comes to hindering a planned nuclear 
9 It is of course far from certain that the terrorist would han' contemplated blackmail in ,1m' C1'-'l' 
10 Excepting, of course, those who argue this threat is not real and thus warranh no particular policy 
response whatsoever. See chapter 1 for a review. 
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acquisition project, there is nothing more effective than to keep the terrorists from 
laying hands on the necessary uranium or plutonium. While a nuclear project can 
take a large number of different paths beyond this point, no such project can esche\\-
the need to acquire the material, and the probability of overall success will be at 
least proportional to the probability of acquiring the fissile materialll . 
Indeed, our quantitative analysis section 4.4 demonstrates that improved HEU 
safeguards gives excellent value for money if one assumes that a nuclear plot is 
under way but has not yet acquired the necessary explosive elements. More exactly, 
by spending money to improve HEU security the reduction in expected cost from 
nuclear terrorism is significantly greater than the cost of improved security. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated in chapter 5, making the ideal material for a 
terrorist bomb harder to acquire will force the terrorist into attempting use of 
suboptimal fissile materials with a higher probability of failure. Materials other than 
metallic HEU will generally be more difficult to handle (more radioactive, 
sometimes pyrophoric, greater quantities are needed) and the probability of a 
dysfunctional bomb or accidents (by criticality or radiation) during assembly is 
increased. The technical challenge of making a workable design is also made greater 
by having to make do with a secondary choice of fissile weapon fuel 12. 
In appendix D of this thesis I review Michael Levi's argument13 that the value of 
good material protection goes beyond the mere blocking of terrorist acquisition 
attempts. Were the terrorists to succeed in acquiring the material despite protection 
methods, good procedures for material accountability will increase the chances that 
the theft is discovered quickly. A quick warning will almost certainly increase the 
probability that the nuclear terrorist plot be intercepted at a later stage. 
Thus the soundness of safeguards measures as a means to counter nuclear 
terrorism seems very well established, but the fortunate effects of material 
protection are even more far-reaching. I demonstrate in chapter 6 that decreasing 
11 Michael Levi effectively argues (On Nuclear Terrorism) that the dependence is morl' than linear. 
See appendix D and discussion below_ 
12 A further elaboration of the technical hurdles in this respect are found in Michael Ll'\-i's 011 
Nuclear Terrorism pp. 66-97_ Note that this discussion is implicitly taken into account in the game 
of chapter 4_ 
13 Michael Levi 011 Nuclear TerrorislIl 
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the terrorist's assessed probability of success of a nuclear terrorism project has the 
added effect of working to deter the terrorist from attempting a nuclear ploy in the 
first instance in favour of staying with her tried and trusted means of conventional 
attacks. While it is true that what counts for deterrence purposes is not in fact how 
difficult a nuclear terrorism project is, but how difficult the terrorist percei'uc5 it to be, 
the only reliable way to achieve this is probably to keep improving defences against 
nuclear terrorism and make sure to publicise all progress made. 
Note how this contrasts with deterrence in the Cold War sense, by threats of 
punishments; in a situation of mutual deterrence by threats, steps to increase 
deterrence, i.e. steps to make the consequences of non-compliance more se\'ere, 
tended to make the consequences more terrible should deterrence fail. The ultimate 
consequence of a failure of deterrence during the Cold War might have been all-out 
nuclear war. When it comes to deterrence by denial, however, the situation is the 
opposite: the measures which may be taken to persuade an adversary that an 
attempt at a particular act will fail are the same efforts which will hinder the 
adversary from succeeding should he try nonetheless. 
In summary, all of our considerations point to the importance of fissile materials 
protection as a means to defend against nuclear terrorism, and none point against it. 
This fact is a notable trait of the problem of nuclear terrorism. 
B.3 The proof of the pudding: has the research approach been 
effective? 
In this thesis a methodology has been used which, it was showed, has hardly 
been applied to the field of nuclear terrorism at all before. In the chapter where the 
methodology was discussed I quoted Osborne's pragmatic criterion for a game's 
justification: 'As always, the proof of the pudding is in the eating: if a model 
enhances our understanding of the world, then it serves its purpose.,14 In chapters .t. 
through 7 I have analysed four different games. Now for the verdict: did they sern' 
their purposes? And more generally, how well was the methodology used suited to 
the study of nuclear terrorism? I will analyse these questions in this section. 
This question has been treated briefly at the close of each gaming chapter, and the 
14 Martin J. Osborne An Introduction to Game Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) p.7 
- 255-
reader who has looked at these will already know the conclusion: this author did 
indeed find the use of rational choice theory to be illuminating and a great help in 
enhancing understanding of the questions at hand. There is more to the question 
than this bottom line, however. 
When inspecting Osborne's criterion more closely, one realises that his criterion is 
not as clear cut as it first appears. Rather, it brings up some new questions which 
must be answered before it can be put to use in an evaluation. Firstly, what does it 
mean to 'enhance our understanding'? Whose understanding? Secondly, what is one 
to compare the merits of a game to; what is the alternative? As I will argue, there is 
no clear distinction between qualitative methodology and rational choice theory. 
And thirdly, I have chosen research sub-questions which match the choice of 
methodology. Will the evaluation then not be lopsided, somewhat like comparing 
the merits of a hammer and a saw with respect to cutting planks in half? 
I shall not here attempt to assay in any detail the achievements of each of the four 
models I employ, since this was treated in the individual chapters. Rather, I will 
attempt to provide a more nuanced picture of how to understand and evaluate the 
merits of rational choice theory in general, and in the context of this thesis. 
8.3.1 Understanding - for whom? 
If one were to accept Osborne's criterion as a guideline for measuring the success 
of the rational choice approach, a natural question comes up: what exactly is 
'understanding'? This question has been central in epistemological philosophy for a 
long time, a debate I shall not go into. More specifically, Osborne speaks of 'our' 
understanding; his use of language seems to imply that there exists some objective 
and common entity which is 'our understanding', and that researchers keep adding 
more material to this entity. 
I would venture to argue a different view, that 'understanding' is inescapably 
subjective, at least in part. One and the same piece of research can be highly 
illuminating to one reader, but provide no new insight to others. Whether a reader 
will extract new understanding from a research report could depend on a number of 
aspects both of the report itself and of the reader. Beyond the message which IS 
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communicated in the text and what the reader is technically able to grasp there is a 
question of what it takes to give a reader the sense of having understood something. 
This will depend on what he already knows and, crucially, the wa\' he is used to 
thinking about scientific analysis. Contrary to, say, a historian, a reader \\"ith a 
mathematical background might find a formal analysis more illuminating than a 
qualitative one arguing the same conclusions, just because what he understands as 
knowledge can be expressed in formulas and associations are easily made to the 
knowledge he already has. This makes an inter-disciplinary effort such as the 
present thesis challenging: it is hard to present material in a way so that it is 
understandable and chimes well with scholars from very different fields. 
When I argue above that the analyses of the various chapters have indeed 
enhanced understanding, this must therefore be understood as partly subjective. 
What I can say with certainty is that I myself found that the analysis in each of the 
four gaming chapters proved an important help for me to conceptualise, systemise 
and visualise the questions at hand, and thereby improve my understanding of 
them. To the extent that I typify a class of researchers, there is reason to believe that 
others will find these models enlightening as well. If one was not worried about the 
impact of one's research, such an argument might be sufficient. 
Arguably, however, the more readers a piece of research can inform, the better. 
The use of formal methodology therefore comes at the price of making the research 
less accessible to some who might otherwise have been interested. Walt is therefore 
right in warning against 'saying what everyone knows in a way no-one can 
understand ,15 as discussed in section 2.7. If a conclusion could have been reached in 
a purely qualitative way, modelling might just be a complicating detour. The 
sections at the end of chapters 4 through 7 where the merits of the games are 
evaluated have therefore focussed on whether conclusions reached might have been 
arrived at solely by qualitative arguments. 
Bearing in mind the inescapable element of subjectivity in such an e\'aluation, the 
rest of this section is therefore primarily devoted to the question of how much of the 
insight gained in my research chapters could have been obtained without the help 
15 Stephen M. Walt 'Rigor or Rigor Mortis?: Rational Choice and Security Studies' Illtenzatiollal 
Security 23:4 (1999) pp.5-48 
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of gaming, and how that question is to be understood. 
8.3.2 Tools and tasks 
I argued in section 2.10 that gaming may be understood as a tool for laying out 
the implications of a set of assumptions in a systematic way. EYaluating a tool, 
however, makes more sense when placed in the context of a specific task. 
Underneath a broad headline like 'Nuclear Terrorism' there exists a wealth of 
different sub-questions, and the analyst must choose some of these to focus on. This 
is well exemplified, for example, by comparing the sub-questions considered in the 
three monographs by Allison16, Ferguson and Potter17, and Levi18, all considering the 
same overall topic but only partly overlapping. 
A tool and a task must be suited for each other, whether the tool is chosen for the 
task, or the task is chosen in order to make use of a specific tool. Because the project 
of the thesis was to apply a certain methodology to the field of nuclear terrorism, the 
sub-questions chosen for closer examination were chosen and framed in such a wa~' 
that they were expected a priori to be suitable for gaming out. To the analyst who 
believes in the potential value of gaming in general it is therefore not so surprising 
that the analysis seems to have worked; after all it was designed to work. 
Clearly there are many other sub-questions beneath the nuclear terrorism 
umbrella for which rational choice theory would not be suitable. All the sub-
questions considered in this thesis have the trait that each actor has a small set of 
available strategies with arguments for and against each strategy. These are the kind 
of questions which may most easily be modelled and expressed in an 'economic' 
language. But during my discussion and modelling a number of other questions 
have come up which had to be discussed by qualitative means or had been 
previously by others. 
Thus, while I have argued extensively above that my analyses have indeed 
provided useful insights, gaming can certainly not be the only approach used by 
16 Graham Allison Nuclear Terrorism:The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe ('-Jew York: Times Books, 
2004) 
17 Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector and Fred L. 
Wehling The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (New York Routledge 2005)* 
18 Michael Levi On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, ;-vlA: Harvard University Press, 2L1117) 
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researchers of this questions for at least three reasons: (1) a qualitative anah'sis is 
always necessary before modelling (discussed further below); (2) there are questions 
which are not suitable for gaming; and (3) a gaming approach will typically capture 
one out of several aspects of a question, and always represents a simplified 
representation of reality. To examine the finer details or the full picture, other 
methods must be employed in addition. 
8.3.3 The role of qualitative analysis 
It is easy to underestimate the qualitative aspect in all gaming. When designing 
the game, deciding what should be in it and what shouldn't, and which 
assumptions to make, qualitative arguments and judgement must be used. And at 
the end of the gaming, a qualitative understanding of the resulting equations or 
graphs should be extracted. A game can illuminate a real-life scenario onl\, In 
conjunction with qualitative considerations. 
Each of the gaming chapters in the thesis begin with a qualitative study of the 
question at hand. Of course, this is a natural way to introduce the problem, review 
the relevant literature, etc., but it also has the role of justifying the model which is 
thereafter created. Only when a picture of the dilemma is drawn in qualitative terms 
does it become possible to decide which aspects the model should account for, what 
the limitations of the model are, and under what circumstances the model must be 
changed in order to be applicable. The alternative to rational choice theory to which 
its merits should be compared is therefore not qualitative methods, but qualitative 
methods alone. 
The question I have focussed on in the sections towards the end of each research 
chapter where the merits of the methodology are surveyed has been whether the 
same conclusions could have been reached without the use of a game. In chapters :; 
and 7 my answer to this was that, while it is impossible to prove the impossibility of 
arriving at the same arguments in verbal form, the production of explicit and 
formulaic criteria for a strategy over another is something which qualitative analysis 
alone would not produce. Likewise in chapter 4, while the conclusions about L;S 
priorities of HEU versus plutonium have been reached by qualitative means before, 
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I find that the symbolic analysis provides a level of precision (in form of a set of 
simple inequalities) and depth (as exemplified by the study of how plutonium 
efforts could possibly be overfunded) which I do not believe I could ha\'e achie\'ed 
otherwise. 
The chapter where it is least obvious that qualitative methodology could not ha\'e 
produced the same results is probably chapter 6. The primary reason for this was 
recognised to be that the model was too complex for analytical treatment to be 
fruitful, and the extraction of intuitively useful knowledge had to be made from 
graphs, at an intuitive and rough (rather than formal and precise) level. Even so, the 
methodology was found to have its definite merits here as well. The process of 
gaming is in itself a valuable tool for the analyst for thinking through the problem, 
and experimenting with simulations using different parameter values was found to 
be a good way to obtain a certain familiarity with and intuition for how the decision 
behaved under varying conditions. 
The taxonomy of terrorists in terms of their impatience, which resulted from the 
study of figure 6.2, is an example of an (arguably) illuminating insight which it is 
reasonable to imagine could have resulted also from a purely qualitative approach. 
As explained, the exercise of simulation certainly did its job as a tool to enhance this 
author's understanding of relative deterrence, but may not have been the only tool 
which could have done so. Different angles of approach will probably highlight 
different parts of a problem, and re-thinking the question of relative deterrence in a 
different light, perhaps taking into account real information about decision making 
in terrorist organisations, will probably be worthwhile and could well be equally 
ill umina ting. 
Just as it is easy to underestimate the role of the qualitative aspect, it is tempting 
to trust the mathematical results overly, since mathematics is a form of argument 
which typically connotes rigour and precision. It is certainly true that, as long as the 
laws of formal logic are followed, the formulas flow from the model with 
inevitability, but it is necessary to keep in mind that the model itself was arrived at 
qualitatively. Thus even the mathematical formulas have a qualitati\'e aspect to 
them. This makes it necessary, before making use of the formulas, to understand the 
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assumptions and arguments behind the model, so as to realise the range within 
which the formulas are applicable. 
8.4 Where to from here? 
The possibilities for extending the models used or devising different ones are 
almost infinite. Nonetheless, some directions seem more natural than others given 
the nature of the problem under scrutiny. 
With the exception of chapter 7 I have focussed in this thesis on simple decision 
theoretical models with no real-time interaction between the players. The major 
strength of such models is obviously that it makes for simple, transparent and 
powerful analytical calculations with fairly obvious interpretations. For exactly this 
reason, it was deemed that such games were most suitable as a first approach. To 
look at future directions, one should consider the weaknesses of such very simple 
games, however, and which extensions might improve on the approach herein \\rith 
respect to these. 
A possible weakness of my games is the lack of communication between the 
players. In every game I see the situation from one player'S perspective while the 
other player is present merely by determining the value of certain parameters that 
the player in focus must take into account. I argue that this is adequate as a first 
approximation, yet there is reason to believe that additional insight might be 
derived from modelling the communication between the players and its impact. 
A natural way to go about this might be to model intelligence gathering. It seems 
reasonable to prescribe some kind of Bayesian game for this19. A simple signalling 
game such as has been used for terrorism gaming before20 and made use of in 
chapter 7 might form a start, yet as is pointed out, the communication from terrorist 
to intelligence is sporadic and stochastic in nature, which might call for a more 
complex model in which time is explicitly incorporated. 
19 Bayesian games are named after the famous statistician Thomas Bayes, 1702-1761, who is credi~ed 
with formulating the Bayes Theorem or Bayes' Rule, which provides a formal method of updating 
beliefs following a signal. Cf. e.g. Robert Gibbons A Pril11er in Game Theory (Hemel Hempstead: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992) chapters 3 and 4. 
20 e.g. Daniel Arce M. and Todd Sandler 'Terrorist Signalling and the Value of Intel.ii?enc.e' BrUish 
Joumal of Political Science 37:4 (2007) pp.573-586; and Basuchoudhary and ~az:~lml: 111dIng In 
plain sight: using signals to detect terrorists' Public Choice 128 (2006) pp.2·b-2:1J 
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It is in principle not difficult to devise complicated models for use \yith computer 
simulations, and this might well form the most fruitful path in extension of our 
simple models. The challenge, then, is perhaps not so much devising the models 
and writing computer programmes to run them, as it is to make sense of the model's 
behaviour and determine numerical values for the parameters of the model. This 
should not deter the clever social scientist, however, and man\' modelling 
approaches have been developed on which the researcher may draw21 • 
Another field in which much may be done is that regarding the cooperation 
between states in the face of a grave threat such as nuclear terrorism. It is most 
peculiar to notice that crucial safeguards projects between great powers such as the 
United States and Russia can be halted for months by small problems such as 
uncertainty over responsibility in case an accident should happen22, and it might be 
a problem for researchers in international relations to investigate whether such 
disagreements do not run deeper than meets the eye. Some authors, moreo\'t~r, ha\'l' 
called for a global coalition against nuclear terrorism23, a prospect well suited for 
gaming, along the lines of some of Professor Sandler's work24 . 
Altogether different paths that seem very fruitful involve real-time role play 
garnes, such as that orchestrated by RAND25, in which policy makers and other 
leading figures in society are faced with scenarios such as nuclear terrorist attacks, 
intelligence reports of such, threats of detonation et cetera. 
An advantage of gaming and role play over more technical studies of feasibility 
of a nuclear project such as that by Zimmerman and Lewis26 is that one is less likely 
to run into ethical dilemmas where the need to create awareness about the dangers 
of nuclear terrorism must be weighed against the danger of providing uSl'ful 
21 A good reference to study is Nigel Gilbert and Klaus G. Troitzsch Simulation for the Social Scienll~t 
2nd edition (Buckham: Open University Press, 2005) 
22 Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier Securing the Bomb 2006 Project Managing the Atom (Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 2006)*, p.1.t-15. 
23 e.g. Matthew Bunn Securing the Bomb 2007 report from Project Managing the Atom (Belfer Center 
for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 2007)*, pp. 97-106. 
24 e.g. Daniel G. Arce M. and Todd Sandler 'Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis' Joumal of 
Conflict Resolution 49:2 (2005) pp.183-200. 
25 Charles Meade and Roger C. Molander Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrori;:;1 Attack 
Technical Report (RAND, 2006)* 
26 Peter D. Zimmerman and Jeffrey G. Lewis 'The Bomb in the Backyard' Foreign Policy (\!o\'jDec 
2006) 
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information to potential perpetrators. Arguably, enough knowledge about nuclear 
weapon design is already public and widely published, that a researcher can form a 
qualified opinion without the need to explore the matter further, hence the 
potential, although probably not exhausted, seems somewhat limited along a 
technical line of research. 
8.4.1 Modelling gives rise to new questions 
One does not have to depart very far from the efforts presented in this thesis in 
order to extract new know ledge from the use of formal social science methods 
applied to nuclear terrorism, however. For each gaming effort presented herein, 
new questions and ideas for further inquiry have come up, suitable perhaps for 
future PhD or Masters theses. The games in this thesis have deliberately been 
designed to be as simple as possible, because the goal was to examine their potential 
and arrive at easily interpreted results of a conceptual nature. I have concentrated 
therefore on developing an analytical framework for thinking about these problems, 
rather than attempting to exhaust the potential they have for examining the 
situation as it stands in the world today. On a general note, therefore, there is much 
one could do in tying the models closer to reality, primarily by generalising the 
assumptions made in order to make the models richer, and undertaking efforts to 
estimate required numerical parameters as accurately as possible. 
In connection with the game of chapter 4 I undertake a coarse numerical study to 
demonstrate how the equations obtained through modelling may be applied to a 
real world scenario. An interesting question to pursue is: how accurately can one 
reasonably estimate such numerical values based on open access sources? Clearly, 
much relevant information is exempt from the public domain, yet given the large 
amount of published data it may be possible to form rather confident bounds on 
several of these parameters. 
Another interesting research enterprise might be to compare different countries 
in models such as that of chapter 4. My numerical study was limited to the case of 
the United States, a country which regards itself as a target for such acts of 
terrorism, and for whose non-proliferation programmes relevant information is 
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readily available. Other countries may be uncertain whether they are the intended 
target or not, which calls for a generalisation of the model to allow the attack to be 
directed towards a different government, resulting in a much lower, collateral 
damage in the case of an attack. Presumably, interesting dynamics between different 
countries would emerge which could tell important lessons about how nations 
should co-operate and share the burden in nuclear non-proliferation issues. 
The model used in chapter 4 has no inherent time and is as such 'instantaneous'. 
Certain effects which could be expected to become of importance are to do with 
changing conditions over time, however, which would require a model which 
introduces a proper timeline. One such example, that of changing stockpiles of HEU 
and plutonium, is discussed in section 4.4.3, and a gaming study of this might be a 
suitable study for a master's thesis, say. 
My model in chapter 4 moreover assumes that the terrorist cannot be deterred 
from a nuclear project. The analysis in chapter 6, however, clearly shows that it is 
possible to sway the terrorist from a nuclear path back to the tried and trusted 
means of conventional bombs, and incorporating the possibility of deterrence by 
denial into the model in chapter 4 would seem an obvious next step. The expected 
result (as I argue on an intuitive basis) would be an even stronger case for 
safeguards in that improved fissile materials security has the added effect of 
deterring the potential nuclear proliferator. 
Several times in chapter 5 I come across examples of a conflict between relative 
deterrence of certain means of terrorism and absolute deterrence of terrorism on the 
whole. The most important example of this dynamic might be the deflection effect: 
hardening targets against conventional attacks can force the terrorist into 
attempting unconventional modes of violence, and conversely, that 'allowing' a 
certain level of conventional terrorism can remove the terrorist's incentive to employ 
more destructive means. It seems to the author that the dynamics between these 
forms of deterrence could be a fruitful area of study for the theoretically inclined. 
A somewhat similar topic is the relationship between the possibility for absolute 
deterrence and the terrorist's fear of failure. It seems from the analysis of chapter 5 
that these two concepts are closely related, and from a theoretical point of vicw it 
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would be interesting to see whether more general statements could be made about 
the exact relation between them, independently of a specific model. 
A number of concepts are developed in chapter 5 and studied in relation to the 
model in that chapter. These are for example the deterrence time, the penetration 
time and the critical period. It would be interesting to see if these concepts, which all 
have intuitive interpretations, could be generalised for a broad class of different 
models. It would seem to the author that these are very useful and general concepb 
for use in the study of terrorism deterrence and 'time failure' more generally. 
In chapter 6 the only two options available to the terrorist are the nuclear and the 
conventional. In reality the number of different modes of attack is larger, making for 
a possible straightforward generalisation of the model in figure 6.1. It is possible 
that more complex behaviour could emerge upon addition of a third option, 
whereas additions beyond this will likely not increase generality much further. 
The terrorist as modelled in chapter 6 and elsewhere is only concerned with 
inflicting damage, which is clearly a simplification. A generalisation of the model in 
that chapter in which terrorist preferences are made more realistic, incorporating 
such effects as the fear of alienating an audience, would be interesting and probably 
not too difficult. Indeed, the preferences could be parameterised so that the 
consequences of terrorist motivations for relative deterrence purposes could be 
investigated directly in reply to the question 'how worried must a terrorist be about 
alienating her audience before she should rationally abandon her nuclear plans?' 
The most important improvement to the model in chapter 6 would arguably be to 
explicitly incorporate terrorist risk aversion. Utility theory is intrinsically risk-
neutral (unless it is explicitly modelled into the terrorist's preferences), so the most 
fruitful approach could be to use another fundamental theory such as regret 
theory27. This could allow the considerations of risk aversion which are only 
qualitative in the present analysis, to be incorporated quantitatively in a direct way. 
A final question, which arises from our gaming in chapter 7, is what happens if a 
terrorist organisation were to obtain a nuclear weapon and use it as a deterrent? 
This question is probably best answered by somebody with a strong background in 
27 e.g. Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden 'Regret Theory: An Alternath'e Theory of Rational 
Choice under Uncertainty' The Economic Journal 92 (1982) pp.805-824 
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international relations. It seems likely that some countries will ''''ish to attack the 
terrorist pre-emptively in order to remove the nuclear threat ,,'hereas countries 
directly threatened by the terrorist bomb might oppose this, since such an attack 
could jeopardise the lives of hundreds of thousands of their citizens. The situation 
which occurs would probably be unpredictable, and planning ahead of such an 
incident might be worthwhile to prevent possible dreadful consequences. 
In this thesis I have focussed on nuclear weapons which the terrorists fabricate 
themselves, so-called 'improvised nuclear devices'. The prospect of terrorist 
acquisition of an intact military nuclear weapon is, however, also a serious concern. 
Suitable for gaming similar to that performed in chapter 5 might be the terrorist's 
choice between these two different 'faces' of nuclear terrorism as I define ies. Further 
choices could include that between different classes of military weapons, according 
to yield, portability, security lock systems and availability. As in the quest for fissilc 
material for a construction project, a choice between opportunism and patience 
might enter here as well. The information for use as input for modelling would 
likely be limited by military secrecy for such a project, which could be a problem 
and which might incline the researcher towards a qualitative approach. On the other 
hand, a well designed game could be a useful tool for a systematic treatment of the 
information which is available, and laying out the implications of it. 
I may finally mention the ideas for future research which came out of the modest 
efforts I made on the question of second layers of defence, appended in appendix O. 
This topic was not pursued in this thesis, but as detailed in section 0.5, opens up a 
range of questions which are probably very well suited for analysis of the kind that I 
have undertaken in chapters 4-7 of the thesis. I conclude in chapter .f that the 
important quantity to establish when setting ideal cost levels for various elements of 
a defence is the security achieved per monetary unit spent. Establishing this for the 
complex and many-faceted second layers of defence, however, is not tri\'iaI, and 
developing methods for estimating the value of various elements of the sccond 
layers taking into account the way the different elements interact and strengthen 
28 I refer here to the title of Ferguson and Potter's The Four Faces (1( Nuclear Terrorism, op.citSCt' e.g. 
chapter 3 of that reference for an overview of nuclear terrorism with intact weaponry. ~(lte from 
chapter 1 that I define nuclear terrorism to include only nuclear fissi~~, hence onl~' two pi the 1\ lur 
faces fit my definition: improvised nuclear devices and assembled mIlItary de\'lCl''-o 
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each other, is both important and complicated. I propose that future researchers of 
this issue might wish to draw on optimisation theory from the engineering sciences 
in combination with decision theory games such as that of chapter 4. Such a task, I 
believe, could form the backbone of a future PhD thesis. 
As a general conclusion of the thesis, it is clear that the employment of rational 
choice theory has proven a fruitful means of research in the field of nuclear 
terrorism as demonstrated by the number of conclusions reached by relatiyel:" 
simple calculations and simulations, and the number of new questions which these 
efforts have given rise to. In a field of research whose results may be of great 
importance for the safety of our future, there is plenty left to do for the somewhat 
mathematically inclined analyst. 
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- A - List of seizures of attempted smuggling of fissile 
materials 
The list is adapted from that provided by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) 
Research Library! 
CASE NAME & MATERIAL ORIGIN OF RECOVERY OF MATERIAL I DATE OF DIVERTED MATERIAL ! 
DIVERSION 
Podolsk 1.5 kg of 90% HEU Luch Scientific 10/9/92: Russian police operation 
5/92-9/92 Production intercepted the smuggler, an 
Association, employee of Luch facility, in the 
Podolsk, Russia Podolsk train station. 
Vilnius, Lithuania About 100 g of 50% Institute of Physics 5/93: Discovered in Vilnius bank 
HEU and Power vault embedded in portions of a 
early 1992 Engineering, shipment of beryllium. 
Obninsk, Russia 
Andreyeva Guba 1.8 kg of 36% HEU Naval base storage 7/29/93: Russian security forces 
7/29/93 facility, Andreeva arrested the thieves before they could 
Guba, Russia smuggle the material out of Russia. 
Tengen 6.15 g of Plutonium- Unconfirmed; 5/10/94: Police in suspect's 
Unknown 239 possibly Arzamas- apartment for another reason, 
16, Russia stumbled upon the cache of 
plutonium. 
Landshut 800 mg of 87.7% Unconfirmed; 6/13/94: Undercover German police 
Unknown HEU likely Obninsk acted as potential customers in a sting 
operation. 
Sevmorput 4.5 kg of 20% HEU Naval shipyard, 6/94: The brother of a suspect asked 
11/27/93 Sevmorput, Russia a co-worker for help finding a 
customer. The co-worker notified 
authorities. 
Munich 560 g MOX fuel; 363 g Unconfirmed; 8/10/94: Undercover German police 
Unknown of Plutonium-239 likely Obninsk acted as potential customers in a sting 
operation. 
Prague 2.7 kg of 87.7% Unconfirmed; 12/14/94: Anonymous tip to police 
Unknown HEU likely Obninsk giving the material's location (a 
parked car). In two instances in June 
1995, Czech authorities recovered 
small additional amounts of HEU 
believed to be from the same source. 
St. Petersburg [2] 3.05 kg of 90% HEU Unconfirmed; 6/8/94: Russian Federal Security 
likely Machine Service agents arrested three suspects 
Unknown Building Plant, attempting to sell the material. 
Elektrostal, Russia Russian officials have confirmed the 






Moscow 1.7kgofHEU Elektrostal 6/8/95: In a sting operation, Russian 
May 1994 
Federal Security Service agents 
i 
arrested three suspects trying to sell 
HEU, one of whom was an employee 
of Elektrostal. 
Sukhumi Approximately 2 kg LN. Vekua Physics 12/97: Russian inspection team 
of 90% HEU and Technology visited facility, which had been 
Unknown Institute, Sukhumi, closed by 1992 Abkhazian-Georgian 
Georgia conflict, and found facility 
abandoned, and material included in 
1992 inventory missing. Material has 
not been recovered. 
Chelyabinsk Oblast, 18.5 kg of HEU Unknown, possibly 12/17/98: Russian Federal Security 
Russia (enrichment level Mayak Production service reports that it thwarted an 
unspecified) Association, attempt by workers at a nuclear 
Unknown Chelyabinsk-70, or facility in Chelyabinsk Oblast to steal 
Zlatoust-36 18.5 kg of nuclear material. 
DunavMost, 10 g of 76% HEU Unknown 5/29/99: Bulgarian customs officers 
Bulgaria discovered HEU hidden in the trunk 
of a car crossing from Bulgaria into 
Unknown Romania. Driver said he had 
obtained material in Moldova. 
Batumi, Georgia 920 g30% HEU Unknown 4/19/00: Georgian police arrested 
four suspects and seized HEU. 
Unknown 
Elektrostal, Russia 3.7 kg of 21 % HEU Unconfirmed., 5/2000: A resident of Elektrostal was 
possibly detained during an attempt to sell 3.7 
Unknown Elektrostal, kg of uranium enriched to 21 percent 
Bochvar Institute U-235. Incident was reported by 
(VNIINM), or Gosatomnadzor. 
Politekh Enterprise, 
Russia 
Tbilisi, Georgia 0.4 g of plutonium Unknown 5/2000: An individual was arrested 
powder for illegal possession of a small 
Unknown quantity of mixed powder containing 
about 0.4 g of plutonium and 0.8 g of 
low-enriched uranium. 
Paris, France -5 g of 70-80% HEU Unknown, 7/16/2001: French police arrested 
Russian/NIS origin three men and confiscated 
suspected approximately 5 g of HEU. 
Sadahlo, Georgia 170 g of nearly 90% Unknown, Russian 6/26/03: Georgian border guards 
6/26/03 HEU origin suspected arrested a man trying to transport the 
material across the Georgian-
Armenian border. 
Thilisi, Georgia 79.5g of 89% HEU Unknown, Russian 2/01/06: Georgian security services 
2/01/06 origin suspected in a string operation arrested a 
Russian national in Thilisi attempting 
to sell 79.5 grams of HEU. 
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- B - Numerical programme used in chapter 6 
Below is presented diagrammatically the structure of the simple programme u d 
for simulations in chapter 6. For simplicity, all parameters in the programme are global 
and may be manipulated by any subroutine. The routines 'vary [parameter] ', thu 
simply vary the global parameter [variable] and calls up the procedure which run th 
actual simulation (same for all the 'vary' routines) . 
Global parameters/variables: 
averaging: # of repetitions for averaging (typically - 1 0 .000) 
nuclear_wait: # of penalty rounds after nuclear attack 
J/uclear .... l J/·ep: # of rounds to prepare nuclear attack 
rounds: # of rounds of the game played out 
Pc: probability of success of conventional attack 
Pn: probability of success of nuclear attack 
Tc: damage inflicted by conventional attack 
T : damage inflicted by nuclear attack II 
Cc: cost of conventional attack 
C : cost of nuclear attack 
n 
R: income per round 
0: discount factor 
cp: cost of failure 
Main Routine 
Set default parameter values 
Choose strategy: 
nuclear/ conventional 





Vary variance .... -----r--
Write results to file 
Illustration B.l .: Structure of programme of chapter 6 
Only pseudo .... code and structural overview is provided, yet the reader with m 
programmrng experience will nonetheless be able to translate to actual programm 
code. The language used for the actual application wa C++, but aIm t nv 
programming language could have done the job with ease . 
.... 270 .... 
r Varyv 
Input: rrr.~~.-i' Simulation 
,..- Input: 
v; : lower value (initial) 
V( upper value (final) 
steps: # steps between lower and higher 
strategtf nuclear or conventional 
foreach j from 0 to steps { 
set v = l~I\{lo.g(v,)+j"log(v/ vN steps}; V 
do nveragmg times / 
runl simulation 
calculate average payoff from simulations. 
~ ~ 
r Vary cp 
Input: 
CP; : lower value (initial) 
cp : upper value (final) 
steps: # steps between lower and higher 
strategtJ: nuclear or conventional 
foreach j from 0 to steps ( V 
set cp = cp; + j"(CPf - cp;)/ steps; 
do averaging times / 
runl simulation 




steps: # steps between lower and higher 
strategy: nuclear or conventional 
foreach j from 0 to steps { 
set {) = j / steps; 
do averaging times 
run lsimulation / 
calculate average payoff from simulations. 
~ 
Input: 
R; : lower value (initial) 
R : upper value (final) 
steps: # steps between lower and higher 
strategtf nuclear or conventional 
foreach j from 0 to steps { 
set R = R{ + j~(l1- R)/steps; 
do averagmg times 
runf simulation 
calculate payoff from simulations. 
/ 
r Calculate variallce (varying 6) 
~ 
Input: 
steps: # steps between lower and higher 
strategtJ: nuclear or conventional 
foreach j from 0 to steps { 
set {) = j/steps; 
do averaging times 
runr simulation 
store payoffs u~ k E {O, ... ,averaging} 
set fJ = (Lk Uk)/ averagillg; 
set if = [Lk VI - IIk)2l/ averagillg; 
set a = "jif; 
v 
/ 
Parameters: Pc. PI! . Tc .TII • C, . C" R. ~, q>, 
strategy. 
run lnuclear simulation 
\.. oc Icon,.nbona' somu'ation~ 
, Nuclear simulation 
while time < rOUllds 
if (funds ~ C,,) 
~ 
runl nuclear attack 
else 
set time = time + 1; 
set fill/ds = funds + R; 
I , Nuclear attack ~ set time = time + IIl1clear -J."ep,' 
set funds = fUl/ds - C,,; 
~ 
set md = random number; 0 < rnd < 1; 
if (mri ~ PI!) 
set payoff = payoff + v"T,"'81\(tI//le-1); 
set til1le = time + nliclear_Tl'filt; 
else 
set payoff = payoff - q>"o"(tlll1e-l); 
, Conventional simulation "" 
~ 
while time < rou /Iris 
if (funds ~ Cc) 
runl conventional attack ~ 
e~ ~ 
set lillie = time + 1; 
setfllnds = funds + R; 
I , Conventional attack ~ set lime = time + 1; 
set fl/nds = funds - C,: 
set rnd = random number; 0 < nrd < 1; 
if (rnd ~ Pc) 
set payoff = payoff + lI·T/O"(tIIllC-l); 
else 
set payoff = payoff - q>"o"(hlllc-1), 
fllu tration B.2.: The programme structure in more detail (with p.eudocode). 
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- C - Some mathematics 
This chapter contains some mathematical support to our chapters. It is assumed 
throughout chapters 4 to 7 that the reader has a basic command of algebra and 
calculus, yet we provide below some support for reference to the less mathematicalh' 
inclined reader. Our goal can neither be completeness nor rigour, hence for a deeper 
understanding the reader should refer to one of the hundreds of undergraduate level 
calculus textbooks available, close to all of which will cover all contents of this 
appendix in much greater depth. 
We will focus on an intuitive understanding of the techniques employed rather than 
the algebraic implementation of these techniques themselves. For example, a graphical 
explanation of differentiation for finding local extrema is given, whereas the 
techniques for working out derivatives in practice are not provided. The below, thus, is 
not intended to provide the reader with the adequate mathematical background to 
perform the calculations presented (this would be too lofty an ambition for a mere 
appendix) but provide explanations which will hopefully suffice to aid the reader's 
understanding of the logic behind the treatment of the models. 
C.l Functions 
In our treatment of all models, we speak of the utility function. Let us therefore take 
an intuitive look at what exactly constitutes a 'function' (,utility' or otherwise). The 
'function' in mathematics is aptly named, for it is a close analogy to what we call a 
function in everyday life. A man's function is the action he does: the blacksmith 
transforms a lump of metal into a horse's shoe or a sword, a painter transforms paint 
and canvas into an artwork. Likewise, a mathematical function transforms one 
mathematical object (or a set of objects) into another object. It is often likened with a 
black box: you put something in and something else comes out the other end. 
Importantly, what comes out depends only on what you put in and on ho\\' the 
machine transforms the input. The function concept is extreme]:' general, but hen" \\'l' 
will only consider simple functions that transform one or two input numbers, or 
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scalars, into one output number. 
Let's look at a couple of simple examples. The cafe chain Costa is running its own 
charity providing education to children in third world countries. In May 2007, their 
money collecting boxes, found in all their cafes, read something like 'Costa will double 
all gifts collected in May'. Very commendable. This is a simple example of a function: 
the costumer gives £1, Costa transforms it into £2. The costumer gives £11.50, Costa 
transforms it into £23. More generally: the costumer gives x and Costa transforms it 
into 2x. If we call Costa's function f, we thus have f(x) = 2x. So the notation f(x) means 
the function f takes the variable x as input and gives you back the number f(x). In this 
case both x and fhave dimension money (measured in units of f). Generally, f and x will 
have different dimension. 
A function can take in more than one number, too. An example is the body mass 
index, widely used in medicine to determine if a person's weight is healthy. The bod~' 
mass index is defined as the weight, measured in kg, divided by the height, measured 
in metres, squared. Let the mass be m and the height h. Let the body mass index be B. 
Then, as the reader should verify, 
m B(m h)=-
, h 2 • (C.1) 
As dimensions go, m has dimension mass, h has dimension length and B has dimension 
mass per length squared. 
C.l.l A little note about dimensions 
We see that all variables need not be of the same dimension, nor does the function 
need to have the same dimension as any of its variables. But dimensions must be used 
consistently throughout all calculations. In our actual calculations in chapters -+ to 7, 
symbolised quantities are of only two different dimensions: money (such as costs, 
symbolised by e.g. C, T and cp with different subindices) and quantities with 1/(1 
dimension (simply numbers, or of 'dimension I', if you will - examples arc 
probabilities p, q and p, which are just numbers between 0 and 1). 
d d h· th same \\'J\' as In fact, dimensions can be thought of an treate muc In e 
I We wI·II demonstrate. Sl1Y the \'ariable .\! j..; l)f mathematical symbols themse ves. -
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dimension mass. Then a numerical value of M is not merelv a number: a unit of rna.;;.;; i.;; 
'" - - -
also required. Any mass unit will do (kg, lb, tonnes, you name it) but the number in A f 
will change according to what unit is used. Say we use kg, being the 51 unit. Then A1 = 
[a number] multiplied by [a unit]. For example: M = 5 ·kg: the number five multiplied bv 
the mass lkg. We normally omit the'· , between number and unit, but it is there 
nonetheless. Now let m = 8 ·kg. Then by the basic laws of algebra: 
m·M=(S·kg)·(S·kg)=40·kg2 and m+M=(S+S)·kg=13·kg and ~=~=~ 
M S·kg S 
Note how we treat 'kg' like any other algebraic factor. In the left expression, we changl> 
the order of multiplication (dimensions are commutative), in the middle expression, 'kg' 
is a common factor, so we can move it outside the parentheses (dimensions are 
distributive). Finally in the rightmost expression, 'kg' is deleted above and below the 
fraction, just like we would with another common factor. 
So what happens if we try to add together two numbers of different dimensions? 
Dimensions are then not a common factor and cannot be placed outside parentheses 
like in the middle above. We must conclude that we can never add (or, equivalently, 
subtract) quantities of different dimensions - it makes no sense to do so! 
C.2 Graphs and plots 
Once a function has been defined, such as f(x)=2x or B(m,h) in (C.l) above, we may 
plot the function (provided it takes no more than two variables as input) in an axes 
system. Figure C.l shows graphs of Costa's function (left) and B(m,h) (right). 
When a function takes two variables in, its graph must be made three-dimensional, 
like a landscape. In fact, a map of a terrain can be thought of as a function of two 
variables, latitude and longitude for example, and whose output is height above sea 
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Illustration C.l.: Examples offunctions: 'Costa function , (left) and BM! (right). 
C.3 The derivative: the slope of the function 
The next concept we introduce is the derivative of a function. For functions of a ingl 
variable, the derivative has a very simple interpretation: it is the slope of the function 
when it's drawn as a graph. Imagine we travel along the graph from left to right along 
the abscissa (that's the horizontal axis). Then the derivative is just how much uphill or 
downhill we travel; how many units we must go vertically for every unit we tray 
horizontall y. 
We will not go into how to work out the derivative of a function - the reader can 
find out from any calculus textbook. It is the intuitive interpretation we're intere ted in. 
The derivative of our Costa function, f(x) = 2x, is 
That df/ dx equals 2 is obvious from the graph to the left of C.l and our e planati n f 
the derivative: for every pound we move along the x-axis, we move 2 pound UP\; r 
on thef-axis1. Since our functionfwhen plotted with respect to x i a traight lin ,i t 
1 In the literature, one will often see used the terms x-axi and y-axi for th horizon tal and \ rtical 
ax s r spectively. This is a potentially mi leading conven tion when th \'~iabl do not .happ~n l~ b 
dubbed x and y (in our case the are x and J). A better el of name i absCIS"a for lh h nz nl 1 a I'> 
and ordin.ate for the ertical a is. 
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slope is constant - the number 2. 
Note the notation df/ dx, as it is used throughout our text; hmvever, when th 
function depends on a single variable, a shorthand notation is often u ed: df/ dx == j . 
Now regard the function drawn in figure C.2. We will call the function (x). T \' r 
mind its algebraic form for now - we regard it purely geometricall_ . The lop of th 
graph in anyone point is found by drawing a tangent to the graph. If th tan nt 
points uphill (when going from left to right) the derivative is positi e, if it point 
downhill, it is negative. From this it follows that when the tangent i perf ctly flat, 









Illustration C.2.: A graph of a function of one variable. 
We have marked the two places in the figure where the slope is zero. From thi it i 
obvious why we will call these points local extrema: the points where d / dx=O r 
either local minima or maxima of the graph2. 
So assume we have found a point at which a function has zero lope. Ho \,\' 
fun · f . I ariabl th rul i know if it is a minimum or a maximum? For a etlan a a smg 
simple (we will not show it here): 
2 
·th .. rna ima (f r ampl f{\)=X3 ha In fact on can have zero-slope point that are nel er rruruma nor . 
z ro lop at x=O, but ha no local minima or maxima), but w keep thlng~ Impl h r 
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d2 j 
if dx 2 >0 at the extremum then the extremum is a minimum 
d2 j if 0 h dx2 < at t e extremum then the extremum is a maximum. 
where the notation d 2/ dx2 means that f is differentiated twice with respect to x. The 
shorthand notation when f depends on a single variable, is f' In more graphic terms: if 
d2f/ dx2 > 0, it means that f(x) is concave up; if d2f/ dx2 < 0, it means that f(x) is concave 
down. From figure C.2 it is easy to verify that wherever the graph is concave up, a 
point of zero slope must be a local minimum, and the opposite if it is concave down. In 
the special case where d'i/ dx2 = 0, the test is inconclusive. 
C.4 Functions of two variables and the partial derivative 
When the function depends on more than one variable, the simple interpretation of 
slope when moving from left to right is not quite enough. Regard the BMI graph to the 
right of figure C.I, for example: how Isteepl the hill is for someone walking at some 
point on the graph depends which direction he is walking. 
This is why we need to generalise the derivative a little and introduce the partial 
derivative. A deep understanding of the difference between different kinds of 
derivatives is non-trivial and beyond our scope here. But it suffices for our simple 
purposes to explain in the following manner: When a function depends on more than 
one variable, the partial derivative is the derivative with respect to one variable, 
holding all others constant. 
Regard the graph of figure C.3, for example. It is, as we can see, a I hill I vvith a single 
maximum (the 'summit'). As is illustrated, the top of the hill may be found by finding 
the point on the hill where a plane that runs tangent to the point (the tangent plane) is 
perfectly flat. That is: whichever direction one walks on this plane, one walks in zero 
slope. On figure C.3 there is only one such point, but we can easily imagine different 
cases where there are several. The tangent plane is the 3D equivalent of the tangent line 






Illustration C.3.: A 3D graph with a single maximum. 
So how do we find such a plane? Obvious: the top of the hill is the only place wher , 
by walking in two different directions 'on the map', we find zero slope simultaneou I . 
In fact, as long as the two directions are not parallel or antiparallel3 to each other, an 
two directions will do the job. Nonetheless, two directions stand out in our graph a 
the natural choices lie along the the x-axis and y-axis. 
Suppose now we start at the point where y = 0 and x = 0.5 (right above the word 
'maximum' in the caption), and walk parallel to the y-axis, that is the direction 'in to th 
paper' more or less, following the landscape. First the slope is uphill, we com to th 
top of this path (not the top of the hill, however), and then it's downhill again on th 
other side. Now we claim: at the top of this path the following is satisfied: 
~: (x=OS)=O 
That is: the partial derivative of g with respect to y, taken at x = 0.5 i z r at th 
highest point of the path that comes from keeping x can tant at 0.5 \: hil varyin y. \t\ 
can do the same thing walking parallel to the x-a is at orne can tant valu f y, and 
3 i.. point in opposite direction 
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find another point which is the highest of that path. And so on and so forth. 
In order to find the highest point, however, we have a better method than such trial 
and failure. We will walk first along the y-axis (say) at some general and unspecified 
value of x, and find the highest point. This gives an equation involving x and y. Then 
we do the walk along the x-axis at some general value of y and do the same thing. \ \"e 
now have two equations in two variables and may solve them together to find the top. 
In figure C.3 it is found to be at x = y = 1. 
This is exactly the technique used in chapter 4, where our sport is to find the 
maximum of the antiterrorist's utility function (which, when plotted, might look a 
little like figure C.3). However, our application is not simply to find the summit: in our 
particular application, what exactly is the ideal spending level is not so interesting, 
since the model is so simple and our numbers so rough. Much more powerfulh', 
however, we can determine whether the planned spendings are too low or too high. 
We'll continue to use figure C.3 as example. 
Let us assume that we are trying to find the top of the hill of the figure, but that we 
are lost somehow and don't know where exactly we are (that is, our xy-coordinate) nor 
where the summit is. What do we do? Of course: we check the terrain and make sure 
that whatever we do, we move uphill! Then, at least, we are sure to be getting closer to 
the top, not further from it. 
This is just analogous to what we do in chapter 4. In chapter 4, we make rough 
estimates of some numbers. This allows us to use the equations we have developed to 
answer the following question: if we move along the x-axis (analogously: if we increase 
the value cp) are we then moving uphill or downhill (analogously: are we then 
increasing or decreasing the expected utility)? Likewise we determine which way is 
uphill along the y-axis. Thus we may determine very roughly which way to go and 
which way not to go in order to get closer to the top. This is called the method of Sft>l'/)l>~t 
ascent. 
For the advanced reader, we may mention that the optimal direction4 to be moving in 
the xy-plane in order to reach the top is given by the gradient of g(x,y) - a \'cctor in the 
4 This is not quite true. If one has knowledge of all derivatives of the function and it i~ analytical one 
can find the direction which will take one to the summit in a straight line. If the avaIlable I11t\lrmatiOn 
is the function value and its first derivatives, however, the gradient is the best direction one can find, 
and a first order approximation of the real optimal direction. 
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xy-plane given by 
D ( )-[fK £K] v g x I Y = B x I By . 
The gradient points in the direction in which g increases fastest. This technique is 
particularly useful in the case where a total expenditure level for both branches (HEU 
and plutonium for example, as in chapter 4) is constant, fixed at a time before the 
division is performed, and totals significantly less than the required sum that can take 
us from the status quo point (somewhere down the slope) to the summit itself. If thus a 
small spending C is given each year, say, the government might do well to each year 
estimate the derivatives involved and spend according to the ideal spending vector. 
c.s Summation of power series 
In this section the level of mathematical complexity is raised a little bit. It is a well 
known result that for a number 0 so that 0 < I 0 I < 1, 
(C.2) 
We use this in chapters 5 and 6 for calculating the sum of payoffs from infinitely many 
rounds, multiplicatively discounted. The formula is easily shown. We start by 
multiplying the sum by the factor (1-6). We then get a difference between two infinite 
sums in such a manner that all terms are cancelled save the first, and thus: 
OCJ (1-8) L 8i =(1 +8+82+83+84+ ... )-(8+82+83+84+ ... ) 
i=O 
=(1+6+#+#+~+ ... )-(6+#+#+~+ ... )=1, 
from which (C.2) follows easily. 
From (C.2), furthermore, it follows that if we sum instead from i = 1, 
OCJ . (OCJ.) 1 8 
". 81=" 81 -1=--1=-, ~ ~ 1-8 1-8 
1=1 1=0 
a result we also make use of. 
- 280 -
Finally, here's a trick I use in chapter 5. To understand how it works, the reader 
must be familiar with the basic rule of differentiation saying that 
Using this, we can evaluate sums where the summation index IS a factor In the 
summand, in some variation of the following example: 
Moving the differentiation operator outside the sum, notably, is not always allowed for 
infinite sums (the sum's convergence must be uniform, to use the correct language -
for explanation, see some university level textbook on calculus). But this is ok for 
power series like that above (so long as -1 < 0 < 1 and 01=0). 
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- D - Some thoughts on a 'Second Line of Defence' 
In the preceding chapters we have focussed on different parts of a terrorist nuclear 
project. In chapter 6 we discussed the planning phase where the terrorist decides 
whether to try for a nuclear option or not. In chapters 3 to 5 the challenge of acquiring 
fissile material for a weapon was the focus point and in chapter 7 I discussed the 
strategic considerations of a terrorist who has already obtained a finished weapon. 
However, there are intermediate stages of every project to build and detonate a nuclear 
weapon which are not considered in the research chapters of the thesis, namely the 
smuggling of material and the finished weapon, and the technical and logistical 
challenges of assembling the weapon itself. 
The tools available to a government to hamstring a nuclear project in progress at a 
time later than the acquisition of fissile materials are collectively dubbed the 'second 
line of defence'. The term spans a wide variety of different measures, typical examples 
of which could be intelligence and police work, radiation detection at border crossings 
and in harbours and airports, economic tools such as freezing of terrorists' assetsl, 
export control on nuclear and dual use equipmenf or even some mechanisms which 
are not directed towards terrorism specifically but could still get in the way of a 
successful execution of a terrorist plot. 
The issue of second layers of defence is not a central topic in this thesis and the 
analysis herein is but a brief discussion of how such measures may be thought of in 
light of the work of the preceding chapters. The present appendix was originalh' 
intended to become a research chapter, but with the publishing of Michael Levi's book 
On Nuclear Terrorism3 which I review below, whatever research effort I had undertaken 
on the question of second layers of defence could make only incremental additions to 
Levi's work, and it was deemed that while the work already done on the issue might be 
interesting reading for some, the level of novelty of the work was no longer sufficient 
1 e.g. Sidney Weintraub 'Disrupting the Financing of Terrorism' The Washington Quarterly 25:1 (2002) 
pp.53-60. 
2 James J. Wirtz 'Counter-terrorism via Counter-proliferation' Terrorism and Political Violence H:3 (2l1112) 
pp.129-140. 
3 Michael Levi On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, \1A: Harvard University Press, 2007) 
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for a research chapter. Hopefully the reader can nonetheless extract some interesting 
thoughts and ideas from the modest contributions in this appendix. 
The diversity of measures which form the second layer makes this part of the 
defence against nuclear terrorism in some ways more complex than the first layer of 
defence which focuses on hindering the spread of fissile materials. The comple:\it:. 
reflects the number of different paths a nuclear terrorism plot can take once the fissile 
material is secured (while no nuclear project can eschew the acquisition phase; a~ 
Allison puts it: 'it's a basic matter of physics: without fissile material, you can't have a 
nuclear bomb. No nuclear bomb, no nuclear terrorism'''). Possibilities are many at thi~ 
stage. The weapon can be assembled in the target country or somewhere else. The 
possible smuggling routes into any given country are many and diverse, and each of 
the large number of minor challenges which must be negotiated on the way to a 
workable weapon presents the terrorist with a set of options. The paths to the bomb is 
formalised diagrammatically below in figure D.l. 
D.I Second layers in literature and policy: a brief review 
The literature on nuclear terrorism has, at least until very recently, had a strong 
emphasis on the first layer of defence, and many experts have held that acquiring the 
necessary material is by far the most important obstacle to the nuclear terrorist. 
Ferguson and Potter, for example, suggest only safeguards-related measures in the face 
of terrorism with nuclear explosives, emphasising (in keeping with our conclusions 
from chapter 4) the importance of 'putting HEU first' in all priorities. 5 Allison's 
comment above indicates a similar view, although he admits that 'even the best efforts 
to secure weapons and fissile material may not achieve 100 percent success, and that 
some nuclear material may already be loose, we cannot rely exclusively on any single 
line of defense'.6 Maerli holds that the building of a gun design weapon7 is relatiyely 
'easy' compared to acquisition of fissile material in sufficient quantity 'which is a 
4 Graham Allison 'How to Stop Nuclear Terror' Foreign Affairs 83 (2004) p.64. 
5 Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (\lew York:Routledge, 
2005)* Chapter 7. 
6 Graham Allison Nuclear Terrorism:The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (;\lew York:Times Books, 2(\(1-+) 
p.199. 
7 See chapter 3. 
- 283 -
prerequisite and probably the most formidable obstacle to the production of nuclear 
weapons'B. 
As for interdicting a nuclear smuggling operation, Bunn, Wier and Holdren are 
amongst those who paint a bleak picture. Acquiring the material is the primary 
difficulty, they maintain, and 'once terrorists get or make a nuclear bomb, there is little 
to stop them delivering it to a US. city', leading to the immediate conclusion that fissile 
materials safeguards must be given the highest possible priority9. Several other 
analyses reach the same conclusionlO• 
Policy measures (by the US in particular) have apparently reflected a more positive 
view of the prospect of second layers. I will briefly look at some examples of us polic:' 
on a second line of defence. At the latest Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Conference, in 
2006, Thomas D. Lehrman of the US Department of State (DoS) presented his vision in 
which 'The United States must work together with partner nations and international 
organizations to develop a global layered defense against this threat. ill 
Lehrman mentions the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a loose co-operation 
between the US and some 75 countries providing the legal framework to aIIo\\' 
interdiction of transport of proliferation concern as a primary example of efforts this 
'layered defence' should encompass12. International naval law does not initially permit 
hindering the free passage of foreign ships on the high seas, one problem the PSI is 
meant to salvage by a network of bilateral agreements13. Lehrman's vision goes beyond 
interdiction, however:14 
Important as interdiction is, a comprehensive approach to combating 
WMD terrorism extends beyond interdiction capabilities. It involves 
8 Morten Bremer Maerli 'Relearning the ABCs: Terrorists and "Weapons of Mass Destruction'" The 
Nonproliferation Review (Summer 2000) p. 113 
9 M. Bunn, A. Wier and J.P. Holdren Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials report of the Project 
Managing the Atom (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 2003)' 
p.1S. 
10 See references in the following. 
11 Thomas D. Lehrman, Office of Strategic Planning and Outreach, DoS, 'Building a Layered DL'len~t' to 
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism', remarks to the ;--.JPT Conference, 
Washington College of Law (February 9, 2006)*. 
12 ibid. 
13 Andreas Persbo and Ian Davis Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security /Ilitiati,'e IIlld Ilze 
Law of the Sea (British American Security Information Council, 2004)*. 
14 Lehrman 'Building a Layered Defense ... ' 
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developing and deploying capabilities to prevent and deter the full 
range of linkages - transport, travel, communications, and financial _ 
between terrorists seeking WMD and their facilitators. 
Notably, safeguarding nuclear materials is nowhere mentioned as part of the 
'multilayered defense', possibly because it largely concerns nuclear weaponry, only one 
class of what Lehrman calls 'WMD'. 
The US has sought to aid the detection of nuclear smuggling abroad and 
domestically. Under its 'Second Line of Defense' programme, the US Department of 
Energy's (DoE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) had by 200b 
provided training and radiation detection equipment to 98 out of a planned 450 non-
US border crossings it recognises as most importane5• Caravelli, a former officer of the 
DoE nonproliferation efforts, grants the programme some success, but holds that in 
recent years DoE's efforts have been fumbled and mismanaged16, officers have been 
more interested in protecting their jobs than doing their work, Caravelli claims, and 
even accusations of deliberately misinforming Congress about the progress of the 
programme are made. Reporting from the ground on the border between Russia and 
Georgia where the NNSA has funded technologically sophisticated radiation detection 
equipment at a number of border crossings, Langewiesche all but ridicules the US 
efforts to secure foreign borders17. Langewiesche relates how the Americans have built 
extravagantly expensive border protection instalments (whose potential is far from 
fully utilised) near the main points of entry while neglecting the rest of the large border 
almost entirely. 
Under the DoE's 'Megaports' initiative and the US Customs and Border Protection's 
(CBP) 'Container Security Initiative' (CSI)lB, the US has made an attempt to 'push its 
15 Matthew Bunn Securing the Bomb 2007 report from Project Managing the Atom (Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 2007)* p.133 
16 Jack Caravelli Nuclear Insecurity (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008) pp.45-5H. ~imil.1r 
criticism has also corne from the Government Accountability Office Nuclear Nonproliferati01l: U.S 
Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordilzation and Plamli,,~ 
GAO-02-426 (May 2002)* 
17 William Langewiesche The Atomic Bazaar (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007) pp. 55-60. 
18 A similar programme which primarily targets transportation over land rather than sea containers. i~ 
the 'Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism' (C-TPAT), a voluntary programnw under whll"h 
exporters to the US are given benefits in exchange for adhering to a set of guidelines. Jon D. . 
Haveman, Howard J. Shatz, and Ernesto A. Vilchis 'U.S. Port Security Policy after LJ/ll: U\·enll'\\ 
and Evaluation' Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Mmzagcl1Iellt 2:-+ (2005) l\rtIcie 1. 
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borders out' by equipping foreign harbours with radiation scanning equipmentl9. The 
equipment installed focuses on identifying 'high risk' containers and scanning them 
before they are loaded onto ships bound for US harbours. A recent review concluded 
that these measures have much room for improvement both in identifying the right 
containers to scan and in covering the routes from the countries of greatest concern20. 
In the mock smuggling episode staged by ABC News described in section 3..1.3, a 6.8kg 
piece of depleted uranium was not detected although the container it was transported 
in was one of the small fraction which was scanned upon arrival in the US~I. 
Domestically, DoE plans to install some 3,000 radiation monitors at US points of 
entry by 2009 at a cost of $1.3B22. This programme was recently criticised for being 
based on umealistic expectations of detector performance23 • The fissile materials of 
interest to us - HEU and plutonium - are not particularly radioactive and are relativeh' 
easily shielded24. These problems were summarised succinctly long ago b!' Robert 
Oppenheimer; when asked by Congress in 1946 how a nuclear weapon on its way to 
New York smuggled in a crate might be detected, he replied 'With a screwdriver'.25 A 
19 Government Accountability Office (GAO) Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited 
Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports GAO-05-375 
(2005)*, see also Bunn and Wier Securing the Bomb 2006 report from Project Managing the Atom 
(Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 2006)* p.82. 
20 For an overview, see Jon D. Haveman, Ethan M. Jennings, Howard J. Shatz, and Greg C. Wright 'The 
Container Security Initiative and Ocean Container Threats' Journal of Homelalld Security alld Emergellcy 
Management' 4:1 (2007) Article 1. 
21 Depleted uranium (basically what is 'left' after the 235U isotope has been extracted in enrichment; 
almost entirely 238U) is somewhat less radioactive than HEU, but physicists at the National Research 
Defense Council, who provided the uranium, argued that HEU could easily be shielded to give a 
comparably detectable signal. Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter The Four Faces of Nuclear 
Terrorism (New YorkRoutledge, 2005)* p.141. 
22 Gene Aloise, Government Accountability Office (US) 'Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Challenges 
Facing U.S. Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in Other Countries and in the United 
States' testimony before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and Governmental Allcm-,. 
US Senate. GAO-06-558T (March 28, 2006) p.4 
23 Gene Aloise, GAO 'Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Decision to Procure and Deploy the ~k,t 
Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment Is Not Supported By Its Cost-Benefit Analysis' 
Testimony, GAO-07-581T (2007)* 
24 As previously noted, HEU has low activity of gamma radiation of low energy (186keV) which is . 
weakly penetrating and easily shielded. Plutonium's gamma signature is somewhat more penetratmg 
(640keV). Both emit neutrons from spontaneous fission but these are slow and harder to detl~t. Thl' 
alpha radiation from 240pU (a primary reason for plutonium's toxicity) will not even penetrate a ~Ill'l'l 
of paper. See Office of Nonproliferation Research and Engineering Technology R&D for :\nllS Control 
David Spears (ed.) (2001)*. 
25 Richard L. Garwin 'The Technology of Megaterror' Technology Revi(~((' 105:7 (Septe~ber 2(02)* p 1'-+ 
Oppenheimer led the nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos dunng World \ \ ar -
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recent task force report indicates that little has changed, saying 'Today, it ,,'ould be 
easy for adversaries to introduce and detonate a nuclear explosive clandestinel\' in the 
United Statesl.26 
The prospect of scanrung every container bound e.g. for the US is a daunting 
prospect. There are some 6,000 shipping ports in the world, some 700 of which ship to 
the US directly27. Expenses due to delays in the shipping current that would follow 
from scanning every freight container would be staggering. Even the most recentl~' 
developed detection system under development at Los Alamos and Idaho I'\ational 
Laboratories requires at least 2 minutes of scanning time per container28, and the 
systems actually deployed probably much more. The world's ten largest container 
ports had a collective throughput of some 162 million containers in 2007; Singapore 
alone shipped 28 million container units29• The cost of delaying a significant fraction of 
these containers just 2 minutes is staggering. 
The problem of interdicting smuggling is even larger, however. 'The number of 
pathways for smuggling a nuclear bomb or its ingredients into the United States is 
immense, I says Bunn and Wier, land intelligent adversaries will choose whichever 
route remains undefended'.30 The US for example (excluding Alaska and islands) has 
some 10,000km of border, 8,000 km of coastline31 as well as almost countless small 
ports and marinas for small boats. The quantity of HEU required for a gun design, 
some 50-60 kg, is easily transported in small private boats, cars and aeroplanes that 
may be rented almost anywhere. Concentrating on container ships seems analogous to 
the parable of the drunk who looks for his lost keys under the streetlight instead of 
26 Report of The Defense Science Board Task Force on Preventing and Defending Against Clandestine Nllclcar 
Attack (Washington D.C.:Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, 2004)* p.1. 
27 Bunn and Wier Securing the Bomb 2006 p.82. 
28 James L. Jones et al'Detection of shielded nuclear material in a cargo container' Nuclear In~lrumelll~ 
and Methods in Physics Research A 562 (2006) p.1087. The system is active, irradiati~g the container ~ith 
high energy photons (10 MeV) and counting gamma and neutron emission. PassIve methods (whIch 
only measure whatever particles radiate from an object without irradiation) are less ~otent and . 
require longer scanning times. The standard reference on passive detection methods IS Doug ReIlly cI 
al. (eds) Passive Nondestructive Assay of Nuclear Materials (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1 qq 1 ) 
(kindly lended to the author by Dr. Morten Bremer Maerli) 
29 Port of Rotterdam Port Statistics 2007 (2008)* p.14. 
30 Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier 'Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: Ho\\ Difficult?' The 
Annals of AAPSS 607 (2006) p.142 
31 Janice Ch. Beaver U.S. International Borders: Brief Facts (Congressional Research Service, 2006). 
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where he knows he dropped them: in a dark area. 
Despite these pessimistic reports, Michael Levi differs from his expert peers and 
emphasises in a recent book the importance of secondary defensive measures32. Le\-i's 
argument is twofold33 • Firstly, probabilities multiply. Levi agrees that each individual 
element of the large operation we dub the Isecond layer I may have a slim chance of 
successfully derailing the nuclear proliferation project when acting in isolation. A 
radiation detector at a border crossing may not detect the nuclear material, guards can 
be bribed and intelligence agents can be avoided by a tight-knit group. However, if a 
number of such measures must be passed one after the other, the probability that one of 
them will catch the terrorist is not so small. As Levi states it34 
This perspective turns a cliche about terrorism on its head. It has often 
been said that defense against terrorism must succeed every time, but 
the terrorist must succeed only once. This is true from plot to plot, but 
within each plot, the logic is reversed. Terrorists must succeed at every 
stage, but the defense needs to succeed only once. 
Say each element of a 'serial ' defence has a 10% probablility of success. Putting 10 of 
these elements together, the probability that the terrorist will be stopped in one of them 
is 65%, a much more agreeable figure which could well deter the rational terrorist from 
trying, as discussed in chapter 6. 
Levi's second argument extends this last point. For every part of the defence which 
the terrorist dodges, he may have to take some detour from the most direct 'route' 
which could make him vulnerable to some other part of a complete set of defence 
mechanisms acting together. To illustrate this point Levi uses an analogy from 
baseball. If the value of a baseball team were to be assessed by evaluating each player 
in isolation one would come to the conclusion that the whole team was useless and 
stood no chance. What would be the point of a right-fielder, for example, when the 
batsman could simply play to the left field? Such an assessment clearly makes no sense: 
to understand the value of each player he must be seen in relation to the rest of his 
team35• Transferring the analogy to nuclear smuggling, for example, the terrorist who 
32 Levi On Nuclear Terrorism 
33 For a more detailed review of Levi's book see Simen A. Ellingsen 'Rethinking the Second Line ()I 
Defense' The Nonproliferation Review (Summer 2008) To be published_ 
34 Levi 011 Nuclear Terrorism p_ 7 
35 ibid. p. 6 
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wishes to avoid radiation detection in US harbours by smuggling the material over the 
land border to Mexico could end up being apprehended by the immigration 
authorities, a measure not even intended primarily to stern terrorism. 
Levi in no way disagrees that a heavy emphasis on securing proliferation attractiyt' 
fissile materials is justified; on the contrary he argues that amongst the most important 
premises of a successful secondary defence is warning provided by the security and 
accountability measures in place where the fissile material is stored. Quite simply: the 
governments stand a very much better chance of regaining control over stolen material 
if they know it has been stolen, preferably shortly after the theft took place. 
D.2 A diagrammatic outline of the paths to nuclear terrorism 
When speaking of different 'layers of defence', it is useful to provide some \'isual 
examplification of what is meant. A suitable procedure is to look at the necessary steps 
a terrorist must take one way or another in order to acquire a nuclear capacity. Upon 
doing so, one finds that while options are many, there is a finite number of principle 
paths leading to this goal. I have outlined this in figure D.l including for completeness 
also the possibility for direct acquisition of a ready weapon from a national stockpile36• 
The diagram is a generalisation and extension of that provided by Bunn, Wier and 
Holdren a few years ag037. 
Figure D.l is largely self-explanatory. Perhaps its most fundamentally important 
trait is the limited number of ways via which a terrorist may acquire a nuclear bomb, 
and that each path involves a certain succession of steps to be taken. Some variation 
from that shown in the figure is certainly possible especially as regards the ordering (If 
the steps (some tasks can also be performed in parallel). Importantly, however, along a 
given path no step may be skipped38, meaning that if the terrorists are unable to manage 
even one of the tasks, they will have no bomb, in line with what Levi concluded. 
36 This option is included in our definition of nuclear terrorism in section 1.2, but is generally 
disregarded in this thesis for reasons of manageability of scope. 
37 Bunn, Wier and Holdren Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials p.2l. 
38 Note that there are thinkable ways the plot could unfold so that not all the points are relevant. 
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The first task, forming a capable group with extreme motives, may onJ b hind r d 
in the long run by addressing the root causes of terrorism itself, an int re ting and 
much researched field which lies outside the scope of this thesi . The n t pint, 
deciding to escalate to nuclear level of violence, may be addre ed thr u h m a ur 
towards deterrence, as understood and treated in chapter 6. Be ond thi pint, lh 
terrorists must be physically stopped from completing their ml ion. Th 'fir t lin 
defence' or 'safeguards' denotes all efforts to ph icall bl ck th t rr n t fr m 
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acquiring military nuclear weapons or fissile materials, such measures as are treated in 
great detail by Bunn and co-workers39. Any efforts to stop the terrorist project other 
than hindering their acquisition of weapons or fissile materials are commonl\' dubbed 
'second layers'. 
D.3 Value for money in second layers: the challenge 
In the following I will use Levi's understanding of second layers of defence as a 
premise and seek to outline how this frame of thinking could be coupled with the 
decision theoretical method employed in the research chapters of this thesis. A brief 
comparison with the efforts in chapter 4 shows that the case is somewhat similar in 
that an evaluation of second layers of defence involves finding a way to prioritisL' 
between different efforts which all cost money but improve security by some amount 
which can in principle be measured in dollar equivalents as reduced nuclear terrorism 
threat. A central question must then be how to evaluate the value for mone~7 of a 
particular branch of the second line of defence. 
In chapter 4 this was rather straightforward because there was a very limited 
amount of overlap between the security measures concerning HEU and that targeting 
plutonium. As for second layers, as we have seen, the situation is far more complex. 
Remembering the baseball analogy it becomes clear that measuring the success rate of 
each piece of the defence in isolation makes little sense and will certainly lead to an 
underestimation of the value of each part of the defence. 
In principle, the methodology explained in chapter 3 and exemplified in chapter .t is 
applicable to second line of defence measures as well, but the challenge of arri\'ing 
analytically at a reasonably realistic model, evaluate the corresponding utility function 
U and its dependency on the potentially large number of parameters at the 
government player's disposal, is formidable. 
The remainder of this chapter is a modest attempt to analyse very crudely the 
interplay between first and second lines of defence and outline possible approaches 
through which a thorough evaluation of second layers of defence may be undertaken. 
We start by devising and analysing a simple model of nuclear terrorism defenL-c,-, 
39 e.g. Bunn SCL'uring the Bomb 2007 
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followed by a short presentation of future directions and some early conclusions. 
D.4 A simple model of nuclear terrorism countermeasures 
To formalise these thoughts a little I'll introduce a very simple game similar to that 
used in chapter 4. For a further discussion of the various aspects of the analysis, see 
that chapter. The government first sets the spending levels for first and second layer 
defences, equal to C1 and C2 respectively, whereupon the terrorist player attempb to 
acquire necessary nuclear material for a simple device (either using HEU or plutonium 
- I will not distinguish explicitly between them here) and second to smuggle the 
material, build the device, smuggle it to its target and detonate it, following the steps 
on the right hand side of figure D.l. The terrorist (player T) is assumed to successfully 
acquire the material with probability p and to go successfully through all the secondary 
hurdles (building and transporting) with probability q. Unlike before, I cannot assume 
that these probabilities are uncorrelated, because there is an important correlation 
between the quality of safeguards measures and the likelihood that a theft is detected 
quickly, even if it is not stopped40. Thus I assume p=p(C) whereas q=q(C2lp), that is q 
depends on C1 as well through the probability p41. The game is shown in figure D.2. As 
before, circles denote either a choice node or end node, and the 'angle' symbols denote 
a choice from a continuum. I will use the notation 
a -a a-a a c = 1; ac = 2. 
1 2 
Similar to chapter 4 (and for the very same reasons as therein) we assume 
Furthermore, the better the first layer of defence, the better the second, so 
which implies that 
40 See Levi 011 Nuclear Terrorism pp. 98-123 
41 Note that this assumption differs from that made in chapter. 
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cq 
->-0 ap~ . 
The payoffs of the game are -C-T if the terrorist can pass both the first and the 
second layer of defence, otherwise it is -C, so the probability we need to establish is the 
that of the terrorist succeeding at both stages Here C = C + C d t th ttl f 
• 1 2 eno es e 0 a cost 0 
all defensive measures spent by the government player (G) and T is the estimated cost 
of a terrorist (player T) nuclear attack. Although p and q are now assumed to be 
correlated, the probability of a successful nuclear attack is still merely the product of 





Illustration 0.2.: A simple model of second layers. 
From figure D.2 we then readily get player GiS expected payoff as 
U=-C-pqT . (D.l) 
I will go through the now standard procedure of locating the maximum of the utility 
function with respect to C1 and C2 which is found where the derivatives of U with 
respect to both variables are zer043• This gives us two equations: 
42 Let A be the event that the terrorist successfully acquires sufficient fissile material and B be the 
probability that she is able to mount an attack. With basic statistics this gives the probability that both 
events happen as P (A AB) = P (BIA)P (A)=P (B) P (A) =qp as before because by the law of 
total probability p(BIA)=P(B)-P(BIA:)=P(B) . Here a bar means 'not'. That 
P (B I A) = 0 is another way of saying as Allison does: 'No fissile material, no nuclear weapon' ( ... l'l' 
footnote 4). 
43 Strictly, this must be checked. I assume as usual that p" ~ 0 and q" ~ 0 so the sufficient criterion is that 
a/u;aC2 ~ 0 and a/u;aC2 ~ 0 are fulfilled evey\,\,,,here, hence a critical point is a maximum. 
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(-p ')(q+p ~q )=~ 
cp T (D.2) 
(D.3) 
Although the analysis is extremely simple, (D.2) and (D.3) could be useful in their 
simplicity, because their significance is easily interpreted: if player G's best estimatL'~ 
indicate that (-p')(q+p·oq/op) > 1fT, it means that safeguards efforts are underfunded 
while (-p')(q+p·oq/op) < 1fT means the opposite: safeguards receive more money than 
can be defended in terms of threat reduction. Likewise for second laver efforts: I>' in 
place of '=' in (D.3) means too little money, '<I means too much. 
The quantity (-02q) may be said to be the 'value for money' of all second layer efforts 
while it is not entirely obvious exactly what the value for money for safeguards 
measures is here; setting it at (-p') will somewhat underestimate the value since the 
positive effects for the second layer are then not taken into account. A better measure 
of 'value for money (which I denote _Pi) is the left hand side of (D.2) divided by q: 
(-P ') (-p ')(1 +E.0I),.....,value formoneyspenton safeguards. 
q 8p (DA) 




In order to make practical use of these formulae, one must be able to establish 
estimated values of the symbols involved. This is a difficult task even when all 
secondary measures are seen as a whole, yet more troubling perhaps is the fact that 
rather than regarding the second layer of defence as a single entity, a government will 
need a tool with which to evaluate each element of this highly comp\c:\ defensive 
effort. Making a single gaming representation for each element of the defence will 
underestimate the value as Levi argues. 
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D.4.1 Tentative numerical example 
My ambitions are modest here, but I find that even a very tentative numerical 
exercise can add valuable insight into the above. In section .fA I used the highly 
approximate measure (-p')~3%/$lB for the US efforts to secure nuclear materials 
abroad, based roughly on a progress report by Bunn and Wier44 • Here, let the \ralue for 
money I quantity (D.4) take that tentative value. Furthermore, let us - again \'l:,ry 
tentatively - use a damage estimate of T = $1,000,000,000,000 (one trillion dollar~). I 
found in section 4.4 that a less conservative estimate indicates a true cost of an attack 
with a ~10kT device in a major city might rather be -3 trillion dollars, but one must 
bear in mind that the estimate used here encompasses the probability that the bomb 
may have a yield dramatically smaller than this (a Ifizzle'45 ). 
With these numbers one finds that the value of q corresponding with an ideal Ic\'el 
of spending on safeguards measures would be qideal=[(-pl)TP~3.3%, as seen from (D.5). 
This is probably lower than the real probability even in light of Levi's optimistic 
analysis (clearly such an estimate must necessarily have a large uncertainty), although 
some experts (see review above) will almost certainly argue that this is on the lo\\' 
side46 . Note how a larger value of T (which is possibly underestimated here) vvilI 
decrease qideal, while a smaller pi will increase it. If, after a more elaborate estimation 
process than I have gone through, finds that qideal is indeed significantly lower than the 
actual value of q as estimated by the government player, it means that more money 
should be spent on safeguards. I believe it more than arguable that this conclusion 
would be correct based on the above figures. Notice that the value of the second term 
between parentheses in (D.4) which represents the positive effect of improved 
safeguards on secondary measures, could be significant and tends to further strengthen 
this conclusion, in line with what Levi emphasises47• 
Mathematically, a similar analysis could be made for secondan' measures as a 
whole, yet the complex nature of these defences mean that such an effort may not be 
44 Bunn and Wier Securing the Bomb 2006, 
45 See chapter 3 for details . 
.t6 Remember I used a 2-10% estimate for the product of p and q in chapter 7, in accord'1l1~l' \\'ith . 
Matthew Bunn 'A Mathematical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism' The Anllals (Jl the AAP.)S 607 
pp.103-120 (2006) 
47 Levi On Nuclear Terrorism Chapter 5. 
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very helpful. Estimating a 'value for money' for secondary measures as a whole i5 of 
limited interest, since this value will depend strongly on exactly how the mone~' i~ 
spent48 and provides no help with the equally important question of how best to 
organise and prioritise the different elements of the 'second line' optimallv. 
Nonetheless the guiding principle for evaluating the second layer must in principle 
be the same as for safeguards measures, that the money that go into improvement' 
should always be spent so as to maximise threat reduction per monetary unit, that i~, in 
such a way that each dollar (say) makes the greatest difference possible. This should be 
the guiding principle behind any effort to analyse the value of second layers of defence 
quantitatively. Devising a good way to ensure this in a useful way, ho\\'e\'er (as 
opposed to evaluating the feasibility of second layers as a whole), is a large and 
complex task which lies beyond the scope of this thesis (indeed, it could well form (1 
thesis worth of research in itself). I will restrict myself to pointing out a direction in 
which future efforts could be directed. 
D.S Outlook: Optimum funding and organisation of of the 'second 
line of defence' 
In this section I will only provide a few paragraphs of outline of an enterprise \\'hich 
could form a suitable task for one or several PhD theses, namely the devising and 
analysing of a model to aid optimising the funding and operation of second layers of 
defence against nuclear terrorism. The methodology will be principally identical to that 
made use of in chapters 5, 6 and in particular 4 of this thesis, which consists in 
principle of 3 steps: 
1. Make a model of the situation which takes account of the (most) relL'\'ant 
interactions which 
a. Minimises the number of free parameters to be determined for 
manageability, but... 
b. ...is still complex enough to capture the essence of the situation modelled, 
11 F 1 't matters whether one safeguards 48 The same is true for safeguards measures as we , or examp e, 1. . . . d 
uranium or plutonium as concluded in chapter 4, However, the vanous mlW .. Ufl'-' \\ hlch -,prtfun er 
, f 1 d' th are those of the '.;('(ond Imt' 0 
'safeguards' as the term is used herem are ar ess Iverse an . 
defence'. 
- 296 -
2. Work out, either analytically or (more likely in case of I . 
a comp ex proJect) 
numerically the utility function of the government player as a function of the 
modelling parameters. 
3. Find a suitable method to 
a. optimise the utility system with respect to the free parameters and ... 
b. . .. analyse the dependency on the various parameters so as to gain a better 
and more general understanding. 
I will discuss these points briefly one by one. 
In the relatively simple cases analysed in chapters 4, 5 and 6, devising a model was 
fairly straightforward, and yet a fair amount of judgement had to be applied in the 
process. There are no general prescriptions available as to how to determine what the 
essential interactions are, so the modelling must be based on a qualitative discussion, 
and the approach may differ from case to case. Doubtless, some will find that 
important aspects of the situation studied in those chapters are missing or could havc 
been represented better. 
The task of modelling is much more complex when considering secondary layers of 
defence, however. As Levi argues, in order to evaluate one element of the defence, the 
interactions of that element with the rest of the second line (which may be defined so 
as to include measures not directed at nuclear terrorism or even conventional 
terrorism) must be taken into account. A fruitful approach could be the tools available 
in the field of network modelling49. The second layer of defence could thus be modelled 
somewhat crudely as a physical network of defensive mechanisms and with the paths 
to nuclear terrorism having to pass nodes of this network. 
The utility function of such a network model is in principle possible to lind 
analytically, but will probably be much too complicated for symbolic analysis such as 
that undertaken in the present thesis to be fruitful. There are however a number of 
numerical approaches available from the literature on optimisation tlzc()r~;o, commonly 
49 See e.g. Nigel Gilbert and Klaus G. Troitzsch Simulation for the Social SciCli ti~1 2nd ed. (;\lew York: 
Open University Press, 2005) Chapter 3. 
50 There exists a number of textbooks in this field. One good introductory textbook is Hubertus Th 
longen, Klaus Meer, and Eberhard Triesch Optimization Theory (\Jew York: Klu\\·er :\(,llil'mic 
Publishers, 2004) 
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used in engineering subjects. One such method has already been used in this th >"._ 
_ t _ b, 
namely the 'method of steepest ascent/ descent' reviewed in section -1-.2.1, where the 
(multidimensional) gradient of the utility function is calculated in a given state of the 
world which points in the direction in which U increases most rapidly. Optimisation i~ 
then performed by taking incremental steps in the direction of the gradient and re-
evaluating the gradient (numerically) for each step. More sophisticated methods are 
also available to improve convergence51, but a complete survey is beyond the scope of 
this section. In simpler models the combination of an explicit (albeit complicated) 
utility function and optimisation theory could form a potent approach in attacking thi~ 
complex task. 
Perhaps a more realistic approach of purely numerical nature is the use of multi-
agent models52• In this approach each element of the second layer is simulated <15 one 
or more agents, that is, it is given 'a mind of its own'. Rules are specified dictating how 
each agent interacts with other agents. The terrorist player is made an agent as well 
with explicitly ordered preferences and a goal to successfully execute a nuclear plot 
from materials acquisition to detonation. A degree of randomness is introduced 
governing the chances of 'defence agents I stopping the terrorist. Such an approach will 
effectively perform step 2 and 3 above together and the analysis of parameters will be 
entirely implicit and numerical rather than explicit and symbolical as was the case in 
our simple models in previous chapters. 
D.6 Some early conclusions 
Second layers of defence against nuclear terrorism have been treated to some extent 
in a large number of publications on this issue, yet has rarely been the foclIs of 
attention. The conventional wisdom has been that once the fissile materials are in 
terrorist hands, a target government's means to derail the terrorist attempt to acquire 
nuclear explosives are severely limited, and that for this reason emphasis should be on 
securing the fissile materials in the first place. In a recent book, ho\\'cn'r, \ lichael Le\·i 
disputed this pessimism, and while agreeing with the importance of s<1Ieguard", 
51 See e.g. Jongen et.al Optimization Theory. . 
. . /.. t· t defer 'nct''' tht'rt'ln 52 See e.g. Chapter 8 of Gilbert and Troitzsch Simuiatiollll1r the SOCIa ::'01'11 1:- an r l:. . 
- 298 -
introduced a framework within which one can argue that second layers of defence are 
not as futile as formerly portrayed. 
A further inquiry into the consequences of Levi's framework for practical polin' 
prioritisation appears warranted, and would seem to provide fertile ground for future 
research on nuclear terrorism defences. Herein I propose a very general scheme by 
which the decision theoretical (economical) tools employed in this thesis may be united 
with Levi's concept to arrive at more detailed recommendations for optimal 
government of second layer efforts. 
I conclude, similar to previous chapters, that the deciding quantities when 
evaluating the balance of second layers versus safeguards, as well as between different 
elements of both layers of defence, are the threat level (most prominently: probability 
of terrorist success) and value for money (probability reduction per monetary unit). 
Two simple formulae are derived giving, provided numerical estimates of the 
quantities involved, a guideline for the relative emphasis between first and second 
layer measures, taking into account the positive synergies of good material accounting 
system for the success of secondary measures. This is, however, merely the beginning 
of what should be a thorough investigation of this important topic, possibly suitable 
for a future PhD. 
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